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Parliament’s Role in the Downfall of the Republic in Afghanistan (2001-2021)

By Narges Mohammadi.

1.      Introduction

The Afghan parliament, crucial for shaping core policies, played a pivotal role in the republic’s destiny. Emerging from the Taliban’s fall in 2001, the 2004 constitution established a powerful bicameral parliament with essential monitoring mechanisms. Despite its structural advancements, the parliament faced challenges leading to the republic’s failure and the inefficiency of the political system. Corruption, inefficiency, ethnic divisions, and outdated laws plagued Afghanistan’s legislative body. Corruption prioritised personal gain over national interests, and ethnic tensions escalated disharmony. Outdated laws failed to uphold civil rights and international standards. Analysing content and interviews with experts in the study of Afghanistan’s legislation deepened the understanding of problems, revealing a parliament that failed to oversee government decisions and adhere to republican principles. The culmination of a dysfunctional parliament, marked by corruption, inefficiency, ethnic divisions, and outdated laws, significantly contributed to political instability, a dysfunctional government system, and eventually to the downfall of the Afghan Republic and the assumption of power by the Taliban on August 15, 2021.

2.      Political System of Afghanistan

Afghanistan has undergone various political structures, transitioning from the Monarchy to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), the Taliban Emirate (I), and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s creation after the Bonn conference 2001. Presently, the country is under the de facto rule of the Taliban Emirate (II). The political system established after 2001 was presidential, encompassing executive, judiciary, and legislative branches with checks and balances. The president served as both head of state and commander-in-chief, supported by two vice presidents. The National Assembly (NA) or Parliament, comprising the House of Elders (Meshrano Jirga (MJ)) and the House of People (Wolesi Jirga (WJ)), served as the highest legislative body. While WJ members were directly elected, MJ included elected and appointed members. The independent judiciary consisted of the Supreme Court (SC), Primary Courts, and the Courts of Appeal (CA), with SC members appointed by the President with WJ approval.

2.1.  Duties and Powers of the Parliament

The 2004 Afghan constitution gave the parliament more power than previous constitutions. The Afghan parliament’s duties represented the nation, making and ratifying laws and reviewing, controlling and supervising the performance of the executive power. In particular, WJ and MJ had the power to approve, modify or abrogate laws and executive decrees. The power and duties of WJ included endorsing social, cultural, and economic development programs, approving state budgets, making, modifying, or abrogating administrative units, and ratifying international treaties and agreements. In addition, the constitution enabled both houses to interrogate and impeach ministers on specific issues and approve or reject high-level appointees.

3.     Factors Contributed to the Parliament’s Role in the Downfall of Democracy in Afghanistan

I was thrilled to present this research during the PSA Parliaments Annual Conference 2023. In this blogpost, in examining the parliament’s role in the collapse of Afghanistan’s democratic government, I explore how the Afghan parliament’s dysfunctionality contributed to the republic government’s downfall. The subsequent factors shed light on my investigation, which reveals ethnic divisions and governmental inefficiency rooted in corruption.

3.1. Corruption

Widespread corruption severely impacted the Afghan government, notably hindering the parliament’s ability to combat corruption effectively. The ministerial impeachment process, designed for accountability, became susceptible to personal biases and alliances within the parliament, undermining stability goals. This corruption permeated the monitoring institution, impeding its crucial role in ensuring good governance and emphasising the urgent need for systemic reforms in Afghanistan’s parliamentary system. Political analyst Hadi Joya highlighted corrupt practices in the Afghan Parliament, labelling it a “trading/commissioning” entity engaged in transactions and bribes, losing its genuine connection with the people and government. An Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) reported widespread corruption, legislative negligence, and budget misappropriation. Furthermore, media reports exposed the misuse of 45,900,000 Afghani funds in former Speaker Abdul Raouf Ebrahimi’s budget, prompting his commitment to return 5.3 million Afghanis to the WJ’s budget.

A police officer witness claimed that corruption among parliamentarians played a significant role in the republic’s downfall, stating, “Getting ministers’ votes of confidence from the Afghan parliament was a mistake, as ministers had to comply with MPs to secure confidence votes.” The officer criticised the Ministry of Interior (MI), pointing out the appointment of “uneducated, unprofessional, and corrupt security officials through MPs’ influence.” Instances were noted where MPs supported the Taliban in areas under their control to secure votes. Moreover, recently, the US imposed sanctions on Mir Rahman Rahmani, the former Speaker of the Afghan parliament, and his son Ajmal Rahmani, citing “massive financial corruption.” Mir Rahman allegedly bribed parliament members for the Speaker role, while Ajmal paid $1.6 million to Election Commission members for parliamentary entry. Despite corruption, a few dedicated MPs in the WJ were acknowledged for their hard work in ratifying and implementing laws prioritising people’s interests, as highlighted by former MP Nisar Ahmad Ghoryani. However, these efforts were insufficient and required additional improvement.

3.2 Ethnic Division

Ethnic divisions pervaded Afghanistan’s government, including Parliament, where democracy was rooted in ethnicity. The selection of the interim government head prioritised ethnicity over political considerations, resulting in Hamid Karzai’s appointment as a Dorani Pashtun. The ethnic basis extended to parliamentary decisions, with MPs’ votes for ministerial candidates reflecting considerations of ethnicity, language, and discrimination instead of meritocracy and experience.

The ethnic division in Afghanistan’s parliament was exacerbated by the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, which emphasised non-partisanship and discouraged the formation of trans-ethnic political parties. The absence of partisan politics in parliament allowed ethnic tendencies to dominate decision-making, leading to prolonged involvement in ethnic issues. For example, debates over the higher education law highlighted linguistic divisions, with disagreements on mentioning Pashto and Persian-Dari words. Additionally, conflicts over key positions in the parliament further underscored ethnocentrism, causing prolonged disputes and hindering effective governance. However, Ghulam Farooq Majrooh, former MP, noted exceptions to ethnic differences, citing instances where individuals from various ethnic groups, such as Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, were appointed to ministerial positions or the Supreme Court. This suggests that, amid challenges, there were efforts to address ethnic diversity and promote inclusivity in key roles, but these efforts fell short and required further enhancement. Therefore, ethnic divisions significantly weakened parliamentary performance as love and hatred were influenced by ethnic affiliations. Rather than representing national interests and promoting nation-building, ethnic divisions fueled tribal conflicts, undermining the parliament’s effectiveness in serving the Afghan people.

3.3. Inefficiency

The inefficiency of the parliament, despite its pivotal role in shaping the republican system and upholding supposed freedoms, became evident as the three powers within the system clashed, compromising democratic principles and neglecting citizens’ rights. Ineffective supervision allowed corruption and legislative weaknesses to persist, with meritocracy often sidelined, impeding parliamentary efficiency. The parliament struggled with lawlessness, lacking the capacity for supervision and prioritising ethnic-based entries over specialisation and commitment. Many MPs, entering through ethnic relations and indirect quotas, were unfamiliar with supervision, turning it into a tool for pursuing individual and group interests rather than upholding democratic values.

