Tag: parliaments

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The real cost of MPs’ security to constituency representation

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date September 12, 2024

By Neil Matthews and Sean Haughey.

The abuse of MPs, both online and offline, is becoming a more prevalent feature of British political life. In the most egregious cases, abuse has escalated into violent and even fatal attacks on MPs. In response, MPs are adopting new security measures at the constituency level to protect themselves from harm. These measures range from the subtle (e.g. no longer advertising the details of surgeries) to the not-so-subtle (such as the wearing of stab vests). We know how these developments are impacting MPs personally, not least in terms of their mental health. We also know about the associated financial ramifications, with the costs of MPs’ security skyrocketing in recent years. But what about the implications for representation and democracy? Are MPs able to perform their representative role just as well amid stricter security protocols? Or are costs incurred to representative democracy when constituency service is securitised?

The security-accessibility trade-off

All security systems come with costs attached. When MPs tighten constituency service security the most obvious cost incurred pertains to accessibility. This security-accessibility trade-off manifests in one of two ways: either through a reduction in opportunities for constituents to meet with their MP, or through the adoption of security protocols which complicate access pathways. In terms of reduced opportunities for constituent-MP engagement, take for instance those MPs who have stopped holding surgeries in public venues (e.g. shopping malls) because of security concerns. Consider also the MP who, after repeated incidents of verbal abuse, admits that he no longer socialises in his own constituency. These examples of retreat from the public square are problematic, because it is through even the most innocuous and impromptu interactions – in the local pub or supermarket for instance – that MPs develop their constituency antennae, learning about the issues which matter to their constituents:

‘We try to be, as constituency MPs, recognisable, available, accessible to all. A successful constituency MP is the person who people feel they can go to in the pub or, as frustrating as that sometimes is, come up to you when you’re doing your shopping.‘

Access to MPs can be complicated by security in a number of ways. Some MPs, for example, have replaced “drop-in” surgeries with appointment-only meetings, a formality which likely results in some constituents being turned away. We also know that, on the advice of police, some MPs have discontinued in-person surgery appointments, instead offering online meetings only. Whilst this might expedite access to MPs for the digitally confident citizen, it will disincentivise engagement for those without the requisite skills. What is more, the value and quality of online meetings – relative to in-person meetings – is open to question. The social scientific evidence underlines the therapeutic value of in-person meetings between MPs and constituents. These in-person meetings are key to the development of “co-presence”, and help build a “human bridge” through which constituents feel listened to. These benefits could be much harder to attain when the interaction occurs through a screen. Similarly, with face-to-face meetings, that personal touch and sense of intimacy is likely compromised by the presence of security guards.

The symbolic costs

Public spaces articulate political and cultural messages. What messages, then, are conveyed to the public when MPs adopt airport-style (or even prison-style) security at their constituency offices? Think bulletproof glass, CCTV, reinforced doors, panic buttons and so on. Whilst these measures may reassure MPs and their staff, the effect on constituents could be quite the opposite, perhaps marking the space as somehow unsafe, where visitors need to be on their guard. Research into other sites that have been securitised suggests as much, whereby defensive urban architecture (designed to mitigate terrorist attacks) has had a chilling effect on public democratic culture, eliciting a range of subjective emotional responses from pedestrians: fearfulness, suspicion, paranoia, and exclusion. Some of the security measures at constituency offices could be eliciting a similar response from constituents. Take, for instance, the MP who tells his constituents they should “be prepared to be searched” when they arrive at his surgery:

‘We are following security guidance, as a result Security Operatives and/or the Police will be screening constituents attending face to face surgery appointments. Please bring along photo ID, leave bags and coats at home where possible, as they will not be permitted in the meeting toom and will need to remain outside the meeting space and be prepared to be searched.‘

(Guidance provided on Julian Smith MP’s website for constituents)

For the architect, Stephen Flusty, places and spaces bearing the features of security – searches of person or property, say – warrant being labelled as “jittery”. They are marked, in other words, by a tense and nervous atmosphere. We might ask then: how many of the constituency offices in the UK are showing signs of the jitters?

Security and trust: a Catch-22?

Security measures at the constituency level could, then, be counter-productive, in that MPs may be undermining the very representative connections they seek to protect. Up until now, the linkage between MPs and constituents at the local level has been held up as a positive exception to what has otherwise been a story of increasing political disengagement across western democracies. But what if new security measures at the local level are making engagement more difficult, placing distance (figuratively and literally) between MPs and constituents?

Amid a general crisis of representation, in which people in the UK typically feel unrepresented by Westminster, there is a risk that the mitigating power of constituency service will be diminished if MPs become (or are perceived to be) harder to reach – or are less present – at the local level. Moreover, if perceptions of disconnect between politicians and the public is a driver of political distrust, and that distrust in turn fuels abuse of politicians, the security steps MPs are taking to mitigate this threat could in fact be exacerbating it.

Importantly, the securitising trend affecting British political life appears set to deepen. The Speaker of the Commons, Lindsay Hoyle – a long-time advocate for greater protections for MPs – has called for a transformation in parliament’s “security culture”. To a similar end, the outgoing Conservative government signed-off on a £31m package to bolster the constituency-level security of MPs; while the recently published Walney review recommends even greater bolstering. Understanding how such enhanced security shapes the character and delivery of representative democracy in the UK – and the myriad costs it brings to bear on both politicians and the public – warrants greater attention.

This blog post was first posted by LSE blogs. It draws on research by the authors published in Parliamentary Affairs. All views expressed are the authors’ own.

About the authors

Neil Matthews is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol.

Sean Haughey is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the Institute of Irish Studies at the University of Liverpool.

Tags House of Commons, MPs, parliaments, representation, security, Westminster

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Parliaments need to ensure democratic accountability for public debt

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date July 1, 2024

By Franklin De Vrieze.

On the occasion of the International Day of Parliamentarism (30 June), this article highlights the challenging task for many parliaments around the globe in ensuring accountability for the rapidly increasing public debt of their nation. It analyses questions of debt transparency, legislative and oversight practices on public debt and the challenge of executive dominance.

Today’s debt crisis

The world is facing a new debt crisis. Twenty-five of the poorest countries spend more on debt repayments than on education, health, and social policy combined. Sixty percent of low- and middle-income countries are highly debt vulnerable. In its latest International Debt Report, the World Bank revealed the sharpest rise in global borrowing costs in four decades.

The origins of this dire situation are both historical and more recent. They include global power dynamics, international and regional barriers to trade and infrastructure development, national political histories and governance decisions around economic development, and the policies of multi-lateral lending institutions and the role of credit agencies. More recently, public debt of many countries has exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the environmental and climate emergency – and their economic and financial impacts – as well as sometimes dubious national borrowing decisions.

Breaking out of the current debt crisis and avoiding future ones will require a fundamental shift in oversight and accountability for the way that governments borrow and manage debt. In this context, there is increasing recognition of the unique roles for parliament in the governance of public debt.

Why parliaments need to get involved

In its submission to the UK House of Common’s International Development Committee’s inquiry, Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) suggested that there are six incentives as to why parliaments can play a more active role with regards to public debt: 1) It serves as a catalyst for greater debt transparency. 2) It helps to establish and implement a stronger legal framework on public debt management. 3) It strengthens oversight over government policies and spending. 4) It protects the national interest in emergency contexts and highlights the gendered effects of public debt. 5) It unearths the risks of State-Owned Enterprises becoming a major cause of debt accumulation and debt crises. 6) It contributes to delivering the requirements of successful Nature-for-Debt swaps, hence contributing to action on climate change mitigation and adaptation, and to climate change finance accountability.

Parliaments, as representatives of people’s interests, as well as lawmakers and agents of accountability, are critical fiscal policy institutions responsible for approving the annual budget and overseeing the government’s execution of its approved programme. Meanwhile, debt managers are responsible for ensuring the government’s financing needs are met at the lowest cost over the medium-to-long term, consistent with an acceptable level of risk, and other objectives such as supporting domestic debt market development.

How parliaments can get involved

How can parliaments play a meaningful role in public debt oversight?

Firstly, setting a legal framework for public debt management ensures that parliament provides strategic direction to borrowing decisions and clearly specifies the roles and responsibilities for the institutions involved in debt management. While most countries in the world have a financial administration act, public debt can also be regulated by more specific legislation.

