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Exposing the hidden wiring of the Parliament

By Ben Yong (Durham University)

‘Who runs the House?’ While most people were watching the Johnson government stumble from one crisis to another in early December 2021, peers in the House of Lords repeatedly asked this question in a rare debate on House governance. How the House of Lords (and Parliament as a whole) is run and the arrangements underpinning that may seem mundane, but ‘mundane’ issues can tell us something about the UK’s constitutional arrangements which are lost in theoretical frameworks such as political and legal constitutionalism, or separation of powers theories which focus on relationships between the branches of government.  

The Lords debate was in part prompted by a House of Lords External Management Review (‘EMR’), published in early 2021, which looked at how the House of Lords is governed and services and support administered. The EMR concluded, amongst other matters, that the accountability arrangements for the administration of the Lords were far from clear. Ultimately, the EMR recommended that the House of Lords Commission needed to be put on a statutory basis; there needed to be a clear statement of the governance arrangements; and a Chief Operating Officer should be appointed.

The debate highlighted that peers’ knowledge of the EMR and the general principles of House governance in the Lords was spotty. Indeed, some peers expressed surprise that the Leader of the House did not, in fact, lead the House (a misconception also common among MPs). Lord Davies’ comment summed up the view of many who attended the debate: ‘The governance of the House is … a mystery to me.’ Other contributions were evidence of Yong’s Law: the longer a debate on House governance continues, the greater the possibility that someone will mention catering, and its cost. Significantly, several Peers expressed fears about the imposition of bureaucratic structures upon a House which had traditionally seen itself as self-regulating.

Anyone with a knowledge of previous reviews of Lords governance would be unsurprised by this, or the EMR’s conclusions and recommendations (for a more in-depth discussion of House governance, see Ben Yong, ‘The Governance of Parliament’ in Alex Horne and Gavin Drewry (eds), Parliament and the Law (2nd edn Hart 2018) 75). Indeed, weak House governance and the confusion of parliamentarians has been a persistent issue in both the Commons and the Lords. 

So what are the governance arrangements of the Houses and why does it matter? Each House has an administrative organisation responsible for providing infrastructure and support for parliamentarians so that they can carry out their constitutional functions. This administration sustains and strengthens the House as an institution. The governance arrangements set out who is in control of the administration; and provide a line of accountability for the provision of that administration. 

One part of the governance arrangements is led by members; the other by officials. In the House of Lords, for instance, on the member side, there is the House of Lords Commission, responsible for political and strategic direction for House administration. The Commission is chaired by the Lord Speaker, and consists of (amongst others) the Leaders of the three parties, the Crossbenchers Convenor and the chairs of certain domestic Committees. Below the Commission are a number of domestic committees which scrutinise the internal working of the House (as opposed to select committees, which scrutinise the work of the executive), and support the Commission. On the official side, there is the Management Board, led by the Clerk of the Parliaments, which is responsible for implementation of Commission policies and day-to-day administration.  

Together these groups work to support peers in their work and maintain the institution. But there are problems. A key one is that the Lords House Commission is structured to be insulated against executive interference: it is cross-party in nature, and there is no government majority. Moreover, the Commission usually meets monthly and membership turnover is uneven (in the Commons, it is less than two years for most members). The result of all these factors is that political will is often lacking, or slow to crystalise. The Commission decides by consensus, if it decides at all. And even where the Commission does agree upon a course of action, it may still require agreement from the House itself. In such a political vacuum, the official-led Administration often cleaves to the status quo. 

There is also a lack of clarity about who is in charge, and therefore, who is accountable. In the debate, peers were quite confused about this. But they are right to be. There are multiple actors with claims to represent institutional interests. Even the titles of key actors suggest conflicting jurisdictional claims: there is a Lord Speaker and a Leader of the House—who is leading or speaking for the House? There is the House of Lords Commission, but as already noted, it is not the most strategic of actors. Nor is it the most visible: meetings are held in private with limited minutes often taking several weeks, if not months, to be published. It has no statutory basis. By contrast, the Clerk of Parliaments does have a statutory basis as Corporate Officer of the House (the Parliamentary Corporate Bodies Act 1992); and in practice is responsible for the day-to-day administration. But as the EMR noted, it is not clear how the Clerk is accountable to the Commission, or indeed, anyone. It is unsurprising there is confusion about who does what in the Lords.

