Tag: Westminster

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Unfit for Hansard?

By Charlie Feldman.

“In the circumstances, both sedentary remarks will be removed from the permanent record.” – Mr. Speaker, Commons Chamber, 14 January 2008.

The official record of debates, Hansard, is relied upon as the authoritative record of what was said in Parliament. As Erskine May explains, citing a parliamentary committee’s report, “though not strictly verbatim, [it] is substantially the verbatim report, with repetitions and redundancies omitted and with obvious mistakes corrected, but which on the other hand leaves out nothing that adds to the meaning of the speech or illustrates the argument’.

While research demonstrates that remarks have been expunged from Hansard in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the UK story appears largely unexplored. This matter was recently raised in the Commons when a Member rose on a point of order suggesting she had been censored given a divergence between her remarks as recorded in Hansard and what is heard on the audiovisual recording,

Those who listen closely to a debate and read it later in Hansard will spot modifications, including the removal of words such as deleting ‘Mr. Speaker’ at the beginning of a contribution. There are numerous conventions around what will be included in the Official Record. In the recent case, the rule strictly applied related to omitting remarks continued after the Speaker calls a member’s speech to a close. Pure Hansard expungements at Westminster are few and far between.

The quote that began this post is from an incident in 2008 in which the sedentary interjection “absolute b******s” (without asterisks) was removed by decision of the Speaker after a point of order. The original Hansard attributed it to an MP who was reportedly incensed as it was another MP who made the remark. In the context of the remark being from a sedentary position and with an unclear (and possibly misattributed) interlocutor, the Speaker removed it. Of note, while considered a swear word, “b******s” in full does appear printed in other debates, including as far back as 1986. (In a contrasting incident, one Speaker is suggested to have edited out his own fleeting use of four-letter profanity from Hansard 1989; ITN bleeped the remark in its airing of proceedings).

If one goes far back, much is missing from Hansard. As explained in The History of Hansard, one of the critiques from the period before official Hansard began (prior to 1909) concerned “some parliamentarians’ speeches being shortened or even suppressed”. While those speeches were missing from the record deliberately, some later interventions in the official era are missing unintentionally. Luckily, technological evolution has helped insofar as one no longer sees Hansard stating that a member “made an observation which was not heard in the Reporters’ Gallery.” In one sitting in 1916, for example, inaudible observations are indicated on four occasions – one of which is attributed to the Prime Minister in responding to a question. Chamber acoustics have long been an issue – an 1849 article in The Spectator begins “If there is any one point settled in history, it is that the House of Lords is the worst place for hearing in the known world.”

Focusing on the official reporting era, press reports of removed Hansard content tell us that times of war saw significant expungement. In an article published in the Sunday Dispatch of 25 August 1946, Britain’s Chief Press Censor – George Pirie Thomson – tells of edits from speeches in the House during World War II for various security reasons. MPs, it seems, often crossed the line accidentally, including then PM Winston Churchill. The censorship went further, however, as Thomson revealed censoring a parliamentary question and even working with the Speaker to change the title of a bill!

Security concerns also prompted edits during World War I. Newspaper reports tell us that in a speech given by Sir William Alfred Gelder in August 1916, he accidentally named a town when speaking to what appears now in Hansard as concerns over anti-aircraft guns being “taken away from a certain city on the East Coast”. The debate in the Hansard that follows does not reflect what press reports suggest – that another MP rose on a point of order that the location information potentially helped the enemy. While Gelder wasn’t so sure, the Speaker suggested he speak to the Editor of Hansard. As no location appears in Gelder’s remarks, it may be safe to assume the expungement occurred; the press reports it outright as being removed.

Members have on occasion asked for something to be removed from Hansard. Sir William Darling rose in debate in 1951, recorded as follows: “[T]he right hon. Gentleman, in the debate the night before last, said that I was asleep, and as this statement by him is likely to cause dissatisfaction to my constituents, who probably look upon me as a watchful and wakeful Member, may I ask what steps I can take to have it expunged from the record?” The Speaker said he would consider the matter. It’s unclear if anything actually changed — the relevant debate portion reads “Members opposite are not enthusiastic about remaining throughout the night. Some of them are already going off to sleep—look at the hon. Member for Edinburgh, South (Sir W. Darling). [Interruption.]” 

Controversies have erupted over whether certain changes to the record crossed the line into changing the meaning of a speech or suppressing content. In 1998, for example, the Speaker found that words removed from the Hansard record of a speech from PM Tony Blair did not alter his meaning. No further action was taken. In another case, what was removed from Hansard was reinserted. In 1966, the Speaker reported that the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s edit “was accepted by the reporters, but, after discussion with the Editor of the OFFICIAL REPORT, both he and I are satisfied that it ought not to have been accepted by the reporters; and the passage, in its original purity, will appear in its original form in the Bound Volume.” The Chancellor, who removed words that might be considered a slur upon farmers, later told the Commons: “I deeply regret that I struck those words out of HANSARD”.

Alas, not everything a MP may have wished to remove from Hansard disappears. In 1978, MP Andrew Faulds told the House “Unfortunately, I cannot expunge the offensive words, but I have already written to the right hon. Member for Knutsford apologising to him, and now I wish to extend my apology to you, Sir, and to the House for my regrettable lapse.” To this day his comments remain on the record, wherein he referred to another member as a “fat-arsed twit”.

These examples, while few in number, show that Hansard is not always the immutable record it is sometimes assumed to be. Whether due to acoustics, editorial discretion, wartime censorship, or parliamentary sensitivities, the official transcript has been shaped by forces beyond the spoken word. In exploring these moments of omission and revision, we are reminded that even the most authoritative records are, at times, curated ones.

About the author

Charlie Feldman is the former President of the Canadian Study of Parliament Group. His forthcoming book “Parliamentary” (University of Toronto Press, 2026) chronicles unexpected moments in Canadian parliamentary history.

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The Hidden Engine of Stability and Growth: Strong Parliaments

By Franklin De Vrieze.

Democratic legislatures are on the frontline of both domestic and international challenges. From executive overreach to authoritarian influence and deepening public mistrust, parliamentary institutions around the globe are under immense strain. The strengthening of parliaments therefore is both a critical safeguard for democracy and a lever for economic development and national security.

Many countries have an imbalance in the distribution of power between the different branches of government: the executive branch dominates, with legislatures left under-resourced, side-lined, or compromised. This concentration of power undermines democratic accountability and weakens institutional checks and balances. People lose faith when they perceive their parliaments as ineffective or complicit, and public trust falls. As executive dominance expands, legislatures struggle to perform their essential roles: representing the electorate, scrutinising the government, and shaping inclusive legislation. Without timely intervention, this democratic erosion is difficult to halt.

Early and strategic support to parliaments is therefore essential for democratic resilience and institutional recovery.

For donor countries, supporting parliamentary strengthening abroad is not merely altruism. It serves strategic interests. Democratic, transparent, and accountable institutions form the backbone of stable governance. In doing so, they promote investment-friendly environments, reduce risks of conflict and the drivers of irregular migration, climate-driven or otherwise, and create socio-economic opportunities that deter brain drain.

Here’s an example of how targeted parliamentary support can have a tangible impact: Albania’s recent reform of its gambling legislation. Using Westminster Foundation for Democracy’s (WFD) corruption proofing of legislation methodology, Albanian legislators assessed legal loopholes and improved transparency in regulating a high-risk industry. This effort resulted in a tighter legal and regulatory framework which reduces the potential for corruption, and that in turn provides necessary reassurances for foreign investors to embark and invest.

The example shows how donor-supported technical interventions can reduce incentives for corruption and improve the legal and economic framework. Addressing legislative vulnerabilities in this way enhances institutional integrity, promotes economic stability, economic partnerships and investments, and reinforces the rule of law.

Similarly, WFD’s work on the cost of emigration in the Western Balkans has helped to galvanise cross-party action in national parliaments in the Balkans to address the causes of brain drain and address the negative economic impacts of youth emigration.

Strategies for parliamentary strengthening

Parliamentary strengthening programmes can only be effective when they are locally-led, responding to locally-defined problems and based on genuine, trusted partnerships. Building upon this basic fact, parliamentary strengthening is most effective when approached through a range of strategies.

