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Why Parliaments? Part 2

Past and current threats to parliamentary democracy

By John Keane

This is the second part of a keynote address, delivered in the presence of King Felipe VI, at the conference to commemorate the International Day of Parliamentarism hosted by the Inter Pares: EU Global Project to Strengthen the Capacity of Parliaments (Cortes Generales, León, Spain, June 30, 2023).

The first part of the keynote on the invention of the cortes model can be read here and the third part discussing the future of parliaments as watchdogs here.

The chamber of the National Assembly of Thailand (The Official Site of The Prime Minister of Thailand)

What about the subsequent fate of the cortes of León? Encouraged by military victories over the Moors, the surviving evidence shows that the cortes managed to survive for several centuries. Long distance government based on the consent of its subjects worked. 

By the end of the fourteenth century, following a merger of the neighbouring kingdoms of León and Castile, the kingdom’s representatives enjoyed considerable powers. Their right of gathering and presenting petitions, and their insistence that agreements struck by the parliament were legally binding, became customary.

Constitutional monarchy produced plenty of strife. The cortes was the site of intense bargaining about definitions of the welfare of the realm. Money was often the key cause of friction. Representatives constantly emphasized that kings were forbidden from manipulating coinage or levying extraordinary taxes without the explicit consent of all the estates. Before the end of the fourteenth century, there were times when the cortes reportedly demanded an audit of the court’s expenditure, even rebates on taxes that had already been paid.

The new León style of government proved geographically infectious. During the thirteenth century, parliaments spread from León and Castile to Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia and Navarre, to Sicily and Portugal, England and Ireland, and across the empires of Austria and Brandenburg. During the next two centuries, parliaments appeared in the large majority of German principalities, in Scotland, Denmark, Sweden, France, the Netherlands, Poland and Hungary. Nearly all these late medieval and early modern parliaments survived until the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Despite the growth of absolutist states, which crushed the assemblies of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia, many continued to function until the irruption of the French Revolution in 1789. The Navarrese cortes, the Swedish Riksdag and the Hungarian Diéta lasted into the nineteenth century. The powerful Estates of the Duchy of Mecklenburg survived intact until 1918.

By that time, in the aftermath of the collapse of empires and a catastrophic world war, Europe, noted Tomáš Masaryk, had become ‘a laboratory atop a vast graveyard’, a laboratory of democracy in which most European parliaments were besieged by political parties, trade unions, suffragists and other citizens demanding universal suffrage. Many observers expected the dawn of parliamentary democracy, but as we know, the cruel opposite happened. The butterfly of parliamentary democracy became the caterpillar of arbitrary rule. The long democratic revolution unleashed by young King Alfonso IX had run its course.

Here’s another irony: just as ‘the people’ mounted the stage of history, demanding ‘one person, one vote’, parliaments were racked by factional disputes, fierce backlashes and acts of violent sabotage. In countries like Yugoslavia and Romania, monarchs strangled parliaments. Military-backed dictators also savaged their parliaments, as happened in Piłsudski’s Poland and Horthy’s Hungary. Totalitarian rule triumphed in Italy, Germany, Russia and Spain, and also in China, which might otherwise have become the world’s largest parliamentary republic.

Admiral Miklós Horthy, ruler of Hungary between 1919 and 1944, greeted by city officials upon entering Budapest, November 1919, when in a fiery speech he accused the capital’s citizens of betraying Hungary by supporting Bolshevism.

During these first decades of the 20th century, the downfall and disappearance of parliaments gathered pace. Politicians dressed in frock coats and top hats grew scared. The spirit of ‘dead bourgeois parliamentarism’ (Lenin) fractured and paralysed parliaments. Governments rose and fell in quick succession.

In Portugal, whose first 15 years of republican government had been marred by dozens of governments, eight presidents and countless attempted coups, the words of the new dictator Salazar blew like a winter wind across the whole continent, and well beyond. ‘So long as there is not some retrograde movement in political evolution,’ he said in 1934, ‘I am convinced that within 20 years there will be no legislative assemblies left in Europe.’

Rump parliaments

Salazar’s wishful prediction almost came true. By 1941, there were only 11 parliamentary democracies left on our planet. Only three survived in Europe: Britain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Historians and political scientists tell us the good news that after World War Two parliamentary government made a stupendous political comeback. The not-so-good news is that the long post-1945 renaissance of parliaments is today losing momentum.

There’s writing on the walls of parliaments. We’re living through times in which parliaments are again plagued by legitimacy and performance problems. We need to pay special attention to this new trend. 