Secondly, the budget cycle provides the main structure for financial decision-making in parliament, and there are opportunities to scrutinize public debt and public debt management throughout the four stages of the budget cycle: formulation, approval, execution and audit/oversight.

Thirdly, parliaments can incorporate debt management into their regular law-making and budgeting responsibilities in various ways, such as: reviewing and endorsing the Debt Management Strategy and monitoring ongoing implementation; reviewing and ratifying external loan and guarantee agreements in a timely manner; drawing on debt management compliance/ performance audit reports prepared by the Supreme Audit Institution to check the effectiveness of regulatory and systems arrangements; maintaining one or more permanent parliamentary oversight committees with overall responsibility for budget and debt management scrutiny.

Worldwide, parliaments fulfil their debt management roles to varying extents, as MPs often struggle to understand the availability and completeness of debt statistics and other debt management documents. Hence, some parliaments decided to create a dedicated Committee on public debt, bringing together those MPs with strongest knowledge and interest in the topic, as is the case in Kenya and Nigeria. Many parliaments lack staff with the specializedknowledge and skills to support stronger oversight of public debt. Hence, some parliaments have established a Parliamentary Budget Office (for instance in Kenya and Sierra Leone), which provides members with specialized analysis on fiscal and budget issues, including issues of public debt.

Transparency as precondition for parliamentary debt oversight

Transparency is one of the major anchors of debt sustainability, ensuring that all stakeholders, including policymakers, creditors and investors, can take optimal decisions on a country’s debt obligations, based on fully disclosed, reliable and timely information. The issue of debt transparency became more prominent following the discovery of hidden debts in some debtor countries (for instance in Mozambique). It’s the main preconditions for parliamentary involvement in public debt oversight.

There are clear advantages to greater debt transparency as it gives credibility to government policies and helps ensure debt and fiscal sustainability. It supports democratic systems and reduces the opportunity for corruption. However, some national governments might not be ready to provide timely, comprehensive, accurate, accessible, and intelligible debt data, policies and operations to their national parliament or the public at large. Parliament often only gets partial access to the relevant data, thus limiting their ability to exercise oversight on public debt.

Executive dominance

In addition, oversight of public debt largely depends on oversight of the political choices underpinning the proposed investment projects which are funded by new loans. However, parliamentary oversight of these political choices often faces the challenge of executive dominance. In some countries, it means that, for instance, the President might request MPs to adopt proposals, vote for proposed investment projects, or increase the debt ceiling while the MPs know that this is not a sound policy. I learned that, in those circumstances, MPs may sometimes feel that they have no choice but to approve requests by the executive, as their position in parliament or within their party – and in extremely worrying cases their personal security and the safety of their family – can depend on it.

This means that debt transparency is not sufficient. Based on a political economy analysis, there is need for a corruption and patronage lens to fiscal and debt policy. When the national budget is inflated by imprudent projects requiring large loans, it is indebting the country for generations to come. In these circumstances, public debt can be called “budgeted corruption”.

Civil society

Therefore, in addition to more rigorous oversight by parliaments, civil society also needs a more robust role. CSOs and academics, with expertise in fiscal and debt policies, can play a complementary monitoring role, reinforcing parliamentary scrutiny. The role of the Institute for Public Finance in Kenya is a commendable example.

Unsustainable and opaque debt is a democratic deficit. It undermines the social contract which underpins a democratic system of governance. That is why Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) advocates for debt transparency, more rigorous debt accountability to parliaments and robust civil society monitoring.

About the author

Franklin De Vrieze is the Head of Practice Accountability at Westminster Foundation for Democracy.

Tags accountability, parliaments, public debt, transparency

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Petitions and Petitioning in Europe and North America

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date June 20, 2024

By Henry Miller.

Over the last decade, parliaments across the world have adopted e-petition systems to promote citizen engagement with legislatures. While made possible by the internet and twenty-first century technology, the contemporary e-petition can also be understood as the latest version of an ancient political practice: the petition. As this blog will illustrate, petitions and petitioning have long been a popular way for people to engage with parliamentary institutions, both before and after the advent of modern democracy.

This blog summarises key findings from a major new edited book, Petitions and Petitioning in Europe and North America: From the Late Medieval Period to the Present published by Oxford University Press for the British Academy. Originating from an AHRC Network, the book brings together historians, political scientists, legal scholars, and sociologists to examine petitions and petitioning, that is the practices related to the drafting, signing, presentation and reception of petitions.

As the book shows, petitions have been ubiquitous across a many different geographical, chronological, and political contexts, including modern democracies and authoritarian regimes. The book is organised into three sections that: 1) define petitions with greater conceptual clarity than before; 2) examine changes and continuities in petitioning over long periods of time; and 3) offer case studies of why and when petitions have mattered in particular political contexts, ranging from late medieval England to the early Soviet Union. This blog will summarise findings in three areas that will be of particular interest to scholars of parliamentary studies.

First, a key theme of the book is the relationship between petitions and the evolution of parliamentary institutions. In his chapter, Gwilym Dodd shows that petitions were an important method for collectively asserting parliamentary authority against royal power in late medieval England. During the ‘age of revolutions’ (1789-1871) in Europe and North America, mass, collective petitioning on public issues, often based on newly codified rights to petition, was increasingly directed to legislatures. The value of petitions to parliaments was double-edged in an age of limited suffrage. Parliaments, including the UK House of Commons, used petitions to claim a degree of popular consent in the absence of democratic elections. Yet at the same time, petitioners invoking ideas of popular sovereignty frequently challenged parliamentary authority by claiming to represent a broader people than the limited electorate.

In the twentieth century, as Richard Huzzey and Henry Miller show, there was a shift away from petitioning legislatures to a broader range of authorities, including international bodies like the United Nations. Petitioning remained a ubiquitous form of political participation, but because petitions to non-parliamentary authorities (such as Number 10 Downing Street) were rarely recorded, its continued popularity remained largely invisible to scholars. This historical perspective allows us to see that one important implication of the growth of legislative e-petitions systems, documented by Cristina Leston-Bandeira in her chapter, is that it restores parliaments as the principal authorities for receiving petitions from citizens.

Second, petitions have been an important mechanism for representation across the centuries. As a series of studies have shown, petitions have enabled the ‘voice of the voteless’ to be heard in legislatures from groups lacking formal political rights, including Native Americans, women before universal suffrage, and colonised peoples in the British empire. In their study of the US Congress over two centuries, Maggie Blackhawk and Daniel Carpenter persuasively argue that petitioning has been an important form of representation that exists independently of electoral and party politics. Examining Dutch petitions over three centuries, Maartje Janse et al, demonstrate that petitioning has been a significant practice for making representative claims to authority by individual citizens and groups. In his survey of petitions in colonial Jamaica during the era of slavery, the late Aaron Graham shows that petitioning was one of the few tools available to groups including Free People of Colour and Jewish subjects to claim rights from a legislature dominated by slave-owners. Marta Gravela and Ismini Pells show that petitions were an important mechanism for claiming citizenship and welfare, respectively, from the state.

Third, the book reveals the essential duality of petitions and petitioning as both formal and informal political practices that is vital for understanding their ubiquity, longevity, and flexibility. While often studied in formal, institutional, official settings, notably parliaments, petitions have always taken informal, unofficial forms as well and have been directly to a range of authorities. As chapters by Mark Knights, Joris Oddens, and others show, there has been an enormous variety of petitions and related subscriptional (or name-signing) practices, including supplications, covenants, declarations, and gravamina to name but a few. In the nineteenth-century UK, petitions to the House of Commons were the most popular genre of petitioning, but these existed alongside addresses to the monarch, memorials to government, and requisitions and other petitions directed to every type of local authority.

Petitions have never been isolated from other forms of political participation. Indeed, in particular contexts they have underpinned and made possible other forms of collective action. While petitions today are often regarded by sociologists as a conventional form of collective action compared to more direct forms of protest, a historical perspective shows that petitioning has often been linked with revolts, rebellions, and revolutions. Petitioning has often been a fluid political practice that could mutate into other forms, including mass demonstrations or strikes, while the correlation between petitions and the formation of political organisation such as political parties or single-issue associations is well-established. Modern forms of participation and engagement have evolved from petitioning. The institutionalised forms of referendums and initiatives in Switzerland, Andreas Würgler shows, developed from a long tradition of petitioning. The practice of letter-writing to MPs and political leaders, which expanded dramatically in the twentieth-century, was an outgrowth of petitioning as Huzzey and Miller suggest.