  • Regional and multi-country programming can create synergies, such as those achieved through post-legislative scrutiny (PLS) efforts in Zambia, where laws on food security were assessed for their impact in the context of climate change.
  • Thematic approaches, like the drafting of public debt legislation in Kenya, help parliaments tackle critical policy areas with precision. Upscaling the role of parliaments in climate governance, essential to ensure that it is transparent, inclusive and informed by social justice principles and thus resilient in the face of unprecedented levels of climate disinformation, is currently the focus of WFD’s work with the Parliament in Indonesia, for instance.
  • Promoting inclusion and engagement, like fostering youth participation in North Macedonia, and enhancing citizens engagement in the Maldives further increase legitimacy and democratic depth.
  • Mutual learning also plays a transformative role in parliamentary strengthening. Peer-to-peer exchange between legislatures in the Global North and South allows for reciprocal knowledge transfer and innovation. These exchanges have already catalysed improvements in parliamentary procedures, transparency, and administration.
  • Moreover, many parliaments are embracing digital transformation, using technology to improve legislative tracking, citizen engagement, and policymaking, as seen in countries like Kenya and Morocco.

Strengthening parliaments is one of the most cost-effective and sustainable interventions to bolster democracy, foster inclusive economic development, and safeguard stability and security. It is time for a renewed commitment to a standards-based approach to parliamentary development, one that is principled, context-sensitive, and collaborative.

Delving deeper

If you are interested in delving deeper into parliamentary strengthening, WFD has been involved in producing a number of efforts and initiatives to inform and guide parliamentary strengthening efforts. I invite you to explore them:

The Global Community of Practice on Post-Legislative Scrutiny, the peer-to-peer network of the Inter Pares project, and the Agora parliamentary portal offer collaborative platforms for sharing experiences, best practices, and innovations as well as helping to build and sustain momentum. Through the network of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), Public Accounts Committees in Asia-Pacific aligned strategies and working methods at a regional workshop hosted by the Fiji Parliament. The AFRIPAL conference recently launched the African Association of Legislation. These networks help parliaments navigate complex challenges together, amplifying the impact of support and creating a shared commitment to democratic governance.

The Common Principles for Support to Parliaments, developed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in cooperation with WFD and others, emphasise that effective support must be guided by parliaments’ own needs, adapted to local contexts, and focused on long-term sustainability. Inclusive of all political orientations, grounded in international democratic norms, and attentive to gender equality and local expertise, these principles provide a shared roadmap for meaningful and ethical engagement.

The Indicators for Democratic Parliaments, were launched by the IPU with the support of WFD and other partner organizations. These 25 indicators, aligned with Sustainable Development Goals 16.6 and 16.7, enable parliaments to assess their own performance across effectiveness, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, inclusivity, participation, and representation. Each indicator includes detailed dimensions and criteria, offering a comprehensive yet practical self-assessment tool. In Pakistan, the use of these indicators served as a SWOT analysis of the Senate, while in Albania, the assessment culminated in a new Open Parliament Action Plan.

The WFD Guidelines for AI in Parliament have gained global traction in advising on an ethical and step-by-step approach to the use of AI in parliamentary proceedings.

About the authors

Franklin De Vrieze is the Head of Practice Accountability for the Westminster Foundation for Democracy

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The benefits of bringing academics and practitioners together: Writing the second edition of Exploring Parliament

By Cristina Leston-Bandeira, Alexandra Meakin and Louise Thompson.

The following blog post is about Exploring Parliament, which was published by Oxford University Press in April 2025 and will be launched at the Institute for Government on 15 May 2025. You can sign up to watch online here.

Over the last three years we have been working with a fantastic team of 38 academics and 35 parliamentary practitioners to create the second edition of the Exploring Parliament textbook. Like its predecessor, the book has collaboration at its very heart. The chapter topics stem from a roundtable discussion between academics and officials at the PSA’s Annual Conference back in April 2022 and wherever possible academics were paired with practitioners in order to write each chapter. Our aim was to create a fresh perspective on a wide range of aspects of the UK Parliament, including its relationship with the devolved parliaments; one which was grounded in key academic concepts and research, but enriched with the real-life details that only those who walk the corridors of Westminster can provide.

In this blog post, we reflect on the process of creating this new edition. We asked a small group of our contributors how they found the experience of working on the book and the benefits for academics of working with practitioners, and vice versa.  

Putting a spotlight on less studied aspects of Parliament

Some of our authors were returning contributors who had previously written in the first edition of the textbook, while others were new to the process.  Although our academics tended to write on topics which they have researched for a long time, our practitioners appreciated the chance to explain how parliament works to a different type of audience and to include examples which students may not have heard about before. In particular, those writing on the devolved parliaments highlighted the utility of a book which appreciates that Westminster works alongside other devolved institutions:

 “it was an opportunity to explain Parliament’s work—particularly the House of Lords—using examples that students and other readers may not have come across before” (Rosanna Barry, House of Lords)

“So often books, reports and studies on parliament in the UK focus on the UK Parliament alone, forgetting that the UK has four legislatures… As someone working in a devolved legislature it can be a frustrating experience to read work that doesn’t reflect your own experience or makes recommendations and conclusions that aren’t relevant or practical in a devolved or sub-nation state context…The opportunity to write a chapter about the work of parliaments in the UK from a devolved perspective, albeit on a UK-wide issue wasn’t something we couldn’t pass up. Any chance to raise awareness of the work of the four different legislatures in the UK is really welcome” (Nia Moss, Senedd)

“At times, textbooks on British politics tend to be quite Westminster centric and I was actually very happy to see how a book and Westminster Parliament itself considers the wider context, which I think is very important” (Prof Diana Stirbu, London Metropolitan University)

Collaborations between academics and practitioners

Academics and practitioners work in roles with very different expectations around the research and writing process. Practitioners for instance tend to write in a more factual style, in a much faster paced environment with shorter deadlines. Academics on the other hand typically have a much longer writing process and are more used to explaining concepts to a student audience.  Bringing the two groups together was an enjoyable experience (for most!), adding a fresh dose of reality to the academics’ writing and allowing practitioners the chance to write for a very different type of audience:

“The combination of academics and Parliament practitioners is a great one, as it combines our political science with a sense of how things really are. My co-author was also a quants whizz with a great head for figures, so could help me on that, where I am (erm) not so expert.” (Ben Worthy, Birkbeck)

“It was a great experience: we brought different skills, perspectives and experiences to the process and that meant we worked really well together as we could complement each other’s way of thinking and working. I feel like I learnt a lot!” (UK Parliament official)

“Working on this chapter was a change of speed. Initially we had a long time to produce a first draft, followed by shorter more intensive bursts of effort during the editing process.” (Rosanna Barry, House of Lords)

 “Although I probably write tens of thousands of words a year in my role in the Senedd, none of these words are particularly ‘academic’. I think I used the phrase ‘I’m not an academic’ more times in conversations with the book’s editors, as a means of forewarning them, than they’ve ever heard before. … We work in a fact paced environment where you have moved on to probably the ten ‘next things’ you need to do before what you worked on last week was even published. We’re busy dealing with the next issue on our desk before we have had time to reflect on last week’s problem. Being forced to take a step back and really reflect on the issue, the work that’s been achieved and the challenges that remain was a privilege I don’t often get afforded and it’s what I enjoyed most” (Nia Moss, Senedd)

“I learned such a lot from [my co-author] about the procedures and protocols and about how the conventions work in practice.” (Ruth Dixon, University of Oxford)

“not being too precious about one’s own writing was helpful. We allowed each other to keep and toss content and re-draft, as this is where there seems to be a lot of difference in how academics and practitioners write” (Ekaterina Kolpinskaya, University of Exeter)

Writing in an accessible manner

Textbooks require a very different type of writing to standard academic journal articles or parliamentary briefings. Both groups of authors needed to think about how to condense what were often very broad topics into short, succinct chapters which provided enough description to explain how processes work, but also contained some analysis of why things happen and the impact they have:

“Bearing in mind that this is a textbook, it was a useful discipline to stick to explaining clearly the normal course of events, without quibbles or little-used variations or historical footnotes” (Liam Laurence-Smyth, House of Commons)

“It’s easy to get lost, especially with something like trust in politics, which is hugely complex and nuanced. My co-author was great at picking out the key drivers, nature of the problem and possible solutions. They helped keep me out of what my teacher at A-levels called the ‘waffle bog’, a place where I find myself far too often.” (Ben Worthy, Birkbeck)

What worked well was being able to reflect on our practical and ‘real world’ experience of how interparliamentary relations is working on the ground. It really helped to focus on what the key message/story of the chapter should be. It hopefully helped to ensure that those reading it will get a real sense of what the genuine issues from people working on the issue day in and day out are rather than just a theoretical perspective.” (Nia Moss, Senedd)

The ongoing relevance of the book in the 2024 Parliament

The book was written shortly before the 2024 General Election and as such the case studies used are from previous Parliaments. Nevertheless, it has quickly become apparent how relevant the book’s themes are in the current Parliament:

