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Why democratic financial governance needs a systems revolution

By Franklin De Vrieze.

When was the last time you had a conversation about power, trust and accountability? For those of us who joined the Global Dialogue on Strengthening Fiscal Ecosystems, it was just a few short weeks ago.

The Global Dialogue was convened by the Trust, Accountability and Inclusion (TAI) Collaborative, with the support of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), Gates Foundation and Ford Foundation, and joined by the World Bank, IMF, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, Accountability Lab, International Budget Partnership (IBP), INTOSAI, London School of Economics and others.

I joined colleagues from parliaments, governments, oversight bodies, civil society organisations, academia, and donor agencies to reflect on how we can make the systems that govern public money more equitable, accountable, and democratic.

This was not a technical workshop on budget classifications or fiscal rules. It was indeed a conversation about power and trust. It was about the ecosystem that shapes how public money is raised, allocated, and spent, and the role of parliaments in this system.

What is a fiscal ecosystem?

The idea of a fiscal ecosystem has emerged from more than a decade of work by different democracy organisations, responding to a paradox: despite major progress in fiscal transparency worldwide, accountability and equity often lag behind. Put simply, publishing more budget data or introducing new audit tools has not been enough to create sustainable positive change.

A fiscal ecosystem perspective starts with the recognition that no single actor, such as the Ministry of Finance, Parliament, the Auditor General, even civil society, can deliver accountable fiscal governance alone.

Instead, outcomes are shaped by the interplay of multiple actors: core state institutions such as finance ministries, legislatures, audit offices, and treasuries; other state institutions, including independent fiscal councils and constitutional courts; and non-state actors, ranging from civil society and media to investors and academics.

An ecosystems approach is valuable because it illuminates relationships and power, helps identify where reform coalitions can be built and where blockages and resistance are to be found. It shifts our gaze from isolated technical fixes to the deeper political dynamics that shape fiscal outcomes.

One participant summed it up vividly: “We’ve invested so much in auditing, transparency tools, and PFM (public financial management) systems, but none of that matters if we don’t address the political power behind the decisions. It’s not enough to have an open budget portal. We need to change the way decisions are made.”

Why this matters for democracy

Fiscal choices are political choices. They reflect whose voices are heard, whose interests are prioritised, and how trade-offs are managed. In an era of growing inequality and declining trust in democratic institutions, financial governance is at the heart of the democratic bargain.

If citizens see that public money is captured by elites, mismanaged through inefficiency, or siphoned away through corruption, their trust in democracy erodes. Whereas, if fiscal decisions are transparent, inclusive, and oriented toward equity, they can restore confidence in democratic institutions.

The fiscal ecosystem approach is therefore not just about improving budgets. It is about revitalising democracy itself.

Country case studies

We heard about case studies from Brazil, Indonesia, and South Africa, which offered both warnings and hope.

  • Brazil’s fiscal ecosystem feels stuck, with power struggles between executive and legislature paralysing budget governance.
  • Indonesia demonstrates how impressive legal frameworks can be undermined by clientelism, what one participant called “superficial transparency.”
  • South Africa shows both fragility and resilience: institutions including Parliament were corroded during “state capture” years, yet independent bodies have forced accountability back onto the agenda.

One of the most striking themes of the Global Dialogue was the oversight of public debt management. Debt sustainability is often framed narrowly as a technocratic issue, managed by finance ministries and assessed by rating agencies. But the Global Dialogue revealed how debt management itself is embedded in the fiscal ecosystem, and the anomalies emerging as a lack of oversight by parliaments, audit institutions and civil society.

In Brazil, congressional amendments and rigid spending rules complicate efforts to manage debt, while courts and media debates shape public perceptions of fiscal credibility.

In Indonesia, debt rules have kept borrowing low, but political capture and inequitable spending reveal that fiscal prudence does not guarantee fairness.

In South Africa, debt is not only a macroeconomic concern but also a political flashpoint: bailouts for SOEs, court challenges over rights-based spending, and parliamentary battles over tax reform all feed into the debt trajectory.

The Global Dialogue highlights how an ecosystems lens can “reveal relationships and power,” showing that debt is not just about numbers but about the balance of competing accountabilities:fiscal (stability), political (patronage), and developmental (equity).

I noticed that parliaments are largely an afterthought in the public financial management (PFM) system. For example, even though the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework recognizes parliamentary oversight as the final pillar of performance, parliaments are generally not understood by multilateral and bilateral donors. Also in PFM and public debt management legislation, parliament’s role is largely nominal.

While debt transparency has improved in many places, transparency alone is not enough. Strengthening public accountability is essential. Legislatures, supreme audit institutions, and CSOs need the tools, access, and authority to scrutinize borrowing decisions and ensure they serve the public interest. In the different countries where it has been rolled out, the Public Debt Management Assessment Tool (PDMAT) has proven to generate new insights about the structures, procedures, resources and access to information for parliaments in the debt debate.

What have we learned so far about the role of parliaments in debt oversight? While formal parliamentary oversight functions, such as loan ratification, review of the debt management strategy, or budget approval, are necessary, they are not sufficient. Parliaments must also exercise substantive oversight that scrutinises the policy rationale behind borrowing, the fiscal risks involved, and the developmental returns on debt-financed investments. Parliamentary oversight is integral to preventing unsustainable borrowing and to ensuring debt contributes to equitable development outcomes.

Applying an ecosystems approach to debt could therefore open new strategies: linking debt debates to rights and equity, mobilizing courts and civil society to demand transparent justifications for borrowing, and involving parliaments and media in shaping narratives about debt sustainability. In short, the debt ecosystem may be the next frontier for systemic reform.

Looking forward

Several insights particularly struck me:

  • Power and trust are central. Lack of trust between governments, parliaments and civil society creates major obstacles.
  • Reform is political, not just technical. Without shifts in political incentives and substantive involvement of parliaments, technical reforms remain “superficial transparency.”
  • Local innovation offers hope, with subnational governments and parliaments experimenting with participatory budgeting and litigation strategies.

The fiscal ecosystems approach gives us a lens to see the whole system, identify blockages, and think strategically about coalitions for change. It challenges us to move beyond transparency for its own sake, grapple with the politics of fiscal governance, and build trust across divides.

The Global Dialogue embodied the very ecosystem we were discussing as we were seeing actors who usually work in silos engage as interdependent partners. It reminded me that strengthening fiscal ecosystems is about rebalancing relationships among many institutions, ensuring that budgets serve the many, not the few.

About the author

Franklin De Vrieze is the Head of Practice Accountability at the Westminster Foundation for Democracy

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Unfit for Hansard?

By Charlie Feldman.

“In the circumstances, both sedentary remarks will be removed from the permanent record.” – Mr. Speaker, Commons Chamber, 14 January 2008.

The official record of debates, Hansard, is relied upon as the authoritative record of what was said in Parliament. As Erskine May explains, citing a parliamentary committee’s report, “though not strictly verbatim, [it] is substantially the verbatim report, with repetitions and redundancies omitted and with obvious mistakes corrected, but which on the other hand leaves out nothing that adds to the meaning of the speech or illustrates the argument’.

While research demonstrates that remarks have been expunged from Hansard in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the UK story appears largely unexplored. This matter was recently raised in the Commons when a Member rose on a point of order suggesting she had been censored given a divergence between her remarks as recorded in Hansard and what is heard on the audiovisual recording,

Those who listen closely to a debate and read it later in Hansard will spot modifications, including the removal of words such as deleting ‘Mr. Speaker’ at the beginning of a contribution. There are numerous conventions around what will be included in the Official Record. In the recent case, the rule strictly applied related to omitting remarks continued after the Speaker calls a member’s speech to a close. Pure Hansard expungements at Westminster are few and far between.

The quote that began this post is from an incident in 2008 in which the sedentary interjection “absolute b******s” (without asterisks) was removed by decision of the Speaker after a point of order. The original Hansard attributed it to an MP who was reportedly incensed as it was another MP who made the remark. In the context of the remark being from a sedentary position and with an unclear (and possibly misattributed) interlocutor, the Speaker removed it. Of note, while considered a swear word, “b******s” in full does appear printed in other debates, including as far back as 1986. (In a contrasting incident, one Speaker is suggested to have edited out his own fleeting use of four-letter profanity from Hansard 1989; ITN bleeped the remark in its airing of proceedings).