The shape-shifting quality of petitions is one of the many reasons why they have been a widespread practice since the late medieval period, and a key means for interacting with parliamentary and representative institutions, even if now, they largely take digital form.

About the authors

Dr. Henry Miller is Vice Chancellor’s Fellow in the Department of Humanities, Northumbria University.

Tags House of Commons, parliaments, UK Parliament

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Reimagining the UK Parliament

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date May 22, 2024

By David Judge and Cristina Leston-Bandeira.

Few institutions – whether economic, social, or political – have escaped calls in recent years for reimagining. In its literal sense reimagining is ‘the action or an act of imagining something again’(OED); or, stated more pithily, it means to ‘think seriously about starting over’. A reimagining of parliament, therefore, needs to explore and trouble (in the sense of challenging and disrupting) current imaginings of what parliament is and does. This is what we set out to do in our new book Reimagining Parliament.

Stages of Reimagining

A ‘stages approach’ was adopted to reimagining. The first stage was to identify what was to be reimagined. Obviously, in our case the specific focus is the UK parliament. It is not about the genus of ‘parliament’, or of the general concept of ‘parliament’. Instead, it is about the Westminster parliament firmly located within a ‘Westminster system’ of government. This is the present (what currently exists). This provides the starting point for reimagining (what does not yet exist).

The second stage of reimagining was to identify who is doing the reimagining. The selection criteria for ‘reimagineers’ was that they should collectively combine the practical, professional experience of those who have worked in Westminster and the academic, research experience of those who have analysed parliament from a range of disciplines; and that they should be willing to step outside their professional and academic comfort zones to be provoked into thinking afresh about how they might reimagine parliament. Our ‘reimagineers’ were: Didier Caluwaerts, Emma Crewe, Paul Evans, David Judge, Cristina Leston-Bandeira, Lucinda Maer, Alexandra Meakin, Dann Vermassen, Hannah White, and Ben Yong.

A third stage was the ‘how’ of reimagining. A ‘headshift’, in the sense of ‘a break with conventional thinking’, was required. To break with the orthodoxies of institutional perspectives, contributors were asked to identify foundational principles with which to drive the modelling ab initio of various dimensions of parliamentary activity; to explain why the identified principles are deemed to be foundational, and why they matter. Two broad categories of principles emerged from this identification process. In the first category are principles broadly reflective of basic political tenets currently underpinning notions of liberal democracy in the UK: these include openness; engagement/connectedness; accessibility; inclusion; equality; fairness; responsiveness; and accountability. Principles in the second category are associated more with institutional and organisational norms and practices: these include wellness; ethical propriety; sustainability; organisational flexibility; and effective institutional governance.

The outcomes of reimagining

Notions of space, connectivity and interaction help in defining the positioning and distinctiveness of parliament at the centre of UK politics. ‘Space’ focuses attention upon location, architectural space and purpose, and the symbols, performances and rituals of parliament. ‘Connectivity’ is concerned with the dynamics of representation, the identities of those to be brought together in parliament, and how citizens are included and engaged in parliamentary processes. ‘Interaction’ is multi-directional, both outward looking to inter-institutional connections and highly politicised processes of effecting government responsibility and accountability; and inward looking to intra-institutional modes of administration and regulation, demarcated by parliamentary procedures and processes of self-governance.

Within these encompassing frames – of parliamentary space, connectivity, and interaction – the impact of how first category foundational principles may impact reimagining can be seen below.

Openness, engagement/connectedness, and accessibility

Space: These principles are used to guide rethinking: first, in the architectural sense of designing more open-plan spaces within which parliamentarians and staff could meet and work; and of an opening-up of the dark recesses of the parliamentary estate to allow in more natural light and ventilation. Second, in the sense of parliament being open to the public and infusing the principle of public access into the architectural design and necessary security structures and working regimes at Westminster. A fundamental question behind such reimagining is: what would the building look like if the public’s access to democracy was the primary purpose for the design?

Connectivity: The principles of openness and accessibility also underpin a reimagining of the engagement networks, mechanisms and processes of parliament to inform its information, education, communication, consultation and participation activities. In part this prioritisation of openness reflects growing citizen expectations of more openness within parliamentary democracies across the world. Whilst the principles of openness and accessibility provide keystones for engagement activities, their interconnectedness with other principles – of relatability, relevance, continuity, and sustainability – is also vital to reimagining public engagement.

Interaction: When applied to parliamentary scrutiny the principles of openness; engagement/connectedness; and accessibility provide for: greater openness and accessibility in the sense of the ability to obtain information from government and citizens and the capacity to receive (and publish) information in a more open way – through reimagining the technologies, the language, and the choreography of scrutiny. A reimagining of connectedness would include greater deliberative innovation into the scrutiny process; alongside a rethinking of partnership working both within Westminster and between legislatures in the UK; as well as enhanced networking with other monitoring and regulatory bodies. In turn, the principle of engagement can be used to rethink the relationship between parliamentarians and scrutiny processes.

When applied to parliamentary procedure, a reimagining based on the above principles, would aim to encourage participation, deliberation, and make procedure more accessible to parliamentarians and citizens. To this end, it should be transparent both in the sense of being ‘open’ about the rules governing parliamentary behaviour and how they are applied, as well as being presented in language which is natural, plain and transparent. Enhanced openness, in conjunction with other identified ‘second category’ principles, envisages procedure to be more ‘relatable’ inasmuch as it must be recognisably human; ‘relevant’ insofar as it must focus attention on what is important; and provide ‘continuity’ to the extent that procedure must be predictable without being unchanging.

Inclusion, equality, fairness, and responsiveness

These principles provide tensile threads running through most aspects of reimagining parliament.

Space: the principles of inclusion and equality are of central importance in re-envisioning parliamentary architectural space and transforming parliamentary rhythms, rituals and symbols. Such reimagining would have at its heart securing greater equality and inclusion in relation to currently under-represented or un-represented groups in parliament. These principles would be inhered by symbolic recognition of the achievements of minority groups; provide challenges to prevailing ‘hierarchies of value’; and made manifest in redesigns of parliamentary space, parliamentary communication and messaging strategies, and the adoption of neutral (non-exclusionary) parliamentary language.

Connectivity: A rethinking of parliamentary engagement imbued with the principle of inclusion aims to produce a parliament that is more welcoming, more relatable, and more relevant both to current generations and to future generations of parliamentarians and citizens. The principle of inclusion also signifies a necessary representation of diverse bodies, abilities, voices, opinions, backgrounds, races, ethnicities, genders, and identities in parliamentary activities. Securing greater equality and inclusiveness in the representative process requires affirmative action, including compensatory measures, to challenge the structural and attitudinal barriers which perpetuate representational inequalities. The inclusion of more, and more diverse, voices in the deliberation of public policies through such institutional actions and measures, alongside the situating of parliament as a key nodal point in intricate networks of electoral and non-electoral representation, are essential elements of reimagining parliamentary representation. The principle of fairness also intersects with the discussion of representational equality, not least in the maxim that formal political equality is secured through free and fair elections. In turn, securing fairness opens up considerations of a more proportional electoral system and greater alignment of the activities of representatives to the preferences of the represented through the institutionalisation of an encompassing system of responsiveness.

Interaction: Inclusion – and the promotion of diversity – serves as a guiding principle for reimagining the patterns of social interactions, working routines, and ‘people policies’ at Westminster. A reimagined parliament would conceptualise itself as an exemplar of best workplace practice and culture, rather than an exception to the rules shaping other workplaces. Moreover, a reimagined parliament would uphold the principle of fairness, and the closely aligned principle of non-discrimination, to guarantee the general right of workers be treated fairly and not to be discriminated against. When reimagining parliamentary governance, a parliamentary administration which is both responsive and responsible is to be a touchstone of good governance. These principles, when operationalised, would provide greater transparency of governance arrangements; and ensure that those making key administrative decisions are clearly identifiable and known to be responsible and accountable for those decisions.