The House of Commons has similar problems. One disgruntled former Clerk of the House gave his book on the House of Commons a harsh subtitle: ‘The Story of an Institution unable to put its own House in order’ (Barnett Cocks Mid-Victorian Masterpiece (1977)). In 2014, an ad hoc committee led by Jack Straw published a review (‘the Straw Review’) on House governance in the Commons. It was the first MP-led review of House governance in over 40 years. The Straw Review found a haphazard set of governance arrangements which lacked clarity; and a Commission which failed to provide adequate direction. 

In a way, the dilemma of governance is the problem of legislatures in condensed form: how can a group of nominally equal members collectively act together when they do not owe each other formal allegiance? With legislation, this problem is usually resolved through party majorities. But where the issue concerns not party, but rather what the institution needs, it is not easy to secure agreement. That is because firstly, it is difficult to turn parliamentarians’ minds to the institution; and secondly, there can be reasonable disagreement about what the institution does need. Without party and a clear set of governance arrangements, inertia and inaction become the obvious default. 

And so the Houses of Parliament are often slow to act on matters outside legislation, because of limited political will and a lack of clarity about who is responsible for what. The 2009 Expenses Scandal was caused in part by a failure of Commons governance to get a grip on the issue. Bullying and harassment of staff by parliamentarians in both the Commons and Lords were also failures of governance. And then there is the ongoing saga of the multibillion Restoration and Renewal (‘R&R’) project of the Palace of Westminster. The Palace is crumbling, and has been for well over a decade. This is in spite of a Joint Committee recommending a full decant from the Palace and sponsor and delivery bodies set up by statute. The Houses continue to dither and delay on timing (on R&R, see the untiring and ongoing work of Dr Alexandra Meakin).

So what? Why should we care? For one thing, the Commissions are primarily responsible for their respective House budgets—which together amounted to just under a billion pounds in 2020-1. This is not small money (although dwarfed by the budgets of the large Whitehall departments: the Home Office budget, for instance, was £16 billion in 2020-1). The governance arrangements can determine what resources are given to parliamentarians and committees. The Houses’ budgets matter, therefore, because they shape the capacity of Parliament to carry out its functions (Colin Lee and I discuss this in a chapter in the forthcoming third edition of Parliament and the Law). 

But more importantly, one reason for executive dominance over the legislature is that Parliament finds it difficult to act coherently: it is hobbled by a lack of clear leadership. Mainstream public lawyers have focused so much on the courts and issues like the location of sovereignty or legislative intent that they neglect the concrete institutional particularities of Parliament. This is not about political versus legal constitutionalism, and prioritising the ‘political’ over the ‘legal’. Rather, this is about recognising that there is more to each branch than its relationship with the others; that each branch has its own internal issues which may impede its effective functioning. Failures of governance can impact on the institution’s performance and ultimately, its legitimacy. ‘Mundane’ issues such as House governance and administration may be ‘constitutional’ matters as much as parliamentary sovereignty or legislative intent. 

My thanks to Arabella Lang, Alexandra Meakin and Patrick O’Brien for their comments on an earlier draft.

Dr Ben Yong, Associate Professor of Public Law and Human Rights, Durham Law School

This post was originally published on the UK Constitutional Law Association’s Blog. Thank you to the editors and Dr Ben Yong for allowing us to cross-post.

You can view the original post here: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2022/01/10/ben-young-exposing-the-hidden-wiring-of-the-parliament/

The suggested citation: B. Young, ‘Exposing the hidden wiring of the Parliament’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (10th January 2022) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/))

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“Tread carefully” – the UK Parliament as a human rights “defender” within the Northern Ireland devolution framework.


Leah Rea examines the role of the UK Parliament in ensuring compliance with the UK’s obligations under international human rights law within the context of devolution, in the absence of legislative intervention from successive UK Governments to address inaction by the Northern Ireland Executive.