“In some senses, 2024 was the ultimate trust (or distrust) election, so the chapter speaks to how the government faces in huge challenge, in somehow winning back or convincing hugely distrustful and cynical voters, against some very strong anti-elite, anti-system head winds. Can a government win back trust (relatively quickly) by delivering on promises? And what happens if they don’t?” (Ben Worthy, Birkbeck)

“Private Member’s Bills became a hot topic at the end of 2024 when the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill was introduced by backbencher Kim Leadbeater.  We had already completed our chapter by the time the bill was introduced, but I think that our explanation of the stages of a PMB will help anyone trying to understand the complex procedures.” (Ruth Dixon, University of Oxford) 

“Our chapter is relevant for the 2024 parliament as it sets the scene of multilevel presentation and parliamentary activity across the UK. It is important for all MPs and especially to new MPs to be aware of the broader parliamentary context across the UK, to understand the differences and similarities between the different systems” (Prof Diana Stirbu, London Metropolitan University)

“Our chapter also speaks strongly to the principles and core aspirations of the ongoing efforts to make Parliament more accessible – for politicians, other passholders and visitors – both as part of the R&R programme and through the efforts of the Modernisation Committee and the work of the Speaker’s Office” (Ekaterina Kolpinskaya, University of Exeter)

“One of the Modernisation Committee challenges in the 2024 Parliament is to improve accessibility by demystifying parliamentary language. My chapter, and Exploring Parliament as a whole, is committed to bringing clarity to the inevitable complexity of legislative activity.” (Liam Laurence-Smyth, House of Commons)

It has been a real privilege to edit the second edition of Exploring Parliament. We have had the opportunity to work with a fantastic set of authors who have demonstrated the real value in bringing academics and practitioners together. We echo the views of one of our contributors who told us that “it was genuinely one of the most enjoyable things I did last year”.

About the authors

Cristina Leston-Bandeira is Professor of Politics at the University of Leeds. Alexandra Meakin is Lecturer in British Politics, also at the University of Leeds. Louise Thompson is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Manchester.  Exploring Parliament was published by Oxford University Press in April 2025 and will be launched at the Institute for Government on 15 May 2025. You can sign up to watch online here.

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Democratic innovation through AI in parliaments

By Franklin De Vrieze.

As well as debating and adopting new legislation aimed at establishing a sustainable legal framework for the governance of AI, parliaments are also exploring and experimenting with the application of AI in their own operations. New AI guidelines by Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) can inform their efforts.

According to the 2024 AI Index Report by Stanford University, the global legislative landscape has seen a significant increase in AI-related laws over recent years. From 2016 to 2023, parliaments in 127 countries passed a total of 123 bills mentioning AI in various contexts. These laws address a variety of issues, including educational reforms, non-discrimination in AI algorithms, and the establishment of AI training programs. This trend highlights the increasing recognition of the need for regulatory frameworks to manage the development and deployment of AI technologies responsibly.

The legislative measures aim to ensure that AI advancements benefit society while mitigating potential risks of AI being manipulated or misused. Therefore, parliaments need to ensure that the adoption of AI is guided by stringent policies, ethical testing, and comprehensive training, as highlighted in WFD’s recent policy brief, “A Democratic Approach to Global Artificial Intelligence (AI) Safety.”

Current applications of AI in parliament

Parliaments have started exploring and experimenting with the application of AI in their own operations. As Dr. Fitsilis from the Hellenic Parliament argues: “the rise of AI is expected to play a significant role in transforming legislatures from paper-based organisations into data-driven institutions”.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) has shared insights on “Use cases for AI in parliaments”, highlighting the growing integration of AI in parliamentary functions.

  • Firstly, AI is increasingly used for transcription and translation, managing records of debates, and subtitling video content. For example, Estonia’s Parliament automates stenography, while Italy’s Senate leverages AI for translating documents. Finland’s Parliament uses AI to summarise documents and create podcast audio, and Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies uses AI to transcribe audio and video files. These tools save time, enhancing productivity and allowing staff to focus on more complex tasks.
  • Secondly, AI is introduced to assist in drafting legislation and amendments and analysing large volumes of text to identify key themes and insights. This can help in creating more comprehensive and well-informed legislative documents. For instance, the Italian Chamber of Deputies uses AI to receive, store and number amendments according to presentation time (voting order) and uses AI to compare amendments to identify similarities. Brazil’s Chamber applies AI to interpret and group amendments, while Italy’s Senate uses it to ensure compliance with drafting rules, ensuring consistency, accuracy and adherence to legal standards.
  • Thirdly, AI supports public engagement by analysing public submissions. Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies uses AI to categorise citizen comments on bills, while Italy’s Senate employs AI to facilitate natural language queries about bills, enhancing accessibility and user experience. This means AI systems are helping citizens interact with parliamentary activities, such as answering questions about legislative processes or providing information on parliamentary sessions.
  • Fourthly, AI is employed in classification systems to manage large data volumes. Italy’s Chamber of Deputies uses AI to categorise plenary session reports, while the European Parliament applies it for automatic text classification with predefined labels.
  • Finally, AI powers chatbots and user support, improving access to parliamentary processes. Italy’s Chamber of Deputies provides a chatbot for querying parliamentary proceedings, and Estonia’s Parliament uses AI to subtitle live broadcasts for the hearing impaired. AI also automates tasks like schedule management and responses to common queries, while enhancing cybersecurity.

Lessons learned

Based on the lived experience of AI in parliament, there are already a few lessons learned on the governance of AI in parliaments, in line with WFD’s new Guidelines for AI in Parliaments..

Parliaments need to adopt a cautious, step-by-step approach to integrating AI, particularly with generative AI technologies. Initial experimentation should occur in controlled environments to mitigate risks before wider implementation. Such approach is emphasised in WFD’s guidelines, highlighting the importance of pilot projects and controlled rollouts to manage potential risks effectively​.

AI systems must be developed and used in accordance with ethical principles to prevent biases and ensure fair representation. WFD’s guidelines stress the importance of developing AI systems that adhere to ethical standards, preventing misinformation and stereotyping​.

Establishing clear governance structures and transparency measures is crucial. This involves setting up auditing processes, maintaining transparency about AI usage, and ensuring that AI systems can be held accountable for their outputs. The WFD guidelines recommend comprehensive transparency measures and accountability frameworks to build trust and credibility in AI applications within parliamentary functions.

Parliaments benefit from sharing experiences and best practices regarding AI implementation. Collaborative efforts, such as those facilitated by the IPU’s Centre for Innovation in Parliament, help build a collective understanding of effective AI governance. The new Global Community of Practice on Post-Legislative Scrutiny helps facilitate dialogue on applying AI in legislative scrutiny processes, as argued by Dr Marci Harris from POPVOX Foundation.

As AI technology evolves rapidly, parliaments must remain flexible and continuously update their policies. This includes partnering with academic institutions and other stakeholders to stay ahead of technological advancements and their implications. The WFD guidelines highlight the importance of ongoing education and adaptation to ensure that both parliamentarians and parliamentary staff are equipped to handle the evolving AI landscape​.

Conclusion

By building on their existing digital infrastructure, parliaments can harness the benefits of AI while ensuring accountability and protecting democratic values. The WFD Guidelines for AI in Parliament provide a comprehensive framework for this endeavour​. Parliaments may take proactive steps to pilot these guidelines, document use cases, and share best practices globally. This will not only strengthen their role as guardians of accountability but also ensure that AI serves the public good, enhances governance, and upholds the principles of democracy.

  Europe’s first political tech summit in Berlin The summit, taking place on Saturday, 25 January, will bring together the global political tech ecosystem—spanning countries and political parties—under one roof. Westminster Foundation for Democracy will lead a panel on “Democratic innovation through AI in parliaments”. Together with the German and Hellenic Parliaments and other tech experts, the panel will explore the potential of AI in fostering innovation and resilience in parliaments worldwide, balancing technological opportunities with ethical and cultural complexities. Info and registration: https://www.politicaltech.eu/  

About the authors

Franklin De Vrieze is Head of Practice Accountability at Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD).

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Westminster Hall: Parliament’s Best Kept Secret?

By Cristina Leston-Bandeira and Louise Thompson.

This blog is based on a paper presented by the authors to the Annual Conference of the PSA Parliaments group in November 2024 at the Senedd Cymru in Cardiff.