If one goes far back, much is missing from Hansard. As explained in The History of Hansard, one of the critiques from the period before official Hansard began (prior to 1909) concerned “some parliamentarians’ speeches being shortened or even suppressed”. While those speeches were missing from the record deliberately, some later interventions in the official era are missing unintentionally. Luckily, technological evolution has helped insofar as one no longer sees Hansard stating that a member “made an observation which was not heard in the Reporters’ Gallery.” In one sitting in 1916, for example, inaudible observations are indicated on four occasions – one of which is attributed to the Prime Minister in responding to a question. Chamber acoustics have long been an issue – an 1849 article in The Spectator begins “If there is any one point settled in history, it is that the House of Lords is the worst place for hearing in the known world.”

Focusing on the official reporting era, press reports of removed Hansard content tell us that times of war saw significant expungement. In an article published in the Sunday Dispatch of 25 August 1946, Britain’s Chief Press Censor – George Pirie Thomson – tells of edits from speeches in the House during World War II for various security reasons. MPs, it seems, often crossed the line accidentally, including then PM Winston Churchill. The censorship went further, however, as Thomson revealed censoring a parliamentary question and even working with the Speaker to change the title of a bill!

Security concerns also prompted edits during World War I. Newspaper reports tell us that in a speech given by Sir William Alfred Gelder in August 1916, he accidentally named a town when speaking to what appears now in Hansard as concerns over anti-aircraft guns being “taken away from a certain city on the East Coast”. The debate in the Hansard that follows does not reflect what press reports suggest – that another MP rose on a point of order that the location information potentially helped the enemy. While Gelder wasn’t so sure, the Speaker suggested he speak to the Editor of Hansard. As no location appears in Gelder’s remarks, it may be safe to assume the expungement occurred; the press reports it outright as being removed.

Members have on occasion asked for something to be removed from Hansard. Sir William Darling rose in debate in 1951, recorded as follows: “[T]he right hon. Gentleman, in the debate the night before last, said that I was asleep, and as this statement by him is likely to cause dissatisfaction to my constituents, who probably look upon me as a watchful and wakeful Member, may I ask what steps I can take to have it expunged from the record?” The Speaker said he would consider the matter. It’s unclear if anything actually changed — the relevant debate portion reads “Members opposite are not enthusiastic about remaining throughout the night. Some of them are already going off to sleep—look at the hon. Member for Edinburgh, South (Sir W. Darling). [Interruption.]” 

Controversies have erupted over whether certain changes to the record crossed the line into changing the meaning of a speech or suppressing content. In 1998, for example, the Speaker found that words removed from the Hansard record of a speech from PM Tony Blair did not alter his meaning. No further action was taken. In another case, what was removed from Hansard was reinserted. In 1966, the Speaker reported that the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s edit “was accepted by the reporters, but, after discussion with the Editor of the OFFICIAL REPORT, both he and I are satisfied that it ought not to have been accepted by the reporters; and the passage, in its original purity, will appear in its original form in the Bound Volume.” The Chancellor, who removed words that might be considered a slur upon farmers, later told the Commons: “I deeply regret that I struck those words out of HANSARD”.

Alas, not everything a MP may have wished to remove from Hansard disappears. In 1978, MP Andrew Faulds told the House “Unfortunately, I cannot expunge the offensive words, but I have already written to the right hon. Member for Knutsford apologising to him, and now I wish to extend my apology to you, Sir, and to the House for my regrettable lapse.” To this day his comments remain on the record, wherein he referred to another member as a “fat-arsed twit”.

These examples, while few in number, show that Hansard is not always the immutable record it is sometimes assumed to be. Whether due to acoustics, editorial discretion, wartime censorship, or parliamentary sensitivities, the official transcript has been shaped by forces beyond the spoken word. In exploring these moments of omission and revision, we are reminded that even the most authoritative records are, at times, curated ones.

About the author

Charlie Feldman is the former President of the Canadian Study of Parliament Group. His forthcoming book “Parliamentary” (University of Toronto Press, 2026) chronicles unexpected moments in Canadian parliamentary history.

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The Hidden Engine of Stability and Growth: Strong Parliaments

By Franklin De Vrieze.

Democratic legislatures are on the frontline of both domestic and international challenges. From executive overreach to authoritarian influence and deepening public mistrust, parliamentary institutions around the globe are under immense strain. The strengthening of parliaments therefore is both a critical safeguard for democracy and a lever for economic development and national security.

Many countries have an imbalance in the distribution of power between the different branches of government: the executive branch dominates, with legislatures left under-resourced, side-lined, or compromised. This concentration of power undermines democratic accountability and weakens institutional checks and balances. People lose faith when they perceive their parliaments as ineffective or complicit, and public trust falls. As executive dominance expands, legislatures struggle to perform their essential roles: representing the electorate, scrutinising the government, and shaping inclusive legislation. Without timely intervention, this democratic erosion is difficult to halt.

Early and strategic support to parliaments is therefore essential for democratic resilience and institutional recovery.

For donor countries, supporting parliamentary strengthening abroad is not merely altruism. It serves strategic interests. Democratic, transparent, and accountable institutions form the backbone of stable governance. In doing so, they promote investment-friendly environments, reduce risks of conflict and the drivers of irregular migration, climate-driven or otherwise, and create socio-economic opportunities that deter brain drain.

Here’s an example of how targeted parliamentary support can have a tangible impact: Albania’s recent reform of its gambling legislation. Using Westminster Foundation for Democracy’s (WFD) corruption proofing of legislation methodology, Albanian legislators assessed legal loopholes and improved transparency in regulating a high-risk industry. This effort resulted in a tighter legal and regulatory framework which reduces the potential for corruption, and that in turn provides necessary reassurances for foreign investors to embark and invest.

The example shows how donor-supported technical interventions can reduce incentives for corruption and improve the legal and economic framework. Addressing legislative vulnerabilities in this way enhances institutional integrity, promotes economic stability, economic partnerships and investments, and reinforces the rule of law.

Similarly, WFD’s work on the cost of emigration in the Western Balkans has helped to galvanise cross-party action in national parliaments in the Balkans to address the causes of brain drain and address the negative economic impacts of youth emigration.

Strategies for parliamentary strengthening

Parliamentary strengthening programmes can only be effective when they are locally-led, responding to locally-defined problems and based on genuine, trusted partnerships. Building upon this basic fact, parliamentary strengthening is most effective when approached through a range of strategies.

  • Regional and multi-country programming can create synergies, such as those achieved through post-legislative scrutiny (PLS) efforts in Zambia, where laws on food security were assessed for their impact in the context of climate change.
  • Thematic approaches, like the drafting of public debt legislation in Kenya, help parliaments tackle critical policy areas with precision. Upscaling the role of parliaments in climate governance, essential to ensure that it is transparent, inclusive and informed by social justice principles and thus resilient in the face of unprecedented levels of climate disinformation, is currently the focus of WFD’s work with the Parliament in Indonesia, for instance.
  • Promoting inclusion and engagement, like fostering youth participation in North Macedonia, and enhancing citizens engagement in the Maldives further increase legitimacy and democratic depth.
  • Mutual learning also plays a transformative role in parliamentary strengthening. Peer-to-peer exchange between legislatures in the Global North and South allows for reciprocal knowledge transfer and innovation. These exchanges have already catalysed improvements in parliamentary procedures, transparency, and administration.
  • Moreover, many parliaments are embracing digital transformation, using technology to improve legislative tracking, citizen engagement, and policymaking, as seen in countries like Kenya and Morocco.

Strengthening parliaments is one of the most cost-effective and sustainable interventions to bolster democracy, foster inclusive economic development, and safeguard stability and security. It is time for a renewed commitment to a standards-based approach to parliamentary development, one that is principled, context-sensitive, and collaborative.

Delving deeper

If you are interested in delving deeper into parliamentary strengthening, WFD has been involved in producing a number of efforts and initiatives to inform and guide parliamentary strengthening efforts. I invite you to explore them:

The Global Community of Practice on Post-Legislative Scrutiny, the peer-to-peer network of the Inter Pares project, and the Agora parliamentary portal offer collaborative platforms for sharing experiences, best practices, and innovations as well as helping to build and sustain momentum. Through the network of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), Public Accounts Committees in Asia-Pacific aligned strategies and working methods at a regional workshop hosted by the Fiji Parliament. The AFRIPAL conference recently launched the African Association of Legislation. These networks help parliaments navigate complex challenges together, amplifying the impact of support and creating a shared commitment to democratic governance.

The Common Principles for Support to Parliaments, developed by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in cooperation with WFD and others, emphasise that effective support must be guided by parliaments’ own needs, adapted to local contexts, and focused on long-term sustainability. Inclusive of all political orientations, grounded in international democratic norms, and attentive to gender equality and local expertise, these principles provide a shared roadmap for meaningful and ethical engagement.