Human rights discourse occupies a prominent role in Northern Ireland’s politics, with the issue of rectifying state non-action of protection of human rights arguably as old as the province itself. As evidenced by both historic and contemporary legislative records, the progression of human rights standards in Northern Ireland has always been problematic. The example of the 1960s civil rights movement illustrates both the historic propensity for the politicisation of human rights in the region, and the difficulty of securing legislative change in i) the absence of progression at devolved level, and ii) the absence of intervention by the UK Government, particularly when the Government evades international obligations. In recent years, the discussion has been framed within the context of devolution, focusing on where does legislative competency reside, and specifically, at what political juncture can legislative intervention be sought from the UK Parliament to rectify human rights issues in Northern Ireland? As we wait on the Northern Ireland Office (‘NIO’) to implement the pledge made by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to introduce the draft Irish language legislationpublished in conjunction with The New Decade, New Approach Agreement 2020, it is worth recalling the UK Parliament’s role as a human rights “defender” vis-á-vis the operation of the Sewel Convention in the context of Northern Ireland’s abortion law between 2018-2019.

Using parliamentary procedure to highlight human rights

Following an early election in March 2017, agreement to form the Northern Ireland Executive could not be reached and subsequently the devolved institutions did not function in Northern Ireland until January 2020. During this time, there were key developments in the recognition of the human rights violations arising from the then law governing abortion in Northern Ireland. In light of these, parliamentary procedure was utilised within the House of Commons to raise the particular matter of human rights in relation to abortion law in Northern Ireland, the UK Government’s corresponding non-compliance with international human rights law, and the need for legislative intervention in the absence of the devolved institutions.

Emergency Debate and navigating Sewel

Following the referendum result to repeal the Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution, the constitutional prohibition on accessing abortion, grassroots movements in Northern Ireland called for urgent legal reform to address widening geographical disparity in abortion access and human rights. With the Abortion Act 1967 limited in territorial application to Great Britain, the then legal framework in Northern Ireland comprised of sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861: abortion was only legal to protect the mother’s life, or cases where her mental and/or physical health was seriously at risk, and could not be accessed in cases of Fatal Fetal Abnormality (FFA), rape and incest. 

The development invoked fresh political impetus: Labour backbencher Stella Creasy MP utilised Standing Orders (No 24) to bring an emergency debate to the House of Commons on 5 June 2018 for the House to consider its role in repealing sections 58 and 59 of the 1861 Act. Creasy aimed to bring the operational impact of the 1861 Act to the attention of the House – and commence the argument that in the absence of a sitting Assembly, it was the responsibility of the UK Government under international human rights law to legislate to address human rights violations in Northern Ireland. 

In the context of Northern Ireland, Creasy referenced the findings of the UN CEDAW Committee inquiry that women and girls had been subjected to “grave and systemic violations of rights”. Conscious there were concerns regarding undermining the constitutional arrangements of devolution, Creasy emphasised the 1861 Act continued to operate across the UK, so Parliament was required to act to remedy the issue on a UK-wide basis. However, she noted the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 1998 provided for the UK Government “to legislate as necessary” to ensure the UK’s “international obligations” are met in respect of Northern Ireland. Conversely, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland upheld the Sewel Convention, stating as abortion was a devolved matter it “would not be appropriate for Westminster” to intervene. Ultimately, the House resolved its affirmation of the motion – and its role as a human rights “defender”.

The Urgent Question and a change in tactics

Shortly after the emergency debate, on 7 June 2018, the UK Supreme Court delivered its judgment in the judicial review brought by the NIHRC against the Department of Justice under the Human Rights Act 1998 on the basis the existing law violated Articles 3, 8 and 14 ECHR of women and girls by criminalising abortion access for FFA, rape and incest. A majority of the Court determined the law was incompatible with Art 8 ECHR in respect of not providing access to women and girls in these circumstances. Responding to the judgment, Creasy availed of procedure to ask an urgent question. In this instance, Creasy directly challenged the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland on the Government’s position of the incompatibility of the 1861 Act with human rights, further urging for the Government to progress the draft Domestic Abuse Bill and adopt it as a vehicle to repeal sections 58 and 59 on a UK-wide basis. She called upon the House, with “its responsibility” under the 1998 Agreement to uphold human rights in Northern Ireland, to “do our job” and call for legislative action. Again, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland invoked the Sewel convention, asserting the matter was within the legislative competence of the devolved institutions and so the responsibility of Northern Ireland politicians alone, and would not commit to recognising the UK Government’s obligations under international law.