The parliament struggled to assert its political authority amid ongoing tension between the executive and legislative branches. As revealed in the MEC report, executive interference manifested in enforcing several laws through presidential decrees without parliamentary approval, indicating failure in ratifying laws, weaknesses, MPs absenteeism, and the influence of external elements. Despite constitutional provisions for legislative decrees during parliamentary recess, the government often avoided submitting decrees for fear of rejection. Parliamentary shutdowns became an opportunity for the executive to pass legislation likely to be rejected by parliament. These challenges and inefficiencies in law-making, where the parliament produced only five laws in 16 years, showcased obstacles within the legislative body and external branches hindering its effective performance.

3.4 Outdated Laws

The practical implementation of approved laws and the prevention of corruption and bribery could mitigate public distrust and prevent further decline in Afghanistan. However, despite the existence of parliament, specific laws needed to be updated in a timely manner. For instance, over the sixteen years of the WJ, crucial laws related to governing constitutional formations were outdated, and some civil matters remained unchanged, reflecting similarities with the 1964 constitution. This failure to adapt these laws to contemporary needs highlights missed opportunities for necessary amendments in response to evolving societal dynamics. Additionally, in a rigid gender context where males dominate, any legislative proposal, government oversight measure, and budget modifications or amendments required the endorsement of the majority of male MPs. Success was particularly contingent on gaining approval from influential and leading legislators.

4. Conclusion

This research explains how the weaknesses inherent in the democratically inclined republican system set up in 2001 led to its downfall in 2021. The republic’s failure in Afghanistan stemmed from various factors. The note focuses on the significant role played by the parliament in the re-emergence of the Taliban. Despite its pivotal function, the Afghan parliament faced challenges such as corruption, ethnic divisions, inefficiency, and outdated laws, leading to a decline in public trust in the system. The parliament’s inability to effectively supervise and ratify laws allowed unchecked governance by a select few, further destabilized democracy. The fraudulent electoral system and MPs’ lack of expertise in key areas rendered the parliament weak and hindered decision-making. This weakness contributed to the republic’s collapse. The writer acknowledges that other factors like legislative and judicial powers, political disagreements, foreign intervention, and public unfamiliarity with democratic processes also played a role.

In the future, if it becomes possible, reforms should include a stronger parliament established to revitalise Afghanistan and its institutions, accompanied by comprehensive political, social, and economic measures. Strengthening anti-corruption laws, fostering inter-ethnic relations, and prioritising citizens’ participation in decision-making are essential for Afghanistan’s progress. Additionally, cultivating political culture, education, public awareness, positive engagement with international communities, and upholding human rights are crucial elements for a positive transformation in Afghanistan’s future.

I hope such possibilities will arise in the future and hope that by establishing how things went wrong in the past, the research may eventually contribute to a better future for the people of Afghanistan.

About the author

Narges Mohammadi is a PhD Student in the School of International Relations and Diplomacy at Beijing Foreign Studies University.

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Trends in Canadian Non-Government Legislation: A Tale of Two Houses

By Charlie Feldman1

Non-government legislation warrants close attention as sittings of Canada’s 44th Parliament, 1st Session resume later this month. Thus far this session, the Senate of Canada has seen more Senate Public Bills (SPBs) introduced than in any session in Canadian history, and this record-setting total will only increase. Meanwhile, a trend in the opposite direction appears to be emerging in the House of Commons as fewer Private Members’ Bills (PMBs) – and fewer items of Private Members’ Business overall – are being introduced compared to previous non-pandemic sessions.

While some scholarship exists regarding Private Members’ Bills in the Canadian House of Commons – including in work from its former Law Clerk and Parliamentary Counsel – far less appears to be written on equivalent legislation in the Senate, Senate Public Bills. Current academic attention on the legislative functions of the Canadian Senate focuses on engagement with government legislation and, in particular, the Senate’s increasing rate of amendment. This focus makes sense given recent reforms to the Senate appointment process and their possible effects on partisanship; however, the SPB story is one worth considering. 

While it would be notable on its own if SPBs were increasingly introduced but went nowhere in the legislative process, these bills are increasingly enacted. At this point in the session, more SPBs (8) than PMBs (5) have received royal assent. Might the Upper House currently have the upper hand when it comes to non-government legislation?

The new Senate record in context

The number of SPBs introduced in the Senate in recent parliamentary sessions (1994-present) is illustrated in Figure 1 (keep in mind that the 44th Parliament, 1st Session remains in progress).

Figure 1: Senate Public Bills introduced in recent parliamentary sessions

It should be recalled that parliamentary sessions have different durations and there may be more or less non-government legislative activity given other circumstances – for example, the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in the 43rd Parliament, 1st Session or the abnormally short 40th Parliament, 1st Session (the so-called ‘coalition crisis’). What is particularly striking about the SPB record being set during the 44th Parliament, 1st session is the relative length of the session compared to others. The longest single session in parliamentary history was the recent 42nd Parliament, 1st Session (2015-2019). Over the course of its 1378 days, the Senate sat 308 times and saw 68 SPBs introduced. Contrast that to the current 44th Parliament which so far has seen 138 Senate sittings in its first 600 days (at the time of this writing) but has seen 73 SPBs introduced. In other words, the Senate is seeing more SPBs introduced in less than half the time as observed just two parliaments ago.

As a historical context note based on Library of Parliament data, during the previous 80 parliamentary sessions in which SPBs were introduced (e.g., prior to the current session), the average was 8.6 SPBs introduced each session (median 3.5 SPBs introduced each session).

Wither the PMB?

With respect to the House of Commons, the number of PMBs being introduced is declining relative to the number of SPBs introduced. At the time of this writing, the PMB-to-SPB introduction ratio is at a 30-year low (excluding the abnormally short 40th Parliament, 1st Session discussed above and the first session impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic). The decreasing introduction gap between the two types of bills can be seen in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Number of non-government Public Bills introduced in recent parliamentary sessions (Data from LEGISinfo. It is important to recall that SPBs do not carry over from one session to another within the same parliament whereas PMBs are reinstated after a prorogation. In other words, in any second or subsequent session of the same Parliament, the PMB number will automatically include bills from the previous session or sessions of that same parliament that did not complete their legislative journey.)

The drop in introduced PMBs during the 43rd Parliament, 1st Session is explained because the Covid-19 pandemic led to fewer parliamentary sittings and a focus on government legislation responding to the pandemic. However, notice that the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session – the longest single parliamentary session in Canadian history – has a drop from previous sessions. Why would fewer PMBs be introduced in a longer session than in shorter ones that preceded it?

As explained in House of Commons Procedure and Practice, “Private Members’ proposals can take the form of a public bill, a motion, or a notice of motion for the production of papers”. As bills are only one aspect of non-government business, it might be suggested that MPs are opting to introduce more motions instead of bills. However, in looking at the other types of private members’ business – motions and notices of motion for the production of papers – a decline similar to that observed with PMBs becomes apparent, as illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Private Members’ Business (other than bills) in recent parliamentary sessions (Data from the Status of House Business documents for the end of recent parliamentary sessions. See: https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/house/status-business)

Nothing in the parliamentary record clearly explains why MPs not in Cabinet are opting to introduce fewer initiatives. This is an area worthy of further examination and analysis. Importantly, there may be a relationship with the increasing number of SPBs.