Photo credit: UK Parliament / Jessica Taylor: https://ukparliament.shorthandstories.com/cet-westminster-hall-debates/index.html

On 30 November 1999 Labour MP Phyllis Starkey made history, being the first MP to introduce a debate in Westminster Hall, the new parallel debating chamber for the House of Commons.  Agreed to by MPs initially as a temporary ‘experiment’ for just one parliamentary session through which to debate topics put forward by backbench MPs and by select committees, Westminster Hall has recently celebrated its 25th anniversary. It rarely attracts much attention, though recent reforms such as the introduction of debates on e-petitions, have put it more firmly into the media spotlight. 

Despite its 25 year history, we still know little about this parallel chamber – no comprehensive research has been undertaken and internal parliamentary reviews have been very limited. Has it added value to parliamentary business, as hoped when first introduced by the first Modernisation Committee in 1999? Drawing from pilot research we have undertaken over the past few months (including analysis of parliamentary debates and interviews), we take a  closer look at the business taking place in Westminster Hall debates to identify four main ways in which these can add value to the House of Commons.

1. It discusses very specific types of topics

    Although debates taking place in Westminster Hall are wide ranging, they tend to fall into two main areas. Often they are used by MPs to raise ‘hyperlocal’ issues of the sort that would not typically be selected for debate in the main chamber because they only affect a particular constituency.  Recent examples of this type of debate include dental healthcare in East Anglia and support for the hospitality sector in Eastleigh.  Westminster Hall is also a place where very emotive topics can be debated. These are often on health-based issues which have affected their constituents, such as Helen Hayes’ recent debate on lobular breast cancer. Tabled in memory of one her constituents, Heather Cripps, Hayes pushed for better awareness of the symptoms and more research into its treatment. Members of Heather’s family attended the debate and sat in the public gallery. Debates such as this one showcase a much more human side to parliamentary politics and as such, Westminster Hall can be an arena which acknowledges the grief and pain of constituents and their families.

    2. It is a place where MPs have fewer time constraints

    One of the real benefits to talking in Westminster Hall is that there is far less pressure on time. MPs introducing a debate have longer to talk and, although time limits are sometimes imposed for particularly well attended debates, other contributing MPs will generally have more time to make their speeches. One MP told us that it gave them time ‘to breathe’, allowing them to develop their points and have less choppy debates.  The MP introducing the debate will also get the right of reply to the minister’s response, something which they wouldn’t get in an adjournment debate in the main chamber.

    3. Its layout facilitates ‘physically close’ scrutiny

    Although the main House of Commons chamber can seem small and crowded at busy times, Westminster Hall is a much more intimate atmosphere. During its first ever debate, then Minister Peter Hain described it as ‘the first non-confrontational Chamber that Westminster has experienced in 800 years of political sparring’.  MPs are seated in a horseshoe seating area more akin to select committees, with all MPs and ministers at the same level.  This means that MPs sit much closer to the responding government minister. And the public gallery is within touching distance of them, with no screens acting as a barrier. MPs speak of being able to ‘look the minister in the eye’ and this can put ministers under considerable pressure, particularly during high profile debates.  The close proximity of the public gallery can be particularly powerful, facilitating conversations before and after debates and allowing the minister to see the faces of those impacted by government policy as they deliver their speech.

    4. It offers a kinder parliamentary culture

    The combination of a more intimate seating area and the more sensitive topics often debated there can facilitate a very different culture to the often adversarial Commons chamber. MPs and officials who participate regularly in Westminster Hall speak of a kinder etiquette, epitomised by DUP MP Jim Shannon’s regular notes to MPs to congratulate them on their debate and ministers going out of their way to thank every contributing Member in their responses. Although debates can occasionally become heated, the absence of any divisions and the location of Westminster Hall away from the limelight of the main chamber tends to inhibit overt partisanship in favour of a more collegiate atmosphere. 

    Debates in Westminster Hall can feel more remote to onlookers than those in the Commons chamber, but they offer something quite different. MPs have described it to us as ‘gold dust’ and ‘parliament’s best kept secret’, a chamber which is especially useful when campaigning on behalf of constituents. With the new Modernisation Committee hoping to look at how to make backbench debates more effective, this Parliament could bring opportunities to entrench the value of Westminster Hall in parliament’s work even more fully.

    About the authors

    Cristina Leston-Bandeira is Professor of Politics at the University of Leeds. Louise Thompson is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Manchester.

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    Disability inclusion in the House of Commons in the spotlight

    By Dr Ekaterina Kolpinskaya.

    This blog draws on the author’s time in a POST Fellowship at the UK Parliament. See the full report here: https://hass-cornwall.exeter.ac.uk/research/voice-participation-governance/hoc-work-environments/

    Over the past couple of years, I have been exploring disability inclusion practices for Members of the UK House of Commons as a Parliamentary Academic Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for Procedural Practice of the House of Commons. Working from within the institution, I have examined written rules and guidelines on accessibility, observed these practices in real life, and interviewed members of the House and MPs staff, as well as several Members and peers. The aim of this research is to understand how accessible the House of Commons is to disabled Members, and what adjustments have been made – and could be made – to improve working environment for disabled politicians, i.e., having physical or mental health impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on their ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.

    The importance of disability inclusion and better descriptive representation has increased substantially with the growing presence and visibility of disability in British society in recent years. Among the population, almost one in four (24%) or 16 million Britons report being disabled, including experiencing mobility issues, low stamina, breathing difficulties, fatigue, and increasingly, reporting symptoms of depression, anxiety or stress. By contrast, only 8 MPs (or 1.2%) declared having a disability in the 2019-2024 Parliament, with the number increasing to 12 MPs (just under 2%) after the 2024 General Election. This discrepancy – although there is significant under-reporting of disability among Members – presents a challenge for the efforts to normalise disability in public life and counter ableist stereotypes, including among voters (though there are encouraging developments) and political parties. Equally, it hinders effective substantive representation of interests of disabled Britons based on first-hand experiences of disability, potentially feeding into their – already – low satisfaction with political institutions and trust in them.

    By examining accessibility provisions and practices that facilitate work of disabled Members, this study addresses the demand side of parliamentary under-representation of disabled people and reflects on disability inclusion of disabled politicians elected to the House of Commons – a unique workplace environment. That is because Members of Parliament are not employees but elected office holders and are therefore excluded from the provisions of the Equality Act 2010; likewise, The House of Commons is not a ‘public authority’ for purposes of the Act. While these legal exclusions exist, in practice, the authorities of both Houses of Parliament act as if the legislation applies[1], reasonable adjustments for disabled Members are made routinely upon request.

    This resonates with a special constitutional status of MPs, whose work no one should dictate or constrain[2] as they are accountable to their electorate. Their parliamentary parties, more experienced Members, and the House staff facilitate their work by explaining what opportunities this job presents but they do not define expectations meaning that Members are independent in choosing their priorities and activities as MPs. The unpredictability of the role can be challenging for some disabled Members, as management of disabilities often relies on establishing daily routines[3]. However, it can be beneficial for others, as differently from 9-to-5 jobs, MPs’ schedules can be adapted to accommodate their medical needs[4].

    This unique institutional environment, the nature of the role of an MP and often conflicting needs stemming from different disabilities[5] steer the House away from a ‘catch-all’, systematic approach to making disability-relating adjustments for Members and favours ad hoc, individual solutions that result in a complex patchwork of remedial measures aiming to improve work environments for disabled MPs. This approach stands out when considering adjustments to procedural norms and practices that concern Members of the House specifically, while unicameral and bicameral services provided for all passholders (including the House and parliamentary staff, peers, MPs and their staff) are more comprehensive. The latter stem from a strong institutional commitment to improving accessibility (e.g., the House’s Inclusion and Diversity Strategy) and the ongoing efforts to enhance working conditions of House and MPs’ staff (e.g., consolidation of the House services[6], the Speaker’s Conference on the employment conditions of Members’ staff), including as part of the Restoration and Renewal Programme (R&R). There are several examples of good practice with regards to disability inclusion in the House of Commons (and the UK Parliament), namely a good range of support services provided at the unicameral and bicameral levels, as well as by external stakeholders such as the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority – with support from informal and partisan networks, i.e., ParliAble and political parties, respectively.

    In addition to this comprehensive and well-resourced provision, there have been improvements to physical access and infrastructure of the debating Chambers and of the House of Commons Committees – with an overall goal of making working environment more inclusive and enabling full participation of disabled parliamentarians. That said, several challenges remain.  

    Firstly, while communication about services has improved, a lack of awareness of available health and wellbeing services, particularly with regards to early intervention, remains, and valuable peer networks and targeted support (e.g., from the Workplace Adjustments Manager) especially by Members can be underused, which resonates with MPs’ heightened concerns over public image and anonymity. Members with less visible disabilities such as dyslexia and dyspraxia may be particularly likely to struggle through on their own, while they would benefit from appropriate targeted support (e.g., specialised software, documents in a different format) put in place early.[7] There is also scope to strengthen triangulation of support and the multi-agency approach to identifying and delivering individual disability support on and off the estate with input from the Members’ Services, the PDS and their network of accessibility champions, the IPSA, and political parties (while adhering to GDPR and data protection regulations).

