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Eyes and ears, and potentially so much more: the role of Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Prime Minister

By Tim Bale

This blog is based on an article originally published in Parliamentary Affairs by the author.

Keir Starmer, in his first eighteen months, has had three.  Rishi Sunak and Liz Truss had one each.  Boris Johnson contrived to have nine, while Theresa May made do with just three, as did David Cameron.  Gordon Brown had four, as did Tony Blair. John Major managed with only two, while Margaret Thatcher had five. 

The superbly well-informed readers of this blog will, of course, know that I’m talking about Parliamentary Private Secretaries.  Yet, with only one or two exceptions, remarkably little has been written on the role – partly perhaps because, as Tim Finch, one of those who has examined it in more detail put it, a PPS is often seen as little more than a ‘bag carrier’.  Yet, as he noted, they have the potential to become a ‘linchpin,’ expanding the scope of the role beyond two-way communication between the Prime Minister and their parliamentary party so as to become a vital part of the PM’s tactical and strategic operation.

The exemplar, perhaps, is Ian Gow, who served as Margaret Thatcher’s PPS from during her first term as Prime Minister.  He was regarded by Thatcher and most of those who served her as a brilliant appointment and, by some margin, as the best PPS she ever had.  It was a role which (in hindsight reluctantly) he relinquished in 1983 in exchange for a junior ministerial job, although he was eventually to resign from government in protest at the Anglo-Irish Agreement two years later.  Even then, however, he insisted on his continued devotion to the woman he (along with her many other admirers at the time) called ‘The Lady.’

Sadly, no PPS since Gow (who died at the hands of the IRA in 1990) seems to have fully realised the enormous potential of the role – a pity, perhaps, given how difficult so many of our recent premiers seem to have found their job. Had they been able or seen fit to appoint someone who could do even half of what Gow did for, they might perhaps have struggled a little less and maybe even have achieved a little more.

Naturally, much of what a PPS does and can do inevitably takes place behind closed doors – one reason why, even if it only allows us to prise (rather than fling) open those doors, exploring contemporaneous archive and diary material, can, especially when combined with material gleaned from ministerial memoirs and interviews, provide us with more insight than hitherto. And this is exactly what my article just published online (and free to read) in Parliamentary Affairs tries to achieve.

Gow, it argues, serves as a reminder of the role that, potentially at least, a good PPS to the PM can play – a role that that goes well beyond ‘eyes and ears’ and, for all that the 2020s are not the 1980s, could still be played today if, that is, someone willing to play it is allowed the requisite leeway.

A Parliamentary Private Secretary to the PM is there to explain the Prime Minister to the parliamentary party and the parliamentary party to the Prime Minister, getting a sense of pitfalls and problems before they turn into something more serious.  He or she should remind their boss of the need to engage with back-benchers and junior frontbenchers on all sides of the party.  Gow, unlike his successors, did not attend Cabinet meetings; but he showed even so that a PPS to the PM is able to influence them, albeit informally.  He or she can also have considerable influence on reshuffles and, fairly or unfairly, on how ministers are regarded by the Prime Minister.  And, if adept at the dark arts, he or she can help the PM deny Cabinet colleagues too much autonomy.  Moreover, if on the same wavelength ideologically as his or her boss, the PPS can also serve not just as a sounding board but as their conscience, stiffening their spine as well as helping with key speeches.  And he or she can play a part in helping the Prime Minister make that supposedly loneliest of decisions – namely when to call an election.

But the role requires a certain sort of individual to do the job well.  They need to be gregarious but also shrewd, relatable but also ruthless. Not only do they have to know their boss’s mind, and their strengths and weaknesses, but they also have to be willing to speak truth to power.  Gow’s apparently phenomenal tolerance for alcohol may not be so necessary nowadays – the Commons has changed (although, some argue, not enough) in that respect.  But a willingness to work far more hours than is strictly sensible probably still is – so much so that MPs who have the combination of personal qualities and sheer commitment needed to make a success of the role may well be a rarer commodity nowadays.  But they are nonetheless a highly valuable one. 

Many recent Prime Ministers, Thatcher included, have eventually been forced out owing to their failure to keep in close touch with (and a close eye on) their colleagues on both the front and back benches – in part through the wont of a high calibre consigliere like Gow.  Whoever takes over from Sir Keir Starmer, then, be it sooner or later, would be well advised to take as much time and care in appointing their PPS as they do in choosing their Cabinet.


About the author

Tim Bale is Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London.


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Everything you ever wanted to know about Early Day Motions (between 2001 & 2019)

By Stephen Holden Bates

This blog was part of a larger project undertaken on policy specialisation and parliamentary roles with Caroline Bhattacharya and Stephen McKay, both of whom were involved in the collection and analysis of the data used in this blog. A draft of this blog has been hanging around for a few years now which explains why it doesn’t cover the 2019-2024 Parliament – apologies for that!

Backbench MPs can submit Early Day Motions (EDMs) “to put on record [their] views … or to draw attention to specific events or campaigns“. In this blog we show which groups of MPs are more likely to use EDMs, and which topics they focus on.

Popularity of EDMs over time

Table 1 shows the most popular EDMs submitted between the 1989-90 parliamentary session and the 2019 General Election. During this time, 50,849 EDMs were submitted, receiving 1,968,850 signatures from 1,722 signatories. This means the average MP sponsored and signed 29.5 and 1143.4 EDMs respectively with the average EDM receiving 38.7 signatures (although the mode is one).

The number of EDMs submitted per sitting day decreased after 2010, but the average number of signatures attracted remained comparable over time. The average number of EDMs per sponsor and per signatory remained comparable; MPs remained as likely to sponsor and sign at least one EDM.

Table 1: Top 10 most popular EDMs, 1989-2019

TitleParl. SessionNum. Signatories
INDIA AND PAKISTAN2001-02503
MAKE POVERTY HISTORY IN 2005 CAMPAIGN2004-05455
CLIMATE CHANGE2004-05416
FIRST AID IN SCHOOLS1991-92416
BBC WORLD SERVICE1992-93408
PRESIDENTIAL & PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN SIERRA LEONE (No. 2)2001-02402
ABOLITION OF THE POST OFFICE CARD ACCOUNT2005-06398
WARM HOMES & ENERGY CONSERVATION1999-2000396
POST OFFICE CARD ACCOUNTS2002-03392
PRESIDENTIAL & PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN SIERRA LEONE2001-02387
[source: EDM database]  

Popularity of EDMs among (different groups of) MPs

Some MPs were (very) prolific in terms of signing or being the primary sponsor on EDMs with most of the most prolific being white and male, usually from the Labour Party (see Table 2).  

Table 2: Top 10 most prolific primary sponsors and signatories of EDMs overall and per Sitting Day not in Government, 1989-2019

RankNameGenderEthnicityPartyNum. EDMs OverallNum. EDMs per Sitting Day
   SponsoredSponsored
Number Sponsored Overall  
1Jeremy CorbynMaleWhiteLab.8330.06
2Paul FlynnMaleWhiteLab.7920.07
3Keith VazMaleBritish AsianLab.7310.07
4Alan MealeMaleWhiteLab.7310.07
5John McDonnellMaleWhiteLab.6940.09
6Lindsay HoyleMaleWhiteLab.6220.08
7Peter BottomleyMaleWhiteCon.5630.05
8Bob RussellMaleWhiteLib. Dem.5450.08
9Harry BarnesMaleWhiteLab.4930.08
10Bob SpinkMaleWhiteCon.4710.09
Number Sponsored per Sitting Day not in Government
1Paul MonaghanMaleWhiteSNP1010.14
2Jim ShannonMaleWhiteDUP4110.12
3Robert HalfonMaleWhiteCon.2980.11
4David LindenMaleWhiteSNP830.09
5Bob SpinkMaleWhiteCon.4710.09
6Greg MulhollandMaleWhiteLib. Dem.3990.09
7Simon ThomasMaleWhitePC1650.09
8John McDonnellMaleWhiteLab.6940.09
9Bob RussellMaleWhiteLib. Dem.5450.08
10Kirsten OswaldFemaleWhiteSNP590.08
   SignedSigned
Number Signed Overall  
1Jeremy CorbynMaleWhiteLab.194601.49
2Alan MealeMaleWhiteLab.183661.77
3Mike HancockMaleWhiteLib. Dem.177782.36
4Alan SimpsonMaleWhiteLab.176602.71
5John McDonnellMaleWhiteLab.175042.17
6Lynne JonesFemaleWhiteLab.166362.56
7Bill EtheringtonMaleWhiteLab.165752.55
8Kelvin HopkinsMaleWhiteLab.155431.92
9Peter BottomleyMaleWhiteCon.153731.24
10Ann CryerFemaleWhiteLab.152813.26
Number Signed per Sitting Day not in Government
1Ann CryerFemaleWhiteLab.152813.26
2Rudi VisMaleWhiteLab.148163.16
3Alan SimpsonMaleWhiteLab.176602.71
4John LeechMaleWhiteLib. Dem.92682.58
5Lynne JonesFemaleWhiteLab.166362.56
6Bill EtheringtonMaleWhiteLab.165752.55
7Mike HancockMaleWhiteLib. Dem.177782.36
8Martin CatonMaleWhiteLab.151552.34
9Chris StephensMaleWhiteSNP36222.25
10John McDonnellMaleWhiteLab.175042.17