Bicameral effects

When an SPB passes the Senate, an MP must be found to sponsor the bill as a matter of Private Members’ Business. MPs not in Cabinet can sponsor one SPB over the course of a Parliament pursuant to Standing Order 86.2(2). If a House sponsor cannot be found, the bill is dropped from consideration, which is rare but occurred earlier this year.

While MPs participate in a lottery to determine the order in which they can advance a matter of Private Members’ Business in their name, SPBs jump the queue. In a 2017 white paper, the Government noted that it might consider “ways to manage Senate Public Bills that delay the replenishment of Private Members’ Business, possibly by having a separate rubric for these bills”.

No action has been taken to revise the process, which has produced some perhaps unexpected results. A particularly notable example is the case of An Act to Recognize Charlottetown as the Birthplace of Confederation. MP Wayne Easter introduced this PMB on March 24, 2016 as Bill C-253 and it never advanced (given Mr. Easter’s position in the lottery). However, the same bill was introduced as an SPB by Senator Diane Griffin on February 15, 2017. That SPB, Bill S-236, passed the Senate, was subsequently sponsored by Mr. Easter in the House, and received royal assent in December 2017. In short, the Senate’s version of the legislation became law before the House version even came up for debate, despite the House version being introduced earlier.

In the current session, some PMBs and SPBs bear striking similarities – including the following: An Act respecting the National Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking (C-308 and S-263), An Act to develop a national framework for a guaranteed livable basic income (C-223 and S-233), and Strengthening Reporting Obligations for Sex Offenders Act (Noah’s Law) (C-336 and S-226). Could it be that some MPs are seeking to advance their initiatives through the Senate in the hopes of having them pass faster than if they were advanced as PMBs in the House? This was the motivation behind the Charlottetown bill.

While the parliamentary rules around similar and identical items are designed to limit one Chamber considering the same thing twice, nothing stops the same initiative from being advanced in each House of Parliament simultaneously. Notably, there is a prohibition against using the legislative drafting services of the House of Commons to advance initiatives for the Senate. The Members By-Law of the House of Commons states that “[t]he funds, goods, services and premises provided by the House of Commons to a Member may not be used to support Senators, the Senate or the Government of Canada in the performance of their duties and functions.”

One other bicameral note warrants mention: When SPBs are received from the Senate, they are subject to review by the House’s Subcommittee on Private Members’ Business (SMEM). That committee reviews non-government public bills against certain criteria and must meet to consider SPBs, regardless whether there are PMBs to consider at the time. Importantly, the committee examines PMBs and SPBs differently. PMBs are subject to a more robust review by SMEM – including in respect of their constitutionality – something that is not required of SPBs. This could, in theory, motivate some to pursue an SPB over a PMB as the Senate has no SMEM-like committee for SPB review.

Conclusion

Parliamentary trends with respect to non-government legislation appear to be changing as more SPBs are being introduced while fewer PMBs and other items of Private Members’ Business are being introduced in the House of Commons.

Further research is warranted on increasing SPB introduction. In particular, has their content changed in recent years? If so, does it relate in some way with Senate composition changes, such as it becoming a gender-equal House for the first time in history? Or, are other activities motivating the SPB rise? Of particular note, recent research demonstrates that senators are now disproportionately lobbied relative to their MP counterparts. Could increased lobbying find expression in increased SPBs?

More research is warranted to explore why individual House legislators not in Cabinet appear to be advancing fewer initiatives in their own right while senators are introducing more. It may be that MPs are increasingly seeking to collaborate with a senator to advance an initiative through the Upper House in the hope that it will complete the legislative process more quickly. Whether the government will seek to encourage the House to reform practices in this area – as suggested in its 2017 white paper – remains to be seen. With Parliament’s imminent return, however, non-government legislation in Canada’s Parliament warrants a watchful eye.

  1. President of the Canadian Study of Parliament Group. The views in this work are those of the author and not of any employer. ↩︎
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Our Survey Says (Part 2): A Few Interesting Nuggets about Committee Prestige

By Stephen Holden Bates, Caroline Bhattacharya and Stephen McKay

Just like in Family Fortunes[i] but by chance rather than by design, 100 people responded to our survey[ii] about the prestige of different select committees (SCs) in the UK House of Commons (HoC).[iii]

From a score of one to five (with five being the most important), respondents were asked to rate the prestige of UK HoC SCs, permanent oversight committees of three main types: (i) Departmental, which scrutinise corresponding government departments; Domestic/Administrative, which are concerned with various aspects of the internal workings of Parliament; and Other Scrutiny, which focus on issues that cut across government departments.

The average committee received a prestige score of 3.03 with Departmental SCs receiving an average of 3.21, Domestic/Administrative 2.96, and Other Scrutiny 2.74. The highest ranked committee was, perhaps unsurprisingly, the Treasury SC (4.48) with the lowest being the punctuationally-anachronistic Consolidation &c. Bills Joint Committee (1.94), which considers Bills that “bring together a number of existing Acts of Parliament on the same subject into one Act without amending the law”.

Figure 1 ranks SCs from most to least prestigious according to the results of the survey. There are perhaps some results which deserve greater attention than others. For example, we may wonder whether the Standards and Privileges SCs would be ranked so highly if the survey hadn’t taken place in the aftermath, or at the same time, as their high-profile inquiries into the behaviour and probity of various MPs, such as Chris Pincher, Matt Hancock, Margaret Ferrier and the former Prime Minister, Boris Johnson. We may also be a little surprised at the lowly rankings of the Northern Ireland, Scottish and Welsh Affairs SCs, perhaps not in relation to other Departmental SCs but maybe in relation to some of the Other Scrutiny and Domestic/Administrative SCs. Finally, those of us who are concerned about the climate crisis (which, let’s face it, should be all of us) may be perturbed by the fact that the three environment-related committees all appear in the bottom half of the table.

Table 1 shows the difference between a committee’s overall ranking and the ranking by different types of respondents. Results with a green font colour indicate a committee which is at the top of the list of those ranked higher by that type of respondent than the overall rankings; those with a red font colour indicate a committee which is the top of the list of those ranked lower. As can be seen, when it comes to departmental and other scrutiny SCs, MPs and their staff who answered the survey think that the International Trade, International Development, Scottish Affairs and, especially, the Levelling Up, Housing & Communities SCs are more prestigious than the average respondent, whereas Work & Pensions, Women & Equalities and the Human Rights Joint Committee are less prestigious. In addition, the Exiting/Future Relationship with the EU Committee is considered more prestigious by parliamentary staff and less prestigious by academics. Some interesting results can also be observed with Domestic/Administrative SCs. Both academic and parliamentary staff respondents believe the Procedure and Petitions SCs are more prestigious than MPs and their staff do, whereas the situation is reversed when it comes to Backbench Business.