Westminster intervenes: the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill

Political negotiations continued in Northern Ireland throughout 2019, and by June 2019 the period outlined within s1 of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation and Exercise of Functions) Act 2018 for Executive formation had expired. To enable the continuation of negotiations, the Secretary of State introduced The Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill to extend the available timeframe. Illustrating the UK Government’s need for the Bill to come into effect promptly, the Bill was subjected to a fast-track process. Whilst this process usually restricts Parliament’s ability to scrutinise Government Bills, in this instance the accelerated schedule proved feasible for tricky amendments to challenge the Government to uphold its international obligations. Creasy availed of the situation, tabling an amendment (New Clause 10) which obligated the Secretary of State, in the event of continued absence of devolved government in Northern Ireland, to implement the 2018 recommendations of the UN CEDAW Committee. This marked a significant change in Creasy’s tactics: here now was an attempt for direct legislative action from Westminster to rectify human rights issues in Northern Ireland. The Sewel Convention notwithstanding, the amendment was accepted by the Speaker’s Office for consideration.

Proposing her amendment at Committee stage, Creasy acknowledged the House must “tread carefully” in relation to achieving a balance between respecting the devolution arrangement and upholding human rights standards, but affirmed the role of Parliament as a human rights “defender”, emphasising the obligations of the House in accordance with the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement as regards safeguarding human rights in Northern Ireland. She submitted the UK Parliament had failed to adhere to its obligations and had a responsibility to intervene in the continued absence of devolved government. 

Responding for the Government, Minister for the NIO, John Penrose stated devolved issues should be the responsibility of the devolved institutions; Parliament should “tread carefully” within the devolved context. The pattern of affirming Sewel then ceased, as the Minister acknowledged the prolonged absence of devolved government in Northern Ireland, and “the result” of which was the list of human rights related amendments. The Minister further noted amendments on issues of conscience, such as the Creasy amendment, were “traditionally free votes” and confirmed the Government would not “break that important principle”. In the absence of a whipping operation Creasy’s amendment was approved by a parliamentary landslide of 332 votes to 99. The Bill as amended was subsequently carried at Third Reading and came into force on 9 July 2018. 

Whither Sewel?

It is interesting to chart the developments in this case study as regards navigating the Sewel Convention. Creasy initially sought to uphold Sewel: her original proposal was for the May Government to repeal the relevant sections of the1861 Act via the draft Domestic Abuse Bill and on a UK-wide basis, using the situation of human rights concerns in Northern Ireland as grounds for the necessity of this. However, following the judgment of the Supreme Court just two days later, Creasy emphasised the House’s particular role under the 1998 Agreement as regards human rights in Northern Ireland and urged for the May Government to directly intervene in light of the political vacuum in Northern Ireland. Her successful amendment to the 2019 Act therefore marked a turning point for the Sewel Convention, suggesting that in the event of a human rights violation in the devolved administrations, the UK institutions may intervene on the grounds of their role as final guarantors of human rights obligations in international law. Can we now interpret “will not normally legislate” in the context of upholding international human rights? Equally, we must consider that the requirement of consent under Sewel was a determining factor: in the absence of the devolved institutions, consent could not be acquired.

Moreover, the case study appears to suggest in the situation of a conflict between the convention of free votes upon conscience issues and the Sewel convention affirming devolved legislative competencies, the former takes precedence. Could the role of the UK Parliament as a human rights “defender” depend on individual Parliamentarians according to their own conscience? Or, was relying on the conscience convention an exercise in political expedience for the May Government to navigate the situation Creasy had created with her significant amendment in a tight timeframe? As the NIO recently introduced the The Abortion (Northern Ireland) Regulations 2021 – which empower the Secretary of State to issue direction to comply with the 2018 UN CEDAW Committee recommendations in Northern Ireland – in light of ongoing failure of the Northern Ireland Executive to fully commission abortion services, and so continuing with Westminster intervention in Northern Ireland, the situation on a contentious issue remains complex. The problem of human rights progression in Northern Ireland goes on.