When it comes to reimagining parliamentary scrutiny, what makes it unique, and distinct from other forms of scrutiny of executive actions, is that it engages the notion of democratic accountability. The media, regulatory bodies, charities and academics may all play valuable scrutiny roles, but they lack this central democratic function. For parliamentary scrutiny to be effective, it needs to engage parliamentarians. Being engaging, efficient, connected, informed, and accessible can all be seen as part of good scrutiny, but good scrutiny should feed back into good government. Equally, if procedure is essential to conferring legitimacy upon the processes and outputs of parliament then the way decisions are reached must be seen to be fair (and, so far as possible, be enduring because they are fair).

Further serious thinking

Whilst the specific focus of Reimagining Parliament is ‘thinking seriously about starting over’ – in conceptualising parliamentary space, connectivity and interaction in Westminster – it also serves to prompt questions about the necessity of further serious thinking about reimagining the broader institutions and processes of parliamentary democracy and parliamentary government in the UK. Calls for broader reimagining are particularly salient at a time when: parliament is widely and roundly criticised (see, for example, Ian Dunt, Hannah White, and Alison Young); significant proportions of the UK population have little trust in Parliament; and many citizens believe that politicians at Westminster do not understand their lives.

About the authors

David Judge is Emeritus Professor of Politics in the Department of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.

Cristina Leston-Bandeira is Professor of Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds.

Tags House of Commons, parliaments, UK Parliament

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Refinement Is All You Need: Shaping the Future of Parliaments with AI

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date April 16, 2024

By Alberto Mencarelli.

In the landmark paper “Attention Is All You Need” (Vaswani et al., 2017), the concept of transformers fundamentally changed the landscape of AI, particularly in how machines understand and generate human language through mechanisms like Generative Pre-trained Transformers (GPT) and Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG). These breakthroughs not only represent significant technological strides but also strikingly parallel the intricate processes in parliaments. Just as transformers learn and adapt by absorbing and synthesizing vast amounts of information, so do parliamentary systems refine legislative measures by assimilating diverse data and viewpoints, underscoring a shared theme of progressive enhancement and complex data integration in both realms.

The essence of this analogy lies in the conceptual similarity between the AI ‘attention’ mechanism and the parliamentary ‘refinement’ process, where both prioritize and contextualize information to produce nuanced outcomes. The refinement process in parliaments evolves through stages: from committee to plenary, and across chambers in bicameral systems – each procedural step meticulously crafted to enhance output. In parliamentary terms, refinement involves a multifaceted iterative process that ensures broad deliberative bases, adversarial but inclusive consideration of diverse views, and the scrutiny of legislative provisions based on data-driven assessments. The similarity between AI systems and parliamentary processes shows that both share a fundamental approach: just as AI uses attention and retrieval mechanisms to process information, parliaments use iterative, knowledge-based methods to develop legislation. Thus, the dynamics of generative AI not only mirror, but also offer new perspectives on traditional methodologies of parliamentary activity, suggesting a unique intersection between technology and governance.

In the digital age, turning data into meaningful action is the cornerstone of progress. Generative AI, with its sophisticated attention mechanism, offers a new lens through which to examine the complexities of parliamentary discussions, identifying connections, trends, and implications that may elude human analysis. This does not mean replacing the human process, but rather enriching it, providing political actors with advanced tools to address contemporary challenges with a deeper understanding.

Linguistic Foundations: Bridging Parliaments and Large Language Models

At the core of both parliamentary procedure and Large Language Models (LLMs) lies a deep appreciation for the nuance and power of language, serving as the foundation for creating, disseminating, and negotiating knowledge.

The parallels between the linguistic dynamics of parliaments and those of LLMs are striking and suggest a natural synergy. Both domains achieve their goals through the meticulous refinement of language, optimizing their outputs to meet pre-defined objectives. This common linguistic underpinning presents a compelling case for the integration of LLMs into parliamentary processes. Such a union promises to enhance the clarity, precision, and accessibility of communication – a cornerstone upon which effective governance is built.

Leveraging AI can streamline legislative workflows and inspire explorations at the intersection of technology and parliamentary practices. By integrating technology and linguistics, we unlock innovative opportunities that could dramatically transform how parliaments and legislatures operate.

Ensuring Diversity, Inclusivity and Depth in AI-Augmented Parliamentary Processes

In recent years, pioneering experiments in some parliamentary settings have laid the groundwork for a more integrated approach to the use of AI tools (see this Popvox Foundation report for an updated overview of current international experiences). Real-time captioning of parliamentary proceedings, automated classification and transcription of policy documents, and the early stages of conversational document search are at the forefront of this integration. The leading parliaments include the U.S. Congress, whose House Subcommittee on Modernization issues regular flash reports on AI strategy and implementation (most recently in December 2023), the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, which has developed the Ulysses artificial intelligence suite, and the Estonian Parliament. But other parliaments have launched or plan to launch pilots in the coming months, as in the case of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, which recently adopted a report.

Parliaments are on the cusp of a transformative journey, blending deep-rooted traditions with cutting-edge AI technology. While still early days, a promising path is unfolding. As AI rapidly evolves, it’s crucial for parliaments worldwide to share best practices and develop common approaches. This collaboration is key to tackling the challenges of this significant shift.

AI’s advanced language models can revolutionize how laws are made. These models are not only adept at producing well-crafted text but also at ensuring laws reflect a broader range of societal objectives and values. Such tools could make legislation more inclusive, weaving minority perspectives into the legislative narrative. By enhancing the drafting phase, AI could lead to laws that represent a more diverse range of opinions, softening the impact of decisions made by slim majorities.

The implications of generative AI in parliamentary contexts are profound, offering numerous possibilities for its application, such as:

Predictive Analysis: AI can forecast voting outcomes based on historical data, aiding in strategic negotiation planning.
Deliberative Refinement: Through quantitative analysis of debate intensities and MP motivations, AI can foster a more inclusive deliberative process. Projects like Inclusive.AI and the latest research highlights AI’s role in enriching democratic deliberation by capturing a broad range of opinions and value preferences. In an effective parliamentary AI system, the technology should not just simplify the aggregation of viewpoints but also ensure that the depth and variation of these viewpoints are preserved.
Moderation and Persuasion: AI moderation tools can enhance the quality and inclusiveness of debates, especially in committees or remote settings. According to empirical evidence, LLMs have the potential to enhance conversational persuasiveness and provide real-time, evidence-based recommendations that can improve participants’ perception of feeling understood in conversations. This, in turn, has the potential to improve the quality of conversations and reduce political divisiveness, without altering the content of the conversation (Argyle et al., 2023).
Data Analysis and Policy Simulation: Generative AI has the capability to analyze vast amounts of data from diverse sources and formats to identify pertinent variables, causal relationships, trends, and anomalies. This capability can be utilized to simulate alternative policy scenarios and predict the potential effects of public policies, while considering various factors and uncertainties.
Participatory Democracy: AI can gauge public opinion on legislative proposals, capturing not just the majority view but the intensity of support or opposition.
Hybrid Proceedings Facilitation: With the shift towards hybrid parliamentary models, AI offers tools for virtual participation, document sharing, real-time translation, and even emotional tone recognition, enhancing session efficiency and accessibility of hybrid sittings by addressing the challenges of virtual engagement.

Integrating AI into parliamentary processes could mark a major shift towards more efficient and inclusive governance.. By leveraging AI’s capabilities, parliaments can navigate the complexities of modern governance, ensuring that legislative processes are both reflective of and responsive to a broader range of societal needs and perspectives.

AI in Parliaments: Opportunities, Risks, and the Democratic Balance

As we contemplate the integration of AI into parliamentary processes, it becomes apparent that this endeavor is both promising and fraught with complexities. The ethical and the procedural implications of these tools for parliaments can shape entirely new functions and attributes. The potential of AI to enhance efficiency and decision-making is counterbalanced by significant ethical and operational challenges. Concerns regarding privacy, data protection, and the transparency of AI-driven decisions highlight the need for rigorous scrutiny. Furthermore, the importance of maintaining accountability in the face of AI’s potential errors or biases cannot be overstated. The task of customizing AI to complement political processes, while ensuring that its decisions remain accessible and understandable to the general public, underscores the critical balance between innovation and the foundational values of democracy. A notable challenge is the risk of AI being manipulated or misused, particularly in an age characterized by advanced cyber threats. In this regard, it seems crucial that parliaments strive to ensure that the introduction of AI tools in their processes is accompanied by maintaining full control over the AI technologies deployed in order to establish sufficient levels of technological sovereignty.

