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Parliaments need to ensure democratic accountability for public debt

By Franklin De Vrieze.

On the occasion of the International Day of Parliamentarism (30 June), this article highlights the challenging task for many parliaments around the globe in ensuring accountability for the rapidly increasing public debt of their nation. It analyses questions of debt transparency, legislative and oversight practices on public debt and the challenge of executive dominance.

Today’s debt crisis

The world is facing a new debt crisis. Twenty-five of the poorest countries spend more on debt repayments than on education, health, and social policy combined. Sixty percent of low- and middle-income countries are highly debt vulnerable. In its latest International Debt Report, the World Bank revealed the sharpest rise in global borrowing costs in four decades.

The origins of this dire situation are both historical and more recent. They include global power dynamics, international and regional barriers to trade and infrastructure development, national political histories and governance decisions around economic development, and the policies of multi-lateral lending institutions and the role of credit agencies. More recently, public debt of many countries has exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the environmental and climate emergency – and their economic and financial impacts – as well as sometimes dubious national borrowing decisions.

Breaking out of the current debt crisis and avoiding future ones will require a fundamental shift in oversight and accountability for the way that governments borrow and manage debt. In this context, there is increasing recognition of the unique roles for parliament in the governance of public debt.

Why parliaments need to get involved

In its submission to the UK House of Common’s International Development Committee’s inquiry, Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) suggested that there are six incentives as to why parliaments can play a more active role with regards to public debt: 1) It serves as a catalyst for greater debt transparency. 2) It helps to establish and implement a stronger legal framework on public debt management. 3) It strengthens oversight over government policies and spending. 4) It protects the national interest in emergency contexts and highlights the gendered effects of public debt. 5) It unearths the risks of State-Owned Enterprises becoming a major cause of debt accumulation and debt crises. 6) It contributes to delivering the requirements of successful Nature-for-Debt swaps, hence contributing to action on climate change mitigation and adaptation, and to climate change finance accountability.

Parliaments, as representatives of people’s interests, as well as lawmakers and agents of accountability, are critical fiscal policy institutions responsible for approving the annual budget and overseeing the government’s execution of its approved programme. Meanwhile, debt managers are responsible for ensuring the government’s financing needs are met at the lowest cost over the medium-to-long term, consistent with an acceptable level of risk, and other objectives such as supporting domestic debt market development.

How parliaments can get involved

How can parliaments play a meaningful role in public debt oversight?

Firstly, setting a legal framework for public debt management ensures that parliament provides strategic direction to borrowing decisions and clearly specifies the roles and responsibilities for the institutions involved in debt management. While most countries in the world have a financial administration act, public debt can also be regulated by more specific legislation.

Secondly, the budget cycle provides the main structure for financial decision-making in parliament, and there are opportunities to scrutinize public debt and public debt management throughout the four stages of the budget cycle: formulation, approval, execution and audit/oversight.

Thirdly, parliaments can incorporate debt management into their regular law-making and budgeting responsibilities in various ways, such as: reviewing and endorsing the Debt Management Strategy and monitoring ongoing implementation; reviewing and ratifying external loan and guarantee agreements in a timely manner; drawing on debt management compliance/ performance audit reports prepared by the Supreme Audit Institution to check the effectiveness of regulatory and systems arrangements; maintaining one or more permanent parliamentary oversight committees with overall responsibility for budget and debt management scrutiny.

Worldwide, parliaments fulfil their debt management roles to varying extents, as MPs often struggle to understand the availability and completeness of debt statistics and other debt management documents. Hence, some parliaments decided to create a dedicated Committee on public debt, bringing together those MPs with strongest knowledge and interest in the topic, as is the case in Kenya and Nigeria. Many parliaments lack staff with the specializedknowledge and skills to support stronger oversight of public debt. Hence, some parliaments have established a Parliamentary Budget Office (for instance in Kenya and Sierra Leone), which provides members with specialized analysis on fiscal and budget issues, including issues of public debt.

Transparency as precondition for parliamentary debt oversight

Transparency is one of the major anchors of debt sustainability, ensuring that all stakeholders, including policymakers, creditors and investors, can take optimal decisions on a country’s debt obligations, based on fully disclosed, reliable and timely information. The issue of debt transparency became more prominent following the discovery of hidden debts in some debtor countries (for instance in Mozambique). It’s the main preconditions for parliamentary involvement in public debt oversight.

There are clear advantages to greater debt transparency as it gives credibility to government policies and helps ensure debt and fiscal sustainability. It supports democratic systems and reduces the opportunity for corruption. However, some national governments might not be ready to provide timely, comprehensive, accurate, accessible, and intelligible debt data, policies and operations to their national parliament or the public at large. Parliament often only gets partial access to the relevant data, thus limiting their ability to exercise oversight on public debt.