We aren’t backsliding to former times, say, to the catastrophes of the 1920s and 1930s. We aren’t even facing the kind of overnight emergencies that gripped Spain on February 23rd 1981 –the moment described with great precision in Javier Cercas’s Anatomía de un instante when, in a hail of bullets, a frightened Cortes fell to the floor and was held hostage for six hours by golpistas.

More recent events in Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Myanmar, Sudan, Thailand and Yemen suggest that armies are still enemies of parliaments, but the main forces threatening the integrity of parliaments are nowadays different. They seem more banal. Their rhythm is different. But these new threats, if left untreated, are bound in the long run to destroy parliaments as effectively as happened a century ago in the heartlands of Europe.

What are these new sources of ruination? Most obviously, rising tides of reputational damage are lapping around parliament’s doorsteps. Cynicism, grumbling, ressentiment and angry citizens’ protests are becoming commonplace. On an already overheated planet, parliaments are said to be hot air chambers, mere talk shops, fabricators of unreality, quarrelsome kindergartens, warehouses of division, irrelevance and incompetence. Parliaments are the butt of bitter jokes. My Irish working class father – who knew something of the 1605 Gunpowder Treason Plot by supporters of Catholic Spain to blow up England’s House of Lords – liked to say that only one man ever entered parliament with honest intentions, and that was Guy Fawkes.

Tomfoolery and contempt for politicians hurt and harm parliaments from the outside, but just as worrying are the forces of decadence within the walls of parliaments. There’s not just the grandstanding, slam-bang rancour, misogyny and cluelessness of more than a few politicians. Or the ‘dead hand of party discipline’, as Michael Ignatieff put it.

Parliaments are materially corrupted by the combined forces of lobbyists, dark money merchants and revolving doors. In Washington DC, this tangled complex of government agencies, think tanks, corporations, academics and lobbyists with big toes in the lawmaking world of legislatures is known (for obvious reasons) as ‘the blob’.

Something similar is happening in the European Union where, in Brussels alone, nearly 12,000 organisations on the current voluntary EU lobby register declare that each year they spend a total of around 1.8 billion euros on their craft. At least 7,500 organisations operate without scrutiny in and around the European Parliament. Whatever is thought of the ethics of lobbying, the fact is government by moonlight is a growing problem in every parliamentary democracy. Mandatory accountability registers and comprehensive integrity checks to prevent ‘Qatargate’ corruption scandals and to ensure ethical fair play among lobbyists are typically in short supply.

India’s lower chamber Lok Sabha is the nightmare instance of what happens when lobbying, dirty money, shady deals, blackmail and criminality get the upper hand. In what’s known as the world’s largest democracy, more money is spent on elections than in the United States, even though average per capita income is only 3 per cent of US levels.

There’s no state funding for political parties and no proper regulation of party finances. 75 per cent of party funding comes from ‘unknown’ sources, including tax-free electoral bonds bought from the state-owned Bank of India (SBI) and anonymously deposited into the parties’ registered bank accounts. An estimated one-quarter of total election campaign expenditure goes directly to voters as cash and gifts. The upshot is that in Modi’s India parliament becomes a place of business deals, organised crime and ‘resort politics’ (an Indian specialty: party bosses buying off recalcitrant lawmakers in luxury hotel hideaways).1 Following the 2019 elections, unsurprisingly, 43 per cent of MPs in the directly elected Lok Sabha had declared criminal cases against them (self-declaration is an election rule); 29 per cent confessed to ‘serious’ criminal charges, which include murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, rape and other crimes against women.

India’s controversial new ‘temple of democracy’ (Narendra Modi) opened in May 2023 (Press Information Bureau on behalf of Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, Government of India).

The Indian case shows how, in the name of democracy, parliaments can slowly degrade into mere meetings of more or less corrupted souls. The old saying that the word politics comes from poly, meaning many, and ticks, meaning bloodsucking parasites, then applies with a cruel vengeance. The decadence is perfected when parliaments fall victim to executive capture, to what Thomas Jefferson originally called ‘elective despotism’. In more than a few of today’s democracies, the centre of gravity of government is shifting from parliaments towards media-spun presidential rule. Take note how growing numbers of political oligarchs do everything they can to prorogue their parliaments, take decisions without consultation, all the while ignoring calls for accountability. They boast, contradict themselves and lie with impunity. Their media performances are reality shows. Excrement without nutrient – commonly called bullshit – is their specialty.