Network analysis can be used to identify clusters of EDM co-signatories (i.e. MPs who are more likely to sign the same EDMs). Figure(s) 1 shows the EDM co-signatory networks for each of the five parliaments between 2001 and 2019, switching between showing the network by party and then by cluster for each Parliament. For the Party view, the nodes in the figures are colour-coded by party with the edges also colour coded to indicate (cross-)partisan linkages. For example, a red node with a purple edge would indicate a Labour MP with cross-partisan links with Conservative MPs. For the Cluster view, the nodes are simply colour coded by cluster. For both, the size of the node relates to the likelihood of an MP acting as a bridge between different parts of the network with larger nodes indicating a greater propensity to broker.

The figure shows that three clusters of EDM co-signatories can be identified in each parliament from 2001 onwards, except for 2015-17 where there were two. Where there are three clusters, two of these are mainly comprised of Conservative MPs and Labour MPs respectively with the third being mainly made up of another group of Labour MPs and MPs from smaller parties. For 2015-17, there is a smaller cluster mainly comprising SNP MPs and then a large cluster made up of everyone else. However, none of the clusters are particularly distinct with all being cross-partisan and with lots of interaction taking place between them and the MPs therein. The network of EDM signatories is thus generally a tightly knit one with the clusters which comprise it not being separate but rather interrelated. The network has become more clustered over time however.

Focusing on some key figures within these EDM networks, Figure(s) 2 shows the core group networks of the most active EDM co-signatories (co-signing at least 40% of EDMs) for each of the five parliaments. The fact that there is only one core group for each parliament reinforces the idea that the EDM network is an integrated one without particularly distinct clusters. Mirroring the results presented in Table 2, the networks are dominated by white, male Labour MPs, and perhaps more accurately Labour MPs who are members of the Socialist Campaign Group, at least until 2015 after which MPs from smaller parties – specifically, the SNP and the DUP – become dominant. This trend is probably a result of MPs such as Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell moving into leadership positions and not having the time and/or proclivity to sign (as many) EDMs as previously. This would then have a knock-on effect of disrupting relationships in the cluster of which these MPs were a part and, consequently, the wider network. Other relationships would then come to the fore.

Figure(s) 1: Early Day Motion Co-Signatory Networks by Parliament

Figure(s) 2: Core group networks of most active EDM co-signatories by Parliament

Characteristics of MPs who sponsor & sign EDMs

Conservative MPs were less likely to sponsor and sign EDMs than Labour and other party MPs (Figure(s) 3) and, when they did, they were also less likely to sponsor and sign as many: the average Conservative MP sponsored and signed 8.6 and 140 EDMs, whereas the figures for the average Labour MP and other party MP were 15.7 and 533, and 26.0 and 874 respectively.

Figure(s) 3: Percentage point difference between proportion of EDM activity and proportion of MPs in Parliament by party, 1989-2019

Female and ethnic minority MPs tended to be sponsors and signatories of EDMs roughly in line with their presence in Parliament (Figure(s) 4). There is some evidence that male sponsors and signatories were more likely to sponsor and sign more EDMs than their female counterparts, especially after 1997 but this gap closed during the last two Parliaments in our analysis. White sponsors were more likely to sponsor more EDMs than ethnic minority sponsors since 2001 but there was no clear trend regarding ethnicity and the ratio of signatories to signatures.

Figure(s) 4: Percentage point difference between proportion of EDM activities and proportion of female and ethnic minority MPs in Parliament, 1989-2019

EDM topics

EDMs are not directed to a particular department so we used topic modelling to identify 27 different policy areas. social welfare, macroeconomics and international affairs are the most popular topics mentioned in EDMs with at least a quarter being related to at least one of these topics (Figure 5). Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are the least popular topics.

Perhaps the most notable trend in the popularity of topics is the steady increase over time in EDMs which mention social policy (Figure(s) 6). Other topics which tended to increase in popularity over time, at least to a certain extent, are civil rights, domestic commerce, education, energy, health, and technology. Topics which tended to decrease in popularity over time, again at least to a certain extent, are agriculture, foreign trade, government operations, international affairs, and law & crime. Other topics remained broadly flat (although macroeconomics did have an increase around the time of the financial crash before falling back slowly to around the same level of popularity as previously).

When comparing different groups of MPs, what is most notable is the consistency in the topic rankings for MPs from different parties. The top five topics are the same for Conservative MPs, Labour MPs and MPs from other parties, even if the order of the ranking is not the same. Perhaps the only notable difference is the ranking of the topic labour. This topic is ranked 13th out of 27 for EDMs sponsored by a Labour MP, whereas it’s ranked 23rd and 20th for EDMs sponsored by a Conservative MP and an MP from another party respectively.

With regard to gender, Civil rights, education, health and social welfare are all more popular topics with female sponsors compared to their male counterparts with international affairs having the biggest difference between the popularity among male sponsors compared to their female counterparts. With regard to ethnicity, the biggest differences in the popularity among sponsors from an ethnic minority background compared to their white counterparts are for the topics civil rights, defence, immigration, international affairs, and social welfare.

Figure 5: Percentage of EDMs which mention topic


Figure(s) 6: Percentage of EDMs which mention topic by parliamentary session


About the author

Dr Stephen Holden Bates is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham.


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Westminster Hall: Parliament’s Best Kept Secret?

By Cristina Leston-Bandeira and Louise Thompson.

This blog is based on a paper presented by the authors to the Annual Conference of the PSA Parliaments group in November 2024 at the Senedd Cymru in Cardiff.

Photo credit: UK Parliament / Jessica Taylor: https://ukparliament.shorthandstories.com/cet-westminster-hall-debates/index.html

On 30 November 1999 Labour MP Phyllis Starkey made history, being the first MP to introduce a debate in Westminster Hall, the new parallel debating chamber for the House of Commons.  Agreed to by MPs initially as a temporary ‘experiment’ for just one parliamentary session through which to debate topics put forward by backbench MPs and by select committees, Westminster Hall has recently celebrated its 25th anniversary. It rarely attracts much attention, though recent reforms such as the introduction of debates on e-petitions, have put it more firmly into the media spotlight

Despite its 25 year history, we still know little about this parallel chamber – no comprehensive research has been undertaken and internal parliamentary reviews have been very limited. Has it added value to parliamentary business, as hoped when first introduced by the first Modernisation Committee in 1999? Drawing from pilot research we have undertaken over the past few months (including analysis of parliamentary debates and interviews), we take a  closer look at the business taking place in Westminster Hall debates to identify four main ways in which these can add value to the House of Commons.

1. It discusses very specific types of topics

    Although debates taking place in Westminster Hall are wide ranging, they tend to fall into two main areas. Often they are used by MPs to raise ‘hyperlocal’ issues of the sort that would not typically be selected for debate in the main chamber because they only affect a particular constituency.  Recent examples of this type of debate include dental healthcare in East Anglia and support for the hospitality sector in Eastleigh.  Westminster Hall is also a place where very emotive topics can be debated. These are often on health-based issues which have affected their constituents, such as Helen Hayes’ recent debate on lobular breast cancer. Tabled in memory of one her constituents, Heather Cripps, Hayes pushed for better awareness of the symptoms and more research into its treatment. Members of Heather’s family attended the debate and sat in the public gallery. Debates such as this one showcase a much more human side to parliamentary politics and as such, Westminster Hall can be an arena which acknowledges the grief and pain of constituents and their families.

    2. It is a place where MPs have fewer time constraints

    One of the real benefits to talking in Westminster Hall is that there is far less pressure on time. MPs introducing a debate have longer to talk and, although time limits are sometimes imposed for particularly well attended debates, other contributing MPs will generally have more time to make their speeches. One MP told us that it gave them time ‘to breathe’, allowing them to develop their points and have less choppy debates.  The MP introducing the debate will also get the right of reply to the minister’s response, something which they wouldn’t get in an adjournment debate in the main chamber.