Figure 1: Ranking of Select Committees by Prestige
Overall RankingCommitteeDifference between overall ranking & ranking by
AcademicsMPs & their StaffParl. Staff
1Treasury0-10
2Foreign Affairs-210
3Public Accounts1-20
4Home Affairs110
5Defence-110
6Liaison10-1
7Health & Social Care0-11
8Privileges010
9Standards-4-40
10Public Administration & Constitutional Affairs-10-1
11Education2-4-4
12Business & Trade01-1
13Exiting/Future Relationship with the European Union -613
14Human Rights Joint Committee4-112
15Justice0-2-1
16National Security Strategy Joint Committee07-2
17Work & Pensions0-60
18Procedure4-84
19Culture, Media & Sport130
20Backbench Business-22-3
21Energy Security & Net Zero10-1
22Transport12-4
23International Trade-442
24Levelling Up, Housing & Communities010-1
25Environment, Food & Rural Affairs-331
26Petitions3-56
27Science, Innovation & Technology20-1
28International Development24-3
29Women & Equalities0-80
30Environmental Audit0-63
31Administration-731
32Finance-23-1
33Selection21-4
34European Scrutiny24-1
35Northern Ireland Affairs2-33
36Statutory Instruments Joint Committee-422
37Statutory Instruments-441
38Arms Export Controls3-20
39Scottish Affairs450
40Regulatory Reform-400
41Welsh Affairs2-10
42European Statutory Instruments5-10
43Consolidation &c. Bills Joint Committee120
Table 1: Difference between overall ranking and rankings by different types of respondents

Table 2 compares the rankings and scores of female and male respondents. A positive number indicates that female respondents scored/ranked that committee higher than male respondents and a negative number that they scored/ranked that committee lower. As can be seen from the lists, all committees which scrutinise policy areas stereotypically seen as feminine are ranked/scored higher by female respondents than male correspondents – Women & Equalities most notably – and only two committees which scrutinise policy areas stereotypically seen as masculine (Business & Trade and Environment, Food & Rural Affairs). Although, of course, no firm conclusions can be drawn from our survey results, they do contribute in a small way to important debates about who gets to define which committees are prestigious. For example, Franchesca Nestor is currently undertaking interesting work about whether influential measures of committee prestige used to rank US congressional committees fail to take into account the fact that different groups of legislators may have systematic differences in their views of which committees are prestigious and that, consequently, prestige is understood in relation to what the majority group (i.e. white, middleclass, male representatives) do and think. It would be intriguing to delve into this issue more deeply this side of the pond…

CommitteeDifference between Female & Male RankingDifference between Female & Male Scores
Women & Equalities80.87
Energy Security & Net Zero60.61
Northern Ireland Affairs60.6
Human Rights Joint Committee40.58
Levelling Up, Housing & Communities40.56
International Trade40.53
Regulatory Reform40.5
Culture, Media & Sport40.45
Welsh Affairs30.51
Scottish Affairs30.44
Finance20.47
Business & Trade20.42
Privileges20.38
Health & Social Care20.36
Education20.36
Arms Export Controls20.32
Petitions10.48
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs10.43
Public Accounts10.12
International Development00.53
Science, Innovation & Technology00.5
Selection00.32
European Statutory Instruments00.31
Work & Pensions00.27
Consolidation &c. Bills Joint Committee00.24
Standards00.2
Home Affairs00.09
Treasury0-0.04
Environmental Audit-10.48
Exiting/Future Relationship with the EU -10.17
Foreign Affairs-1-0.06
Liaison-1-0.07
European Scrutiny-20.26
National Security Strategy Joint Committee-20.19
Defence-3-0.15
Statutory Instruments Joint Committee-40.17
Transport-50.18
Public Admin. & Constitutional Affairs-5-0.08
Justice-60.07
Statutory Instruments-60.05
Procedure-70.07
Administration-8-0.01
Backbench Business-90.14
Table 2: Comparison between the scores and rankings of female and male survey respondents

[i] Or Family Feuds in the US, or Familien-Duell in Germany.

[ii] The survey was run as part of Stephen Holden Bates’ 2021-22 Parliamentary Academic Fellowship, which was funded by the UKRI/ESRC Impact Acceleration Account, and is part of on-going work looking at the impact of membership patterns on the work and outputs of select committees.

[iii] 100 people answered our online survey between 22nd May and 18th July 2023. The survey was aimed at experts, although we allowed anyone to answer, and was distributed via Twitter, the newsletter of the UK Political Studies Association’s Parliaments Specialist Group and through email contacts. Of the 100 respondents, 30 were parliamentary staff in the House of Commons, 15 were academics, 13 were MPs, 12 worked for MPs, and 10 were parliamentary staff beyond the HoC, with the other 20 compromising members of the public, journalists, people who work for think tanks, and ‘other’. Overall, 30 respondents were female, 63 were male and seven preferred not to say; no respondent said their gender was not the same as the sex they were assigned at birth. Seven respondents said they belonged to a group which was considered an ethnic minority in the country in which they worked, 86 said they did not belong to such a group and seven preferred not to say. Four respondents were removed for the analysis presented in this blog, as there were problems with their answers and/or they did not complete the survey properly.

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Our Survey Says (Part 1): No Real Surprises about the Importance of Parliamentary Work

By Stephen Holden Bates, Caroline Bhattacharya and Stephen McKay

Just like in Family Fortunes[i] but by chance rather than by design, 100 people responded to our survey[ii] about the importance of different elements of MPs’ work in the UK Parliament.[iii]

From a score of one to five (with five being the most important), respondents were asked to rate the importance of a non-exhaustive list of parliamentary activities. As can be seen in Table 1, contributing to the work of Select Committees is considered the most important aspect of MPs’ work by quite a distance. Next, bunched together quite closely, are, in order, debating in the Chamber, Public Bill Committee (PBC) work and tabling Written Questions (WQs). There is then a bit of a gap to tabling Private Members’ Bills (PMBs) and then another to introducing and to signing Early Day Motions (EDMs).

RankActivityAverage Score (max = 5; min = 1)
1Contributing to the work of Select Committees4.12
2Debating in the Chamber (including Westminster Hall)3.81
3Contributing to the work of Public Bill Committees3.60
4Tabling Written Questions3.54
5Tabling Private Members’ Bills2.73
6Introducing Early Day Motions1.70
7Signing Early Day Motions introduced by another MP1.43
Table 1: The Importance of MPs’ Parliamentary Work

None of this is perhaps particularly surprising. Select committees are often considered both to be Parliament ‘at its best’ and to overshadow Public Bill Committees, and the House of Commons has traditionally been seen as a deliberating parliament par excellence.

Although we don’t, of course, have enough respondents to draw robust conclusions, what may be considered more intriguing results come when we look at the rankings of different types of respondents. For example, female and male respondents both ranked the activities in the same order as in Table 1 but, interestingly, female respondents ranked each activity at least 0.29 and as much as 0.67 higher than male correspondents. Furthermore, as shown in Table 2, while academics, MPs and their staff, and parliamentary staff agree that tabling PMBs and introducing and signing EDMs are the 5th, 6th and 7th most important activities respectively, there is disagreement at the top of the rankings. MPs and their staff appear to place greater importance on the talking elements of Parliament, ranking debating in the Chamber first. Academics, on the other hand, rank debating in the Chamber fourth, seemingly placing greater importance on the working elements of Parliament and, in particular, committee work and WQs.

ActivityRank
AcademicsMPs & their StaffParl. Staff
Contributing to the work of Select Committees121
Debating in the Chamber (inc. Westminster Hall)412
Contributing to the work of PBCs2=34
Tabling Written Questions3=33
Tabling PMBs555
Introducing EDMs666
Signing EDMS introduced by another MP777
Table 2: The Importance of MPs’ Parliamentary Work by Different Groups of Respondents

These results might raise questions about how different groups of people who variously engage with Parliament understand its importance[iv] and place different emphases on the functions that it fulfils – and should fulfil – in our political life. Such differences might perhaps be fruitfully explored in future qualitative work.