    While improving accessibility is one of the priorities of the R&R programme, there is limited accessibility in parts of the estate, as pointed out by interviewees and campaigners. This has a knock-on effect for Members trying to get to debating Chambers and around buildings[8] and leads to their disproportionate dependence on assisting staff[9]. Challenges for physical accessibility, including to debating Chambers, necessitate Members to have permanent assistance, which increases their visibility as disabled politicians often making them reluctant to request it[10]. Even aids as basic as infrared hearing loops (a device worn on a lanyard around one’s neck to amplify sound) are under-used by Members who do not want to display such a visible marker of disability[11], which may open them for attack or mockery from other Members. While such instances were condemned by the House,[12] they did happen and may make other disabled Members wary of visibility.

    Equally, Members’ assessments of how procedurally accessible for disabled Members the House of Commons is are mixed. Some point out that they are ‘incredibly hostile and quite frankly, ableist’ and ‘on occasion [prevent them] from representing … constituents’. Others – while disagreeing with certain practices (e.g., bobbing, conduct during PMQs, lack of allocated or reserved sitting) – pointed out that there is much good will in the House (and among the Speaker and his Deputies), once their attention is engaged.[13] In particular, ad-hoc, case-by-case adjustments to etiquette and courtesies observed in the Chambers are made frequently upon request and with support from the Speaker (or of the Deputy Speaker in Westminster Hall). This does not require a collective buy-in of the House or a cost-benefit analysis that would accompany a more systematic, far-reaching adjustments (e.g., reflected in Standing Orders and affecting the workings of the House). It also reflects the need to consider each adjustment within the context of other adjustments and needs of Members.

    Overall, there is a sense that the House of Commons wants to be inclusive and accessible to disabled Members, but it is a busy place where partisanship trumps collegiality, and it is very difficult to organise.[14] Additionally, disability-related concerns – in addition to being complex and not sometimes in conflict with each other – are often outweighed by considerations of institutional efficiency and effectiveness and trade-offs with required resources and associated costs, as shown by discussions of retaining elements of remote participation and the R&R programme.[15] Considering the small number of visibly disabled Members and Members who self-identify as disabled, the House mostly adapts existing systems on a case-by-case basis (on demand) rather than designs a comprehensive system.[16] For example, there is a provision for individual adjustments in the debating Chambers in Erskine May 21.6.  This reinforces the need for individual Members to adapt to the ways of the House, not the other way around.[17]  

    The pace of institutional change and adaptation – especially if it aims to be sustainable and lasting – is slow. Development of unicameral and bicameral services, semi-formal workplace networks and a multi-agency approach to supporting disabled politicians, as well as improvements to accessibility in some parts of the parliamentary estate are examples of good practice and a significant step forward for the institution. Likewise, technical solutions and aids provided by parliamentary services and the IPSA improve daily lives and work of disabled Members significantly. However, these successes are more modest when it comes to adjusting procedural norms and practices that rely heavily on consensus within the House that in turn requires cross-party collaboration and a more collegiate and less adversarial culture of interactions between Members from the opposite sides of the aisle.

    [1] Interview 35, 11 August 2023

    [2] Interview 27, 15 December 2022; Interview 19, 16 March 2023; Interview 21, 31 March 2023

    [3] Interviewed by Ekaterina Kolpinskaya on 19 May 2023; Interview 10, 16 August 2023; Interview 14, 24 April 2023

    [4] Interview 21, 31 March 2023; Interview 7, 24 May 2023

    [5] E.g., low light is beneficial for those with ADHD but challenging for visually impaired Members.

    [6] Interview 20, 03 February 2023

    [7] Interview 40, 13 April 2023

    [8] Interview 1, 13 July 2023; Interview 18, 17 July 2023; Interview 16, 24 May 2023

    [9] Interview 1, 13 July 2023

    [10] Interview 1, 13 July 2023

    [11] Interview 34, 06 June 2023

    [12] Interview 7, 24 May 2023

    [13] Interview 14, 24 April 2023

    [14] Interview 13, 24 April 2023

    [15] Interview 3, 02 March 2023; Interview 27, 15 December 2022

    [16] Interview 5, 03 July 2023

    [17] Interview 7, 24 May 2023

    About the author

    Dr Ekaterina Kolpinskaya is a Senior Lecturer in British Politics at the University of Exeter.

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    The real cost of MPs’ security to constituency representation

    By Neil Matthews and Sean Haughey.

    The abuse of MPs, both online and offline, is becoming a more prevalent feature of British political life. In the most egregious cases, abuse has escalated into violent and even fatal attacks on MPs. In response, MPs are adopting new security measures at the constituency level to protect themselves from harm. These measures range from the subtle (e.g. no longer advertising the details of surgeries) to the not-so-subtle (such as the wearing of stab vests). We know how these developments are impacting MPs personally, not least in terms of their mental health. We also know about the associated financial ramifications, with the costs of MPs’ security skyrocketing in recent years. But what about the implications for representation and democracy? Are MPs able to perform their representative role just as well amid stricter security protocols? Or are costs incurred to representative democracy when constituency service is securitised?

    The security-accessibility trade-off

    All security systems come with costs attached. When MPs tighten constituency service security the most obvious cost incurred pertains to accessibility. This security-accessibility trade-off manifests in one of two ways: either through a reduction in opportunities for constituents to meet with their MP, or through the adoption of security protocols which complicate access pathways. In terms of reduced opportunities for constituent-MP engagement, take for instance those MPs who have stopped holding surgeries in public venues (e.g. shopping malls) because of security concerns. Consider also the MP who, after repeated incidents of verbal abuse, admits that he no longer socialises in his own constituency. These examples of retreat from the public square are problematic, because it is through even the most innocuous and impromptu interactions – in the local pub or supermarket for instance – that MPs develop their constituency antennae, learning about the issues which matter to their constituents:

    ‘We try to be, as constituency MPs, recognisable, available, accessible to all. A successful constituency MP is the person who people feel they can go to in the pub or, as frustrating as that sometimes is, come up to you when you’re doing your shopping.‘

    Access to MPs can be complicated by security in a number of ways. Some MPs, for example, have replaced “drop-in” surgeries with appointment-only meetings, a formality which likely results in some constituents being turned away. We also know that, on the advice of police, some MPs have discontinued in-person surgery appointments, instead offering online meetings only. Whilst this might expedite access to MPs for the digitally confident citizen, it will disincentivise engagement for those without the requisite skills. What is more, the value and quality of online meetings – relative to in-person meetings – is open to question. The social scientific evidence underlines the therapeutic value of in-person meetings between MPs and constituents. These in-person meetings are key to the development of “co-presence”, and help build a “human bridge” through which constituents feel listened to. These benefits could be much harder to attain when the interaction occurs through a screen. Similarly, with face-to-face meetings, that personal touch and sense of intimacy is likely compromised by the presence of security guards.

    The symbolic costs

    Public spaces articulate political and cultural messages. What messages, then, are conveyed to the public when MPs adopt airport-style (or even prison-style) security at their constituency offices? Think bulletproof glass, CCTV, reinforced doors, panic buttons and so on. Whilst these measures may reassure MPs and their staff, the effect on constituents could be quite the opposite, perhaps marking the space as somehow unsafe, where visitors need to be on their guard. Research into other sites that have been securitised suggests as much, whereby defensive urban architecture (designed to mitigate terrorist attacks) has had a chilling effect on public democratic culture, eliciting a range of subjective emotional responses from pedestrians: fearfulness, suspicion, paranoia, and exclusion. Some of the security measures at constituency offices could be eliciting a similar response from constituents. Take, for instance, the MP who tells his constituents they should “be prepared to be searched” when they arrive at his surgery:

    ‘We are following security guidance, as a result Security Operatives and/or the Police will be screening constituents attending face to face surgery appointments. Please bring along photo ID, leave bags and coats at home where possible, as they will not be permitted in the meeting toom and will need to remain outside the meeting space and be prepared to be searched.‘

    (Guidance provided on Julian Smith MP’s website for constituents)

    For the architect, Stephen Flusty, places and spaces bearing the features of security – searches of person or property, say – warrant being labelled as “jittery”. They are marked, in other words, by a tense and nervous atmosphere. We might ask then: how many of the constituency offices in the UK are showing signs of the jitters?

    Security and trust: a Catch-22?