Parliaments are thus confronted with a pivotal challenge: to adopt AI through the development of stringent policies, the conduct of ethical testing, and the provision of comprehensive training. The stakes are significant, as failure to effectively integrate AI could result in falling behind in the ongoing technological revolution, potentially compromising the resilience and adaptability of parliamentary ecosystems.

Embracing AI in parliaments thoughtfully yet boldly requires striking a balance between innovation and democratic integrity, safeguarding the core values of these vital institutions.

About the author

Dr Alberto Mencarelli is a parliamentary official in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. He gained his PhD in constitutional law from Sapienza University of Rome.

Tags AI, artificial intelligence, knowledge, parliaments

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Evidence on Stage? Comparing committee hearings in the UK House of Commons and German Bundestag

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date April 15, 2024

By Marc Geddes.

Parliamentary and legislative committees perform a range of roles, such as the scrutiny of legislation or accountability of government. Increasingly, committees are holding public hearings, which can be really important for MPs to gather relevant knowledge and evidence to support their work and fulfil committee tasks. In recent research, I spent time in the UK House of Commons and German Bundestag and interviewed MPs and staff to get a better understanding of whether committee hearings are important information-gathering tools. Given that these are often official and formal routes for parliaments to listen to stakeholders, these are prestigious and important and can be seen as ‘evidence on stage’.

In the House of Commons, the parliament has two committee systems. For scrutinising legislation, temporary bill committees are made up of 30 or so members, appointed by parliamentary parties, to go through proposed laws via public meetings with an optional evidence-gathering stage. For scrutinising policy and holding government to account, permanent select committees exist to shadow government departments. Made up of small groups of MPs – usually around 11 members – and elected by the party colleagues, they are often independent-minded spaces. Select committees conduct policy scrutiny through inquiries that include open calls for written evidence and public hearings with a variety of witnesses (e.g. scientists, business or trade union leaders, interest groups, etc.). Committee members deliberate in private to identify key conclusions and recommendations, to which government must respond (but is not forced to accept). Analysis has shown that around 40 percent of recommendations are accepted.

In the German parliament, permanent committees mirror government departments (plus some cross-cutting ones, such as a Petitions Committee). Committees are tasked with both examining legislation and with scrutinising policy. Committee size varies depending on the topic, but they are in general much larger than UK committees. For example, the Committee on Work and Social Affairs has 49 members. Members are appointed by parliamentary parties and take on the role of rapporteur, i.e. they are allocated specific portfolios within the committee’s wider remit. For example, in the Committee on Work and Social Affairs, one MP from each party will have responsibility for migration issues, another for pensions, etc. In general, Bundestag committee meetings are private but, especially since the 1980s, they have increasingly made use of public hearings. These can be used to invite experts to give evidence as part of scrutiny of legislative or policy proposals.

At first glance, both parliaments seem reasonably similar. But this masks considerable differences. In the UK, committees are supported by a secretariat of procedural and policy specialists, who write briefing papers for all members, suggest witnesses and analyse written evidence. Witnesses are usually identified on the basis of suggestions from members and especially the committee’s chair, in consultation with the advice from parliamentary officials (including the secretariat but also the House of Commons Library and the Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology). Bundestag committees, meanwhile, are also served by a secretariat, but their role is to offer procedural advice only. Witnesses are instead nominated by parliamentary parties, often via group leaders and rapporteurs, who’s own staff will undertake research and identify experts. The number of witnesses depends on the size of the parliamentary party. Witness lists are published, inclusive of the party that nominated them, so it is fully transparent who invited whom.

The two approaches by the House of Commons and the Bundestag push evidence-gathering in different directions. In the former case, hearings are usually organised in a non-partisan way, especially for select committees. In the latter, given the inbuilt party political considerations, the process sharpens political divisions. These differences are reinforced through other practices. Briefing packs in the House of Commons are produced by the parliamentary administration and shared with all members; these often serve as agendas and give suggestions for issues to probe. Witnesses are often given oral briefing by the inquiry manager so that the witness can adequately prepare. In the Bundestag, briefings are handled by the rapporteur within each parliamentary party, often in close collaboration with the party leadership teams. Witnesses are usually briefed by the relevant party, too, in terms of the kinds of points and questions the party wants to get across.

These dynamics mean that committee hearings in both parliaments operate differently. Questioning in the House of Commons can be very political, but it is rarely directly partisan. Indeed, many hearings – especially with experts – tend to be thematic and open-ended, which may be directed a the panel in general or at specific witnesses, and without time limits (though the chair may play an active role in directing questioning). Committee hearings in this context can allow for robust questioning of political and policy positions, and allow MPs to gather information and expert opinion on a range of issues. In the Bundestag, meanwhile, questioning dynamics are very different. MPs usually focus their questions only on witnesses that they have invited, and usually have a set amount of time to both pose a question and receive an answer (in committees I’ve observed, this was often three to five minutes). Consequently, hearings do not develop thematically or where responses can build on one another; there is no dialogue. The end result is that hearings are often used by MPs to confirm existing knowledge, legitimise pre-existing political positions, or criticise the government.

Given the often assumed centrality of committees, and the growing prevalence of hearings, understanding how these function and work on a daily basis is critically important. What does this mean for committee hearings as evidence on stage? In both settings, it is clear that expertise is used, but used differently. Borrowing from the work of Christina Boswell, it seems that committee hearings in the UK case are used more ‘instrumentally’, i.e., for their problem-solving functions, while in the German case to ‘substantiate’ and ‘legitimise’ policy positions.

What I have found so far is notably different to what we might expect. Given the UK’s wider adversarial political culture, replicated in many dynamics in the House of Commons (not least prime minister’s questions), and Germany’s consensus-seeking political system characterised by coalition governments and bargaining, we would have perhaps expected committee work to echo such cultural differences. And yet, they operate in opposing ways. We can explain this at least in part due to their parliamentary structures, whereby the German Bundestag is organised with reference to its parliamentary party groups and the UK House of Commons gives primacy to the individually elected representative.

However, there are deeper underlying issues at play. First, with respect to the parliamentary administration, for example, MPs in the UK are a lot more positive about the service provided by officials who are seen as trusted and impartial. In my interviews, German MPs were a lot more sceptical of the idea of neutrality, with many questioning whether anybody can ever be neutral. Second, MPs view their roles in the institutions differently. In the House of Commons, MPs are either part of the frontbench or backbench; and if the latter, they see themselves as independent-minded and with the freedom to focus on anything they want. In the Bundestag, MPs are allocated policy portfolios on behalf of their parliamentary parties, and so see themselves as becoming specialists and advocate for their party in respective debates and committees. This suggests a more general point of difference between the two parliaments, which have developed within different parliamentary traditions and therefore have developed different structures and organisational methods to achieve those results.

About the author

Dr Marc Geddes is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, and Visiting Fellow, Institute for Parliamentary Research (IParl). His past area of research expertise focuses on parliamentary committees in the UK House of Commons. Since 2024, he has begun a new research project to compare how parliaments across Europe gather, analyse and make use of different types of knowledge to fulfil their democratic functions.

Tags Bundestag, comparative, Germany, House of Commons, legislatures, MPs, parliaments, UK

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Where MPs sit in social networks matters

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date February 23, 2024

By Grace Cooper.

Most office workers tend to do much of their day-to-day socialising with colleagues. They meet over coffee, talk in corridors on the way to meetings, or grab a drink together at the end of a long day. These shared activities can have a significant impact on people’s behaviour and preferences. MPs are no different – Parliament is their workplace, and other MPs make up most of their social network. Their social interactions shape their preferences and behaviour, just like it would any other workplace. But the details matter for understanding how influential MPs can be, given their roles within their social networks.

How Parliament’s institutions affect MPs behaviour

MPs spend the majority of their time in Westminster in meeting rooms for select committee hearings, in the chamber, in the division lobby or in All-Party Parliamentary Group meetings (APPGs). APPGs are less formal meetings where MPs and Lords meet to discuss certain topics, such as refugees, climate change or gender equality. An MP’s primary social network is formed of other MPs they socialise with through being on a select committee or an APPG together.