When this colonization of parliaments happens, the spirit of the León cortes is replaced by the mantra of Charles de Gaulle: that politics is much too serious a matter to be left to time-wasting, dithering politicians. The trend resembles a slow-motion coup d’état. It is backed by tactics such as government whipping, gag orders, gerrymandering and voter deregistration, emergency rule, compulsory budget limits, and the punishment of dissenting members. There are also kickbacks and favours and, lest we underestimate, sly efforts to outflank parliaments and silence their committees with the help of hand-picked, loyal bureaucrats, journalists, judges and other high officials, as Donald J. Trump attempted during his post-2016 presidency.

Things grow worse when populist parties and their demagogues get their paws on the levers of government. Populism accelerates the transition to elective despotism. Populists like Erdoğan, Kais Saied, Vučić, López Obrador and Kaczyński favour executive rule. They have a taste for prorogued legislatures, or what the English used to call rump parliaments: chambers that resemble chunks of rotting meat infected with maggots, parliamentary representatives who in the name of the people do little more than serve their executive masters on bended knees.

Things grow much worse when populist governments de-regulate, privatize and commodify public services. When neo-liberalism gets the upper hand, parliaments are blindsided. They become complicit in the growth of what should be called democracy exclusion zones: self-regulating banks, lawless tax havens, secret military-industrial complexes, and buccaneer data-harvesting media corporations which elude parliamentary scrutiny and legislative restraint.

The final part discusses the future of parliaments as watchdogs. Please continue reading here.


About the author

John Keane is Professor of Politics at the University of Sydney and Professorial Fellow at the WZB (Berlin). His latest book is The Shortest History of Democracy (2022), which has already been published in more than 12 languages.


  1. See Chowdhury & Keane (2021), To Kill a Democracy, Oxford University Press. ↩︎
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The Speaker of the Lok Sabha: Performing and Consuming ‘Neutrality’ in the Indian Parliament

By Mouli Banerjee

The Indian Parliament has been in crisis for a while now. With record disruptions, protests that have broken out in the well of the House, regular walk-outs staged by Opposition Members of Parliament, and MPs of the governing coalition often disregarding the House’s Rules of Procedure, the democratic legitimacy of the Parliament of India has been increasingly fragile. How does such a parliament interact with and shape broader public discourse? And more importantly, what can the consumption of the parliamentary proceedings, and its iterations and reproductions outside the walls of the parliament tell us about the legitimacy of a parliament in such ostensibly turbulent times? I suggest that answering these questions requires looking at the parliament as a space, and the different elements and actors that bring it to life, through the lens of performance and performativity. To do that, in this piece, I link these broader questions to a particular figure in performance: the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, the elected Lower House of the Indian Parliament. 

The Parliament as Stage, the Speaker as Performer 

The interdisciplinary interfaces of politics and performance provide a fertile ground for this analysis, making it possible to study parliaments as stages, and meaning-making on such stages as a performative process (Crewe and Müller 2006; Crewe 2015; Spary, Armitage, and Johnson 2014;  Rai and Johnson 2014; Parkinson 2012). These processes have a crucial discursive value, creating normative definitions by repetition and reiteration (Rai 2010). But these performances also need to be staged strategically in order for meaning to not just be created but also be adequately consumed

This applies to the performance of all MPs and parties within the space of the Parliament. Here, however, I want to focus on the role of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha in particular, to understand the implications of embodied performances of that role (its generation and its consumption)  within the current Indian democracy. I suggest that the Speaker is a ‘figure in performance’ in more ways than other MPs. By taking on the role of the Speaker, an MP layers their parliamentary performance with an additional role: that of party-neutrality. What tensions emerge, then, between the purported party-neutral position of the Speaker and instances of party-favouritism in a fragile democracy?

The Contentious Neutrality of the Speaker in the Indian Parliament

The position of the Speaker in the Indian Parliament does not imply official neutrality. There is however an expectation of the Speaker’s neutrality, which follows from a slightly convoluted path of explanation. The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India, added only in 1985, enlists the “Provisions as to disqualification (of MPs) on ground of defection”. It allows Speakers and Deputy-Speakers of both houses of the Parliament as well as the Speakers and Chairpersons of the states’ Legislative Councils and Legislative Assemblies an exemption from disqualification from their political party on grounds of defection, while they hold the Speaker’s chair, if the voluntarily give up party membership while they hold the chair (even if they are to re-enter the party once they step down from the Speaker’s role) (Government of India 1985). This, compounded with the presiding authority inherently implied in the chair, has come to confer an expectation of neutrality from the Speaker, even as paradoxically the Speaker of the Lok Sabha must not just normally first be elected as an MP on a party ticket but must also in practice return to a party’s folds for re-election in the subsequent terms. There are also no provisions or privileges currently in place to incentivise party neutrality for the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, once they step down from the role. 