    Security measures at the constituency level could, then, be counter-productive, in that MPs may be undermining the very representative connections they seek to protect. Up until now, the linkage between MPs and constituents at the local level has been held up as a positive exception to what has otherwise been a story of increasing political disengagement across western democracies. But what if new security measures at the local level are making engagement more difficult, placing distance (figuratively and literally) between MPs and constituents?

    Amid a general crisis of representation, in which people in the UK typically feel unrepresented by Westminster, there is a risk that the mitigating power of constituency service will be diminished if MPs become (or are perceived to be) harder to reach – or are less present – at the local level. Moreover, if perceptions of disconnect between politicians and the public is a driver of political distrust, and that distrust in turn fuels abuse of politicians, the security steps MPs are taking to mitigate this threat could in fact be exacerbating it.

    Importantly, the securitising trend affecting British political life appears set to deepen. The Speaker of the Commons, Lindsay Hoyle – a long-time advocate for greater protections for MPs – has called for a transformation in parliament’s “security culture”. To a similar end, the outgoing Conservative government signed-off on a £31m package to bolster the constituency-level security of MPs; while the recently published Walney review recommends even greater bolstering. Understanding how such enhanced security shapes  the character and delivery of representative democracy in the UK – and the myriad costs it brings to bear on both politicians and the public – warrants greater attention.

    This blog post was first posted by LSE blogs. It draws on research by the authors published in Parliamentary Affairs. All views expressed are the authors’ own.

    About the authors

    Neil Matthews is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol.

    Sean Haughey is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the Institute of Irish Studies at the University of Liverpool.

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    Parliamentary scrutiny: what is it, and why does it matter?

    Parliamentary scrutiny is at the heart of UK politics. In this post, Meg Russell and Lisa James examine the four key methods of parliamentary scrutiny, and offer proposals on how to strengthen it, calling for better behaviour by government and strong engagement from backbenchers.

    Background

    Parliament lies at the heart of UK politics. The legislature is a core institution in any democracy, but is particularly important in the UK, due to our tradition of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’. The government is dependent on the confidence of the House of Commons, which can potentially remove it from office. Parliamentary consent is required for primary legislation, and parliament is a particularly central and important body in holding ministers to account day-to-day.

    This makes scrutiny – the detailed examination of policy proposals, actions and plans – one of the essential roles of parliament. Other functions include representation, and serving as a space for national debate – which in turn feed into parliament’s scrutiny function.

    This briefing summarises why parliamentary scrutiny matters, what different kinds of parliamentary scrutiny exist at Westminster, some recent concerns about the decline of scrutiny, and ways in which it can be protected and strengthened.

    Why does parliamentary scrutiny matter?

    The government is responsible for much day-to-day decision-making, in terms of national policy formulation and implementation. But the government itself is not directly elected, and depends for its survival on the continued confidence of the House of Commons. This makes parliament one of the central checks and balances in the constitution – arguably the most central one of all. To provide government accountability, one of the core functions of parliament is scrutiny.

    Parliament is a very public arena, with debates televised and transcribed on the public record. Hence parliamentary scrutiny means that ministers must justify their policies in front of an audience, which provides transparency and accountability, and helps to ensure that policies are seen as legitimate.

    Crucially, parliament contains many and varied political voices. MPs are elected from diverse constituencies all over the UK, and represent different political parties. The House of Lords includes members from a wide range of backgrounds, many of whom are independent of political party, and some of whom are respected experts in their field. Parliamentary debates, and other mechanisms such as committee calls for evidence, also enable specialist groups and individual citizens to hear about policy and feed in their expertise, evidence and concerns. All of this ensures that different perspectives are heard in parliament when considering government policy.

    The mere existence of parliamentary scrutiny, given its public nature and diverse contributors, can have an important effect. Even where nothing visibly changes as a result (e.g. if a government bill remains unamended) studies show that ‘anticipated reactions’ are important. Policy is more carefully thought through because ministers and officials know that it will be scrutinised by parliament. Hence scrutiny improves the quality of decision-making; and if it is lacking, policy may be poorer as a result.

    What are the key forms of parliamentary scrutiny?

    Scrutiny takes place both in the Commons and in the Lords, and both on the floor of the chamber and in various kinds of committees. At Westminster, even processes not focused directly on government policy require a ministerial response. Scrutiny and accountability thereby come through numerous mechanisms. These same forums also to some extent subject opposition parties to scrutiny, in the sense that they too must set out their own views on the public record.

    The key forms and venues for scrutiny are set out below. In a number of these areas there have been recent concerns expressed about weakness or decline in scrutiny, which deserve attention.

    1. Scrutiny of legislation

    Most obviously, parliament conducts scrutiny of government legislation, and also of private members’ bills, with slightly different mechanisms operating in the Commons and the Lords.

    Despite occasional backbench rebellions resulting in visible government climbdowns, scrutiny in the Commons is often seen as weak. But this can be overstated, given that ministers think carefully about the acceptability of bills to MPs before they are introduced. Changes in the Lords also often respond to concerns raised (including behind the scenes) in the Commons.

    Nonetheless, adequate bill scrutiny depends on government cooperation. Ministers must ensure that bills are in good shape before introduction, and (given government’s extensive control of the Commons agenda) allow sufficient time for debate. They also need to be willing to listen and respond to reasonable points made by parliamentarians. There have been recent concerns about bills being rushed, and about late government amendments.

    There are various known weaknesses in the legislative scrutiny process. Commons public bill committees are temporary and nonspecialist, unlike in many other legislatures, and the process of evidence-taking could be improved. Meanwhile, there is no formal evidence-taking stage for bills introduced in the Lords, or that have their committee stage in the Commons on the floor. This limits opportunities for expert input.

    Perhaps the biggest concern in recent years has been about the growing use of delegated (or ‘secondary’) legislation, and increasing powers delegated to ministers in bills. This legislation receives very limited parliamentary scrutiny, raising clear accountability gaps if it implements major policy. Particular controversies emerged in this area during the Covid-19 pandemic, but overuse of delegated legislation has long been criticised, including by parliamentary committees, and expert groups such as the Hansard Society.

    2. Parliamentary questions and government statements

    Written and oral questions in both chambers put ministers on the spot about policy. Aside from scheduled questions, more ad hoc urgent questions allow sustained questioning on a topic, and their use has grown in recent years. Voluntary government statements take a similar form – and when not offered on key topics may trigger an urgent question.

    Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) are the highest profile forum and have long been subject to criticism for their ‘bearpit’ and adversarial nature. They attract attention, but are unrepresentative of most forms of questioning, which can be more constructive but are lower profile. There are regular calls to reform PMQs but even they may have important ‘anticipated reactions’ functions.

    The Cabinet Manual states that ‘the most important announcements of government policy should, in the first instance, be made to Parliament’, but there have been many recent complaints about ministers flouting this rule. This again occurred particularly frequently during the pandemic, but has continued – often to the displeasure of the Commons Speaker. Making major announcements outside parliament denies the opportunity for the kind of sustained questioning and democratic accountability that occurs when making announcements to MPs. Follow-up statements or urgent questions sometimes follow, but may be lower profile.

    3. Opposition, backbench and adjournment debates

    Parliament holds various kinds of debates in non-government time, including Commons backbench business debates, opposition day debates and adjournment debates. Irrespective of the topic, ministers must always appear and explain the government’s position, creating additional accountability. Often such debates are directly focused on government policy, and/or on topics that ministers would prefer to avoid.

    Backbench business debates and opposition day debates may result in a vote on a substantive motion. In recent years there have been criticisms of the government’s relatively new practice of instructing MPs to abstain on opposition motions. Although decisions in these votes are not enforceable, the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, has suggested that this shows a ‘lack of respect for the House’.

    These two forms of debate are guaranteed a minimum number of days per session in standing orders. But recent years have seen a number of long sessions (2010–12, 2017–19, 2019–21), which gives excessive control to the government over their scheduling.

    4. Select committees

    The select committees are seen as jewels in Westminster’s crown. They are unusual in international terms for conducting extensive and careful non-legislative scrutiny, for their nonpartisan ethos, and for generally producing unanimous reports. Committees in the Commons mostly shadow government departments, while those in the Lords are more crosscutting.

    Committees gather expert and other evidence (including some recently using citizens’ assemblies to elicit considered public views). Ministers are often called to give evidence to the committees, as well as the government being required to respond to their reports. There have been occasional concerns about ministers cancelling committee appearances, but this is the exception.

    Research shows that, while the select committees have little ‘hard power’ to force changes, they can be influential through putting topics onto the political agenda, feeding valuable evidence into wider debates, and having an ‘anticipated reactions’ effect – through forcing ministers to consider policy carefully, because they know they may have to publicly explain it to committees later.