My previous research has shown that these parliamentary institutions shape the degree to which MPs are engaged in different topics. For example, if an MP is a member of the Home Affairs Select Committee or Refugee APPG, they are more likely to raise questions about refugees in Parliament above and beyond their committee obligations.

Perhaps it’s no surprise that MPs who end up having several meetings on specific issues tend to then promote those very issues in Parliament. What’s more interesting though is that what particular role an MP ends up playing within these networks goes on to impact their behaviour, such as the number of written questions they submit about a particular policy.

As part of my research, I looked at four types of MPs who had an important role in the network and tested to see how their relationships to other MPs affected their parliamentary behaviour.

The middleman

This is the broker, the go-between. They have a structural advantage in the network and as a result an increased engagement with representative activities, such as submitting written parliamentary questions. This MP has a structural social advantage as they are the easiest person to access information from the select committees and APPGs and therefore captures this knowledge. They bridge the gaps of disconnected or uninformed MPs in parliament and connect the social network with the knowledge that they have as a key player in the network. This type of MP was found to submit more questions than their respective colleges in the same select committees or APPGs, indicating higher engagement with the issue.

The popular one

This very important MP sits at the heart of the network. They have closer social access to other MPs in the network, highlighting connectivity and being at the centre of the flow of information. This centrality gives them easier access to the flow of information and as a result this social network influences their behaviour by being linked to a higher rate of raising questions within parliament. Some MPs worth noting are Kate Green, Tim Farron and Olivia Blake who were identified as key actors and as ‘Popular’ MPs. These MPs had the shortest pathways to other MPs in the network and therefore had a higher rate of written question submission.

The busy one

This MP is in a lot of social groups, they are in select committees and multiple APPGs meaning they know a lot of MPs. Their social network is larger than those of other MPs in their network. In the refugee policy network, Afzal Khan was the busiest MP. However, surprisingly, there was no evidence that this gave them structural advantage. The assumption that knowing more MPs and having a larger network would mean MPs knew more, had access to more information and contacts, and therefore would encourage them to be more engaged in a specific policy area turned out not to be true. Someone like Afzal Khan was no more likely than his colleagues to submit written questions about refugees. Simply knowing more MPs or being involved in more parliamentary groups doesn’t mean an MP ends up doing more.

The social climber

This MP is well connected to other well-connected MPs, demonstrating that they are part of the ‘popular’ groups in the parliamentary system. Initially it was assumed that as this type of MP came into contact with other well-connected MPs, it would give them a structural social advantage, leading to more engagement in the policy world they were socialising in. In other words, the thought was that their more connected and involved network would lead to an increase in their engagement. This has not been proven to be the case, however, no matter what the size of an MP’s network. Simply being an MP of a party with a larger representation, like the Conservative party, and therefore having a larger network than the MPs of smaller parties, does not increase their activity.

Where you sit in the social network matters

While being a member of a social network matters, it is the MP’s specific social, or structural position within this network that has the greatest impact on how they perform in their role. Simply having a bigger social network and joining more groups doesn’t seem to have a great effect on an MP’s levels of engagement compared to their colleagues. However, occupying the right kind of structural position, such as being the middleman or popular MP can end up having a noticeable impact on how an MP conducts themselves within parliament and how they advocate for particular groups.

It’s not enough for an MP to be in a select committee or APPG if they want to have an impact – MPs have to position themselves carefully within these networks. Parliamentary researchers should continue to look into social network analysis if they want to better understand how the social world of MPs affects and shapes their influence.

This post was first published on the LSE British Politics and Policy blog.

About the author

Grace Cooper is a PhD candidate in parliamentary studies at the University of York. Her research interests include social network analysis and the representation of refugees in Parliament.

Tags legislatures, MPs, parliaments

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Petition platforms must reach beyond the usual suspects

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date February 14, 2024

By Cristina Leston-Bandeira and Blagovesta Tacheva.

Petitions are a popular avenue for participating in politics, with a recent study finding that signing a petition is the dominant form of political engagement. Thanks to new parliamentary processes introduced in recent years, petitioning parliament has also become an effective way for the public to raise issues of concern to policymakers.

However, as illustrated in the figure below, current petitioners are overwhelmingly from already politically engaged groups, typically an older white public with high socio-economic status – the so-called “usual suspects”. Rather than expanding opportunities for democratic engagement, there is a risk that petitions to parliament are simply amplifying the voices of those who “already shout the loudest”.

Source: Research Retold

This problem is compounded by a lack of research on how people from disengaged groups perceive engagement and petitioning. In a new study, we addressed this issue by asking people from seldom-heard groups, such as those from a low socio-economic or ethnic minority background, for their perceptions about petitioning. Our aim was to identify the barriers and enablers to engagement faced by groups beyond the usual suspects.

To do so, we organised focus groups with petitioners and non-petitioners, including people from seldom-heard groups. This was supplemented by interviews with parliamentary officials and representatives from community organisations. This research allowed us to identify six core findings.

1. Deep mistrust

Unsurprisingly, our research unveiled deep mistrust of politics – as illustrated in the figure below, which shows participants’ views when asked what politics would be if it were an animal.

Source: Nifty Fox

There was a particularly acute disconnect from the political system among seldom-heard groups. Although everyone who took part in the research identified core issues they felt strongly about, they did not see these issues as being related to politics.

Participants held such negative perceptions that positive experiences with politicians did not alter these perceptions. This affected participants’ willingness to engage in politics and petitioning. As a result, they did not view politics as a route for addressing core issues affecting them. Participants felt politics was not for them, despite expressing interest in it.

Our research showed that engagement with politics or political processes, such as petitioning, needs to be communicated through issues (examples, case studies, stories) as much as possible. This is what enables a connection between politics and citizens. We also found evidence that the deep well of distrust keeps people away from opportunities such as petitions.

2. A lack of awareness

Seldom-heard groups had limited knowledge or awareness of petitioning in general, including through platforms such as change.org. Very few were aware that they can petition their parliament. Those participants aware of petitioning were usually those who reported higher levels of political engagement overall. However, even the politically engaged non-petitioners were mostly unaware of petitions to their parliament, only knowing of websites such as change.org.

3. Obstacles to engagement

Seldom-heard groups are often affected by intersecting inequalities. These inequalities can exacerbate each other, making it extremely difficult for people within these groups to engage in politics. As illustrated in the figure below, seldom-heard groups can be affected by illiteracy, language barriers, low IT literacy, a lack of IT equipment, disability, poverty and isolation. These barriers can preclude them from engaging in formal politics.

Our research also identified specific barriers to political engagement and petitioning, such as limited knowledge about politics. This was a recurring theme throughout our research, with participants lacking basic knowledge about politics and the UK political system, such as an understanding of what parliament does and how it differs from the government

.Source: Research Retold

This was combined with a lack of key campaigning skills, as well as a lack of confidence, which can make the process of petitioning feel intimidating. These findings show why parliaments need to be more proactive in the way they disseminate and explain their petition systems if they wish to reach beyond the usual suspects.

4. Community organisations as mediators

Our research also showed the importance of community organisations working with seldom-heard groups as mediators when it comes to facilitating access. Community organisations have often built long-term relationships with these communities, they have direct access to them, they have a good understanding of their circumstances and challenges, and they have gained their trust. They could therefore play a role in helping to raise awareness of petitioning among these groups and even help them to start a petition, just as they help people access other services.

However, these types of organisations would not necessarily think of facilitating engagement with petitions, as they may themselves be unaware or unconvinced of their value. This was apparent in our interviews. Facilitating further involvement from these groups would also be challenging for community organisations due to a lack of capacity and resources.

Still, interviewees suggested that a buddy system in which engagement “champions” are identified could make this role easier. Following the “train the trainer” principle, these champions could be based in community organisations and trained to have a better understanding of petitioning and their potential role in supporting service users.

5. Managing expectations and guiding participation

Managing expectations was a recurring theme in our research. This is closely linked to the way parliaments’ e-petitions systems are communicated to the public. The language used to communicate with petitioners and explain the petitions process was often seen as unclear, with many asking for more plain language to be used.