Leah is a PhD Researcher at the Transitional Justice Institute at Ulster University. Her research focuses on examining the relationship between constitutional conventions established by devolution settlements, and the progression (or hindrance) of human rights standards in Northern Ireland. This blog post is based on a paper delivered at the PSA Parliaments Conference 2021.

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The Owen Patterson Scandal: Standards, Trust and Democratic Norms

By Chris Monaghan, Caroline Bhattacharya and Alexandra Meakin

NB The views expressed in this blog post do not reflect the view of PSA Parliaments

The resignation of Owen Paterson as Member of Parliament for North Shropshire, following revelations that he had been paid half a million pounds to lobby ministers has highlighted  what may be an uncomfortable truth, that many MPs supplement their parliamentary salary with taking on second or indeed third jobs. The extent of this practice has been forced into the open, with newspaper reports highlighting that the former Attorney-General Sir Geoffrey Cox had spent substantial time undertaking paid work (earning £700,000) for the British Virgin Islands. 

The focus on this blog will be the Paterson scandal. The blog will outline the events that gave rise to the controversial attempt by the government to protect Paterson from sanction, and in doing so revealed the problems with regulating the conduct of Members of Parliament and holding them to account for engaging in lobbying. The blog will then place the scandal within a broader context. 

Factual background

In response to the revelation in The Guardian that Paterson had been paid £500,000 to lobby ministers, an investigation was commenced by the Parliamentary Standards Commissioner, Kathryn Stone, who found that Paterson had  breached the rules relating to paid advocacy, declaration of interests, and the use of parliamentary facilities. Her findings were considered by the House of Commons Standards Committee—comprising four Conservative MPs, two Labour MPs, one Scottish National Party MP and seven lay members—who concluded:

“This is an egregious case of paid advocacy. Previous instances have led to suspensions of 18 days, 30 days and six months. Each of Mr Paterson’s several instances of paid advocacy would merit a suspension of several days, but the fact that he has repeatedly failed to perceive his conflict of interest and used his privileged position as a Member of Parliament to secure benefits for two companies for whom he was a paid consultant, is even more concerning. He has brought the House into disrepute. We therefore recommend that Mr Paterson be suspended from the service of the House for 30 sitting days”.

It is customary for the recommendations of the Standards Committee to be approved by MPs without a vote. Ahead of the vote on the suspension of Paterson, however, the former Leader of the House of Commons, Dame Andrea Leadsom, tabled an amendment, signed by 59 MPs, to the motion, declining to endorse the suspension until and if by a specially-formed select committee reviewed the “clearly flawed” standards system for MPs. The Government enforced a three-line whip on the vote and Dame Andrea’s amendment was passed by 250 to 232 Members of Parliament, with only two non-Conservative MPs voting in favour (one of whom was Rob Roberts MP, who had been elected as a Conservative prior to losing the Whip when he was suspended for a separate breach of standards rules). (It is important to note, however, that from the Conservative backbenches, 98 MPs did not vote and thirteen voted against the government). 

Any celebrations for ministers were short-lived, however, as the Government was forced into a U-turn almost immediately when the opposition parties made clear that they would not serve on the proposed new select committee. Just hours after the Leader of the Commons, Jacob Rees-Mogg, pledged to work on a “cross-party basis to achieve improvements in our system for future cases”, Paterson resigned as a Member of Parliament, triggering a by-election for December 2021. The Government’s initial approach was heavily criticised and it was seen by opponents and many commentators as shielding one of its own supporters and undermining the accountability of members for breaches of parliamentary rules. Ministers have acknowledged the Government’s mistake and described the U-Turn as the ‘grown-up thing’ to do (Nadhim Zahawi MP, BBC News). The Government has formally asked the Commons to rescind the motion establishing the new Committee, and Paterson’s resignation has meant that he will avoid any suspension. 