[i] Or Family Feuds in the US, or Familien-Duell in Germany.

[ii] The survey was run as part of Stephen Holden Bates’ 2021-22 Parliamentary Academic Fellowship, which was funded by the UKRI/ESRC Impact Acceleration Account, and is part of on-going work looking at specialisation in the UK House of Commons.

[iii] 100 people answered our online survey between 22nd May and 18th July 2023. The survey was aimed at experts, although we allowed anyone to answer, and was distributed via Twitter, the newsletter of the UK Political Studies Association’s Parliaments Specialist Group and through email contacts. Of the 100 respondents, 30 were parliamentary staff in the House of Commons, 15 were academics, 13 were MPs, 12 worked for MPs, and 10 were parliamentary staff beyond the HoC, with the other 20 compromising members of the public, journalists, people who work for think tanks, and ‘other’. Overall, 30 respondents were female, 63 were male and seven preferred not to say; no respondent said their gender was not the same as the sex they were assigned at birth. Seven respondents said they belonged to a group which was considered an ethnic minority in the country in which they worked, 86 said they did not belong to such a group and seven preferred not to say. Two respondents were removed for the analysis presented in this blog, as there were problems with their answers and/or they did not complete the survey properly.

[iv] Left deliberately undefined in the survey because we didn’t want to impose our understanding of what activities were/should be considered important within the UK Parliament on the respondents.

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We need reform of the legislative process to empower Parliament

Jess Sargeant

Parliamentary sovereignty is the UK’s central constitutional principle; in theory, parliament holds all the power, but in practice, the government wields much of it. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the legislative process; legislation is one of Parliament’s core functions, but government control of the timetable and scrutiny mechanisms in the House of Commons – means that its ability to influence the content of bills is limited. Recent trends towards passing bills on expedited timetables and increased use of secondary legislation – accelerated by the UK’s exit from the EU and the coronavirus pandemic – have curtailed opportunities for parliamentary input still further. This has prompted urgent warnings from two House of Lords committees of the need to rebalance power between Parliament and the Executive.

But redressing this constitutional imbalance requires going beyond asking the government to exercise restraint.  It means empowering parliament and creating new opportunities for parliamentary influence. The recommendations of the Wright Report, published in 2009, led to the election of Commons select committee chairs and the establishment of a backbench business committee. They demonstrated the power of procedural change in giving parliamentarians the tools and opportunities to challenge government policy and influence debate. In this spirit, the Institute for Government and Bennett Institute has undertaken a comprehensive study of the legislative process to identify opportunities for reform. 

One area is pre-legislative scrutiny (PLS). There is wide consensus amongst MPs, ministers and officials that pre-legislative scrutiny can greatly improve the quality of legislation. It gives Parliament the opportunity to influence legislation before it is finalised, allowing for more time and space for the government to make changes to reflect the views of parliamentarians on the quality and content of draft legislation. It can be useful too for the government, allowing ministers to tease out disagreements on knotty policy issues, test arguments and ultimately smooth a bill’s passage through parliament. 

Since 1997 eight parliamentary select committee reports have recommended expanding the use of pre-legislative scrutiny and making it a core part of the legislative process. However, bursts of enthusiasm for the practice amongst governments have been short-lived. Pre-legislative scrutiny remains a rarity; overall just 11.6% of the total government bills receiving royal assent since 2007 were published in draft.

It is clear that the current approach to pre-legislative scrutiny, in which the government has complete discretion as to whether and which bills to publish in draft, is failing to unlock its full potential. So we propose taking inspiration from the Oireachtas (the Irish Parliament) and requiring that the government give parliament an opportunity to conduct pre-legislative scrutiny on all government bills. 

This does not mean that a full PLS inquiry – taking three to four months – should take place on every bill, but that the government should publish all its bills in draft and give parliament the opportunity to select bills for PLS and allow others to progress without delay. They should be able to choose from a menu of options including a full inquiry and report, scrutiny of certain clauses, to a one-off evidence session and letter. This should ensure the level of scrutiny is proportionate and does not introduce undue delay to the bill timetable, or pressure on parliamentary capacity. 

Another area ripe for reform is Commons Committee stage. While public bill committees are intended to allow MPs to scrutinise each clause of the bill in detail, their partisan nature means that they are rarely constructive, and research suggests their impact on the content of bills have diminished over time. Reforms to permit oral evidence-taking has improved the functioning of these forums, but it is still only taken a quarter (27%) of all bills passed in the last five parliamentary sessions. Witnesses are chosen through the usual channels, meaning they are often there to support one political position or the other rather than bring new evidence and perspectives to deliberations. 

One proposal, already adopted by the devolved legislatures, is to abolish public bill committees and give select committees responsibility for scrutiny during this stage of the bill’s progress. This has the potential benefits of bringing more expertise and cross-party working into the process, as well as the ability to utilise the relationships with key experts, interest groups and businesses. But it risks overwhelming these committees’ work, and by making them a forum for key votes it could undermine their independence. 

Nonetheless, we believe there is a middle ground. Building on the informal inquiries they already conduct on bills, we propose that select committees should be able to request a ‘select committee’ stage on all government bills – to allow them to consider the bill, take oral evidence and publish a committee view, including draft amendments. This can inform the debate in public bill committees and beyond, while giving select committees the opportunity to decide which bills to prioritise.

We recognise that many of these recommendations may add time and potential friction to the legislative process. But legislating is a serious business – policy is more likely to succeed where it has been robustly tested and where it has broad support from the people’s representatives. The government’s short-term desire to do things quickly should not overrule the long-term objective of do things well. 

Jess Sargeant is a senior researcher working on devolution. She joined the Institute for Government in May 2019 from the House of Lords Library.

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There’s a time and place for prorogation — and this is it

As I sit and watch the turmoil at Westminster on the morning (afternoon in London) that Liz Truss announced her resignation; the morning that the 1922 Committee of Conservative backbenchers scramble to find a leader in a week’s time; a seemingly firm date of October 31 for a budget statement from a recently appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer; and cries for an election, there seems to be no way forward that does not continue the chaos.  But there just may be a way to calm the waters somewhat.  A proper and timely use of prorogation.

Prorogation, where one session of Parliament ends and a new session is prepared for, has received much negative press and commentary in the last few years, in the UK and in Canada.   It has been seen as a way for a Prime Minister and a government to avoid facing Parliament when there was an imminent need for a decision of Parliament.   But there are times when prorogation is appropriate.  In most cases it is used when a parliamentary session has effectively exhausted the government’s agenda and there is a belief that the government needs to set out the next stages of its “new” agenda for the following session.  In some countries this is effectively set as an annual or biannual process, in others it is discretionary.  In either case, there is also room for the Prime Minister to ask for the King to prorogue Parliament as a necessary re-set button, either when a new King’s Speech is required to address an emergency, or to set out a new way forward for the government in light of changed circumstances.  Sometimes, such pauses are just necessary to stop, rethink, plan and explain a way forward.  The present circumstances would, I suggest, be such a cas, although some consideration would have to be given to ensuring that legislation that meets the revised agenda, or to meet urgent needs is carried forward in the next session.   