    3. Its layout facilitates ‘physically close’ scrutiny

    Although the main House of Commons chamber can seem small and crowded at busy times, Westminster Hall is a much more intimate atmosphere. During its first ever debate, then Minister Peter Hain described it as ‘the first non-confrontational Chamber that Westminster has experienced in 800 years of political sparring’.  MPs are seated in a horseshoe seating area more akin to select committees, with all MPs and ministers at the same level.  This means that MPs sit much closer to the responding government minister. And the public gallery is within touching distance of them, with no screens acting as a barrier. MPs speak of being able to ‘look the minister in the eye’ and this can put ministers under considerable pressure, particularly during high profile debates.  The close proximity of the public gallery can be particularly powerful, facilitating conversations before and after debates and allowing the minister to see the faces of those impacted by government policy as they deliver their speech.

    4. It offers a kinder parliamentary culture

    The combination of a more intimate seating area and the more sensitive topics often debated there can facilitate a very different culture to the often adversarial Commons chamber. MPs and officials who participate regularly in Westminster Hall speak of a kinder etiquette, epitomised by DUP MP Jim Shannon’s regular notes to MPs to congratulate them on their debate and ministers going out of their way to thank every contributing Member in their responses. Although debates can occasionally become heated, the absence of any divisions and the location of Westminster Hall away from the limelight of the main chamber tends to inhibit overt partisanship in favour of a more collegiate atmosphere. 

    Debates in Westminster Hall can feel more remote to onlookers than those in the Commons chamber, but they offer something quite different. MPs have described it to us as ‘gold dust’ and ‘parliament’s best kept secret’, a chamber which is especially useful when campaigning on behalf of constituents. With the new Modernisation Committee hoping to look at how to make backbench debates more effective, this Parliament could bring opportunities to entrench the value of Westminster Hall in parliament’s work even more fully.

    About the authors

    Cristina Leston-Bandeira is Professor of Politics at the University of Leeds. Louise Thompson is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Manchester.


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    Disability inclusion in the House of Commons in the spotlight

    By Dr Ekaterina Kolpinskaya.

    This blog draws on the author’s time in a POST Fellowship at the UK Parliament. See the full report here: https://hass-cornwall.exeter.ac.uk/research/voice-participation-governance/hoc-work-environments/

    Over the past couple of years, I have been exploring disability inclusion practices for Members of the UK House of Commons as a Parliamentary Academic Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for Procedural Practice of the House of Commons. Working from within the institution, I have examined written rules and guidelines on accessibility, observed these practices in real life, and interviewed members of the House and MPs staff, as well as several Members and peers. The aim of this research is to understand how accessible the House of Commons is to disabled Members, and what adjustments have been made – and could be made – to improve working environment for disabled politicians, i.e., having physical or mental health impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on their ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities.

    The importance of disability inclusion and better descriptive representation has increased substantially with the growing presence and visibility of disability in British society in recent years. Among the population, almost one in four (24%) or 16 million Britons report being disabled, including experiencing mobility issues, low stamina, breathing difficulties, fatigue, and increasingly, reporting symptoms of depression, anxiety or stress. By contrast, only 8 MPs (or 1.2%) declared having a disability in the 2019-2024 Parliament, with the number increasing to 12 MPs (just under 2%) after the 2024 General Election. This discrepancy – although there is significant under-reporting of disability among Members – presents a challenge for the efforts to normalise disability in public life and counter ableist stereotypes, including among voters (though there are encouraging developments) and political parties. Equally, it hinders effective substantive representation of interests of disabled Britons based on first-hand experiences of disability, potentially feeding into their – already – low satisfaction with political institutions and trust in them.

    By examining accessibility provisions and practices that facilitate work of disabled Members, this study addresses the demand side of parliamentary under-representation of disabled people and reflects on disability inclusion of disabled politicians elected to the House of Commons – a unique workplace environment. That is because Members of Parliament are not employees but elected office holders and are therefore excluded from the provisions of the Equality Act 2010; likewise, The House of Commons is not a ‘public authority’ for purposes of the Act. While these legal exclusions exist, in practice, the authorities of both Houses of Parliament act as if the legislation applies[1], reasonable adjustments for disabled Members are made routinely upon request.

    This resonates with a special constitutional status of MPs, whose work no one should dictate or constrain[2] as they are accountable to their electorate. Their parliamentary parties, more experienced Members, and the House staff facilitate their work by explaining what opportunities this job presents but they do not define expectations meaning that Members are independent in choosing their priorities and activities as MPs. The unpredictability of the role can be challenging for some disabled Members, as management of disabilities often relies on establishing daily routines[3]. However, it can be beneficial for others, as differently from 9-to-5 jobs, MPs’ schedules can be adapted to accommodate their medical needs[4].

    This unique institutional environment, the nature of the role of an MP and often conflicting needs stemming from different disabilities[5] steer the House away from a ‘catch-all’, systematic approach to making disability-relating adjustments for Members and favours ad hoc, individual solutions that result in a complex patchwork of remedial measures aiming to improve work environments for disabled MPs. This approach stands out when considering adjustments to procedural norms and practices that concern Members of the House specifically, while unicameral and bicameral services provided for all passholders (including the House and parliamentary staff, peers, MPs and their staff) are more comprehensive. The latter stem from a strong institutional commitment to improving accessibility (e.g., the House’s Inclusion and Diversity Strategy) and the ongoing efforts to enhance working conditions of House and MPs’ staff (e.g., consolidation of the House services[6], the Speaker’s Conference on the employment conditions of Members’ staff), including as part of the Restoration and Renewal Programme (R&R). There are several examples of good practice with regards to disability inclusion in the House of Commons (and the UK Parliament), namely a good range of support services provided at the unicameral and bicameral levels, as well as by external stakeholders such as the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority – with support from informal and partisan networks, i.e., ParliAble and political parties, respectively.

    In addition to this comprehensive and well-resourced provision, there have been improvements to physical access and infrastructure of the debating Chambers and of the House of Commons Committees – with an overall goal of making working environment more inclusive and enabling full participation of disabled parliamentarians. That said, several challenges remain.  

    Firstly, while communication about services has improved, a lack of awareness of available health and wellbeing services, particularly with regards to early intervention, remains, and valuable peer networks and targeted support (e.g., from the Workplace Adjustments Manager) especially by Members can be underused, which resonates with MPs’ heightened concerns over public image and anonymity. Members with less visible disabilities such as dyslexia and dyspraxia may be particularly likely to struggle through on their own, while they would benefit from appropriate targeted support (e.g., specialised software, documents in a different format) put in place early.[7] There is also scope to strengthen triangulation of support and the multi-agency approach to identifying and delivering individual disability support on and off the estate with input from the Members’ Services, the PDS and their network of accessibility champions, the IPSA, and political parties (while adhering to GDPR and data protection regulations).

    While improving accessibility is one of the priorities of the R&R programme, there is limited accessibility in parts of the estate, as pointed out by interviewees and campaigners. This has a knock-on effect for Members trying to get to debating Chambers and around buildings[8] and leads to their disproportionate dependence on assisting staff[9]. Challenges for physical accessibility, including to debating Chambers, necessitate Members to have permanent assistance, which increases their visibility as disabled politicians often making them reluctant to request it[10]. Even aids as basic as infrared hearing loops (a device worn on a lanyard around one’s neck to amplify sound) are under-used by Members who do not want to display such a visible marker of disability[11], which may open them for attack or mockery from other Members. While such instances were condemned by the House,[12] they did happen and may make other disabled Members wary of visibility.

    Equally, Members’ assessments of how procedurally accessible for disabled Members the House of Commons is are mixed. Some point out that they are ‘incredibly hostile and quite frankly, ableist’ and ‘on occasion [prevent them] from representing … constituents’. Others – while disagreeing with certain practices (e.g., bobbing, conduct during PMQs, lack of allocated or reserved sitting) – pointed out that there is much good will in the House (and among the Speaker and his Deputies), once their attention is engaged.[13] In particular, ad-hoc, case-by-case adjustments to etiquette and courtesies observed in the Chambers are made frequently upon request and with support from the Speaker (or of the Deputy Speaker in Westminster Hall). This does not require a collective buy-in of the House or a cost-benefit analysis that would accompany a more systematic, far-reaching adjustments (e.g., reflected in Standing Orders and affecting the workings of the House). It also reflects the need to consider each adjustment within the context of other adjustments and needs of Members.