The Indicators for Democratic Parliaments, were launched by the IPU with the support of WFD and other partner organizations. These 25 indicators, aligned with Sustainable Development Goals 16.6 and 16.7, enable parliaments to assess their own performance across effectiveness, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, inclusivity, participation, and representation. Each indicator includes detailed dimensions and criteria, offering a comprehensive yet practical self-assessment tool. In Pakistan, the use of these indicators served as a SWOT analysis of the Senate, while in Albania, the assessment culminated in a new Open Parliament Action Plan.

The WFD Guidelines for AI in Parliament have gained global traction in advising on an ethical and step-by-step approach to the use of AI in parliamentary proceedings.

About the authors

Franklin De Vrieze is the Head of Practice Accountability for the Westminster Foundation for Democracy

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The benefits of bringing academics and practitioners together: Writing the second edition of Exploring Parliament

By Cristina Leston-Bandeira, Alexandra Meakin and Louise Thompson.

The following blog post is about Exploring Parliament, which was published by Oxford University Press in April 2025 and will be launched at the Institute for Government on 15 May 2025. You can sign up to watch online here.

Over the last three years we have been working with a fantastic team of 38 academics and 35 parliamentary practitioners to create the second edition of the Exploring Parliament textbook. Like its predecessor, the book has collaboration at its very heart. The chapter topics stem from a roundtable discussion between academics and officials at the PSA’s Annual Conference back in April 2022 and wherever possible academics were paired with practitioners in order to write each chapter. Our aim was to create a fresh perspective on a wide range of aspects of the UK Parliament, including its relationship with the devolved parliaments; one which was grounded in key academic concepts and research, but enriched with the real-life details that only those who walk the corridors of Westminster can provide.

In this blog post, we reflect on the process of creating this new edition. We asked a small group of our contributors how they found the experience of working on the book and the benefits for academics of working with practitioners, and vice versa.  

Putting a spotlight on less studied aspects of Parliament

Some of our authors were returning contributors who had previously written in the first edition of the textbook, while others were new to the process.  Although our academics tended to write on topics which they have researched for a long time, our practitioners appreciated the chance to explain how parliament works to a different type of audience and to include examples which students may not have heard about before. In particular, those writing on the devolved parliaments highlighted the utility of a book which appreciates that Westminster works alongside other devolved institutions:

 “it was an opportunity to explain Parliament’s work—particularly the House of Lords—using examples that students and other readers may not have come across before” (Rosanna Barry, House of Lords)

“So often books, reports and studies on parliament in the UK focus on the UK Parliament alone, forgetting that the UK has four legislatures… As someone working in a devolved legislature it can be a frustrating experience to read work that doesn’t reflect your own experience or makes recommendations and conclusions that aren’t relevant or practical in a devolved or sub-nation state context…The opportunity to write a chapter about the work of parliaments in the UK from a devolved perspective, albeit on a UK-wide issue wasn’t something we couldn’t pass up. Any chance to raise awareness of the work of the four different legislatures in the UK is really welcome” (Nia Moss, Senedd)

“At times, textbooks on British politics tend to be quite Westminster centric and I was actually very happy to see how a book and Westminster Parliament itself considers the wider context, which I think is very important” (Prof Diana Stirbu, London Metropolitan University)

Collaborations between academics and practitioners

Academics and practitioners work in roles with very different expectations around the research and writing process. Practitioners for instance tend to write in a more factual style, in a much faster paced environment with shorter deadlines. Academics on the other hand typically have a much longer writing process and are more used to explaining concepts to a student audience.  Bringing the two groups together was an enjoyable experience (for most!), adding a fresh dose of reality to the academics’ writing and allowing practitioners the chance to write for a very different type of audience:

“The combination of academics and Parliament practitioners is a great one, as it combines our political science with a sense of how things really are. My co-author was also a quants whizz with a great head for figures, so could help me on that, where I am (erm) not so expert.” (Ben Worthy, Birkbeck)

“It was a great experience: we brought different skills, perspectives and experiences to the process and that meant we worked really well together as we could complement each other’s way of thinking and working. I feel like I learnt a lot!” (UK Parliament official)

“Working on this chapter was a change of speed. Initially we had a long time to produce a first draft, followed by shorter more intensive bursts of effort during the editing process.” (Rosanna Barry, House of Lords)

 “Although I probably write tens of thousands of words a year in my role in the Senedd, none of these words are particularly ‘academic’. I think I used the phrase ‘I’m not an academic’ more times in conversations with the book’s editors, as a means of forewarning them, than they’ve ever heard before. … We work in a fact paced environment where you have moved on to probably the ten ‘next things’ you need to do before what you worked on last week was even published. We’re busy dealing with the next issue on our desk before we have had time to reflect on last week’s problem. Being forced to take a step back and really reflect on the issue, the work that’s been achieved and the challenges that remain was a privilege I don’t often get afforded and it’s what I enjoyed most” (Nia Moss, Senedd)

“I learned such a lot from [my co-author] about the procedures and protocols and about how the conventions work in practice.” (Ruth Dixon, University of Oxford)

“not being too precious about one’s own writing was helpful. We allowed each other to keep and toss content and re-draft, as this is where there seems to be a lot of difference in how academics and practitioners write” (Ekaterina Kolpinskaya, University of Exeter)

Writing in an accessible manner

Textbooks require a very different type of writing to standard academic journal articles or parliamentary briefings. Both groups of authors needed to think about how to condense what were often very broad topics into short, succinct chapters which provided enough description to explain how processes work, but also contained some analysis of why things happen and the impact they have:

“Bearing in mind that this is a textbook, it was a useful discipline to stick to explaining clearly the normal course of events, without quibbles or little-used variations or historical footnotes” (Liam Laurence-Smyth, House of Commons)

“It’s easy to get lost, especially with something like trust in politics, which is hugely complex and nuanced. My co-author was great at picking out the key drivers, nature of the problem and possible solutions. They helped keep me out of what my teacher at A-levels called the ‘waffle bog’, a place where I find myself far too often.” (Ben Worthy, Birkbeck)

What worked well was being able to reflect on our practical and ‘real world’ experience of how interparliamentary relations is working on the ground. It really helped to focus on what the key message/story of the chapter should be. It hopefully helped to ensure that those reading it will get a real sense of what the genuine issues from people working on the issue day in and day out are rather than just a theoretical perspective.” (Nia Moss, Senedd)

The ongoing relevance of the book in the 2024 Parliament

The book was written shortly before the 2024 General Election and as such the case studies used are from previous Parliaments. Nevertheless, it has quickly become apparent how relevant the book’s themes are in the current Parliament:

“In some senses, 2024 was the ultimate trust (or distrust) election, so the chapter speaks to how the government faces in huge challenge, in somehow winning back or convincing hugely distrustful and cynical voters, against some very strong anti-elite, anti-system head winds. Can a government win back trust (relatively quickly) by delivering on promises? And what happens if they don’t?” (Ben Worthy, Birkbeck)

“Private Member’s Bills became a hot topic at the end of 2024 when the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill was introduced by backbencher Kim Leadbeater.  We had already completed our chapter by the time the bill was introduced, but I think that our explanation of the stages of a PMB will help anyone trying to understand the complex procedures.” (Ruth Dixon, University of Oxford) 

“Our chapter is relevant for the 2024 parliament as it sets the scene of multilevel presentation and parliamentary activity across the UK. It is important for all MPs and especially to new MPs to be aware of the broader parliamentary context across the UK, to understand the differences and similarities between the different systems” (Prof Diana Stirbu, London Metropolitan University)

“Our chapter also speaks strongly to the principles and core aspirations of the ongoing efforts to make Parliament more accessible – for politicians, other passholders and visitors – both as part of the R&R programme and through the efforts of the Modernisation Committee and the work of the Speaker’s Office” (Ekaterina Kolpinskaya, University of Exeter)

“One of the Modernisation Committee challenges in the 2024 Parliament is to improve accessibility by demystifying parliamentary language. My chapter, and Exploring Parliament as a whole, is committed to bringing clarity to the inevitable complexity of legislative activity.” (Liam Laurence-Smyth, House of Commons)

It has been a real privilege to edit the second edition of Exploring Parliament. We have had the opportunity to work with a fantastic set of authors who have demonstrated the real value in bringing academics and practitioners together. We echo the views of one of our contributors who told us that “it was genuinely one of the most enjoyable things I did last year”.