Executive dominance

In addition, oversight of public debt largely depends on oversight of the political choices underpinning the proposed investment projects which are funded by new loans. However, parliamentary oversight of these political choices often faces the challenge of executive dominance. In some countries, it means that, for instance, the President might request MPs to adopt proposals, vote for proposed investment projects, or increase the debt ceiling while the MPs know that this is not a sound policy. I learned that, in those circumstances, MPs may sometimes feel that they have no choice but to approve requests by the executive, as their position in parliament or within their party – and in extremely worrying cases their personal security and the safety of their family – can depend on it.

This means that debt transparency is not sufficient. Based on a political economy analysis, there is need for a corruption and patronage lens to fiscal and debt policy. When the national budget is inflated by imprudent projects requiring large loans, it is indebting the country for generations to come. In these circumstances, public debt can be called “budgeted corruption”.

Civil society

Therefore, in addition to more rigorous oversight by parliaments, civil society also needs a more robust role. CSOs and academics, with expertise in fiscal and debt policies, can play a complementary monitoring role, reinforcing parliamentary scrutiny. The role of the Institute for Public Finance in Kenya is a commendable example.

Unsustainable and opaque debt is a democratic deficit. It undermines the social contract which underpins a democratic system of governance. That is why Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) advocates for debt transparency, more rigorous debt accountability to parliaments and robust civil society monitoring.

About the author

Franklin De Vrieze is the Head of Practice Accountability at Westminster Foundation for Democracy.

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Together and Apart: Innovations in Prime Ministerial questioning the Canadian House of Commons

Historically, the questioning model of Question Period in the Canadian House of Commons was collective: the Prime Minister was questioned together with ministers. Question Period takes place every sitting day, and by convention the Prime Minister is expected to attend. In this collective questioning model, MPs addressed questions to the Prime Minister or to ministers. Conventionally, the Prime Minister received questions at the start of Question Period, usually from the Leader of the Opposition and from other opposition party leaders. The remaining questions went to ministers.

During the 2015 federal election, the Liberal Party promised to introduce a Prime Minister’s Question Period in order to make the Prime Minister more accountable. Following a long tradition of collective questioning, in April 2017, halfway through the 42ndparliament, the Liberal government introduced a questioning slot for the Prime Minister. Similar to the procedure for PMQs in the UK, the Canadian Prime Minister would be questioned on their own once a week on Wednesday. 

What can we learn about prime ministerial questioning from this reform?

Given its introduction halfway through a parliament, this reform offers a unique methodological opportunity to study whether, and in what ways questioning the Prime Minister is different in collective procedures compared to individualised procedures. 

Previous studies have explored this question through cross-case comparisons: for example, by comparing how prime ministers are questioned in legislatures that use individualised procedures (UK) versus similar legislatures that use collective procedures (Canada and Australia). A within-case comparison before and after a reform in the same legislature may offer insights into whether questioning the Prime Minister alone is conducive to more or better accountability.

Previous work has also shown that a key variable is whether or not the procedure allows spontaneous questioning (i.e. topics are not known in advance), or whether questions are submitted in advance. For example, in Ireland, questions for Oral Questions to the Taoiseach are submitted in writing in advance, whilst in the UK questions are asked spontaneously on the day at PMQs. The Irish procedure displays far higher levels of questions targeted at the Prime Minister’s responsibilities compared to the UK’s PMQs, where questions to the Prime Minister span a wide range of topics; the Prime Minister is seen as responsible for everything. Given that the Canadian Question Period also involves spontaneous questioning, we would expect that moving to an individualised procedure would lead to a similar pattern: a wide range of questions addressed to the Prime Minister.

Importantly, Question Period is to a large extent party controlled. For every Question Period, political parties hand over a list of questioners to the Speaker, who uses the list as a guide in calling MPs to ask questions. This means that access to questioning is largely determined by internal party strategy.

Research design

This paper asks an exploratory research question: How are prime ministers questioned in collective and individualised procedures? Did the introduction of an individualised procedure in the Canadian House of Commons lead to the Prime Minister being more accountable, as the Liberals intended?

Leveraging the introduction of the reform halfway through the 42nd Parliament, I use a before-and-after evaluation design. The first stage of this study involves a quantitative analysis of questions addressed to the Prime Minister in collective sessions before the reform, and in individualised sessions after the reform. I randomly sampled 30 questioning sessions: 15 on each side of the reform. Questions were coded on several variables based on validated coding protocols and analysed in R. The topic of each question and the political party of each questioner were sourced from the labels given in Hansard. I coded whether the topic falls within the Prime Minister’s direct remit, as that remit is understood within the Canadian political system, whether it is shared with a minister, or whether the topic is in the competence of a minister. I also coded whether the question included a conflictual remark. 