    Overall, there is a sense that the House of Commons wants to be inclusive and accessible to disabled Members, but it is a busy place where partisanship trumps collegiality, and it is very difficult to organise.[14] Additionally, disability-related concerns – in addition to being complex and not sometimes in conflict with each other – are often outweighed by considerations of institutional efficiency and effectiveness and trade-offs with required resources and associated costs, as shown by discussions of retaining elements of remote participation and the R&R programme.[15] Considering the small number of visibly disabled Members and Members who self-identify as disabled, the House mostly adapts existing systems on a case-by-case basis (on demand) rather than designs a comprehensive system.[16] For example, there is a provision for individual adjustments in the debating Chambers in Erskine May 21.6.  This reinforces the need for individual Members to adapt to the ways of the House, not the other way around.[17]  

    The pace of institutional change and adaptation – especially if it aims to be sustainable and lasting – is slow. Development of unicameral and bicameral services, semi-formal workplace networks and a multi-agency approach to supporting disabled politicians, as well as improvements to accessibility in some parts of the parliamentary estate are examples of good practice and a significant step forward for the institution. Likewise, technical solutions and aids provided by parliamentary services and the IPSA improve daily lives and work of disabled Members significantly. However, these successes are more modest when it comes to adjusting procedural norms and practices that rely heavily on consensus within the House that in turn requires cross-party collaboration and a more collegiate and less adversarial culture of interactions between Members from the opposite sides of the aisle.


    [1] Interview 35, 11 August 2023

    [2] Interview 27, 15 December 2022; Interview 19, 16 March 2023; Interview 21, 31 March 2023

    [3] Interviewed by Ekaterina Kolpinskaya on 19 May 2023; Interview 10, 16 August 2023; Interview 14, 24 April 2023

    [4] Interview 21, 31 March 2023; Interview 7, 24 May 2023

    [5] E.g., low light is beneficial for those with ADHD but challenging for visually impaired Members.

    [6] Interview 20, 03 February 2023

    [7] Interview 40, 13 April 2023

    [8] Interview 1, 13 July 2023; Interview 18, 17 July 2023; Interview 16, 24 May 2023

    [9] Interview 1, 13 July 2023

    [10] Interview 1, 13 July 2023

    [11] Interview 34, 06 June 2023

    [12] Interview 7, 24 May 2023

    [13] Interview 14, 24 April 2023

    [14] Interview 13, 24 April 2023

    [15] Interview 3, 02 March 2023; Interview 27, 15 December 2022

    [16] Interview 5, 03 July 2023

    [17] Interview 7, 24 May 2023

    About the author

    Dr Ekaterina Kolpinskaya is a Senior Lecturer in British Politics at the University of Exeter.


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    The real cost of MPs’ security to constituency representation

    By Neil Matthews and Sean Haughey.

    The abuse of MPs, both online and offline, is becoming a more prevalent feature of British political life. In the most egregious cases, abuse has escalated into violent and even fatal attacks on MPs. In response, MPs are adopting new security measures at the constituency level to protect themselves from harm. These measures range from the subtle (e.g. no longer advertising the details of surgeries) to the not-so-subtle (such as the wearing of stab vests). We know how these developments are impacting MPs personally, not least in terms of their mental health. We also know about the associated financial ramifications, with the costs of MPs’ security skyrocketing in recent years. But what about the implications for representation and democracy? Are MPs able to perform their representative role just as well amid stricter security protocols? Or are costs incurred to representative democracy when constituency service is securitised?

    The security-accessibility trade-off

    All security systems come with costs attached. When MPs tighten constituency service security the most obvious cost incurred pertains to accessibility. This security-accessibility trade-off manifests in one of two ways: either through a reduction in opportunities for constituents to meet with their MP, or through the adoption of security protocols which complicate access pathways. In terms of reduced opportunities for constituent-MP engagement, take for instance those MPs who have stopped holding surgeries in public venues (e.g. shopping malls) because of security concerns. Consider also the MP who, after repeated incidents of verbal abuse, admits that he no longer socialises in his own constituency. These examples of retreat from the public square are problematic, because it is through even the most innocuous and impromptu interactions – in the local pub or supermarket for instance – that MPs develop their constituency antennae, learning about the issues which matter to their constituents:

    We try to be, as constituency MPs, recognisable, available, accessible to all. A successful constituency MP is the person who people feel they can go to in the pub or, as frustrating as that sometimes is, come up to you when you’re doing your shopping.

    Access to MPs can be complicated by security in a number of ways. Some MPs, for example, have replaced “drop-in” surgeries with appointment-only meetings, a formality which likely results in some constituents being turned away. We also know that, on the advice of police, some MPs have discontinued in-person surgery appointments, instead offering online meetings only. Whilst this might expedite access to MPs for the digitally confident citizen, it will disincentivise engagement for those without the requisite skills. What is more, the value and quality of online meetings – relative to in-person meetings – is open to question. The social scientific evidence underlines the therapeutic value of in-person meetings between MPs and constituents. These in-person meetings are key to the development of “co-presence”, and help build a “human bridge” through which constituents feel listened to. These benefits could be much harder to attain when the interaction occurs through a screen. Similarly, with face-to-face meetings, that personal touch and sense of intimacy is likely compromised by the presence of security guards.

    The symbolic costs

    Public spaces articulate political and cultural messages. What messages, then, are conveyed to the public when MPs adopt airport-style (or even prison-style) security at their constituency offices? Think bulletproof glass, CCTV, reinforced doors, panic buttons and so on. Whilst these measures may reassure MPs and their staff, the effect on constituents could be quite the opposite, perhaps marking the space as somehow unsafe, where visitors need to be on their guard. Research into other sites that have been securitised suggests as much, whereby defensive urban architecture (designed to mitigate terrorist attacks) has had a chilling effect on public democratic culture, eliciting a range of subjective emotional responses from pedestrians: fearfulness, suspicion, paranoia, and exclusion. Some of the security measures at constituency offices could be eliciting a similar response from constituents. Take, for instance, the MP who tells his constituents they should “be prepared to be searched” when they arrive at his surgery:

    We are following security guidance, as a result Security Operatives and/or the Police will be screening constituents attending face to face surgery appointments. Please bring along photo ID, leave bags and coats at home where possible, as they will not be permitted in the meeting toom and will need to remain outside the meeting space and be prepared to be searched.

    (Guidance provided on Julian Smith MP’s website for constituents)

    For the architect, Stephen Flusty, places and spaces bearing the features of security – searches of person or property, say – warrant being labelled as “jittery”. They are marked, in other words, by a tense and nervous atmosphere. We might ask then: how many of the constituency offices in the UK are showing signs of the jitters?

    Security and trust: a Catch-22?

    Security measures at the constituency level could, then, be counter-productive, in that MPs may be undermining the very representative connections they seek to protect. Up until now, the linkage between MPs and constituents at the local level has been held up as a positive exception to what has otherwise been a story of increasing political disengagement across western democracies. But what if new security measures at the local level are making engagement more difficult, placing distance (figuratively and literally) between MPs and constituents?

    Amid a general crisis of representation, in which people in the UK typically feel unrepresented by Westminster, there is a risk that the mitigating power of constituency service will be diminished if MPs become (or are perceived to be) harder to reach – or are less present – at the local level. Moreover, if perceptions of disconnect between politicians and the public is a driver of political distrust, and that distrust in turn fuels abuse of politicians, the security steps MPs are taking to mitigate this threat could in fact be exacerbating it.

    Importantly, the securitising trend affecting British political life appears set to deepen. The Speaker of the Commons, Lindsay Hoyle – a long-time advocate for greater protections for MPs – has called for a transformation in parliament’s “security culture”. To a similar end, the outgoing Conservative government signed-off on a £31m package to bolster the constituency-level security of MPs; while the recently published Walney review recommends even greater bolstering. Understanding how such enhanced security shapes  the character and delivery of representative democracy in the UK – and the myriad costs it brings to bear on both politicians and the public – warrants greater attention.

    This blog post was first posted by LSE blogs. It draws on research by the authors published in Parliamentary Affairs. All views expressed are the authors’ own.

    About the authors

    Neil Matthews is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol.

    Sean Haughey is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the Institute of Irish Studies at the University of Liverpool.


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    Petitions and Petitioning in Europe and North America

    By Henry Miller.

    Over the last decade, parliaments across the world have adopted e-petition systems to promote citizen engagement with legislatures. While made possible by the internet and twenty-first century technology, the contemporary e-petition can also be understood as the latest version of an ancient political practice: the petition. As this blog will illustrate, petitions and petitioning have long been a popular way for people to engage with parliamentary institutions, both before and after the advent of modern democracy.