About the authors

Cristina Leston-Bandeira is Professor of Politics at the University of Leeds. Alexandra Meakin is Lecturer in British Politics, also at the University of Leeds. Louise Thompson is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Manchester.  Exploring Parliament was published by Oxford University Press in April 2025 and will be launched at the Institute for Government on 15 May 2025. You can sign up to watch online here.

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Parliament’s Role in the Downfall of the Republic in Afghanistan (2001-2021)

By Narges Mohammadi.

1.      Introduction

The Afghan parliament, crucial for shaping core policies, played a pivotal role in the republic’s destiny. Emerging from the Taliban’s fall in 2001, the 2004 constitution established a powerful bicameral parliament with essential monitoring mechanisms. Despite its structural advancements, the parliament faced challenges leading to the republic’s failure and the inefficiency of the political system. Corruption, inefficiency, ethnic divisions, and outdated laws plagued Afghanistan’s legislative body. Corruption prioritised personal gain over national interests, and ethnic tensions escalated disharmony. Outdated laws failed to uphold civil rights and international standards. Analysing content and interviews with experts in the study of Afghanistan’s legislation deepened the understanding of problems, revealing a parliament that failed to oversee government decisions and adhere to republican principles. The culmination of a dysfunctional parliament, marked by corruption, inefficiency, ethnic divisions, and outdated laws, significantly contributed to political instability, a dysfunctional government system, and eventually to the downfall of the Afghan Republic and the assumption of power by the Taliban on August 15, 2021.

2.      Political System of Afghanistan

Afghanistan has undergone various political structures, transitioning from the Monarchy to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), the Taliban Emirate (I), and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s creation after the Bonn conference 2001. Presently, the country is under the de facto rule of the Taliban Emirate (II). The political system established after 2001 was presidential, encompassing executive, judiciary, and legislative branches with checks and balances. The president served as both head of state and commander-in-chief, supported by two vice presidents. The National Assembly (NA) or Parliament, comprising the House of Elders (Meshrano Jirga (MJ)) and the House of People (Wolesi Jirga (WJ)), served as the highest legislative body. While WJ members were directly elected, MJ included elected and appointed members. The independent judiciary consisted of the Supreme Court (SC), Primary Courts, and the Courts of Appeal (CA), with SC members appointed by the President with WJ approval.

2.1.  Duties and Powers of the Parliament

The 2004 Afghan constitution gave the parliament more power than previous constitutions. The Afghan parliament’s duties represented the nation, making and ratifying laws and reviewing, controlling and supervising the performance of the executive power. In particular, WJ and MJ had the power to approve, modify or abrogate laws and executive decrees. The power and duties of WJ included endorsing social, cultural, and economic development programs, approving state budgets, making, modifying, or abrogating administrative units, and ratifying international treaties and agreements. In addition, the constitution enabled both houses to interrogate and impeach ministers on specific issues and approve or reject high-level appointees.

3.     Factors Contributed to the Parliament’s Role in the Downfall of Democracy in Afghanistan

I was thrilled to present this research during the PSA Parliaments Annual Conference 2023. In this blogpost, in examining the parliament’s role in the collapse of Afghanistan’s democratic government, I explore how the Afghan parliament’s dysfunctionality contributed to the republic government’s downfall. The subsequent factors shed light on my investigation, which reveals ethnic divisions and governmental inefficiency rooted in corruption.

3.1. Corruption

Widespread corruption severely impacted the Afghan government, notably hindering the parliament’s ability to combat corruption effectively. The ministerial impeachment process, designed for accountability, became susceptible to personal biases and alliances within the parliament, undermining stability goals. This corruption permeated the monitoring institution, impeding its crucial role in ensuring good governance and emphasising the urgent need for systemic reforms in Afghanistan’s parliamentary system. Political analyst Hadi Joya highlighted corrupt practices in the Afghan Parliament, labelling it a “trading/commissioning” entity engaged in transactions and bribes, losing its genuine connection with the people and government. An Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) reported widespread corruption, legislative negligence, and budget misappropriation. Furthermore, media reports exposed the misuse of 45,900,000 Afghani funds in former Speaker Abdul Raouf Ebrahimi’s budget, prompting his commitment to return 5.3 million Afghanis to the WJ’s budget.

A police officer witness claimed that corruption among parliamentarians played a significant role in the republic’s downfall, stating, “Getting ministers’ votes of confidence from the Afghan parliament was a mistake, as ministers had to comply with MPs to secure confidence votes.” The officer criticised the Ministry of Interior (MI), pointing out the appointment of “uneducated, unprofessional, and corrupt security officials through MPs’ influence.” Instances were noted where MPs supported the Taliban in areas under their control to secure votes. Moreover, recently, the US imposed sanctions on Mir Rahman Rahmani, the former Speaker of the Afghan parliament, and his son Ajmal Rahmani, citing “massive financial corruption.” Mir Rahman allegedly bribed parliament members for the Speaker role, while Ajmal paid $1.6 million to Election Commission members for parliamentary entry. Despite corruption, a few dedicated MPs in the WJ were acknowledged for their hard work in ratifying and implementing laws prioritising people’s interests, as highlighted by former MP Nisar Ahmad Ghoryani. However, these efforts were insufficient and required additional improvement.

3.2 Ethnic Division

Ethnic divisions pervaded Afghanistan’s government, including Parliament, where democracy was rooted in ethnicity. The selection of the interim government head prioritised ethnicity over political considerations, resulting in Hamid Karzai’s appointment as a Dorani Pashtun. The ethnic basis extended to parliamentary decisions, with MPs’ votes for ministerial candidates reflecting considerations of ethnicity, language, and discrimination instead of meritocracy and experience.

The ethnic division in Afghanistan’s parliament was exacerbated by the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, which emphasised non-partisanship and discouraged the formation of trans-ethnic political parties. The absence of partisan politics in parliament allowed ethnic tendencies to dominate decision-making, leading to prolonged involvement in ethnic issues. For example, debates over the higher education law highlighted linguistic divisions, with disagreements on mentioning Pashto and Persian-Dari words. Additionally, conflicts over key positions in the parliament further underscored ethnocentrism, causing prolonged disputes and hindering effective governance. However, Ghulam Farooq Majrooh, former MP, noted exceptions to ethnic differences, citing instances where individuals from various ethnic groups, such as Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, were appointed to ministerial positions or the Supreme Court. This suggests that, amid challenges, there were efforts to address ethnic diversity and promote inclusivity in key roles, but these efforts fell short and required further enhancement. Therefore, ethnic divisions significantly weakened parliamentary performance as love and hatred were influenced by ethnic affiliations. Rather than representing national interests and promoting nation-building, ethnic divisions fueled tribal conflicts, undermining the parliament’s effectiveness in serving the Afghan people.

3.3. Inefficiency

The inefficiency of the parliament, despite its pivotal role in shaping the republican system and upholding supposed freedoms, became evident as the three powers within the system clashed, compromising democratic principles and neglecting citizens’ rights. Ineffective supervision allowed corruption and legislative weaknesses to persist, with meritocracy often sidelined, impeding parliamentary efficiency. The parliament struggled with lawlessness, lacking the capacity for supervision and prioritising ethnic-based entries over specialisation and commitment. Many MPs, entering through ethnic relations and indirect quotas, were unfamiliar with supervision, turning it into a tool for pursuing individual and group interests rather than upholding democratic values.

The parliament struggled to assert its political authority amid ongoing tension between the executive and legislative branches. As revealed in the MEC report, executive interference manifested in enforcing several laws through presidential decrees without parliamentary approval, indicating failure in ratifying laws, weaknesses, MPs absenteeism, and the influence of external elements. Despite constitutional provisions for legislative decrees during parliamentary recess, the government often avoided submitting decrees for fear of rejection. Parliamentary shutdowns became an opportunity for the executive to pass legislation likely to be rejected by parliament. These challenges and inefficiencies in law-making, where the parliament produced only five laws in 16 years, showcased obstacles within the legislative body and external branches hindering its effective performance.

3.4 Outdated Laws

The practical implementation of approved laws and the prevention of corruption and bribery could mitigate public distrust and prevent further decline in Afghanistan. However, despite the existence of parliament, specific laws needed to be updated in a timely manner. For instance, over the sixteen years of the WJ, crucial laws related to governing constitutional formations were outdated, and some civil matters remained unchanged, reflecting similarities with the 1964 constitution. This failure to adapt these laws to contemporary needs highlights missed opportunities for necessary amendments in response to evolving societal dynamics. Additionally, in a rigid gender context where males dominate, any legislative proposal, government oversight measure, and budget modifications or amendments required the endorsement of the majority of male MPs. Success was particularly contingent on gaining approval from influential and leading legislators.