Instances of past Speakers of the Lok Sabha performing their expected neutrality have been a part of broader media conversations. Meira Kumar, the Lok Sabha Speaker from 2009 to 2014, stated in a national interview that much to the chagrin of her party (the then-ruling Indian National Congress) she refused to clamp down on protests by Opposition MPs inside the House because they are representatives who must be allowed dissent (NDTV 2012). Before her, Communist Party of India (Marxist)’s Somnath Chatterjee famously faced expulsion and wrath from his party for refusing to vote on the party line and citing his duty to party-neutrality as the Speaker as his grounds for defying party diktat (Bagchi, Suvojit 2018). The Speaker of the last Lok Sabha, who has captured much recent attention,  Sumitra Mahajan of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), had to apologise in Parliament and expunge her own words from the transcript of a parliamentary debate, after protests from Opposition MPs erupted post her party-biased statements from the Speaker’s chair (NDTV2015).

The figure of the Speaker in performance, especially in the performance of this neutrality, thus is clearly politically charged. Much of the mainstream debate on the Speaker’s neutrality takes on a normative tone, i.e. it is framed in terms of whether or not, and to what extent, the Speaker can justly be party-neutral. Employing the lens of performance-performativity instead allows us to step outside this normative reading, and locate the ways in which these claims of neutrality function as a potent tool not only to signal a balanced parliamentary discourse inside the House but to also allow a discursively charged transmission of these embodied performances outside of its walls and into public discourse. 

The Parliament as a ‘Videosphere’

The witnessing of the performance is key to its existing. I borrow here from critical legal perspectives wherein when the courts transformed people from spectators of justice into witnesses and participatory audiences (Resnik and Curtis 2011, 295), part-taking in the physical space/stage of the courtroom where the theatricality of legal discourse-making plays out (Goodrich and Hayaert 2015). This can be extended to the parliament as well – parliaments are screened and transmitted, creating legislative “videospheres” (Goodrich Cf. Peters 2014, 48) where meanings multiply, destabilize and evolve. 

As parliamentary proceedings in India are transmitted and consumed, on television and online, not just via official governmental channels but as material for proliferating news media, how do the Speaker’s performances multiply and proliferate? With every new ‘reproduction’ of the performance beyond original parliamentary proceeding, the performance of neutrality becomes further distanced from the Speaker themselves, and take on an instrumentalised life of their own. This opens up multiple possible avenues of analysis and of future research. I have selected here some examples from video clips of parliamentary debates available on the internet to illustrate my argument.

Which videoclips of the Speaker’s performances, then, do particular media channels choose to instrumentalise, and how do they narrativise them? Some examples from Sumitra Mahajan’s time as the Speaker (form 2014 to 2019) provide us with an entry point to these questions. Hailing from BJP, the right-wing party in power currently at the Centre for its second consecutive term, Mahajan, with a long, successful political career, has been widely popular by her nickname ‘Tai’ (an endearing term for ‘elder sister’ in Marathi) in the Parliament, press, as well as in online conversations on her  interjections in the Lok Sabha (The Indian Express 2014). While the Parliament’s official channel, Sansad TV, maintains neutral thumbnails of Mahajan, it is worth contrasting this with the discursive framing by media channels sympathetic to the ruling party – BJP’s own official YouTube channel as well as the channels of India’s dominant right-wing news media. BJP’s YouTube channel has captioned videos of the Speaker, for example, with “Smt. Sumitra Mahajan strongly censures opposition parties for their irresponsible obstructionism”(Bharatiya Janata Party 2018). Again, telecasting a particularly polarised interaction between Rahul Gandhi, the president of the Indian National Congress (a key Opposition party), and Narendra Modi (India’s current Prime Minister), Republic World, one of India’s leading right-leaning news channels, for example, captioned their video – “Speaker Sumitra Mahajan Criticises Rahul Gandhi’s Behaviour In Lok Sabha” – with a thumbnail that showed a panel of a winking Rahul Gandhi placed next to a panel of a displeased Sumitra Mahajan (Republic World 2018). Another more polarising right-wing channel captioned the same video “Rahul Gandhi COMEDY with Lok Sabha Speaker Sumitra Mahajan” (News Hour India 2019), while the more mainstream national news channel, India Today, reported this debate with the caption “Speaker Sumitra Mahajan Sparks Row For Mocking Rahul Gandhi”(India Today 2019). Most of the polarised video transmissions of Mahajan’s speeches carry thumbnails of her pointing fingers at someone or gesturing to ask for explanations, next to visuals of Opposition MPs with serious faces or downcast eyes. The captions repeatedly use narrative versions of a ‘scolding’ in action.