The way forward would be for the Conservative party to choose a leader, have the King appoint them as Prime Minster, then have that person request that Parliament be prorogued for a couple of weeks to allow them to put a cabinet together, prepare an agenda, and then to have that agenda presented to Parliament through a King’s Speech. There would then follow debate and a vote of the House of Commons in support of the Speech or else defeat and an election.  This process would allow the new Prime Minister to gather their thoughts, form a cabinet with appropriate deliberation, and present a coherent plan to Parliament to be aired and discussed before specific actions are taken.  It would also result in the constitutional legitimacy that the House of Commons can provide by voting on the King’s Speech.  

No doubt there will be those who will argue that this is merely a political tactic and an attempt to govern without facing Parliament. Or else they will claim it is a way to avoid addressing the urgent needs of the country in difficult economic and international times.  Surely, a short pause for a new Prime Minister and their cabinet to work their way through the issues, consult with the cabinet, the caucus, the public service, experts and concerned parties, is better than trying to address the issues piecemeal and in short soundbites amid the clamouring from all directions.

For those who argue that there has been a promise to deliver a much need economic update or mini-budget on or before October 31, otherwise the country and the economy will lose the confidence of the international community and the public, one need only look at the rushed and ill considered economic policies made by Liz Truss without fully thinking them through.  By setting a timeline that would result in a Prime Minister being chosen by next Friday and expecting such a major economic statement the following Monday, the scene is set for history to repeat itself.  While the country and the economic world need an indication of how the UK proposes to address the serious issues of inflation, income security and energy sustainability, the new Prime Minister and Chancellor will undoubtedly be granted the time necessary to put together a considered and responsive budget.  It is also more likely that the public and international markets will accept and understand the position of the budget if it is set within the context of an overall government agenda laid out in a King’s Speech.  Calm and measured is often what is needed, not bold and reckless – just to meet an artificial deadline set by predecessors.

There are, and will continue to be, those who argue that an election is needed and that whoever is chosen as Prime Minister will lack any mandate to govern.  While it may be true that the Prime Minister and their government will not have faced the electorate as such, the Westminster system of government is not one that works in such a straight line.  The question of legitimacy and capacity to govern is one that is based on parliamentary support and confidence, with the public having the ability to judge what has occurred in the previous Parliament, as much as looking forward to the next.  The Prime Minister and cabinet emerge from the various members of the House of Commons.  It is the Commons, as a collection of elected representatives, that determines who is best able to govern.  The Commons, by its votes on major proposals and legislation demonstrates confidence in the government and continually tests the government as it delivers on its proposed agenda and faces events that arise during the life of the Parliament. Although the most visible test of confidence comes in the form of a straight-up motion of non-confidence, votes on major government initiatives can also demonstrate confidence.  The Commons is given the opportunity to discuss the proposed agenda through votes on, among other matters, the King’s Speech and budgetary matters   It is the Commons, as representatives, not the public, that decides these issues during the life of a Parliament.  We elect Parliaments (members of the House of Commons) not governments.  

Immediately following an election, we look to the make-up of Parliament to determine who is likely to be called on as Prime Minister to form a government.  It may be the existing Prime Minister, who had the confidence of the previous House of Commons, or it may be a new Prime Minister.  If a new Prime Minister, they may be given a slightly longer period of time to form a government and prepare a King’s Speech to open the new Parliament.  It is in that Parliament that the new Prime Minister is tested and secures the legitimacy to govern.   It is at this time, and through this mechanism, that the new Prime Minister sets out their agenda and seeks support of the government’s mandate.  Although a bit more traumatic, and possibly chaotic, sometimes it is necessary to choose a new Prime Minister during the course of a sitting Parliament.  In such circumstances, it is arguably only right that they have the same opportunity as a Prime Minister appointed following an election to choose their cabinet from members of the House of Commons, set their own course of action in the circumstances, and to present them to and have them tested in Parliament, in the same manner.

For comparison, when dissolution occurs, Parliament ends for the length of the election and the time to put a government together and prepare a King’s Speech and for the Prime Minister to meet Parliament.  This can take longer when there is a change of Prime Minister and there is a question of who should be called on to take on that role.  There is no parliamentary business, budget or focussed parliamentary debate during this time.   Although Parliament ceases to exist during this time, the previous Prime Minister and government continue to govern, albeit in a reduced capacity.   In the present circumstances, if the Prime Minister has resigned, another person would still need to be called on to be Prime Minister, thus leading to a different type of constitutional “crisis”.   It is also noted that a dissolution is considerably longer than a prorogation, which suspends Parliament for a shorter, defined period, and allows Parliament to be recalled to consider a new Agenda, or at least to address enough of the issues required to provide the degree of stability that might be required to cover the dissolution and election period.  

Elections are not the only safety valve in a Westminster democracy.  Prorogation as a reset can provide a similar respite when necessary.  

Many events occur during the life of a Parliament which the public looks to the Parliament and the government to resolve.  Economic challenges, wars, international crises, natural disasters and political change.  Over the course of five years, the economic, international and political landscapes change.  Political fortunes, membership and leadership of the various parties and caucus also change.   When such changes occur the Parliament that was elected is required to change with them.   In some such cases, the government through the testing of Parliament requires a reset.   In the present circumstances, a new Prime Minister taking a short pause, preparing an agenda and seeking a new mandate through the elected House of Commons, could provide the stability, even if temporary, that the UK needs. Whether Parliament supports the new Prime Minister, the government and the direction proposed in the King’s Speech, or whether Parliament believes it is time for the electorate to decide, is a decision for the House of Commons.   Whether they have made the right decision will ultimately be decided by the electorate.

The present situation is like the driver who tries to fix the engine of a moving car while keeping the car on the road at the same time.  It’s just better to pull the car to the side of the road, fix the car, read the map, and then get back on the road.

Steven Chaplin, Adjunct Professor Common Law and Fellow uOttawa Public Law Centre

This blog post was originally published on the UK Constitutional Law Blog. The original post is available here:

S. Chaplin, ‘There’s a Time and Place for Prorogation—and this is it’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (25th October 2022) https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2022/10/25/steven-chaplin-theres-a-time-and-place-for-prorogation-and-this-is-it/

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Using the past to help us to understand the future of the Palace of Westminster

Ahead of next Tuesday’s Virtual IHR Parliaments, Politics and People seminar, we hear from Dr Alexandra Meakinof the University of Leeds. On 9 November 2021, between 5.15 p.m. and 6.30 p.m., she will be responding to your questions about her pre-circulated paper on ‘Using the past to help us understand the future of the Palace of Westminster’.

The Palace of Westminster is in a state of advanced disrepair, and faces what was described by a Joint Committee of MPs and Peers in 2016 as ‘an impending crisis which we cannot reasonably ignore’. While a major refurbishment project—Restoration and Renewal (R&R)—was approved in 2018, the future of the Palace remains uncertain, as concerns mount among some MPs about the cost and the prospect of temporarily moving out to allow the work to take place.