Although petitioners were happy overall with their experience, a few found the process disjointed and unclear. These concerns were well summarised by one petitioner, who highlighted that clarity around the process and the language used to describe it is key for managing petitioners’ expectations: “You’ve got to have that clarity, otherwise people’s expectations go up here and they’re just going to be massively deflated by the end of it.”

The language used across all communication channels is essential to making the process more accessible beyond the usual suspects. This should be accompanied by the development of resources aimed at wider audiences, such as infographics, audiovisual material and “Easy Read” guides.

6. Collaboration with citizen-centred services

Finally, our research showed that petitioning processes cannot be considered solely through the actions of the officials directly involved. Other citizen-centred services, such as education, communication, outreach and participation services, play a key role.

However, links between these services and the staff responsible for petitions are not always well established. Petitions to parliament are considered to be parliamentary business, but they are also led by citizens. Supporting the petitions process therefore requires closer collaboration between those services that focus on enhancing the public’s understanding of parliament.

The need to be proactive

Overall, we found people have considerable interest in political issues and petitions, including those within seldom-heard groups. However, there is also deep mistrust within these groups, often coupled with a lack of knowledge, skills and confidence to engage with participatory tools such as petitions.

To expand the reach of petitions beyond the usual suspects, parliaments need to be proactive in reaching out to a wider audience. The mere fact a participatory tool exists does not mean it will be used by everyone. Our research underlines the importance of education and clear communication for enhancing the value of participatory tools.

This post was first published on the LSE British Politics and Policy blog.

About the authors

Cristina Leston-Bandeira is a Professor of Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds.

Blagovesta Tacheva is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds.

Tags legislatures, parliaments, Participation, petitions

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The (worst) laws of the land: The concept of legislative basket cases in Central-Eastern Europe

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date February 14, 2024

By Miklós Sebők and Rebeka Kiss.

Is it possible to conceptualise the quality of legislation in a multidimensional manner? If yes, how can we define the laws which are of the lowest quality? This blog examines these conceptual and methodological issues by introducing a theory of legislative basket cases and offering illustrative case studies from Central-Eastern Europe.

How can we conceptualise legislative quality in a multidimensional manner?

One way to start the conceptualisation of legislative quality is to look at some examples which are universally (regardless of party affiliation) considered to be “bad” laws. An example, which we described in more detail in Sebők, Kiss and Kovács, 2023, that highlights the potential failures of the legislative process is the famous case of the ‘Bridge to Nowhere’ in Alaska. The ‘Bridge to Nowhere’ narrative commenced in 1996 when municipal authorities in the city of Ketchikan endorsed a proposal to construct a bridge. This proposed infrastructure aimed to connect the sparsely populated Gravina Island to the Alaskan mainland. The justification for this bridge was vigorously debated, especially since a functional and inexpensive ferry service was already in place. Despite the availability of this service, the bridge project secured initial federal backing under the ‘Transportation Equity Act of 1998’.

Eventually, the Gravina bridge became a notorious example of wasteful expenditure and dysfunctional legislation, particularly after a dramatic U-turn by Sarah Palin, who was campaigning for the governorship of Alaska at the time. Palin had initially displayed support for the project, only to pivot post-election as governor and ultimately dismissing the bridge in 2007 as an impractical solution. Extant scholarship often correlates such poor legislative practices with authoritarian and illiberal regimes. The case of the ‘Bridge to Nowhere’, however, demonstrates that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ laws are not a regime characteristic as the legislative process leading up to is passage unfolded in one of the longest-standing liberal democracies.

Conceptualising the quality of law-making and legislative basket cases

Although the problem of legislative quality has not generated a unified strand of research in political science and legal studies, various approaches to conceptualisation are available that we can build on:

Substantive approaches: These examine whether the objectives of the law are clearly stated in the text and whether its stipulations are clear and coherent (Gomes, Barbosa and Figueiredo, 2011; Vanterpool, 2007; Voermans, 2009).
Impact-based approaches: These investigate the expected or actual consequences of laws, for example, based on efficiency, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, or stakeholder satisfaction (Gajduschek, 2016; Mousmouti, 2012).
Formal approaches: These primarily consider procedural aspects (Arter, 2006; Krutz and Lebeau, 2006; Norton, 2001; Vogler, 2012).
Combinations of different approaches: Most often the quality of legislation is conceived as a combination of some of the abovementioned perspectives (Mousmouti, 2014; Radaelli and De Francesco, 2013; Xanthaki, 2014).

Based on the literature cited, a ‘good’ law can be characterized by a clear, and publicly supported policy objective which was fleshed out in stakeholder consultations. It should be efficient, coherent, transparent, and relatively stable post-adoption. Essentially, a ‘good’ law meets high standards across four key dimensions of legislative quality: (1) public policy; (2) formal–legal–constitutional; (3) procedural; and (4) stability.

Conversely, a legislative basket case signifies a major failure in law-making, marked by various deficiencies compromising its effectiveness and legitimacy. Such laws often miss their public policy goals, have unclear purposes, and may conflict with existing laws and constitutional principles. Their drafting often bypasses essential consultations and is rushed through the legislature without adequate justification, leading to a lack of consensus. Post-enactment, these laws are unstable, requiring frequent amendments. The absence of post-implementation evaluations and a failure to establish necessary enforcement conditions further diminish their effectiveness and enforceability. In essence, a law can be considered to be a legislative basket case if it is flawed across a wide-ranging of indicators of legislative quality.

Building on our previous research, which delves into the concept and measurement of legislative backsliding (Sebők, Kiss and Kovács, 2023), in the manuscript serving as the basis of this blog entry, we aim to identify legislative basket cases by employing a multidimensional framework for assessing legislative quality considering content, public process, legal formalities, and constitutional considerations. We examine the quality criteria listed in Table 1 for each law under consideration.

An empirical case study: The Polish Law on Forests

In our presentation at PSA Parliaments Conference 2023, we examined illustrative cases from the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, and Slovak legislation in detail. Here, we focus on the Polish Law on Forests (Act on Forests of 16 December 2016, known as “Ustawa o lasach”) and evaluate it from the perspective of our theory of legislative quality. This piece of legislation was at the centre of a significant legal controversy due to its provisions allowing land clearing and excessive cutting down of trees, which was claimed by its detractors to be in violation of European Union conservation laws. The initial goals of the law were to enhance the rights of property owners regarding tree and shrub growth, simplify regulations on felling trees, and delegate to local governments the ability to adjust greenery protection levels to their needs. The law aimed to introduce a stable solution under the oversight of the Minister for the Environment, who was expected to ensure environmental balance and prevent selective application of provisions (Radecka, 2018).

However, the law’s implementation led to a scandal involving the Minister of Climate and Environment, who approved a logging plan that sparked widespread criticism. The law’s enforceability was complicated by the fact that the area in question—Białowieża forest—is part of the Natura 2000 network and UNESCO World Heritage sites, which is subject to stringent protection standards. The European Commission consistently and formally called on Poland to avoid extensive logging in the primeval forest, which Poland’s government initially ignored and proceeded with the logging activities.

The law faced challenges regarding its constitutionality and compliance with EU law, whereby the Polish government defended its policies by asserting that national legislation mandated sustainable forest management, implying that its tree-cutting practices were environmentally friendly. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) sided with the European Commission, ruling that Poland’s policy contravened the EU’s nature conservation rules (C-432/21). Notably, this was not the first instance of Poland facing legal action over forest management. In 2018, CJEU had already ruled that Poland should halt tree-cutting in the protected Białowieża forest (C-441/17). Due to a ruling in 2023 (C-432/21), Poland was required to revise its national legislation to align its forest management plans with EU biodiversity conservation laws.

The procedural aspects of the law’s enactment were also criticised, as it was adopted hastily, without sufficient preparation, stakeholder consultation, and proper public deliberation. The parliamentary debate was conducted in a fast-track manner, raising concerns about the law’s rushed adoption and potential violation of EU directives— this was later confirmed by the judgments mentioned above. Overall, the Forest Law ticks most boxes related to poor legislative quality and, therefore, constitutes an example of a legislative basket case.

As we showed in our presentation at PSA Parliaments 2023 this case is not unique, and similar multidimensional deficiencies can be observed in relation to many other laws passed in the Central-Eastern European region. Notable such examples include the Czech taxation of church restitution (Act No. 125/2019 Coll.), the Hungarian Medical Chamber Law (Act I of 2023) or the Slovak Land Acquisition Law (Act No. 140/2014 Coll.). Avenues for future research include developing methods to measure and quantify individual quality criteria in a multilingual research design and to assess the causes and consequences of passing legislative basket cases.