    This blog summarises key findings from a major new edited book, Petitions and Petitioning in Europe and North America: From the Late Medieval Period to the Present published by Oxford University Press for the British Academy. Originating from an AHRC Network, the book brings together historians, political scientists, legal scholars, and sociologists to examine petitions and petitioning, that is the practices related to the drafting, signing, presentation and reception of petitions.

    As the book shows, petitions have been ubiquitous across a many different geographical, chronological, and political contexts, including modern democracies and authoritarian regimes. The book is organised into three sections that: 1) define petitions with greater conceptual clarity than before; 2) examine changes and continuities in petitioning over long periods of time; and 3) offer case studies of why and when petitions have mattered in particular political contexts, ranging from late medieval England to the early Soviet Union. This blog will summarise findings in three areas that will be of particular interest to scholars of parliamentary studies.

    First, a key theme of the book is the relationship between petitions and the evolution of parliamentary institutions. In his chapter, Gwilym Dodd shows that petitions were an important method for collectively asserting parliamentary authority against royal power in late medieval England. During the ‘age of revolutions’ (1789-1871) in Europe and North America, mass, collective petitioning on public issues, often based on newly codified rights to petition, was increasingly directed to legislatures. The value of petitions to parliaments was double-edged in an age of limited suffrage. Parliaments, including the UK House of Commons, used petitions to claim a degree of popular consent in the absence of democratic elections. Yet at the same time, petitioners invoking ideas of popular sovereignty frequently challenged parliamentary authority by claiming to represent a broader people than the limited electorate.

    In the twentieth century, as Richard Huzzey and Henry Miller show, there was a shift away from petitioning legislatures to a broader range of authorities, including international bodies like the United Nations. Petitioning remained a ubiquitous form of political participation, but because petitions to non-parliamentary authorities (such as Number 10 Downing Street) were rarely recorded, its continued popularity remained largely invisible to scholars. This historical perspective allows us to see that one important implication of the growth of legislative e-petitions systems, documented by Cristina Leston-Bandeira in her chapter, is that it restores parliaments as the principal authorities for receiving petitions from citizens.

    Second, petitions have been an important mechanism for representation across the centuries. As a series of studies have shown, petitions have enabled the ‘voice of the voteless’ to be heard in legislatures from groups lacking formal political rights, including Native Americans, women before universal suffrage, and colonised peoples in the British empire.  In their study of the US Congress over two centuries, Maggie Blackhawk and Daniel Carpenter persuasively argue that petitioning has been an important form of representation that exists independently of electoral and party politics. Examining Dutch petitions over three centuries, Maartje Janse et al, demonstrate that petitioning has been a significant practice for making representative claims to authority by individual citizens and groups. In his survey of petitions in colonial Jamaica during the era of slavery, the late Aaron Graham shows that petitioning was one of the few tools available to groups including Free People of Colour and Jewish subjects to  claim rights from a legislature dominated by slave-owners. Marta Gravela and Ismini Pells show that petitions were an important mechanism for claiming citizenship and welfare, respectively, from the state.

    Third, the book reveals the essential duality of petitions and petitioning as both formal and informal political practices that is vital for understanding their ubiquity, longevity, and flexibility. While often studied in formal, institutional, official settings, notably parliaments, petitions have always taken informal, unofficial forms as well and have been directly to a range of authorities. As chapters by Mark Knights, Joris Oddens, and others show, there has been an enormous variety of petitions and related subscriptional (or name-signing) practices, including supplications, covenants, declarations, and gravamina to name but a few. In the nineteenth-century UK, petitions to the House of Commons were the most popular genre of petitioning, but these existed alongside addresses to the monarch, memorials to government, and requisitions and other petitions directed to every type of local authority.

    Petitions have never been isolated from other forms of political participation. Indeed, in particular contexts they have underpinned and made possible other forms of collective action. While petitions today are often regarded by sociologists as a conventional form of collective action compared to more direct forms of protest, a historical perspective shows that petitioning has often been linked with revolts, rebellions, and revolutions. Petitioning has often been a fluid political practice that could mutate into other forms, including mass demonstrations or strikes, while the correlation between petitions and the formation of political organisation such as political parties or single-issue associations is well-established. Modern forms of participation and engagement have evolved from petitioning. The institutionalised forms of referendums and initiatives in Switzerland, Andreas Würgler shows, developed from a long tradition of petitioning. The practice of letter-writing to MPs and political leaders, which expanded dramatically in the twentieth-century, was an outgrowth of petitioning as Huzzey and Miller suggest.

    The shape-shifting quality of petitions is one of the many reasons why they have been a widespread practice since the late medieval period, and a key means for interacting with parliamentary and representative institutions, even if now, they largely take digital form.  

    About the authors

    Dr. Henry Miller is Vice Chancellor’s Fellow in the Department of Humanities, Northumbria University.


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    Reimagining the UK Parliament

    By David Judge and Cristina Leston-Bandeira.

    Few institutions – whether economic, social, or political – have escaped calls in recent years for reimagining. In its literal sense reimagining is ‘the action or an act of imagining something again’(OED); or, stated more pithily, it means to ‘think seriously about starting over’. A reimagining of parliament, therefore, needs to explore and trouble (in the sense of challenging and disrupting) current imaginings of what parliament is and does. This is what we set out to do in our new book Reimagining Parliament.

    Stages of Reimagining

    A ‘stages approach’ was adopted to reimagining. The first stage was to identify what was to be reimagined. Obviously, in our case the specific focus is the UK parliament. It is not about the genus of ‘parliament’, or of the general concept of ‘parliament’. Instead, it is about the Westminster parliament firmly located within a ‘Westminster system’ of government. This is the present (what currently exists). This provides the starting point for reimagining (what does not yet exist).

    The second stage of reimagining was to identify who is doing the reimagining. The selection criteria for ‘reimagineers’ was that they should collectively combine the practical, professional experience of those who have worked in Westminster and the academic, research experience of those who have analysed parliament from a range of disciplines; and that they should be willing to step outside their professional and academic comfort zones to be provoked into thinking afresh about how they might reimagine parliament. Our ‘reimagineers’ were: Didier Caluwaerts, Emma Crewe, Paul Evans, David Judge, Cristina Leston-Bandeira, Lucinda Maer, Alexandra Meakin, Dann Vermassen, Hannah White, and Ben Yong.

    A third stage was the ‘how’ of reimagining. A ‘headshift’, in the sense of ‘a break with conventional thinking’, was required. To break with the orthodoxies of institutional perspectives, contributors were asked to identify foundational principles with which to drive the modelling ab initio of various dimensions of parliamentary activity; to explain why the identified principles are deemed to be foundational, and why they matter. Two broad categories of principles emerged from this identification process. In the first category are principles broadly reflective of basic political tenets currently underpinning notions of liberal democracy in the UK: these include openness; engagement/connectedness; accessibility; inclusion; equality; fairness; responsiveness; and accountability. Principles in the second category are associated more with institutional and organisational norms and practices: these include wellness; ethical propriety; sustainability; organisational flexibility; and effective institutional governance.

    The outcomes of reimagining

    Notions of space, connectivity and interaction help in defining the positioning and distinctiveness of parliament at the centre of UK politics. ‘Space’ focuses attention upon location, architectural space and purpose, and the symbols, performances and rituals of parliament. ‘Connectivity’ is concerned with the dynamics of representation, the identities of those to be brought together in parliament, and how citizens are included and engaged in parliamentary processes. ‘Interaction’ is multi-directional, both outward looking to inter-institutional connections and highly politicised processes of effecting government responsibility and accountability; and inward looking to intra-institutional modes of administration and regulation, demarcated by parliamentary procedures and processes of self-governance.

    Within these encompassing frames – of parliamentary space, connectivity, and interaction – the impact of how first category foundational principles may impact reimagining can be seen below.

    Openness, engagement/connectedness, and accessibility

    Space: These principles are used to guide rethinking: first, in the architectural sense of designing more open-plan spaces within which parliamentarians and staff could meet and work; and of an opening-up of the dark recesses of the parliamentary estate to allow in more natural light and ventilation. Second, in the sense of parliament being open to the public and infusing the principle of public access into the architectural design and necessary security structures and working regimes at Westminster. A fundamental question behind such reimagining is: what would the building look like if the public’s access to democracy was the primary purpose for the design?