The risk of a catastrophic fire, flood or failure of the essential services within the Palace has developed over many decades, as vital maintenance was neglected and the infrastructure serving the building went far past its expected lifespan. Indeed, some of the mechanical and electrical plant dates back to the building’s establishment in the mid-19th century, as a replacement for the old Palace, destroyed by fire in 1834.

The 1834 fire, as discussed previously on this blog, occurred after multiple unheeded warnings about the state of the building, a situation worryingly similar to today. It is not the only lesson from history, however, which may be relevant for current discussions. This blog posits that through historical analysis we can identify five recurrent themes that help to explain policymaking decisions relating to the Palace as a legislative building (figure 1, below).

Figure 1: Explaining policy decisions

A confused governance system has been evident in Westminster for centuries, manifested through divided patronage between the King and Prime Minister in the appointment of architects to work on the Palace in the 18th century and delays to the rebuilding after the 1834 fire caused by contradictory instructions from ministers, MPs and Peers—an issue still present today. In addition, the emotional attachment parliamentarians feel about their workplace—for example in the form of a connection to their predecessors, transmitted through the very fabric of the Palace—influences the decisions they make about its future.

This is linked to the third recurrent theme: a clear unwillingness to make radical changes to the Palace. When disaster has occurred, there has been a tendency to recreate the past: either in the exact replica of the previous Commons chamber in the 1940s (described by one MP in 1945 as taking ‘nostalgia to the stage of absurdity’), or in Barry’s design for the new Palace after the 1834 fire. These decisions then become precedent to be followed faithfully in future, a form of path dependency that explains the reluctance to move out of the Palace, the fourth theme. Finally, historical analysis shows that you cannot explain decisions about the Palace of Westminster purely by considering what was happening within the building. The intrinsically political nature of the legislature means that wider political events have influenced the policies chosen for the building.

The Elizabeth Tower covered in scaffolding, 2019; image: Ethan Doyle White, CC via Wikimedia Commons

Looking to history helps to explain how R&R became necessary but it can also explain why its future remains unclear. While the Parliamentary Buildings (Restoration and Renewal) Act 2019 legislated for an independent governance structure, the future of the R&R project continues to be subject to the views of the House of Commons Commission. A number of MPs remain opposed to leaving the Palace of Westminster even temporarily, demonstrating the same attachment to the building as has been witnessed for generations. There have been repeated efforts to scale back the scope of programme, in a further sign of the tendencies towards conservatism and to reflect the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic. A key lesson from the historical analysis is that major work to the Palace of Westminster has tended to occur only when unavoidable: despite the approval of R&R, it may be that history repeats itself and the ‘impending crisis’ warned of in 2016 occurs.

The threat of a crisis is one major reason why the future of the Palace of Westminster matters. The risk to the Palace is not just about the potential loss of an emblem of national identity, but also the very real dangers faced by the people working in or visiting Parliament. Former Leader of the Commons, Andrea Leadsom, has warned that ‘it is only by sheer luck that no one has been injured or killed’ to date. But the future of the building also matters for the health of our democracy. Legislative buildings are not just symbols of the institution, but their architecture, design and décor affect how people—parliamentarians, staff and visitors—behave within. Through the necessary work to fix the pipes and stonework, the UK Parliament has an opportunity to think about how it can build a legislative building fit for the 21st century, shaped by the public and designed to facilitate their engagement with democracy. Taking this opportunity before crisis occurs would demonstrate that MPs and Peers really have learnt from the past.

To find out more, Alexandra’s full-length paper ‘Using the past to help us understand the future of the Palace of Westminster’ is available here.

This blog was originally posted on The History of Parliament Website and is reposted with permission.

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Parliaments are watching to make sure climate legislation has an impact

How have parliaments responded to the Paris Agreement during the past five years? In which way are parliaments making sure that climate legislation does have an impact? These were some of the questions guiding the new report “Parliaments and the Paris Agreement”, published by Westminster Foundation for Democracy, ParlAmericas, INTER PARES, and GLOBE International. Based on this report, we put forward five golden rules for conducting climate-proof Post-Legislative Scrutiny.

By Rafael Jimenez Aybar and Franklin De Vrieze.

With only a few of weeks until the start of COP-26 in Glasgow, the role of parliaments in advancing international climate commitments deserves a spotlight. Parliament’s critical role in the development, implementation, and monitoring of their country’s climate objectives is often underestimated. 

The recent report “Parliaments and the Paris Agreement” shows that, to date, action on climate by parliaments has gone beyond adopting climate policies and legislation. The report also notes how parliaments focus on implementation and impact, thus contributing to promoting environmental democracy by upholding the environmental rule of law. 

While legislation is of critical importance to achieve national climate commitments, it is equally vital to ensure that the legislation is implemented and has the intended outcomes. This process is often referred to as Post-legislative Scrutiny (PLS) or ex-post impact assessment of legislation. 

PLS can help identify implementation shortcomings, areas of improvement and good practices. While PLS can provide oversight of the implementation gap, the gap between ambitions legislated for and those delivered, PLS can also provide a window for increasing legislative ambitions in line with what the science demands. 

PLS can be applied to climate-specific legislation as well as to general legislation which is not specifically environment- or climate-focused. In case of the latter, one speaks of a climate and environmental “lens” over PLS. 

Based on the new report, we outline five golden rules for conducting climate-proof PLS. The five golden rules capture the do’s and don’ts for parliaments willing to engage on PLS of environment and climate legislation and PLS of general legislation with an environment and climate lens.

1. Make the work of parliament climate-proof. Climate-proof PLS is not the job of the Environmental Committee only. All committees need to be engaged. This means that parliaments need to organise their internal processes to ensure that environmental oversight spans the entirety of its work, including through inter-committee communication and environmental and climate mainstreaming in committees’ work. This requires that all MPs and staff have been informed of the national targets related to mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and the strategy on adaptation.

For instance, the Scottish Parliament applies its sustainable development Impact Assessment Tool to all its legislation. It helps parliamentarians moving beyond simply asking ‘what is the economic cost or benefit of this law’ to asking, ‘what is the carbon cost?’. The UK Parliament Environmental Audit Committee has a cross-government mandate to consider the extent to which government departments and public bodies contribute to environmental protection and sustainable development.

2. Make all PLS inquiries climate-inclusive. For PLS of general legislation, it is important that environmental impact is explicitly included in the PLS guidance, calls for evidence, and questions used in data collection. The PLS report needs to include a section on findings and recommendations relevant to the environment and climate; going beyond findings and recommendations related to the thematic remit of that law. This is similar to the approach that says that any legislative impact report must have a section relevant to gender equality.

An example is the Indonesian Parliament which has started PLS of the ‘Law on Job Creation’ with specific attention to the risks of driving environmental degradation.

3. Employ environmental treaties as entry-point for environmental PLS. Parliaments have a key role in ratifying international environmental and climate treaties. PLS can provide a window of analysis to check on the government’s commitments and adherence to such treaties as reflected in the national law. Furthermore, delivery against international treaties takes place at national, regional, and sub-regional level. Parliaments are critical to ensure that this happens.

4. Look at the role of implementing agencies of legislation. Each law designates an institution, department or ministry for its implementation. In many countries, the piecemeal development of environmental legislation risks regulatory overlap. Through PLS, MPs can review the role of implementing agencies of environmental laws, in order to consider whether compliance and enforcement regimes exist, and what is their effectiveness, legality, and coherence.