4. Conclusion

This research explains how the weaknesses inherent in the democratically inclined republican system set up in 2001 led to its downfall in 2021. The republic’s failure in Afghanistan stemmed from various factors. The note focuses on the significant role played by the parliament in the re-emergence of the Taliban. Despite its pivotal function, the Afghan parliament faced challenges such as corruption, ethnic divisions, inefficiency, and outdated laws, leading to a decline in public trust in the system. The parliament’s inability to effectively supervise and ratify laws allowed unchecked governance by a select few, further destabilized democracy. The fraudulent electoral system and MPs’ lack of expertise in key areas rendered the parliament weak and hindered decision-making. This weakness contributed to the republic’s collapse. The writer acknowledges that other factors like legislative and judicial powers, political disagreements, foreign intervention, and public unfamiliarity with democratic processes also played a role.

In the future, if it becomes possible, reforms should include a stronger parliament established to revitalise Afghanistan and its institutions, accompanied by comprehensive political, social, and economic measures. Strengthening anti-corruption laws, fostering inter-ethnic relations, and prioritising citizens’ participation in decision-making are essential for Afghanistan’s progress. Additionally, cultivating political culture, education, public awareness, positive engagement with international communities, and upholding human rights are crucial elements for a positive transformation in Afghanistan’s future.

I hope such possibilities will arise in the future and hope that by establishing how things went wrong in the past, the research may eventually contribute to a better future for the people of Afghanistan.

About the author

Narges Mohammadi is a PhD Student in the School of International Relations and Diplomacy at Beijing Foreign Studies University.

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Trends in Canadian Non-Government Legislation: A Tale of Two Houses

By Charlie Feldman1

Non-government legislation warrants close attention as sittings of Canada’s 44th Parliament, 1st Session resume later this month. Thus far this session, the Senate of Canada has seen more Senate Public Bills (SPBs) introduced than in any session in Canadian history, and this record-setting total will only increase. Meanwhile, a trend in the opposite direction appears to be emerging in the House of Commons as fewer Private Members’ Bills (PMBs) – and fewer items of Private Members’ Business overall – are being introduced compared to previous non-pandemic sessions.

While some scholarship exists regarding Private Members’ Bills in the Canadian House of Commons – including in work from its former Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel – far less appears to be written on equivalent legislation in the Senate, Senate Public Bills. Current academic attention on the legislative functions of the Canadian Senate focuses on engagement with government legislation and, in particular, the Senate’s increasing rate of amendment. This focus makes sense given recent reforms to the Senate appointment process and their possible effects on partisanship; however, the SPB story is one worth considering. 

While it would be notable on its own if SPBs were increasingly introduced but went nowhere in the legislative process, these bills are increasingly enacted. At this point in the session, more SPBs (8) than PMBs (5) have received royal assent. Might the Upper House currently have the upper hand when it comes to non-government legislation?

The new Senate record in context

The number of SPBs introduced in the Senate in recent parliamentary sessions (1994-present) is illustrated in Figure 1 (keep in mind that the 44th Parliament, 1st Session remains in progress).

Figure 1: Senate Public Bills introduced in recent parliamentary sessions

It should be recalled that parliamentary sessions have different durations and there may be more or less non-government legislative activity given other circumstances – for example, the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in the 43rd Parliament, 1st Session or the abnormally short 40th Parliament, 1st Session (the so-called ‘coalition crisis’). What is particularly striking about the SPB record being set during the 44th Parliament, 1st session is the relative length of the session compared to others. The longest single session in parliamentary history was the recent 42nd Parliament, 1st Session (2015-2019). Over the course of its 1378 days, the Senate sat 308 times and saw 68 SPBs introduced. Contrast that to the current 44th Parliament which so far has seen 138 Senate sittings in its first 600 days (at the time of this writing) but has seen 73 SPBs introduced. In other words, the Senate is seeing more SPBs introduced in less than half the time as observed just two parliaments ago.

As a historical context note based on Library of Parliament data, during the previous 80 parliamentary sessions in which SPBs were introduced (e.g., prior to the current session), the average was 8.6 SPBs introduced each session (median 3.5 SPBs introduced each session).

Wither the PMB?

With respect to the House of Commons, the number of PMBs being introduced is declining relative to the number of SPBs introduced. At the time of this writing, the PMB-to-SPB introduction ratio is at a 30-year low (excluding the abnormally short 40th Parliament, 1st Session discussed above and the first session impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic). The decreasing introduction gap between the two types of bills can be seen in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Number of non-government Public Bills introduced in recent parliamentary sessions (Data from LEGISinfo. It is important to recall that SPBs do not carry over from one session to another within the same parliament whereas PMBs are reinstated after a prorogation. In other words, in any second or subsequent session of the same Parliament, the PMB number will automatically include bills from the previous session or sessions of that same parliament that did not complete their legislative journey.)

The drop in introduced PMBs during the 43rd Parliament, 1st Session is explained because the Covid-19 pandemic led to fewer parliamentary sittings and a focus on government legislation responding to the pandemic. However, notice that the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session – the longest single parliamentary session in Canadian history – has a drop from previous sessions. Why would fewer PMBs be introduced in a longer session than in shorter ones that preceded it?

As explained in House of Commons Procedure and Practice, “Private Members’ proposals can take the form of a public bill, a motion, or a notice of motion for the production of papers”. As bills are only one aspect of non-government business, it might be suggested that MPs are opting to introduce more motions instead of bills. However, in looking at the other types of private members’ business – motions and notices of motion for the production of papers – a decline similar to that observed with PMBs becomes apparent, as illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Private Members’ Business (other than bills) in recent parliamentary sessions (Data from the Status of House Business documents for the end of recent parliamentary sessions. See: https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/house/status-business)

Nothing in the parliamentary record clearly explains why MPs not in Cabinet are opting to introduce fewer initiatives. This is an area worthy of further examination and analysis. Importantly, there may be a relationship with the increasing number of SPBs.

Bicameral effects

When an SPB passes the Senate, an MP must be found to sponsor the bill as a matter of Private Members’ Business. MPs not in Cabinet can sponsor one SPB over the course of a Parliament pursuant to Standing Order 86.2(2). If a House sponsor cannot be found, the bill is dropped from consideration, which is rare but occurred earlier this year.

While MPs participate in a lottery to determine the order in which they can advance a matter of Private Members’ Business in their name, SPBs jump the queue. In a 2017 white paper, the Government noted that it might consider “ways to manage Senate Public Bills that delay the replenishment of Private Members’ Business, possibly by having a separate rubric for these bills”.

No action has been taken to revise the process, which has produced some perhaps unexpected results. A particularly notable example is the case of An Act to Recognize Charlottetown as the Birthplace of Confederation. MP Wayne Easter introduced this PMB on March 24, 2016 as Bill C-253 and it never advanced (given Mr. Easter’s position in the lottery). However, the same bill was introduced as an SPB by Senator Diane Griffin on February 15, 2017. That SPB, Bill S-236, passed the Senate, was subsequently sponsored by Mr. Easter in the House, and received royal assent in December 2017. In short, the Senate’s version of the legislation became law before the House version even came up for debate, despite the House version being introduced earlier.

In the current session, some PMBs and SPBs bear striking similarities – including the following: An Act respecting the National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking (C-308 and S-263), An Act to develop a national framework for a guaranteed livable basic income (C-223 and S-233), and Strengthening Reporting Obligations for Sex Offenders Act (Noah’s Law) (C-336 and S-226). Could it be that some MPs are seeking to advance their initiatives through the Senate in the hopes of having them pass faster than if they were advanced as PMBs in the House? This was the motivation behind the Charlottetown bill.

While the parliamentary rules around similar and identical items are designed to limit one Chamber considering the same thing twice, nothing stops the same initiative from being advanced in each House of Parliament simultaneously. Notably, there is a prohibition against using the legislative drafting services of the House of Commons to advance initiatives for the Senate. The Members By-Law of the House of Commons states that “[t]he funds, goods, services and premises provided by the House of Commons to a Member may not be used to support Senators, the Senate or the Government of Canada in the performance of their duties and functions.”