Analysis 

Paterson has resigned, the government has apologised and conceded its mistake. However, this does not negate the sense of double standards and the concern that the Johnson administration is further tarred with the taint of corruption. It has further reignited debate over the number of Members of Parliament who have second jobs. While MPs are barred from acting as “a paid advocate in any proceeding of the House”, there is no universal restriction on second jobs.  Just under a third of all Members of Parliament have additional income to their official parliamentary salary, and although this does not just affect one party (the Leader of the Official Opposition, Sir Keir Starmer reportedly received £70,000 for legal advice from private companies), the party with the highest proportion of MPs with second jobs is the Conservative Party (It should be noted that neither Sir Geoffrey Cox nor Sir Keir Starmer are accused of engaging in lobbying on behalf of their clients). A study by Weschle shows that Conservative MPs with a second job ask more parliamentary questions, and that these questions are targeted at larger ministries with more procurement spending and often concern internal policies (such as the state or planning of projects). 

There have been some defences of outside interests: Cabinet Office Minister Steve Barclay argued that there is “value in MPs having a continued connection with the world outside of politics”. Legal commentator Joshua Rozenberg has defended Sir Geoffrey Cox, partly due to the need to attract practicing lawyers to serve both in Parliament and as law officers—the ministerial roles of attorney general, solicitor general and advocate general for Scotland. Such arguments have often caused past efforts to bar MPs from holding certain outside interests to fail to gather sufficient support (e.g. the Private Members’ Bills tabled by Peter Bradley in 2002 and Martin Salter in 2007 and the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s recommendations in 2018). Following the Paterson scandal, however, Sir Keir Starmer’s intention to table a motion to ban MPs from paid consultancies or directorships may prove more successful.

The broader decline of trust in parliamentarians and Parliament itself is a matter of concern. New polling by the Committee on Standards of Public Life found that 44% of people rated the standards of conduct of MPs as quite or very low, compared to only 20% taking a positive view, and noted the progressively lower scores reported since 2002. The Hansard Society’s latest Audit of Political Engagement found that 72% of the public believe that our system of parliamentary government needs ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a great deal’ of improvement. 

In their book How democracies die: What history tells us about our future, Levitsky and Ziblatt remind us that “[d]emocratic backsliding today begins at the ballot box” (p. 5). In other words, nowadays it is more often elected governments than men with arms who seek to undermine democracy, and often “democracies erode slowly, in barely visible steps” (p. 3). Democracy is safeguarded by institutions such as parliament and written laws and rules upheld by independent courts, but, Levitsky and Ziblatt argue, at least as important are unwritten democratic norms:

Norms are […] shared codes of conduct that become common knowledge within a particular community or society – accepted, respected, and enforced by its members. Because they are unwritten, they are often hard to see, especially when they’re functioning well. […] Like oxygen or clean water, a norm’s importance is quickly revealed by its absence. When norms are strong, violations trigger expressions of disapproval, ranging from head-shaking and ridicule to public criticism and outright ostracism. And politicians who violate them can expect to pay a price. (p. 102)

When applying these arguments to the parliamentary setting, we can make a strong case that parliament as a democratic institution and the norms that underpin parliamentary democracy need to be defended first and foremost from within. And this task does not fall merely on the shoulders of the Speaker of the House of Commons as the highest representative of parliament and ‘conductor’ of parliamentary proceedings, but is a responsibility that should be shared by all parliamentary actors.

The main problem was not Owen Paterson. (There will always be some bad apples among the bunch.) The key issue was that the government – with the help of their Commons majority and key parliamentary figures such as the current and former Leaders of the House – (a) denied the legitimacy of the outcome of the parliamentary procedure to investigate and sanction MPs’ rule-breaching behaviour and (b) proposed to overhaul the institutional system for evaluating parliamentary standards, also retrospectively for the Paterson case.

Lord Evans, Chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, said on 4 November:

[I]t cannot be right to propose that the standards system in the House of Commons should be reviewed by a Select Committee chaired by a member of the ruling party, and with a majority of members from that same party. This extraordinary proposal is deeply at odds with the best traditions of British democracy. The political system in this country […] is a common good that we have all inherited from our forebears and that we all have a responsibility to preserve and to improve.

The two important norms at play here are the acceptance of outcomes of democratic processes (in this case the standards inquiry system) and what Levitsky and Ziblatt call ‘institutional forbearance’, that is the exercise of self-restraint and acting not only in the letters of the law but also in its spirit. The government’s actions in parliament undermined both these values. By imposing a three-line whip on its MPs, the government did not only interfere in what is generally seen as parliamentary business but also signalled that defiance would be considered a serious breach of party loyalty with potential consequences. (Angela Richardson, who abstained, lost her job as a Parliamentary private secretary – before being reappointed after the government’s U-turn.)