    In the Commons, select committee structures are routinely changed when government departments are reorganised. This can cause concerns – for example most recently when the abolition of the International Trade Committee left little opportunity for scrutiny by MPs of important international agreements (though such scrutiny remains in the Lords).

    How can parliamentary scrutiny be strengthened?

    There have been some welcome changes to mechanisms for parliamentary scrutiny in relatively recent years, such as the election of House of Commons select committee members and chairs (since 2010), and introduction of evidence-taking by Commons public bill committees (in 2006).

    But this briefing has mentioned various weaknesses in parliamentary scrutiny processes, including recent concerns about decline – for example through primary legislation being rushed or subject to late government amendments, and an overreliance on delegated legislation. Recent polling shows that the public wants new laws to be subject to full parliamentary scrutiny. Improved government behaviour could make a good deal of difference in this area, but the Hansard Society has also proposed procedural changes.

    Proposals exist for strengthening Commons public bill committees – e.g. by injecting greater permanence and specialism – and for publishing more government bills in draft. The Commons Procedure Committee has proposed improvements to the private members’ bill process.

    Government control of the House of Commons agenda creates weaknesses, including over the timetabling of bills, ministers’ ability to withhold backbench and opposition days, and parliament’s inability to recall itself from recess. The Constitution Unit has proposed changes in this area.

    Fundamentally, improved scrutiny depends on better behaviour by government, but also on strong engagement by backbenchers and other non-government parliamentarians. Even seemingly ‘toothless’ scrutiny mechanisms can have important effects, by subjecting government policy to public exposure and debate. Both government and non-government parliamentarians therefore have important responsibilities to maintain the system of parliamentary scrutiny – in order to uphold good quality government decision-making, and the legitimacy of politics in the eyes of the public.

    This blog is part of the UCL Constitution Unit’s briefing series designed to inform policy-makers and the public about key constitutional issues and democratic debates. Our briefings draw on international evidence and examine both long-term trends and current developments in the UK. This is part of our project on constitutional principles and the health of democracy.

    It was originally published on the Constitution Unit’s blog and is re-published here with thanks.

    About the authors

    Meg Russell FBA is Professor of British and Comparative Politics at UCL and Director of the Constitution Unit.

    Lisa James is a Research Fellow at the Constitution Unit.

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    How did the Prime Minister win a vote in Parliament and lose her authority?

    It is remarkable that after a series of U-turns on key policy announcements and the resignation of two senior members of her Cabinet, the event which may well have precipitated the Prime Minister’s resignation was a parliamentary vote on an opposition motion which the Government actually won.

    To be sure, many would argue that the Prime Minister’s position was already untenable before Wednesday evening but any hopes of retaining office went downhill quickly following the chaotic mismanagement of a vote on a Labour motion on fracking. While the Labour Party may take some pleasure in contributing to PM’s downfall, much of the damage was self-inflicted.

    What is an opposition day debate?

    Wednesday was one of twenty afternoons set aside in each parliamentary session to debate issues raised by opposition parties. Although so-called opposition days allow the opposition to set the agenda, they rarely cause serious difficulties for a government which can command a majority in the House of Commons. A government with a majority can usually be assured of defeating an opposition motion. Moreover, even if the government loses a vote on an opposition day motion, in most cases these are not considered to be binding and the government is not obliged to make any changes in response. Consequently, government’s may even choose to ignore an opposition motion entirely and not bother voting at all. Opposition days do provide an important opportunity for opposition parties to raise issues of concern and possibly to embarrass the government by forcing its MPs to vote against something which may be popular, such as extending free school meals, but can’t generally be used to force the government to take action.

    Labour’s motion on fracking was slightly different in that it included a clause which would set aside the standing orders of the House of Commons, which state that the government has control over parliamentary business. The motion then allowed for the opposition to take control of the parliamentary order paper at a later date (29th November) in order to bring forward a bill which would ban the use of fracking in the UK. This was an unusual tactic but reflects a similar episode during the Brexit debates in 2019, when a group of MPs took control of the parliamentary agenda in order to bring forward a bill to prevent a no-deal Brexit.

    This was an interesting tactic by Labour, facilitating a parliamentary vote on the standing orders which can be changed by a vote in the House, rather than seeking to press the government to take action without any real power to compel it to do so. As a result, the opposition sought to turn a non-binding opposition motion into a resolution with real effects. This meant the government could not afford simply to ignore the opposition motion and cede control of the legislative agenda to Labour.

    Moreover, Labour’s decision to focus on fracking was also key. The Prime Minister had proposed lifting the ban on fracking, but this is an issue on which Conservative MPs are divided. Not only was a moratorium on fracking included in the party’s 2019 manifesto, but several Conservative MPs  represent constituencies where plans for fracking have been subject to considerable local opposition. In short Labour sought to force Conservative MPs to vote against a key manifesto pledge and in favour of something which many of them oppose. By combining this with an attempt to take control of the parliamentary agenda, Labour effectively forced the government into a position in which it felt the need to whip its MPs to vote against the motion.

    Three-line whips and confidence motions

    While Labour might be seen to have laid a trap for the government, the chaos which followed was largely self-inflicted. The Conservative response was to issue a three-line whip, effectively compelling Conservative MPs to vote against the opposition motion or be subject to disciplinary action. Given the size of the government’s majority this should have been enough to defeat the motion. It is possible that several Conservative MPs would have abstained, some may even have decided to vote for the Labour motion, although this seems unlikely. Although this is a serious disciplinary matter, as several commentators have since observed, the penalty for abstaining on a three-line whip is unlikely to have extended to having the whip withdrawn and, if the MPs in question had particular constituency concerns, the government would usually have been sympathetic to their predicament.

    However, at some point on Wednesday, the Government decided to make this a confidence motion, implying that if the government was defeated it would be forced to resign and call a general election. Although set piece votes, such as those on the Queen’s speech or the budget are generally considered to be confidence issues which the government must win, the government can declare any vote a matter of confidence. It was, however, a considerable escalation of the stakes to make a vote on an opposition motion on such a divisive issue a confidence vote.

    Ironically opposition days can be used to table motions of no confidence in the government and unlike most opposition day motions these are considered binding. Given the difficulties facing the Truss government Labour may well have considered this, but perhaps dismissed the idea on the grounds that a confidence motion was more likely to unite Conservative MPs around their leader. By choosing to turn a vote on which its MPs are divided into a confidence vote, the Conservative leadership, however, managed to create a level of disruption which the Labour opposition could not hope to have achieved simply by tabling a confidence motion. MPs who might reasonably be allowed to quietly abstain on an issue which was particularly sensitive in their constituencies, were now being asked to put their own re-election chances on the line to prop up the Prime Minister.

    It is not clear why the government chose to do this. One must assume that Conservative whips felt that a three-line whip was not enough to ensure victory and there was a real danger that Labour would win the vote. It is also worth considering the wider implications of a Labour victory. If Labour had been successful in seizing the agenda and bringing forward its own legislation on this issue, it might well have repeated the trick on subsequent opposition days, significantly disrupting the government’s own legislative agenda.

    It’s hard to know what intelligence Conservative whips had about the scale of the potential backbench rebellion on the Labour motion but there is very little evidence that a sizeable and damaging rebellion was impending. On Wednesday afternoon less than a handful of Conservative MPs publicly stated that they could not vote with the government on this motion, and most of the dismay on Conservative benches revolved around the fact that the government had chosen to make this a confidence issue.

    Confusion in the chamber and in scuffles in the lobby

    The government’s problems were compounded by the handling of the issue as the day progressed. Having decided to make this already divisive issue the one on which the Truss government would survive or fall, someone in number 10 got cold feet and decided not to risk it. The minister closing the debate at the despatch box, Graham Stuart, dismayed the House by stating that ‘quite clearly, this is not a confidence vote’, repeating ‘obviously this is not a confidence vote’. Stuart was asked to clarify this by the Conservative MP, Ruth Edwards, who stated ‘many of us have been told today by our Whips that if we vote for, or abstain from voting against, this motion, we will lose the Whip.’ His response, ‘that is a matter for party managers, and I am not a party manager’ was hardly a lesson in clarity.

    The effect of this was twofold. There was clearly some confusion as to whether this was a confidence issue. Stuart’s initial statement that it was not a confidence issue was arguably clear, but his follow up did little to settle the matter, particularly for MPs who had been told all day by the whips, presumably in the most robust terms, that they must vote with the government to prevent a general election. Secondly, it is apparent that this last-minute change had not been communicated to the whips, effectively undermining their authority. As Conservative MPs made their way into the division lobbies there were reports that the chief whip and the deputy chief whip had both resigned, and for several hours afterwards the government was unable to confirm if either were still in place.