One other bicameral note warrants mention: When SPBs are received from the Senate, they are subject to review by the House’s Subcommittee on Private Members’ Business (SMEM). That committee reviews non-government public bills against certain criteria and must meet to consider SPBs, regardless whether there are PMBs to consider at the time. Importantly, the committee examines PMBs and SPBs differently. PMBs are subject to a more robust review by SMEM – including in respect of their constitutionality – something that is not required of SPBs. This could, in theory, motivate some to pursue an SPB over a PMB as the Senate has no SMEM-like committee for SPB review.

Conclusion

Parliamentary trends with respect to non-government legislation appear to be changing as more SPBs are being introduced while fewer PMBs and other items of Private Members’ Business are being introduced in the House of Commons.

Further research is warranted on increasing SPB introduction. In particular, has their content changed in recent years? If so, does it relate in some way with Senate composition changes, such as it becoming a gender-equal House for the first time in history? Or, are other activities motivating the SPB rise? Of particular note, recent research demonstrates that senators are now disproportionately lobbied relative to their MP counterparts. Could increased lobbying find expression in increased SPBs?

More research is warranted to explore why individual House legislators not in Cabinet appear to be advancing fewer initiatives in their own right while senators are introducing more. It may be that MPs are increasingly seeking to collaborate with a senator to advance an initiative through the Upper House in the hope that it will complete the legislative process more quickly. Whether the government will seek to encourage the House to reform practices in this area – as suggested in its 2017 white paper – remains to be seen. With Parliament’s imminent return, however, non-government legislation in Canada’s Parliament warrants a watchful eye.

  1. President of the Canadian Study of Parliament Group. The views in this work are those of the author and not of any employer. ↩︎
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Our Survey Says (Part 2): A Few Interesting Nuggets about Committee Prestige

By Stephen Holden Bates, Caroline Bhattacharya and Stephen McKay

Just like in Family Fortunes[i] but by chance rather than by design, 100 people responded to our survey[ii] about the prestige of different select committees (SCs) in the UK House of Commons (HoC).[iii]

From a score of one to five (with five being the most important), respondents were asked to rate the prestige of UK HoC SCs, permanent oversight committees of three main types: (i) Departmental, which scrutinise corresponding government departments; Domestic/Administrative, which are concerned with various aspects of the internal workings of Parliament; and Other Scrutiny, which focus on issues that cut across government departments.

The average committee received a prestige score of 3.03 with Departmental SCs receiving an average of 3.21, Domestic/Administrative 2.96, and Other Scrutiny 2.74. The highest ranked committee was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the Treasury SC (4.48) with the lowest being the punctuationally-anachronistic Consolidation &c. Bills Joint Committee (1.94), which considers Bills that “bring together a number of existing Acts of Parliament on the same subject into one Act without amending the law”.

Figure 1 ranks SCs from most to least prestigious according to the results of the survey. There are perhaps some results which deserve greater attention than others. For example, we may wonder whether the Standards and Privileges SCs would be ranked so highly if the survey hadn’t taken place in the aftermath, or at the same time, as their high-profile inquiries into the behaviour and probity of various MPs, such as Chris Pincher, Matt Hancock, Margaret Ferrier and the former Prime Minister, Boris Johnson. We may also be a little surprised at the lowly rankings of the Northern Ireland, Scottish and Welsh Affairs SCs, perhaps not in relation to other Departmental SCs but maybe in relation to some of the Other Scrutiny and Domestic/Administrative SCs. Finally, those of us who are concerned about the climate crisis (which, let’s face it, should be all of us) may be perturbed by the fact that the three environment-related committees all appear in the bottom half of the table.

Table 1 shows the difference between a committee’s overall ranking and the ranking by different types of respondents. Results with a green font colour indicate a committee which is at the top of the list of those ranked higher by that type of respondent than the overall rankings; those with a red font colour indicate a committee which is the top of the list of those ranked lower. As can be seen, when it comes to departmental and other scrutiny SCs, MPs and their staff who answered the survey think that the International Trade, International Development, Scottish Affairs and, especially, the Levelling Up, Housing & Communities SCs are more prestigious than the average respondent, whereas Work & Pensions, Women & Equalities and the Human Rights Joint Committee are less prestigious. In addition, the Exiting/Future Relationship with the EU Committee is considered more prestigious by parliamentary staff and less prestigious by academics. Some interesting results can also be observed with Domestic/Administrative SCs. Both academic and parliamentary staff respondents believe the Procedure and Petitions SCs are more prestigious than MPs and their staff do, whereas the situation is reversed when it comes to Backbench Business.

Figure 1: Ranking of Select Committees by Prestige
Overall RankingCommitteeDifference between overall ranking & ranking by
AcademicsMPs & their StaffParl. Staff
1Treasury0-10
2Foreign Affairs-210
3Public Accounts1-20
4Home Affairs110
5Defence-110
6Liaison10-1
7Health & Social Care0-11
8Privileges010
9Standards-4-40
10Public Administration & Constitutional Affairs-10-1
11Education2-4-4
12Business & Trade01-1
13Exiting/Future Relationship with the European Union -613
14Human Rights Joint Committee4-112
15Justice0-2-1
16National Security Strategy Joint Committee07-2
17Work & Pensions0-60
18Procedure4-84
19Culture, Media & Sport130
20Backbench Business-22-3
21Energy Security & Net Zero10-1
22Transport12-4
23International Trade-442
24Levelling Up, Housing & Communities010-1
25Environment, Food & Rural Affairs-331
26Petitions3-56
27Science, Innovation & Technology20-1
28International Development24-3
29Women & Equalities0-80
30Environmental Audit0-63
31Administration-731
32Finance-23-1
33Selection21-4
34European Scrutiny24-1
35Northern Ireland Affairs2-33
36Statutory Instruments Joint Committee-422
37Statutory Instruments-441
38Arms Export Controls3-20
39Scottish Affairs450
40Regulatory Reform-400
41Welsh Affairs2-10
42European Statutory Instruments5-10
43Consolidation &c. Bills Joint Committee120
Table 1: Difference between overall ranking and rankings by different types of respondents

Table 2 compares the rankings and scores of female and male respondents. A positive number indicates that female respondents scored/ranked that committee higher than male respondents and a negative number that they scored/ranked that committee lower. As can be seen from the lists, all committees which scrutinise policy areas stereotypically seen as feminine are ranked/scored higher by female respondents than male correspondents – Women & Equalities most notably – and only two committees which scrutinise policy areas stereotypically seen as masculine (Business & Trade and Environment, Food & Rural Affairs). Although, of course, no firm conclusions can be drawn from our survey results, they do contribute in a small way to important debates about who gets to define which committees are prestigious. For example, Franchesca Nestor is currently undertaking interesting work about whether influential measures of committee prestige used to rank US congressional committees fail to take into account the fact that different groups of legislators may have systematic differences in their views of which committees are prestigious and that, consequently, prestige is understood in relation to what the majority group (i.e. white, middleclass, male representatives) do and think. It would be intriguing to delve into this issue more deeply this side of the pond…

CommitteeDifference between Female & Male RankingDifference between Female & Male Scores
Women & Equalities80.87
Energy Security & Net Zero60.61
Northern Ireland Affairs60.6
Human Rights Joint Committee40.58
Levelling Up, Housing & Communities40.56
International Trade40.53
Regulatory Reform40.5
Culture, Media & Sport40.45
Welsh Affairs30.51
Scottish Affairs30.44
Finance20.47
Business & Trade20.42
Privileges20.38
Health & Social Care20.36
Education20.36
Arms Export Controls20.32
Petitions10.48
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs10.43
Public Accounts10.12
International Development00.53
Science, Innovation & Technology00.5
Selection00.32
European Statutory Instruments00.31
Work & Pensions00.27
Consolidation &c. Bills Joint Committee00.24
Standards00.2
Home Affairs00.09
Treasury0-0.04
Environmental Audit-10.48
Exiting/Future Relationship with the EU -10.17
Foreign Affairs-1-0.06
Liaison-1-0.07
European Scrutiny-20.26
National Security Strategy Joint Committee-20.19
Defence-3-0.15
Statutory Instruments Joint Committee-40.17
Transport-50.18
Public Admin. & Constitutional Affairs-5-0.08
Justice-60.07
Statutory Instruments-60.05
Procedure-70.07
Administration-8-0.01
Backbench Business-90.14
Table 2: Comparison between the scores and rankings of female and male survey respondents

[i] Or Family Feuds in the US, or Familien-Duell in Germany.

[ii] The survey was run as part of Stephen Holden Bates’ 2021-22 Parliamentary Academic Fellowship, which was funded by the UKRI/ESRC Impact Acceleration Account, and is part of on-going work looking at the impact of membership patterns on the work and outputs of select committees.