    Connectivity: The principles of openness and accessibility also underpin a reimagining of the engagement networks, mechanisms and processes of parliament to inform its information, education, communication, consultation and participation activities. In part this prioritisation of openness reflects growing citizen expectations of more openness within parliamentary democracies across the world. Whilst the principles of openness and accessibility provide keystones for engagement activities, their interconnectedness with other principles – of relatability, relevance, continuity, and sustainability – is also vital to reimagining public engagement.

    Interaction: When applied to parliamentary scrutiny the principles of openness; engagement/connectedness; and accessibility provide for: greater openness and accessibility in the sense of the ability to obtain information from government and citizens and the capacity to receive (and publish) information in a more open way – through reimagining the technologies, the language, and the choreography of scrutiny. A reimagining of connectedness would include greater deliberative innovation into the scrutiny process; alongside a rethinking of partnership working both within Westminster and between legislatures in the UK; as well as enhanced networking with other monitoring and regulatory bodies. In turn, the principle of engagement can be used to rethink the relationship between parliamentarians and scrutiny processes.

    When applied to parliamentary procedure, a reimagining based on the above principles, would aim to encourage participation, deliberation, and make procedure more accessible to parliamentarians and citizens. To this end, it should be transparent both in the sense of being ‘open’ about the rules governing parliamentary behaviour and how they are applied, as well as being presented in language which is natural, plain and transparent. Enhanced openness, in conjunction with other identified ‘second category’ principles, envisages procedure to be more ‘relatable’ inasmuch as it must be recognisably human; ‘relevant’ insofar as it must focus attention on what is important; and provide ‘continuity’ to the extent that procedure must be predictable without being unchanging.

    Inclusion, equality, fairness, and responsiveness

    These principles provide tensile threads running through most aspects of reimagining parliament.

    Space: the principles of inclusion and equality are of central importance in re-envisioning parliamentary architectural space and transforming parliamentary rhythms, rituals and symbols. Such reimagining would have at its heart securing greater equality and inclusion in relation to currently under-represented or un-represented groups in parliament. These principles would be inhered by symbolic recognition of the achievements of minority groups; provide challenges to prevailing ‘hierarchies of value’; and made manifest in redesigns of parliamentary space, parliamentary communication and messaging strategies, and the adoption of neutral (non-exclusionary) parliamentary language.

    Connectivity: A rethinking of parliamentary engagement imbued with the principle of inclusion aims to produce a parliament that is more welcoming, more relatable, and more relevant both to current generations and to future generations of parliamentarians and citizens. The principle of inclusion also signifies a necessary representation of diverse bodies, abilities, voices, opinions, backgrounds, races, ethnicities, genders, and identities in parliamentary activities. Securing greater equality and inclusiveness in the representative process requires affirmative action, including compensatory measures, to challenge the structural and attitudinal barriers which perpetuate representational inequalities. The inclusion of more, and more diverse, voices in the deliberation of public policies through such institutional actions and measures, alongside the situating of parliament as a key nodal point in intricate networks of electoral and non-electoral representation, are essential elements of reimagining parliamentary representation. The principle of fairness also intersects with the discussion of representational equality, not least in the maxim that formal political equality is secured through free and fair elections. In turn, securing fairness opens up considerations of a more proportional electoral system and greater alignment of the activities of representatives to the preferences of the represented through the institutionalisation of an encompassing system of responsiveness.

    Interaction: Inclusion – and the promotion of diversity – serves as a guiding principle for reimagining the patterns of social interactions, working routines, and ‘people policies’ at Westminster. A reimagined parliament would conceptualise itself as an exemplar of best workplace practice and culture, rather than an exception to the rules shaping other workplaces. Moreover, a reimagined parliament would uphold the principle of fairness, and the closely aligned principle of non-discrimination, to guarantee the general right of workers be treated fairly and not to be discriminated against. When reimagining parliamentary governance, a parliamentary administration which is both responsive and responsible is to be a touchstone of good governance. These principles, when operationalised, would provide greater transparency of governance arrangements; and ensure that those making key administrative decisions are clearly identifiable and known to be responsible and accountable for those decisions.

    When it comes to reimagining parliamentary scrutiny, what makes it unique, and distinct from other forms of scrutiny of executive actions, is that it engages the notion of democratic accountability. The media, regulatory bodies, charities and academics may all play valuable scrutiny roles, but they lack this central democratic function. For parliamentary scrutiny to be effective, it needs to engage parliamentarians. Being engaging, efficient, connected, informed, and accessible can all be seen as part of good scrutiny, but good scrutiny should feed back into good government. Equally, if procedure is essential to conferring legitimacy upon the processes and outputs of parliament then the way decisions are reached must be seen to be fair (and, so far as possible, be enduring because they are fair).

    Further serious thinking

    Whilst the specific focus of Reimagining Parliament is ‘thinking seriously about starting over’ – in conceptualising parliamentary space, connectivity and interaction in Westminster – it also serves to prompt questions about the necessity of further serious thinking about reimagining the broader institutions and processes of parliamentary democracy and parliamentary government in the UK. Calls for broader reimagining are particularly salient at a time when: parliament is widely and roundly criticised (see, for example, Ian Dunt, Hannah White, and Alison Young); significant proportions of the UK population have little trust in Parliament; and many citizens believe that politicians at Westminster do not understand their lives.

    About the authors

    David Judge is Emeritus Professor of Politics in the Department of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.

    Cristina Leston-Bandeira is Professor of Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds.


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    Evidence on Stage? Comparing committee hearings in the UK House of Commons and German Bundestag

    By Marc Geddes.

    Parliamentary and legislative committees perform a range of roles, such as the scrutiny of legislation or accountability of government. Increasingly, committees are holding public hearings, which can be really important for MPs to gather relevant knowledge and evidence to support their work and fulfil committee tasks. In recent research, I spent time in the UK House of Commons and German Bundestag and interviewed MPs and staff to get a better understanding of whether committee hearings are important information-gathering tools. Given that these are often official and formal routes for parliaments to listen to stakeholders, these are prestigious and important and can be seen as ‘evidence on stage’.

    In the House of Commons, the parliament has two committee systems. For scrutinising legislation, temporary bill committees are made up of 30 or so members, appointed by parliamentary parties, to go through proposed laws via public meetings with an optional evidence-gathering stage. For scrutinising policy and holding government to account, permanent select committees exist to shadow government departments. Made up of small groups of MPs – usually around 11 members – and elected by the party colleagues, they are often independent-minded spaces. Select committees conduct policy scrutiny through inquiries that include open calls for written evidence and public hearings with a variety of witnesses (e.g. scientists, business or trade union leaders, interest groups, etc.). Committee members deliberate in private to identify key conclusions and recommendations, to which government must respond (but is not forced to accept). Analysis has shown that around 40 percent of recommendations are accepted.

    In the German parliament, permanent committees mirror government departments (plus some cross-cutting ones, such as a Petitions Committee). Committees are tasked with both examining legislation and with scrutinising policy. Committee size varies depending on the topic, but they are in general much larger than UK committees. For example, the Committee on Work and Social Affairs has 49 members. Members are appointed by parliamentary parties and take on the role of rapporteur, i.e. they are allocated specific portfolios within the committee’s wider remit. For example, in the Committee on Work and Social Affairs, one MP from each party will have responsibility for migration issues, another for pensions, etc. In general, Bundestag committee meetings are private but, especially since the 1980s, they have increasingly made use of public hearings. These can be used to invite experts to give evidence as part of scrutiny of legislative or policy proposals.

    At first glance, both parliaments seem reasonably similar. But this masks considerable differences. In the UK, committees are supported by a secretariat of procedural and policy specialists, who write briefing papers for all members, suggest witnesses and analyse written evidence. Witnesses are usually identified on the basis of suggestions from members and especially the committee’s chair, in consultation with the advice from parliamentary officials (including the secretariat but also the House of Commons Library and the Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology). Bundestag committees, meanwhile, are also served by a secretariat, but their role is to offer procedural advice only. Witnesses are instead nominated by parliamentary parties, often via group leaders and rapporteurs, who’s own staff will undertake research and identify experts. The number of witnesses depends on the size of the parliamentary party. Witness lists are published, inclusive of the party that nominated them, so it is fully transparent who invited whom.

    The two approaches by the House of Commons and the Bundestag push evidence-gathering in different directions. In the former case, hearings are usually organised in a non-partisan way, especially for select committees. In the latter, given the inbuilt party political considerations, the process sharpens political divisions. These differences are reinforced through other practices. Briefing packs in the House of Commons are produced by the parliamentary administration and shared with all members; these often serve as agendas and give suggestions for issues to probe. Witnesses are often given oral briefing by the inquiry manager so that the witness can adequately prepare. In the Bundestag, briefings are handled by the rapporteur within each parliamentary party, often in close collaboration with the party leadership teams. Witnesses are usually briefed by the relevant party, too, in terms of the kinds of points and questions the party wants to get across.

