PSA ParliamentsIn this blog, Franklin De Vrieze and Luka Glusac discuss the role of the parliament of Ukraine and the country’s ACA in combating high-profile corruption. Corruption is detrimental to the successful functioning of democratic political systems, economic development, and the provision of public services. To overcome corruption, countries in transition towards a more accountable system of governance increasingly count on the role of an Anti-Corruption Commission or Agency (ACA).
Marc Geddes provides us with an overview of some important findings from his research into select committees. In this blog he discusses how committees collate and examine evidence to support their deliberations and to effect scrutiny.
Franklin De Vrieze, Senior Governance Adviser at the Westminster Foundation for Democracy discusses the role played by independent oversight institutions in ensuring democratic accountability. As governance processes occur within a country’s political-economic and legal-constitutional context, bringing accountability to national governance cannot be left to those individuals and groups holding power. Independent oversight institutions have a specific role in strengthening accountability which is complementary to the oversight role of parliament. Because the relationship between parliament and independent oversight institutions is sub-optimal in many countries, this article discusses the issues shaping their relationship, outlining how to make it more productive.
Dr Philip Aylett builds on his previous contributions to this blog-site to provide historical insight into the role played by Commons Committees as the UK participated in the European Economic Community during the 1970s and 1980s.
Mark Bennister, Ben Yong and Diana Stirbu discuss the lack of a shared parliamentary identity in Westminster, considering the implications for institutional governance and reform.
On Tuesday 4 December the UK Government was found to be in contempt of Parliament. Dr Andrew Defty explains how this unprecedented situation occurred.
The EU Withdrawal Bill’s return to the Commons saw SNP MPs protest about their voices having been excluded from the debate. Our Co-Convenor, Louise Thompson, explains how parliamentary procedures can indeed restrict debate for smaller opposition parties, and considers whether something ought to be done about it.
Andrew Defty, University of Lincoln, analyses the “parliamentary trap” Labour laid for the Government on the release of the Brexit impact assessment studies.
By Daniel Gover and Michael Kenny
It is now just over a year since the House of Commons adopted a new set of procedural rules known as ‘English Votes for English Laws’ (or EVEL). Put simply, EVEL provides MPs representing constituencies in England (or England and Wales) with the opportunity to veto certain legislative provisions that apply only in that part of the UK. (For a reminder of how the process works, see here.) Introduced with some fanfare by the Conservative government following the 2015 election – and criticised heavily by its political opponents – these procedures have quickly faded from public view. But, one year on, what lessons can be drawn from how EVEL has operated so far?
Please note that this blog piece was originally published on Colin Talbot’s personal blog on 20 April 2015, and is available here.
By Colin Talbot
The SNP are claiming they can ‘block Labour budgets’, ‘end austerity’ and ‘stop Trident’. Their problem however is simple – most of what they say is based on assuming that Westminster works the same way as Holyrood does for budgeting – and it doesn’t.
There are huge ‘constitutional’ and practical obstacles to implementing the sort of radical challenges to Government tax and spend decisions that the SNP and others seem to be mooting.