[iii] 100 people answered our online survey between 22nd May and 18th July 2023. The survey was aimed at experts, although we allowed anyone to answer, and was distributed via Twitter, the newsletter of the UK Political Studies Association’s Parliaments Specialist Group and through email contacts. Of the 100 respondents, 30 were parliamentary staff in the House of Commons, 15 were academics, 13 were MPs, 12 worked for MPs, and 10 were parliamentary staff beyond the HoC, with the other 20 compromising members of the public, journalists, people who work for think tanks, and ‘other’. Overall, 30 respondents were female, 63 were male and seven preferred not to say; no respondent said their gender was not the same as the sex they were assigned at birth. Seven respondents said they belonged to a group which was considered an ethnic minority in the country in which they worked, 86 said they did not belong to such a group and seven preferred not to say. Four respondents were removed for the analysis presented in this blog, as there were problems with their answers and/or they did not complete the survey properly.

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Our Survey Says (Part 1): No Real Surprises about the Importance of Parliamentary Work

By Stephen Holden Bates, Caroline Bhattacharya and Stephen McKay

Just like in Family Fortunes[i] but by chance rather than by design, 100 people responded to our survey[ii] about the importance of different elements of MPs’ work in the UK Parliament.[iii]

From a score of one to five (with five being the most important), respondents were asked to rate the importance of a non-exhaustive list of parliamentary activities. As can be seen in Table 1, contributing to the work of Select Committees is considered the most important aspect of MPs’ work by quite a distance. Next, bunched together quite closely, are, in order, debating in the Chamber, Public Bill Committee (PBC) work and tabling Written Questions (WQs). There is then a bit of a gap to tabling Private Members’ Bills (PMBs) and then another to introducing and to signing Early Day Motions (EDMs).

RankActivityAverage Score (max = 5; min = 1)
1Contributing to the work of Select Committees4.12
2Debating in the Chamber (including Westminster Hall)3.81
3Contributing to the work of Public Bill Committees3.60
4Tabling Written Questions3.54
5Tabling Private Members’ Bills2.73
6Introducing Early Day Motions1.70
7Signing Early Day Motions introduced by another MP1.43
Table 1: The Importance of MPs’ Parliamentary Work

None of this is perhaps particularly surprising. Select committees are often considered both to be Parliament ‘at its best’ and to overshadow Public Bill Committees, and the House of Commons has traditionally been seen as a deliberating parliament par excellence.

Although we don’t, of course, have enough respondents to draw robust conclusions, what may be considered more intriguing results come when we look at the rankings of different types of respondents. For example, female and male respondents both ranked the activities in the same order as in Table 1 but, interestingly, female respondents ranked each activity at least 0.29 and as much as 0.67 higher than male correspondents. Furthermore, as shown in Table 2, while academics, MPs and their staff, and parliamentary staff agree that tabling PMBs and introducing and signing EDMs are the 5th, 6th and 7th most important activities respectively, there is disagreement at the top of the rankings. MPs and their staff appear to place greater importance on the talking elements of Parliament, ranking debating in the Chamber first. Academics, on the other hand, rank debating in the Chamber fourth, seemingly placing greater importance on the working elements of Parliament and, in particular, committee work and WQs.

ActivityRank
AcademicsMPs & their StaffParl. Staff
Contributing to the work of Select Committees121
Debating in the Chamber (inc. Westminster Hall)412
Contributing to the work of PBCs2=34
Tabling Written Questions3=33
Tabling PMBs555
Introducing EDMs666
Signing EDMS introduced by another MP777
Table 2: The Importance of MPs’ Parliamentary Work by Different Groups of Respondents

These results might raise questions about how different groups of people who variously engage with Parliament understand its importance[iv] and place different emphases on the functions that it fulfils – and should fulfil – in our political life. Such differences might perhaps be fruitfully explored in future qualitative work.

[i] Or Family Feuds in the US, or Familien-Duell in Germany.

[ii] The survey was run as part of Stephen Holden Bates’ 2021-22 Parliamentary Academic Fellowship, which was funded by the UKRI/ESRC Impact Acceleration Account, and is part of on-going work looking at specialisation in the UK House of Commons.

[iii] 100 people answered our online survey between 22nd May and 18th July 2023. The survey was aimed at experts, although we allowed anyone to answer, and was distributed via Twitter, the newsletter of the UK Political Studies Association’s Parliaments Specialist Group and through email contacts. Of the 100 respondents, 30 were parliamentary staff in the House of Commons, 15 were academics, 13 were MPs, 12 worked for MPs, and 10 were parliamentary staff beyond the HoC, with the other 20 compromising members of the public, journalists, people who work for think tanks, and ‘other’. Overall, 30 respondents were female, 63 were male and seven preferred not to say; no respondent said their gender was not the same as the sex they were assigned at birth. Seven respondents said they belonged to a group which was considered an ethnic minority in the country in which they worked, 86 said they did not belong to such a group and seven preferred not to say. Two respondents were removed for the analysis presented in this blog, as there were problems with their answers and/or they did not complete the survey properly.

[iv] Left deliberately undefined in the survey because we didn’t want to impose our understanding of what activities were/should be considered important within the UK Parliament on the respondents.

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We need reform of the legislative process to empower Parliament

Jess Sargeant

Parliamentary sovereignty is the UK’s central constitutional principle; in theory, parliament holds all the power, but in practice, the government wields much of it. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the legislative process; legislation is one of Parliament’s core functions, but government control of the timetable and scrutiny mechanisms in the House of Commons – means that its ability to influence the content of bills is limited. Recent trends towards passing bills on expedited timetables and increased use of secondary legislation – accelerated by the UK’s exit from the EU and the coronavirus pandemic – have curtailed opportunities for parliamentary input still further. This has prompted urgent warnings from two House of Lords committees of the need to rebalance power between Parliament and the Executive.

But redressing this constitutional imbalance requires going beyond asking the government to exercise restraint.  It means empowering parliament and creating new opportunities for parliamentary influence. The recommendations of the Wright Report, published in 2009, led to the election of Commons select committee chairs and the establishment of a backbench business committee. They demonstrated the power of procedural change in giving parliamentarians the tools and opportunities to challenge government policy and influence debate. In this spirit, the Institute for Government and Bennett Institute has undertaken a comprehensive study of the legislative process to identify opportunities for reform. 

One area is pre-legislative scrutiny (PLS). There is wide consensus amongst MPs, ministers and officials that pre-legislative scrutiny can greatly improve the quality of legislation. It gives Parliament the opportunity to influence legislation before it is finalised, allowing for more time and space for the government to make changes to reflect the views of parliamentarians on the quality and content of draft legislation. It can be useful too for the government, allowing ministers to tease out disagreements on knotty policy issues, test arguments and ultimately smooth a bill’s passage through parliament. 

Since 1997 eight parliamentary select committee reports have recommended expanding the use of pre-legislative scrutiny and making it a core part of the legislative process. However, bursts of enthusiasm for the practice amongst governments have been short-lived. Pre-legislative scrutiny remains a rarity; overall just 11.6% of the total government bills receiving royal assent since 2007 were published in draft.

It is clear that the current approach to pre-legislative scrutiny, in which the government has complete discretion as to whether and which bills to publish in draft, is failing to unlock its full potential. So we propose taking inspiration from the Oireachtas (the Irish Parliament) and requiring that the government give parliament an opportunity to conduct pre-legislative scrutiny on all government bills. 

This does not mean that a full PLS inquiry – taking three to four months – should take place on every bill, but that the government should publish all its bills in draft and give parliament the opportunity to select bills for PLS and allow others to progress without delay. They should be able to choose from a menu of options including a full inquiry and report, scrutiny of certain clauses, to a one-off evidence session and letter. This should ensure the level of scrutiny is proportionate and does not introduce undue delay to the bill timetable, or pressure on parliamentary capacity. 

Another area ripe for reform is Commons Committee stage. While public bill committees are intended to allow MPs to scrutinise each clause of the bill in detail, their partisan nature means that they are rarely constructive, and research suggests their impact on the content of bills have diminished over time. Reforms to permit oral evidence-taking has improved the functioning of these forums, but it is still only taken a quarter (27%) of all bills passed in the last five parliamentary sessions. Witnesses are chosen through the usual channels, meaning they are often there to support one political position or the other rather than bring new evidence and perspectives to deliberations. 