    These dynamics mean that committee hearings in both parliaments operate differently. Questioning in the House of Commons can be very political, but it is rarely directly partisan. Indeed, many hearings – especially with experts – tend to be thematic and open-ended, which may be directed a the panel in general or at specific witnesses, and without time limits (though the chair may play an active role in directing questioning). Committee hearings in this context can allow for robust questioning of political and policy positions, and allow MPs to gather information and expert opinion on a range of issues. In the Bundestag, meanwhile, questioning dynamics are very different. MPs usually focus their questions only on witnesses that they have invited, and usually have a set amount of time to both pose a question and receive an answer (in committees I’ve observed, this was often three to five minutes). Consequently, hearings do not develop thematically or where responses can build on one another; there is no dialogue. The end result is that hearings are often used by MPs to confirm existing knowledge, legitimise pre-existing political positions, or criticise the government.

    Given the often assumed centrality of committees, and the growing prevalence of hearings, understanding how these function and work on a daily basis is critically important. What does this mean for committee hearings as evidence on stage? In both settings, it is clear that expertise is used, but used differently. Borrowing from the work of Christina Boswell, it seems that committee hearings in the UK case are used more ‘instrumentally’, i.e., for their problem-solving functions, while in the German case to ‘substantiate’ and ‘legitimise’ policy positions.

    What I have found so far is notably different to what we might expect. Given the UK’s wider adversarial political culture, replicated in many dynamics in the House of Commons (not least prime minister’s questions), and Germany’s consensus-seeking political system characterised by coalition governments and bargaining, we would have perhaps expected committee work to echo such cultural differences. And yet, they operate in opposing ways. We can explain this at least in part due to their parliamentary structures, whereby the German Bundestag is organised with reference to its parliamentary party groups and the UK House of Commons gives primacy to the individually elected representative.

    However, there are deeper underlying issues at play. First, with respect to the parliamentary administration, for example, MPs in the UK are a lot more positive about the service provided by officials who are seen as trusted and impartial. In my interviews, German MPs were a lot more sceptical of the idea of neutrality, with many questioning whether anybody can ever be neutral. Second, MPs view their roles in the institutions differently. In the House of Commons, MPs are either part of the frontbench or backbench; and if the latter, they see themselves as independent-minded and with the freedom to focus on anything they want. In the Bundestag, MPs are allocated policy portfolios on behalf of their parliamentary parties, and so see themselves as becoming specialists and advocate for their party in respective debates and committees. This suggests a more general point of difference between the two parliaments, which have developed within different parliamentary traditions and therefore have developed different structures and organisational methods to achieve those results.

    About the author

    Dr Marc Geddes is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, and Visiting Fellow, Institute for Parliamentary Research (IParl). His past area of research expertise focuses on parliamentary committees in the UK House of Commons. Since 2024, he has begun a new research project to compare how parliaments across Europe gather, analyse and make use of different types of knowledge to fulfil their democratic functions.


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    Changes in UK executive-legislative relations: A Congressionalising House of Commons, 1997-2015

    By Kento Ohara.

    Literature on the changing nature of the UK constitution in recent years abounds. Although there is a widespread perception that the UK constitution has been undergoing some significant change recently, there is little consensus to date on how to conceptualise this change. In addressing this challenge and placing the UK’s recent constitutional developments in a comparative context, my project focuses on executive-legislative relations in the UK as the underlying dimension in the country’s recent constitutional evolution. This focus flows from the fact that the sovereignty of crown-in-parliament has been widely identified as the core of the UK constitution. To repeat the well-rehearsed phrase of the late English constitutional thinker Walter Bagehot, it is the ‘close union, the nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers’ that is the ‘efficient secret’ of the (English) constitution (2009, p. 11). Notable recent developments within the UK’s sovereign parliament (especially the House of Commons) and its relationship with the executive branch include: major shake-ups in the Commons’ select committee system (Fisher 2015; Russell 2011), increasing number of rebellions within parliamentary parties (Cowley & Stuart 2012; 2014) and new legislation on the prime minister’s dissolution power (Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011; Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022). The role perception of MPs and their career patterns, amid the rise of ‘career politicians’ in UK politics, have also been said to be going through some transformation, influencing attitudinal changes on part of these politicians to a certain extent (Fisher 2015; Heuwieser 2018).

    How then can we conceptualise these changes in UK executive-legislative relations, and how can we measure such changes empirically? My project seeks to address these questions by turning to the classic works of Polsby (1975, ch. 4) and Wilson (1885) on Anglo-American comparison of legislatures. Drawing on these influential studies on comparative legislatures, my project proposes the concept of ‘Congressionalisation’ of the UK House of Commons. It is argued that both institutionally and behaviourally, UK executive-legislative relations are incrementally becoming more similar to those observed between the US executive and congress.

    Traditionally, the UK’s executive-dominated parliamentary system has been contrasted with the US presidential system, where Congress dominates the legislative process. Whereas in the UK the parliamentary majority, controlled by the executive, is vested with extensive agenda control and legislative power in its fusion-of-power model of government, under the US’s division-of-power constitution, the executive and legislative branches retain a much more significant degree of power to constrain each other in the legislative process (not to mention the heftier role of the judicial branch) (Bagehot 2009; Lijphart 1992; Wilson 1885).[i] This arrangement has created what the US political scientist Richard E Neustadt called a system where ‘separated institutions shar[e] power’ (1960, p. 39). This Anglo-American difference has long been noted by American and British constitutional thinkers, perhaps most notably by the future American president Woodrow Wilson, who decried the American system as a ‘congressional government’ (1885).

    It was Polsby who picked up on these earlier observations on the different levels of policy-making influence legislatures have in Western democracies, and conceptualised the Westminster parliament as the ideal-type of an ‘arena’ legislature, in contrast to the ‘transformative’ Congress in the US (1975, pp. 278ff). In short, an arena legislature exercises very limited policy-making powers, whereas a transformative legislature enjoys a vital role in shaping policies. Following Wilson’s and other earlier observations, Polsby attributed this difference in policy-making influence of the UK and US legislatures primarily to the strength of their committees. Whilst the UK featured ad hoc standing committees to scrutinise bills, congressional committees yielded significant and effective policy influence. Indeed, some ‘mega-seat’ committees, such as the House Rules Committee, have acted as gateways for bills thereby exercising considerable agenda control, a power that is usually reserved for government ministers in the UK.

    Polsby also proposed some preliminary hypotheses as to why some legislatures enjoyed larger policy-making influence than others. According to Polsby, it was the ‘character of parliamentary parties’ (emphasis added) that was related to the extent to which a legislature was ‘arena’ or ‘transformative’: the more coalitional, decentralised and flexible the parties, the more transformative the legislature.[ii] Among these characteristics, the first dimension (the extent to which parties are coalitional) related to the electoral parties, and the third dimension (flexibility) to the legislative parties, whilst the second dimension (the extent to which parties are decentralised) concerned both electoral and legislative parties. Hence, with respect to the internal working of legislatures, Polsby’s argument on the difference between the UK parliament and the US congress can be summarised into the following three key aspects:

    1. Committee strength: the US congress features stronger committees in terms of policy influence than the UK parliament.
    2. Agenda control: the US congress features a more decentralised, coalitional agenda control over its business than the UK parliament.
    3. Legislative parties: the US congress features parties that are more decentralised in terms of the distribution of legislative posts and more flexible (less party-disciplined) in terms of intra-legislative voting than the UK parliament.

    My project argues that the UK parliament is indeed incrementally growing similar to this classic understanding of the US congress on these three dimensions, and seeks to corroborate the Congressionalisation argument by empirically measuring recent changes in these three aspects.

    Existing studies do point to some recent developments in Westminster with regard to these three aspects. For example, studies have shown that with reforms to both public bill committees (legislative committees, formerly known as standing committees) and select committees (executive oversight committees), parliament is in a better position to scrutinise the government effectively (Levy 2009; Benton & Russell 2013). Especially in the case of select committees, these institutional innovations seem to have strengthened Parliament’s policy-making influence (Russell & Benton 2011; Lynch & Whitaker 2019). Although the UK government still retains unrivalled agenda control (a pledge made by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition to establish a House Business Committee in the House of Commons went unfulfilled), there now exists the Backbench Business Committee, which determines the topics to be debated during backbench business, giving parliamentarians more control over their own time (Matthews 2015). Distribution of legislative posts, such as select committee chairs and membership, has also become more decentralised, taking patronage away from the party whips (Fisher 2015; Russell 2011).