High levels of party unity are a key feature of a well-functioning parliamentary system. But a parliamentary party group cannot always be perfectly cohesive in their viewpoints, and when divergence emerges, party leaders usually have an array of institutional tools at their disposal to impose discipline. During every MP’s time in office, occasions will arise when their constituency interests and/or personal views and convictions will stand at odds with the official party line. Those are the moments when an MP needs to decide whether to stay silent for the sake of party loyalty or publicly communicate and act on their dissent, in full awareness that a roll-call vote stays in the historical records. When the issue at stake is not a specific policy but essential democratic norms and procedures, the option to stay silent is a particularly serious one, as MPs fail to fulfil their role as guardians of parliamentary democracy.

On 3 November, 248 Conservative MPs voted in favour of the Leadsom amendment, 13 voted against and a few more abstained and publicly voiced their objection such as the ‘Father of the House’, Sir Peter Bottomley. The government’s U-turn indicates that the broad public outrage and presumably conversations among members of the Conservative Party behind closed doors (and sometimes apparently in semi-public view) have succeeded in safeguarding parliamentary democracy in this instance. But this was not the first time and is unlikely to be the last time that the Johnson government seeks to tighten the executive grip on parliament, and that Conservative MPs must decide when the defence of the role of parliament, democratic norms and ethical principles is more important than party-political goals and personal ambitions.

This post was originally published on the Political Studies Association Blog.

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Using the past to help us to understand the future of the Palace of Westminster

Ahead of next Tuesday’s Virtual IHR Parliaments, Politics and People seminar, we hear from Dr Alexandra Meakinof the University of Leeds. On 9 November 2021, between 5.15 p.m. and 6.30 p.m., she will be responding to your questions about her pre-circulated paper on ‘Using the past to help us understand the future of the Palace of Westminster’.

The Palace of Westminster is in a state of advanced disrepair, and faces what was described by a Joint Committee of MPs and Peers in 2016 as ‘an impending crisis which we cannot reasonably ignore’. While a major refurbishment project—Restoration and Renewal (R&R)—was approved in 2018, the future of the Palace remains uncertain, as concerns mount among some MPs about the cost and the prospect of temporarily moving out to allow the work to take place.

The risk of a catastrophic fire, flood or failure of the essential services within the Palace has developed over many decades, as vital maintenance was neglected and the infrastructure serving the building went far past its expected lifespan. Indeed, some of the mechanical and electrical plant dates back to the building’s establishment in the mid-19th century, as a replacement for the old Palace, destroyed by fire in 1834.

The 1834 fire, as discussed previously on this blog, occurred after multiple unheeded warnings about the state of the building, a situation worryingly similar to today. It is not the only lesson from history, however, which may be relevant for current discussions. This blog posits that through historical analysis we can identify five recurrent themes that help to explain policymaking decisions relating to the Palace as a legislative building (figure 1, below).

Figure 1: Explaining policy decisions

A confused governance system has been evident in Westminster for centuries, manifested through divided patronage between the King and Prime Minister in the appointment of architects to work on the Palace in the 18th century and delays to the rebuilding after the 1834 fire caused by contradictory instructions from ministers, MPs and Peers—an issue still present today. In addition, the emotional attachment parliamentarians feel about their workplace—for example in the form of a connection to their predecessors, transmitted through the very fabric of the Palace—influences the decisions they make about its future.

This is linked to the third recurrent theme: a clear unwillingness to make radical changes to the Palace. When disaster has occurred, there has been a tendency to recreate the past: either in the exact replica of the previous Commons chamber in the 1940s (described by one MP in 1945 as taking ‘nostalgia to the stage of absurdity’), or in Barry’s design for the new Palace after the 1834 fire. These decisions then become precedent to be followed faithfully in future, a form of path dependency that explains the reluctance to move out of the Palace, the fourth theme. Finally, historical analysis shows that you cannot explain decisions about the Palace of Westminster purely by considering what was happening within the building. The intrinsically political nature of the legislature means that wider political events have influenced the policies chosen for the building.