Performing Rebuke

Of course, all parliamentary performances are open to discursive instrumentalisation by political parties, so what makes these transmissions of the Speaker’s interventions in the parliamentary videospheres different? I would argue that this assumption of neutrality allows the conceptualisation of a framework of “rebukes” to the Opposition, which is operationalised when the parliamentary performance and its visual dissemination come together. It is also relevant that two of the last three Lok Sabha Speakers have been women, and the gendered aspect of the rebuke and its embodied visuals also contributes to the overall performance of neutrality and the authority derived from it. There is much to be mapped out in order to analyse the full implications of these performances of neutrality (and rebuke) and how they are narrativized by parties in power, but this piece has hopefully laid some initial groundwork in the direction of scoping out the ways in which parliamentary discourse proliferates through the videospheres of a rapidly weaking parliamentary democracy. 

Mouli Banerjee is a PhD Candidate at the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick. 

References:

Bagchi, Suvojit. 2018. ‘Somnath Chatterjee (1929–2018) : Remembering the “Gentleman” of Indian Politics | Economic and Political Weekly’ 53 (37). https://www.epw.in/journal/2018/37/commentary/somnath-chatterjee-1929%E2%80%932018.html.

Bharatiya Janata Party. 2018. Smt. Sumitra Mahajan Strongly Censures Opposition Parties for Their Irresponsible Obstructionism. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xT4fcWBIu5Q.

Crewe, Emma. 2015. Commons and Lords : A Short Anthropology of Parliament. London, UNITED KINGDOM: Haus Publishing.

Crewe, Emma, and M G Müller. 2006. Rituals in ParliamentsFrankfurt/Main: Lang.

Goodrich, Peter, and Valérie Hayaert. 2015. Genealogies of Legal VisionGenealogies of Legal Vision. London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315774268.

Government of India. 1985. The Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act. https://www.india.gov.in/my-government/constitution-india/amendments/constitution-india-fifty-second-amendment-act-1985.

India Today. 2019. Speaker Sumitra Mahajan Sparks Row For Mocking Rahul Gandhi. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UUMA7ig0Hg4.

NDTV. 2012. Won’t Act against Unruly MPs: Speaker Meira Kumar to NDTV. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7ZHZik6UDQ.

———. 2015. ‘Lok Sabha Speaker Expunges Her Own Remarks After Congress Protests’, 2015. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/lok-sabha-speaker-expunges-her-own-remarks-after-congress-protests-1258172.

News Hour India. 2019. Rahul Gandhi COMEDY with Lok Sabha Speaker Sumitra Mahajan. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PDTnIZdn2p0.

Parkinson, John R. 2012. Democracy and Public Space. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199214563.001.0001.

Peters, Julie Stone. 2014. ‘Theatrocracy Unwired: Legal Performance in the Modern Mediasphere’. Law & Literature 26 (1): 31–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/1535685X.2014.888200.

Rai, Shirin. 2010. ‘Analysing Ceremony and Ritual in Parliament’. The Journal of Legislative Studies 16 (3): 284–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2010.498098.

Rai, Shirin M., and Rachel E. Johnson, eds. 2014. Democracy in Practice. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137361912.

Republic World. 2018. Speaker Sumitra Mahajan Criticises Rahul Gandhi’s Behaviour In Lok Sabha | #ModiTrustVote. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O21njBl7MqU.

Resnik, Judith, and Dennis Curtis. 2011. Representing Justice Invention, Controversy, and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms. Yale University Press.

Spary, Carole, Faith Armitage, and Rachel E. Johnson. 2014. ‘Disrupting Deliberation? Comparing Repertoires of Parliamentary Representation in India, the UK and South Africa’. In Democracy in Practice : Ceremony and Ritual in Parliament, edited by Shirin Rai and Rachel Johnson. Palgrave Macmillan UK.

The Indian Express. 2014. ‘Soft-Spoken Speaker Sumitra “Tai” Is a Battle Hardened MP’, 2014. https://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/soft-spoken-speaker-sumitra-tai-is-a-battle-hardened-mp/.