    It is also important to note the behavioural changes on part of both MPs and the executive as well. Party cohesion in the House of Commons has waned in recent years with rebellions and government defeats becoming increasingly more common (Cowley & Stuart 2012; 2014). The preventive, as opposed to reactive, influence of Parliament has also manifested in the government’s approach to the legislative process, with the government’s Guide to making legislation explicitly advising ministers to anticipate potential dissent in Parliament (Cabinet Office 2022, pp. 159-160; see also Russell & Cowley 2016; Russell et al 2016). This is more akin to what we are used to see in the US context, where the executive branch is required to anticipate and bargain with congressional actors to achieve policy goals (e.g. Mayhew 1974, p. 107).

    My project seeks to further this comparison of the British and American legislatures, especially on the flexibility dimension of legislative parties. I am devising new measures on divisions, i.e. intra-legislative voting, and on parliamentary speeches, that will allow me to trace behavioural changes of parliamentarians over time, especially in relation to Anthony King’s ‘modes’ of executive-legislative relations (1976). This will make a novel contribution to the literature on UK parliamentary reform and cross-national comparison of legislatures, as well as documenting the logic of Westminster’s evolution over recent years.


    [i] Takayasu’s recent contribution highlights the changing roles of the judiciary and the House of Lords in the UK constitution as well, which he denotes as ‘Madisonianisation’(2018, in Japanese). My project focuses on the UK’s narrower executive-legislative relations.

    [ii] Later studies have also confirmed that in parliamentary systems, having a coalition government is correlated with stronger parliamentary power to scrutinise the executive (Martin & Vanberg 2011; André et al 2016).


    About the author

    Kento Ohara is an MPhil student reading Politics (Comparative Government) at the University of Oxford. He is primarily interested in legislatures in parliamentary democracies, mainly in the UK, Germany and Japan, and how their internal procedures change over time.

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    Necessary Women: pioneering women working in Parliament

    By Mari Takayanagi.

    Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, many people lived and worked in the Palace of Westminster. Some worked for the House of Commons or House of Lords, some were family members of office holders, and others were servants in households. This included many women. Indeed, at times female residents outnumbered male residents by nearly two to one: the 1911 census, for example, lists 67 women and 36 men living in the Palace of Westminster in addition to the suffragette Emily Wilding Davison who hid there in a cupboard overnight. There were also of course many staff who did not live in, an enormous variety of roles from Clerks to cleaners.

    The presence of so many staff may be surprising, as Parliament is always equated in the general public mind with MPs and Members of the House of Lords debating in their chambers. Although some staff might play visible roles, such as the Doorkeepers in their uniforms and the Clerks sitting at the table, they appear almost as part of the furniture – blending in with the Gothic architecture, ritual and ceremony, rather than as individuals. Even more overlooked are the staff in less visible roles, including many women. 

    But staff not only work in Parliament, they are also subject to the same kinds of employment and social issues as workers outside Parliament. Recent research by Rebecca McKee has examined ‘unsung heroes’, staff who work for MPs. The staff who work for the House of Lords and House of Commons are similarly unsung. My new book Necessary Women, co-authored with Elizabeth Hallam Smith, uses new archival research to provide the first ever history of women working in the Palace of Westminster. This approach helps reframe Parliament from a solely political workspace to a place of work more generally, highlighting women from all classes working in jobs reflecting gender roles in wider society.

    I was delighted to share some of this research at the PSA Parliaments Annual Conference 2023. In this blogpost I’m going to focus on three pioneering women for whom the Second World War brought new opportunities in Parliament: Kay Midwinter, Monica Felton, and Jean Winder.

    Kay Midwinter

    In May 1940, shock rang around the House of Commons as a woman walked in and stood calmly on the floor of the House, looking around at her new workplace. This was Kay Midwinter, the first female Clerk in the House of Commons. Appointed to free up a man for war service, the ‘Girl Clerk’ as she was termed in the press –she was aged 32 – worked for the House of Commons National Expenditure Committee during the Second World War.  Previous experience of working with committees in the League of Nations in Geneva helped her to get the job. Highly praised by her managers and by Irene Ward and Joan Davidson, the female MPs on the committee, Midwinter worked particularly closely with Ward and Davidson on two reports, on the women’s armed services and women factory workers.

    Midwinter later reflected on her time in the Commons as follows:

    During the war I was standing behind the Speaker’s Chair about 5 or 6 yards from Churchill while he made all his famous war speeches. He used to glare at me as much as to say “What’s this woman doing?” but he never challenged me…. when it came to laying the Report on the table of the House – you know, my male colleagues said “Oh you’d better not do that, you know, it has never been done by a woman before!” So I said “Well, for that reason I’m going to do it!” So there we are. But really one was up against male prejudice throughout. Absolutely. There was never any question of promotion.

    [Oral history recording, United Nations Career Records Project, Bodleian Library]

    Not only promotion but pay, for Midwinter was paid less than half the rate of her fellow male Clerks doing the same job as her. Ward and Davidson expressed their opinion that she was ‘inadequately paid’ and she did receive a pay rise, although only to the ‘women’s equivalent’ of the male grade. She moved to the Foreign Office in 1943. After the war she went to work for the United Nations, first in New York and then back in Geneva, where she died in 1996.

    Monica Felton

    Like Kay Midwinter, Dr Monica Felton worked for the National Expenditure Committee in the House of Commons during the war as a fairly small part of a wider public career – but there the similarities end. Felton was as an elected Labour member of the London County Council, most unusual; Parliamentary staff would not usually have such a public party-political affiliation. She was appointed to the Commons as an economic advisor on the recommendation of Lewis Silkin, a Labour MP on the committee who had also previously been an LCC member.  He and Felton had a strong shared interest in town planning; her significance as a woman town planner has been studied by Mark Clapson.  Felton had a doctorate from the LSE and was previously a lecturer for the Worker’s Educational Association, where she was remembered by students as a Marxist. She worked in the Commons for 18 months before resigning with permission.

    After the war, Silkin appointed Felton to be chairman of first Peterlee and then Stevenage New Town Development Corporations between 1949 and 1951. However, she was fired from Stevenage after going on an unauthorised trip to North Korea for the left-wing Women’s International Democratic Federation in 1951. It was a very controversial visit; on her return, she accused American, South Korean and even British troops of involvement in massacres of the Korean population and other atrocities, on Radio Moscow and in the Daily Worker, and was awarded the Stalin Peace Prize. The episode made her infamous and ruined her career in the UK. She made a new life for herself in India, where she died in 1970.

    Jean Winder

    Jean Winder was the first woman Hansard reporter. She fought a long battle for equal pay, and like Midwinter, was also assisted by Irene Ward MP. In August 1951, Ward stood up in the House of Commons chamber and said:

    The House of Commons is run on the basis of equal pay… but there is one woman on the HANSARD staff in the Gallery, Mrs. Winder, who has not got equal pay… I have got Mrs. Winder’s permission to draw the attention of the House to what I consider is an intolerable constitutional position…

    [House of Commons Debates, 2 August 1951, col 1710]

    Jean Winder was appointed to House of Commons Official Report, known as Hansard, in January 1944 when the Editor was desperate for staff and unable to find a suitable man.  Like Midwinter, Winder was an immediate success in the Commons, highly rated, and performing exactly the same job as her male colleagues who were paid more than she was. Despite support all the way up to the Speaker, the Treasury refused equal pay. It took years of advocacy by Irene Ward before Winder finally achieved equal pay in late 1953. Ward supported Winder in private and in public over many years. This undoubtedly influenced Ward’s politics and relationships with political colleagues as she lobbied inside and outside Parliament.

    In conclusion, the stories of Midwinter, Felton and Winder illustrate various themes of Necessary Women including opportunities brought by war, important relationships between staff and MPs, and struggles for equal pay. Sadly, these innovative Second World War appointments had no direct successors in the House of Commons. The next female Hansard reporter was not appointed until 1968, and further female Clerks did not follow until 1969. The indirect and direct contribution of these pioneering women to Parliamentary life and work deserves to be better known.


    About the author

    Dr Mari Takayanagi FRHistS is Senior Archivist at the UK Parliamentary Archives and a historian of women and Parliament. Her first book, ‘Necessary Women: the Untold Story of Parliament’s Working Women’, co-authored with Elizabeth Hallam Smith, was published in June 2023 by History Press.