The Elizabeth Tower covered in scaffolding, 2019; image: Ethan Doyle White, CC via Wikimedia Commons

Looking to history helps to explain how R&R became necessary but it can also explain why its future remains unclear. While the Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Act 2019 legislated for an independent governance structure, the future of the R&R project continues to be subject to the views of the House of Commons Commission. A number of MPs remain opposed to leaving the Palace of Westminster even temporarily, demonstrating the same attachment to the building as has been witnessed for generations. There have been repeated efforts to scale back the scope of programme, in a further sign of the tendencies towards conservatism and to reflect the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic. A key lesson from the historical analysis is that major work to the Palace of Westminster has tended to occur only when unavoidable: despite the approval of R&R, it may be that history repeats itself and the ‘impending crisis’ warned of in 2016 occurs.

The threat of a crisis is one major reason why the future of the Palace of Westminster matters. The risk to the Palace is not just about the potential loss of an emblem of national identity, but also the very real dangers faced by the people working in or visiting Parliament. Former Leader of the Commons, Andrea Leadsom, has warned that ‘it is only by sheer luck that no one has been injured or killed’ to date. But the future of the building also matters for the health of our democracy. Legislative buildings are not just symbols of the institution, but their architecture, design and décor affect how people—parliamentarians, staff and visitors—behave within. Through the necessary work to fix the pipes and stonework, the UK Parliament has an opportunity to think about how it can build a legislative building fit for the 21st century, shaped by the public and designed to facilitate their engagement with democracy. Taking this opportunity before crisis occurs would demonstrate that MPs and Peers really have learnt from the past.

To find out more, Alexandra’s full-length paper ‘Using the past to help us understand the future of the Palace of Westminster’ is available here.

This blog was originally posted on The History of Parliament Website and is reposted with permission.

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What does ‘evidence’ mean to MPs and officials in the UK House of Commons?

Marc Geddes provides us with an overview of some important findings from his research into select committees. In this blog he discusses how committees collate and examine evidence to support their deliberations and to effect scrutiny.

© Irish Times
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Monitoring Westminster: who is watching parliament?

Ben Worthy and Stefani Langehennig discuss their Leverhulme funded project on monitory democracy. The blog outlines some of the key implications for scrutiny of political representatives and the manner in which monitoring mechanisms are used in the arena of democratic conflict.

Panopticon – Wikipedia Commons
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(Re)-connecting parliamentary engagement: how storytelling can strengthen public-parliament dynamics in the UK

Alex Prior (University of East Anglia) and Cristina Leston-Bandeira (Leeds) discuss the potential for parliamentary story-telling to reach new audiences and to promote wider public engagement.

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Liaison Committee: A Prime Ministerial Performance?

Dr Mark Bennister of the University of Lincoln provides an incisive account of last week’s Liaison Committee. The piece considers the quality of scrutiny and the effectiveness of the Prime Minister’s performance during the session.

©BBC News online
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Bedding Down, Treading Water and Taking Two Steps Forward: Gender Equality and the 2019-20 House of Commons Select Committee Elections

Stephen Holden Bates (University of Birmingham, UK)

Stephen McKay (University of Lincoln, UK)

Mark Goodwin (Coventry University, UK)

The results of the elections for the UK House of Commons Select Committees are out[1]!

The 2010 Wright Reforms, designed to increase the standing of Parliament in the wake of the MPs’ expenses scandal, are now a decade old. One of the main reforms introduced was to alter the method of selection for House of Commons Select Committees[2] from one of appointment by party managers to one of election by the whole House (in the case of chairships) and by party caucuses (in the case of membership). This reform has been hailed by many as one of the reasons why select committees have become an ever more prominent and prestigious part of Parliament. There is also evidence that the reform has been good for some aspects of gender equality within the committee system, particularly in terms of female MPs becoming committee chairs[3]. Below we consider the outcomes of the latest round of select committee elections and argue that, in terms of female representation, they are a case of simultaneously bedding down, treading water and taking two steps forward.

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Parliamentary Standards – the battle to retain control

Richard Kelly of the House of Commons Library provides an overview of recent developments in the field of parliamentary standards. The blog discusses how institutional arrangements have evolved in response to a series of significant events such as scandals related to ‘cash for questions’ and MP’s expenses.

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