For example, the National Assembly of Nigeria is currently assessing the Environmental Impact Assessment Act and the Act on the National Agency for the Great Green Wall.

5. Review the legislative targets. It is important that legislative targets for climate and environment are adequate, timely and achievable. Setting targets alone does not in itself improve environmental outcomes. PLS of climate and environment legislation should therefore focus its assessment not only on targets, but also performance against those targets – asking if the targets and actions to meet them are doing enough.

For example, the Canadian Parliament enacted a review clause in the Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act to ensure a parliamentary review after 5 years of it coming into force with the aim to sharpen the targets.

Rafael Jimenez Aybar is Environmental Democracy Adviser and Franklin De Vrieze is Senior Governance Adviser at Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD).

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How did parliamentary procedure change while Theresa May was Prime Minister?

Thomas Fleming of Nuffield College discusses his recent research into parliamentary procedural change during the premiership of Theresa May.

Parliamentary procedures have many important political consequences. Yet during the premiership of Theresa May, British parliamentary procedure was scrutinised, criticised, and challenged to an extent unprecedented in recent years. This placed intense pressures on the important ‘rules of the game’ governing parliamentary politics in Britain. In a recent article in Parliamentary Affairs, I have described these pressures and their consequences.

How was parliamentary procedure challenged?

This period saw four areas of parliamentary procedure come under particularly intense scrutiny and pressure.

First, the government’s control of the agenda – a key feature of parliamentary politics at Westminster – was challenged by several controversial rulings by the then Speaker, John Bercow. Bercow initially broke with convention by allowing a vote on a backbench amendment to the government’s timetable for the ‘meaningful vote’ on their Brexit deal. After that deal had been defeated in the Commons twice, Bercow angered the government further by ruling that they couldn’t bring it back for a third vote unless it were a substantially different proposition.

Second, the government’s agenda control was also challenged by backbench MPs who opposed the government’s approach to Brexit. On several occasions backbenchers voted to set aside the parliamentary rule granting the government near-total control of the Commons agenda (Standing Order 14), and set the agenda themselves. This highly controversial move gave backbenchers the opportunity to hold ‘indicative votes’ on various alternative Brexit approaches, and to rapidly pass legislation in April 2019 which aimed at preventing (or at least delaying) a ‘no deal’ Brexit.

Third, this period saw intense controversy around the procedures by which MPs cast their votes in parliament. Historically, MPs have only been able to vote if they are physically present. Between 2016 and 2019 there was ongoing discussion of the adverse effects of this rule for MPs who are new parents. Despite a growing consensus around Professor Sarah Childs’ proposal that new parent MPs be entitled to vote by proxy, the government was slow to actually implement any reforms. In the end, this change was only implemented after high-profile controversies involving the MPs Jo Swinson and Tulip Siddiq highlighted the need for urgent change.

Finally, this period saw considerable scrutiny of the process by which backbench MPs propose legislation known as ‘private members’ bills’.  This process has long been criticised as opaque and open to obstruction. But its shortcomings received widespread public attention when a Conservative MP, Christopher Chope, blocked bills which aimed to ban ‘upskirting’ and increase the protection of children from female genital mutilation. Much criticism in the press and from fellow Conservatives was focused on Chope himself. But this incident also appeared to validate existing concerns about parliament’s rules, and the ease with which individual MPs are able to block their backbench colleagues’ legislative proposals.

How did parliamentary procedure change?

Given how many parliamentary debates and newspaper column inches were occupied by these discussions, they led to surprisingly little formal change in how the House of Commons works.

Of the four areas of pressure discussed above, only one – proxy voting – saw any change in the Commons’ formal rules. In January 2019, the Commons adopted a system allowing new parent MPs to nominate another MP as a proxy to vote on their behalf. This system was only established on a temporary basis, but looks set to become permanent. When it was initially due to expire in January 2020, the scheme was extended without any opposition. Moreover, it has subsequently been widened to grant proxy votes to MPs who are unable to attend Westminster in person due to the coronavirus pandemic.

However, the three other areas of pressure on parliamentary procedure described here saw no changes in the Commons’ formal rules. In fact, this period saw remarkably little formal parliamentary reform. Using data from the ParlRulesData Project, I have calculated how far the House of Commons’ formal rules were altered during the tenure of every prime minister since 1945. This shows that only three post-war prime ministers – Anthony Eden (1955-57), Alec Douglas-Home (1963-64), and James Callaghan (1976-79) – oversaw less extensive changes than Theresa May.

 While this period saw very little formal change to parliament’s rules, it did nonetheless see significant informal change. When backbenchers voted to suspend Standing Order 14 and take control of the Commons’ agenda for themselves, this was a highly significant innovation. The government has had virtually monopoly control of the parliamentary agenda for over a century, despite some recent decentralization. This innovation also outlasted Theresa May’s premiership – a similar procedure was used again in September 2019 when MPs fast-tracked a bill designed to prevent Boris Johnson from pursuing a ‘no deal’ Brexit at the end of October.

However, this temporary informal development is unlikely to become permanent, for several reasons. Most importantly, the MPs behind these measures seem to have only conceived of them as temporary expedients. Their goal was not to permanently alter the way the Commons’ agenda is set. Instead, they wanted to facilitate discussion of alternative approaches to a situation they saw as an emergency. For example, in March 2019, Sir Oliver Letwin told the Commons that he hoped future MPs ‘… will not for many decades face an emergency of the kind that we are currently facing, because this is not a way of proceeding that I think any of us would like our country to face in the future’. It thus seems unlikely that MPs will seek to entrench this practice as a regular part of Commons procedure. Even if they did, such attempts are highly unlikely to pass, given the sizeable majority secured by the Conservatives at last year’s general election.

Why was there so little change?

How can we explain this combination of long-term procedural stability and significant short-term procedural innovation? Crucially, parliamentary rules do not change simply because they are challenged or criticized. Instead, Philip Norton has argued that significant long-term changes usually require favourable political conditions – a window of opportunity, a clear reform agenda, and leadership. All three of these conditions were arguably absent between 2016 and 2019. It was a period of severe political turmoil, with little time for parliament to focus on anything except Brexit. Proposals for procedural change were largely ad hoc responses to events, rather than part of a coherent overall reform agenda. Perhaps most decisively, the government showed little interest in procedural reform in this period, let alone leadership.

However, temporary change was still possible because of divisions in the Conservative party over Brexit. The Conservative MPs who voted to let backbenchers control the agenda were not trying to permanently alter parliamentary rules. Instead, they used temporary procedural changes to address specific, time-limited grievances with the government’s approach to Brexit. Despite these temporary changes, the overall pattern in this period is clear. Between 2016 and 2019, parliamentary rules in Britain were challenged extensively but changed very little.

Thomas Fleming is a DPhil Candidate in Politics, Nuffield College and Non-Stipendiary Lecturer in Politics, St Edmund Hall
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What does ‘evidence’ mean to MPs and officials in the UK House of Commons?

Marc Geddes provides us with an overview of some important findings from his research into select committees. In this blog he discusses how committees collate and examine evidence to support their deliberations and to effect scrutiny.

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