About the authors

Miklós Sebők is a Research Professor at HUN-REN Centre of Social Sciences and poltextLAB (poltextlab.com). He serves as the research director of the Hungarian Comparative Agendas Project, and as principal investigator of the V-SHIFT Momentum research project, funded by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. His research in legislative studies includes co-authored contributions such as “The Concept and Measurement of Legislative Backsliding” in Parliamentary Affairs, “Measuring legislative stability – A new approach with data from Hungary”, in European Political Science, and “Comparative European legislative research in the age of large-scale computational text analysis: A review article” in International Political Science Review.

Rebeka Kiss is a Junior Research Fellow at the HUN-REN Centre for Social Sciences and a PhD student at the Doctoral School of Public Administration Sciences of the University of Public Service, specialising in legislative studies. Her contributions to the field include co-authored works such as “The Concept and Measurement of Legislative Backsliding” in Parliamentary Affairs and “The Transparency of Constitutional Reasoning: A Text Mining Analysis of the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s Jurisprudence” published in Studia Iuridica Lublinensia. She has participated in various research projects including as the Hungarian Comparative Agendas Project, the V-SHIFT Momentum research project, and the OPTED – Observatory for Political Texts in European Democracies.

Tags Central-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, legislatures, parliaments

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Obstruction, Alternation, and Amendments: Evidence from Israel

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date January 23, 2024

By Tal Elovits.

Obstruction in parliament dates back to the eighteenth century when legislatures became more diverse and democratic. Parliamentary obstruction is a deliberate strategy used within legislative bodies to delay or prevent legislation from being passed. A minority or individual legislators commonly use it to oppose the majority will. While conscious obstruction can be a strategic tool within a democratic system, its misuse can jeopardize the democratic principles that it means to protect. It can potentially reduce legislative power while increasing executive power, putting the democratic principle of broad representation at risk. If an obstruction is used excessively, it can endanger the proper functioning of legislative bodies, possibly threatening the future of parliamentary government. As a result, extreme caution is essential while employing obstruction techniques (Bell, 2018; Rutherford, 1914).

Previous study points out that obstruction using legislative instruments may be connected to government alternation. According to Zucchini (2011), who used the Italian case study to explore the relationship, the opposition is likelier to use delay tactics following an alternation government, and the more the opposition is ideologically cohesive, the greater the chance they will use obstruction tactics. In this study, I wish to explore the relationship between alternation and legislative obstruction in Israel following the alternation government of 2021 and specifically ask how the alternation affected the amendment’s introduction in the Israeli Knesset. Furthermore, when were amendments used more strategically? The use of amendments in the legislative process will measure legislative obstruction, and this study will be the first to analyze amendments in the Israeli parliament.

As a part of the legislative process, amendment is an instrument that allows parliament members to suggest changes to a bill under deliberation, usually by a committee. In the same way that private members have the right to introduce private member bills, private members may propose changes to a bill. Typically, amendments introduced by individual members of parliament (MPs) are voted on before the final vote of the plenum (Behrens et al., 2023; Mattson, 1995; Palau et al., 2023). Although a form of amendment as a parliamentary instrument can be found in many legislatures, they differ greatly in their restrictions, stage of voting, and deliberation time assigned to a bill considered in the final vote (Strøm, 1995).

The Israeli parliament posits an interesting and vibrant arena to study the possible effects of government alternation. In 2021, what is known as the “right bloc,” led by long-serving PM Benjamin Netanyahu, lost its governmental positions, and Israel had for a year an alternation government for the first time in 15 years. As illustrated in Figure 1, this special circumstance allows us to question and study the possible effects of government alternation in Israel and to provide further empirical evidence for the study of legislative behavior. We set two hypotheses for our study. H1 – Government alternation increases amendment introduction. H2 – Narrow ideological differences between opposition parties foster strategic cooperation.

Figure 1 – Israel political parties 2015-2022 with their coalition status

In Israel, amendments are the only tool allowing parliament members to gain debate time at the committee and the plenary. Each amendment allows a 5-minute speech for each sponsor, which can be multiplied, sometimes reaching hundreds of debate hours on a single bill (Akirav et al., 2010). Therefore, when studying legislative obstruction in Israel, using parliament members in amendments becomes a vital measurement.

Although amendments have been in use in the Israeli parliament since its first day, no data is available for analysis, and retrieving this requires manual analysis of bills in their final wording. This study covers 2015-2022, 3 legislative terms – the 20th, 23rd, and 24th and three different governments, as seen in Figure 1. In the study period, 791 non-budgetary bills have reached the final wording stage. Amendments data was collected manually regarding each bill. Further data, such as the legislative committee, bill category, type of legislation, and when the bill was introduced, were mined from the Knesset Odata API service. In total, 24,001 amendments were gathered. Figure 2 shows the share of bills with amendments by legislative term and yearly quarter. Even without any further statistical analysis, one can notice the different pattern that the 24th term presents.

Figure 2 – Share of bills with amendments 2015–2022

The data gathered was also statistically manipulated to uncover possible mechanisms explaining this change in using amendments. I have constructed two dependent variables: Amendments – dummy, where one is when a bill is introduced with amendment(s), and Strategic – dummy, where one is when amendments are introduced by half or more of the effective number of opposition members. The study hypothesis was tested using statistical Probit regression in Stata in two models —the first tested alternation as an independent variable, and the second focused on the Knesset term as an independent variable. Table 1 presents the results of the two models. Further marginal analysis was done following the first model to uncover the probability of a bill being introduced with amendments under an alternate government. The results, illustrated in Figure 3, show that while under continuous government, the probability for a bill to be introduced with the amendment is 26.4%, under alternation government, the probability rises to 70.8%, supporting the first hypothesis.

Table 1 – Probit model results for amendments and strategic (1)

Figure 3 – Margin analysis following first model probit regression

The result of the second model supports this study’s second hypothesis. As the opposition becomes cohesive, they will increase their cooperation, acting more strategically, providing additional evidence for earlier theoretical and empirical studies suggesting that when ideological distance is small, they are more likely to coordinate in the parliamentary arena (Dewan & Spirling, 2011; Kaiser, 2008; Whitaker & Martin, 2022).

Our analysis also suggests that the use of amendment is related to the legislative term cycle, where both the first month of the new government and the period following parliament dissolution appear to have an effect with a slightly significant positive coefficient and a highly significant negative coefficient, in accordance. At the beginning of a new government, regardless of the alternation status, the probability that a bill will introduced with amendment increases, and this probability drops significantly following parliament dissolution. We found no significant effect on the bill’s content or the committee it deliberated in.

This study’s findings open a wide window into how parliamentarian obstruction may look in Israel and shed light on the use of amendments in the Knesset. Alternation fuels opposition resistance. In Israel, this resistance manifested through the use of amendments. However, one must be aware that with obstructing comes anti-obstruction measures by the majority of parliament. This tit-for-tat escalation into a pattern of obstruction and retaliation can poison the spirit of mutual respect between parties. Partisan mistrust and even demonization replace good faith assumptions of sincerity and reasonableness. Thus, while limited obstruction may sometimes be justified, oppositions must also weigh the risks of it becoming entrenched in political culture. When this balance is disrupted, and the opposition resorts to obstructionist tactics without a clear strategy or purpose, it can weaken the legislature and, by extension, lead to democratic backsliding.

This study sheds light on the important role that amendments play in the hands of Knesset opposition members as a significant instrument in filling the gap in the existing scholarship. Furthermore, this study provides important empirical evidence for the use of legislative instruments by opposition parties, especially in the light of government alternation. Future studies, expanding this study period, might allow us to uncover additional patterns of the use of amendments in Israel’s busy parliament.

This short blog post is part of the author’s PhD project, “The Knesset: A Busy Parliaments in the 2020s”.

About the author

Tal Elovits is a PhD fellow at the Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Milan, Milan, Italy. Former faction director in the Israeli parliament. tal.elovits@unimi.it ORCID: 0000- 0003-2681-1445

Tags Israel, Knesset, legislatures, parliaments, scrutiny