    There were also reports of an unseemly row between Conservative MPs in the division lobby. A groups of Conservative MPs, including cabinet members, were accused of physically manhandling at least one reluctant Conservative MP into the lobby in support of the government, prompting the speaker to launch an investigation into bullying.

    To compound the confusion, in the commotion in the division lobbies it is apparent that several MPs failed to record their vote using the electronic card readers when entering the lobbies. For a time it appeared that the Conservative rebellion was even greater than it eventually proved to be, and perhaps most remarkably, that the Prime Minister had not voted.

    In the end the Conservatives won the vote with some ease. The Labour motion was defeated, it was later announced that the whips had not resigned, and the record was corrected to show that the Prime Minister had voted with most of the rest of her party. Thirty-two Conservative MPs abstained, although some of these will have had permission to miss the vote and will presumably have been paired with an opposition MP who was also missing.  In a bizarre coda at 1.30 in the morning Downing Street issued a statement that although the vote had not been a confidence issue, it had still been a three-line whip and those who did not have a reasonable excuse for their absence would face ‘proportionate disciplinary action.’ It is not clear if this process had begun by the time the Prime Minister resigned twelve hours later.

    With its fracking motion Labour presented the government with a knotty problem, which certainly required careful handling. Instead, the government contrived to alienate its own embattled backbenchers by selecting the nuclear option and making it a confidence vote. It then further alienated them by changing its position only minutes before the vote took place. The melee in the division lobby only added to the sense of confusion and lack of control at the heart of government. That the government won the vote is largely irrelevant, as in the process it lost what remaining credibility it had amongst its own MPs. The episode is a remarkable example of the importance of party management in the House of Commons and that opposition parties do not necessarily need to win a parliamentary vote in order to undermine the government.

    Dr Andrew Defty, Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Lincoln 

    This post was originally published on the Who Runs Britain Blog and can be found here: https://whorunsbritain.blogs.lincoln.ac.uk/2022/10/21/how-did-the-prime-minister-win-a-vote-in-parliament-and-lose-her-authority/

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    Reflections from Shenzhen – understanding Westminster select committees 

    By Winnie Zhou

    This year, the SCIE Politics Club organized multiple events on the topic of UK select committees. We’ve witnessed many meaningful debates and thoughts coming out during the process. 

    At the start of the term, the Head of Humanities and Social Sciences faculty and founder of SCIE’s Politics club, Mr. Richard Driscoll introduced us to the basics of the select committee. To better answer our questions on how the select committee works in real life, Mr. Richard led us through a recent report published by the Health and Social Care and Science and Technology Committees, a select committee in the House of Commons[1]. It concluded the UK’s major lessons from Covid 19 regarding public health management by analyzing six critical areas of responses: preparedness, non-pharmaceutical intervention; social care; impact on different communities, and vaccines distribution. Within each section, specific statistics and quotations of experts are referenced. 

    We further discussed the comprehensiveness of the report by reading it in detail. A problem identified in the report was the lack of resources in the NHS. The Royal College of Midwives reported that “NHS was short of over 3,000 midwives and that 40% of RCM members worked three or more hours of unpaid overtime every week, suggesting that the NHS had been ‘reliant upon the goodwill of those who staff the system.'”,[2] the specific data of which provides convincing evidence of the credibility and accuracy of the report. However, the solution explicitly given to this problem, “the experience of the demands placed on the NHS during the covid-19 pandemic should lead to a more explicit, and monitored, surge capacity being part of the long term organization and funding of the NHS”[3], seems vague and unpromising. We are concerned that an unclear short-term and long-term target may be hard to follow up. 

    On January 6th, 2022, our school invited Dr. Alexandra Meakin from the University of Leeds to lecture on the select committee system in depth. A majority of our Politics Club members appreciated this opportunity and joined the event passionately. Dr Meakin showed us a detailed understanding of the working mechanism of the select committee and its composition. The lecture taught us that the select committee, usually a permanent division representing the public to examine and make recommendations to governmental policy, consists of MPs elected in the secret ballot. It conducts pre-appointed hearings with experts, goes through the written evidence submitted by experts, and ultimately forms reports to the government. 

    Most interestingly, she listed some common arguments about the strengths and weaknesses of the select committee, which inspires interesting thoughts in us. For example, statistics show that the select committee’s suggestions are relatively practical, among which the executives implement over 40% of recommendations. This helps improve policymaking a lot. Also, she explained the advantages of its membership which reflects the composition of parties in the Commons. Hence, a report representing a cross-party consensus would more forcefully influence the House of Commons. 

    However, she also admitted some flaws in the select committee. The cross-party composition may make the select committee less effective in giving a thorough recommendation, as reaching consensus may sacrifice some detailed plans. MPs are also busy with businesses outside the select committee, so they may not devote sufficient time to drafting a comprehensive report. Compared with the Commons in general, the select committee usually does poorly in terms of diversity. Most detrimentally, the select committee lacks formal power. They can not directly implement but merely suggest policies to the government. Nor does the committee have any mechanism to follow up the changes in governmental policies. That’s why around 60% of the recommendation provided by the committee cannot be implemented as expected. 

    Dr. Alexandra Meakin’s lecture inspires interesting thoughts among our club members. We actively participated in the Q&A session to discuss further the role of the select committee. One of our members asked about how the committee balances between the power constraint on the Chair, and the consistency of the policy recommendation or the committee’s expertise. To further explain, the student considered that giving the Chair a relatively huge power to control the committee’s agenda may be a prerequisite for systematic policy recommendation over time, yet this may allow the power of the Chair to grow uncontrollably – a threat to the democracy. Dr. Meakin agreed that this conflict constitutes the core conflict within the select committee. Based on her expert knowledge, she concluded that, in practice, different chairs solve this problem with their approach. Some may lean towards reaching a consensus in the committee at the sacrifice of effectiveness, while others may take a more rigid grip to reinforce their ideas. This would also have something to do with the composition of the committee. The extent of party politics in the committee may be a crucial factor determining how fiercely effectiveness collides with consensus. 

    Inspired by Dr. Meakin’s answer, another club member added a follow-up question. Because the composition of the committee reflects the composition of the Commons, the club member was wondering whether this membership benefits the majority party, and if so, to what extent the committee can still achieve its goal of supervising the government, especially over some fields at the core of party struggle. Dr. Meakin admitted the composition does somehow formally benefit the majority party while offering some counter-arguments for us to think about. For example, the backbench MPs don’t necessarily agree with the governmental policies, if not critical of it, thus are still likely to provide insightful recommendations. Also, being in the same party with the government, the MPs from the majority party are more incentivized to give constructive criticism for the governmental policies, as improving the government’s performance yields benefit in the elections. Yet, it’s correct to question the extent of criticism the committee can give. With the harsh party whip, a select committee with a majority of MPs from the majority party is unlikely to provide criticisms at the risk of infringing the government’s fundamental interests. In response, one student added another question: the select committee supervises the government, then what institution is responsible for overseeing the select committee? Dr. Meakin’s answer of “the Parliament” also led us to think about democracy in the UK. The lack of the absolute doctrine of separation of power in the UK political system may indicate the impossibility of strict supervision over the majority party’s power. 

    In addition to theoretical analysis, we have seen other interesting practical questions. One student extended our previous club activity to discuss the effectiveness of policy during the Covid and how the select committee may help improve that. Another student also asked about how the lesson from the select committee may improve our work at the student council. Dr. Meakin shared constructive suggestions for us from her years of experience working for a select committees. The event ultimately concluded with our heated discussion and abundant new knowledge in our heads. 

    With continued interest in the topic, we plan to organize a Mock Education Select Committee at the Humanities and Social Sciences week at our school, on the subject of “cap on the number of international students admitted in the UK universities,” a relevant topic to us all. Members from our Political Club will represent the 11 MPs in the committee, while four competitors outside of the club will act as four experts to provide written evidence and go through a hearing process. We hope that this event can boost students’ interest in political affairs and encourage critical thinking throughout the process. 

    Author Details

    Winnie Zhou is 18 years old and is a student at Shenzhen College of International Education (SCIE).

    [1] Health and Social Care, and Science and Technology Committees, House of Commons. “Coronavirus: lessons learned to date: Sixth Report of the Health and Social Care Committee and Third Report of the Science and Technology Committee of Session 2021–22.” Sept. 2021, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/7496/documents/78687/default/

    [2] Ibid., p.28

    [3] Ibid.