One proposal, already adopted by the devolved legislatures, is to abolish public bill committees and give select committees responsibility for scrutiny during this stage of the bill’s progress. This has the potential benefits of bringing more expertise and cross-party working into the process, as well as the ability to utilise the relationships with key experts, interest groups and businesses. But it risks overwhelming these committees’ work, and by making them a forum for key votes it could undermine their independence. 

Nonetheless, we believe there is a middle ground. Building on the informal inquiries they already conduct on bills, we propose that select committees should be able to request a ‘select committee’ stage on all government bills – to allow them to consider the bill, take oral evidence and publish a committee view, including draft amendments. This can inform the debate in public bill committees and beyond, while giving select committees the opportunity to decide which bills to prioritise.

We recognise that many of these recommendations may add time and potential friction to the legislative process. But legislating is a serious business – policy is more likely to succeed where it has been robustly tested and where it has broad support from the people’s representatives. The government’s short-term desire to do things quickly should not overrule the long-term objective of do things well. 

Jess Sargeant is a senior researcher working on devolution. She joined the Institute for Government in May 2019 from the House of Lords Library.

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There’s a time and place for prorogation — and this is it

As I sit and watch the turmoil at Westminster on the morning (afternoon in London) that Liz Truss announced her resignation; the morning that the 1922 Committee of Conservative backbenchers scramble to find a leader in a week’s time; a seemingly firm date of October 31 for a budget statement from a recently appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer; and cries for an election, there seems to be no way forward that does not continue the chaos.  But there just may be a way to calm the waters somewhat.  A proper and timely use of prorogation.

Prorogation, where one session of Parliament ends and a new session is prepared for, has received much negative press and commentary in the last few years, in the UK and in Canada.   It has been seen as a way for a Prime Minister and a government to avoid facing Parliament when there was an imminent need for a decision of Parliament.   But there are times when prorogation is appropriate.  In most cases it is used when a parliamentary session has effectively exhausted the government’s agenda and there is a belief that the government needs to set out the next stages of its “new” agenda for the following session.  In some countries this is effectively set as an annual or biannual process, in others it is discretionary.  In either case, there is also room for the Prime Minister to ask for the King to prorogue Parliament as a necessary re-set button, either when a new King’s Speech is required to address an emergency, or to set out a new way forward for the government in light of changed circumstances.  Sometimes, such pauses are just necessary to stop, rethink, plan and explain a way forward.  The present circumstances would, I suggest, be such a cas, although some consideration would have to be given to ensuring that legislation that meets the revised agenda, or to meet urgent needs is carried forward in the next session.   

The way forward would be for the Conservative party to choose a leader, have the King appoint them as Prime Minster, then have that person request that Parliament be prorogued for a couple of weeks to allow them to put a cabinet together, prepare an agenda, and then to have that agenda presented to Parliament through a King’s Speech. There would then follow debate and a vote of the House of Commons in support of the Speech or else defeat and an election.  This process would allow the new Prime Minister to gather their thoughts, form a cabinet with appropriate deliberation, and present a coherent plan to Parliament to be aired and discussed before specific actions are taken.  It would also result in the constitutional legitimacy that the House of Commons can provide by voting on the King’s Speech.  

No doubt there will be those who will argue that this is merely a political tactic and an attempt to govern without facing Parliament. Or else they will claim it is a way to avoid addressing the urgent needs of the country in difficult economic and international times.  Surely, a short pause for a new Prime Minister and their cabinet to work their way through the issues, consult with the cabinet, the caucus, the public service, experts and concerned parties, is better than trying to address the issues piecemeal and in short soundbites amid the clamouring from all directions.

For those who argue that there has been a promise to deliver a much need economic update or mini-budget on or before October 31, otherwise the country and the economy will lose the confidence of the international community and the public, one need only look at the rushed and ill considered economic policies made by Liz Truss without fully thinking them through.  By setting a timeline that would result in a Prime Minister being chosen by next Friday and expecting such a major economic statement the following Monday, the scene is set for history to repeat itself.  While the country and the economic world need an indication of how the UK proposes to address the serious issues of inflation, income security and energy sustainability, the new Prime Minister and Chancellor will undoubtedly be granted the time necessary to put together a considered and responsive budget.  It is also more likely that the public and international markets will accept and understand the position of the budget if it is set within the context of an overall government agenda laid out in a King’s Speech.  Calm and measured is often what is needed, not bold and reckless – just to meet an artificial deadline set by predecessors.

There are, and will continue to be, those who argue that an election is needed and that whoever is chosen as Prime Minister will lack any mandate to govern.  While it may be true that the Prime Minister and their government will not have faced the electorate as such, the Westminster system of government is not one that works in such a straight line.  The question of legitimacy and capacity to govern is one that is based on parliamentary support and confidence, with the public having the ability to judge what has occurred in the previous Parliament, as much as looking forward to the next.  The Prime Minister and cabinet emerge from the various members of the House of Commons.  It is the Commons, as a collection of elected representatives, that determines who is best able to govern.  The Commons, by its votes on major proposals and legislation demonstrates confidence in the government and continually tests the government as it delivers on its proposed agenda and faces events that arise during the life of the Parliament. Although the most visible test of confidence comes in the form of a straight-up motion of non-confidence, votes on major government initiatives can also demonstrate confidence.  The Commons is given the opportunity to discuss the proposed agenda through votes on, among other matters, the King’s Speech and budgetary matters   It is the Commons, as representatives, not the public, that decides these issues during the life of a Parliament.  We elect Parliaments (members of the House of Commons) not governments.  

Immediately following an election, we look to the make-up of Parliament to determine who is likely to be called on as Prime Minister to form a government.  It may be the existing Prime Minister, who had the confidence of the previous House of Commons, or it may be a new Prime Minister.  If a new Prime Minister, they may be given a slightly longer period of time to form a government and prepare a King’s Speech to open the new Parliament.  It is in that Parliament that the new Prime Minister is tested and secures the legitimacy to govern.   It is at this time, and through this mechanism, that the new Prime Minister sets out their agenda and seeks support of the government’s mandate.  Although a bit more traumatic, and possibly chaotic, sometimes it is necessary to choose a new Prime Minister during the course of a sitting Parliament.  In such circumstances, it is arguably only right that they have the same opportunity as a Prime Minister appointed following an election to choose their cabinet from members of the House of Commons, set their own course of action in the circumstances, and to present them to and have them tested in Parliament, in the same manner.

For comparison, when dissolution occurs, Parliament ends for the length of the election and the time to put a government together and prepare a King’s Speech and for the Prime Minister to meet Parliament.  This can take longer when there is a change of Prime Minister and there is a question of who should be called on to take on that role.  There is no parliamentary business, budget or focussed parliamentary debate during this time.   Although Parliament ceases to exist during this time, the previous Prime Minister and government continue to govern, albeit in a reduced capacity.   In the present circumstances, if the Prime Minister has resigned, another person would still need to be called on to be Prime Minister, thus leading to a different type of constitutional “crisis”.   It is also noted that a dissolution is considerably longer than a prorogation, which suspends Parliament for a shorter, defined period, and allows Parliament to be recalled to consider a new Agenda, or at least to address enough of the issues required to provide the degree of stability that might be required to cover the dissolution and election period.  

Elections are not the only safety valve in a Westminster democracy.  Prorogation as a reset can provide a similar respite when necessary.  

Many events occur during the life of a Parliament which the public looks to the Parliament and the government to resolve.  Economic challenges, wars, international crises, natural disasters and political change.  Over the course of five years, the economic, international and political landscapes change.  Political fortunes, membership and leadership of the various parties and caucus also change.   When such changes occur the Parliament that was elected is required to change with them.   In some such cases, the government through the testing of Parliament requires a reset.   In the present circumstances, a new Prime Minister taking a short pause, preparing an agenda and seeking a new mandate through the elected House of Commons, could provide the stability, even if temporary, that the UK needs. Whether Parliament supports the new Prime Minister, the government and the direction proposed in the King’s Speech, or whether Parliament believes it is time for the electorate to decide, is a decision for the House of Commons.   Whether they have made the right decision will ultimately be decided by the electorate.

The present situation is like the driver who tries to fix the engine of a moving car while keeping the car on the road at the same time.  It’s just better to pull the car to the side of the road, fix the car, read the map, and then get back on the road.

Steven Chaplin, Adjunct Professor Common Law and Fellow uOttawa Public Law Centre

This blog post was originally published on the UK Constitutional Law Blog. The original post is available here:

S. Chaplin, ‘There’s a Time and Place for Prorogation—and this is it’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (25th October 2022) https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2022/10/25/steven-chaplin-theres-a-time-and-place-for-prorogation-and-this-is-it/