This first stage aims to explore patterns in questions to the Prime Minister before and after the reform. The next stage of the project will involve interviews with Canadian MPs active during the 42nd parliament, to gain a deeper understanding of their experience of Question Period and of the reform. This paper presents preliminary results from the first stage.

Results

  1. Widening access to questioning

The move to an individualised procedure increased access to questioning: MPs from a wider range of roles and political parties are able to ask the Prime Minister a question (Figures 1 and 2). Although the pre-reform collective procedure meant that the Prime Minister appeared in parliament more often during the week, he was only asked around eight questions at the start of each Question Period session. This means he was always questioned by the Leader of the Opposition, the leader of the second opposition party, and other frontbench actors who conventionally ask questions at the start of Question Period. More junior frontbenchers and backbenchers did not get to question the head of government. The individualised procedure, by contrast, dedicates a full session to the Prime Minister, with questioners including a wider range of frontbench roles, and backbenchers also getting a chance to question the Prime Minister.

Figure 1. Number of questions by party
Figure 2. Number of questions by type of actor

2. Less focus on matters within the Prime Minister’s remit.

As Figure 3 shows, the introduction of an individualised slot for the Prime Minister did not result in more questions targeted at Prime Ministerial responsibilities. In the collective procedure around 70% of questions were targeted at topics that were either the Prime Minister’s own remit, or topics that the Prime Minister shares with a minister. After the introduction of an individualised slot, more than half of questions were on topics not within the Prime Minister’s remit. Within the sample included in this study, the range of topics in questions to the Prime Minister increased from 29 during the pre-reform procedure to 59 topics over the course of the individualised sessions included.

Figure 3. Questions within the Prime Minister’s remit

Previous studies have shown that the UK’s PMQs, the most well-known opportunity for individualised prime ministerial questioning, displays a wide range of topics in questions; the Prime Minister is held to account for everything. A similar pattern appears in Canada after the introduction of a weekly individualised procedure: when the Prime Minister appears on their own, the range of topics of questions broadens. Far from offering an opportunity for more targeted questioning, a weekly individualised slot results in more questions addressed to the Prime Minister on a wider range of issues.

An individualised plenary questioning procedure creates an opportunity for regular dialogue with the Prime Minister, and a focus point during the parliamentary week, but not an opportunity for holding the Prime Minister to account in a targeted way. This finding has important procedural implications for designing questioning mechanisms. 

3. No difference in how adversarial questions are

The change from a collective to an individualised procedure did not generate different patterns in terms of conflictual questions (defined as questions containing at least one conflictual remark). In fact, although in both types of procedure over 75% of questions include a conflictual remark, the proportion of conflictual questions decreases slightly in the individualised procedure (Figure 4). However, as Figure 2 shows, a wider range of actors get to criticise the Prime Minister in the individualised procedure. Whilst the collective procedure primarily involved a duel between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, in the individualised procedure a wider range of frontbench and backbench actors intervene to ask critical questions. The high levels of conflict suggest that the Canadian Question Period is inherently an adversarial procedure, at least when it comes to questions addressed to the Prime Minister, and that changing whether the Prime Minister is questioned alone or alongside the cabinet does not have any visible effect on that.

Figure 4. Conflictual questions

Conclusions: what difference did the reform make?

The move to an individualised procedure led to a new model of Prime Ministerial questioning and accountability in the Canadian House of Commons.

Firstly, the reform widened access to questioning the Prime Minister: MPs from more political parties and from a wider range of parliamentary roles (including backbenchers) can now question the Prime Minister. However, Question Period remains very party controlled, and access to questioning is not open on the floor of the House. The Question Period strategy and who gets to be added to the list of questioners are determined internally by parties.

The reform also made the Canadian Question Period more similar to PMQs: the Prime Minister is tested on many aspects across government policy. But evidence from other legislatures suggests that this is not always the case for all individualised questioning procedures. For example, comparative evidence from Ireland and the UK showed that open individualised procedures, where the topics of questions are not known in advance, are more conducive to a wide range of topics in questions. If questions are submitted in writing before the session, they tend to be on topics that are within the Prime Minister’s remit. It is hence the combination of the open, spontaneous nature of Question Period, and its new individualised version, that makes it more similar to PMQs.

Finally, the reform did not affect how conflictual questions to the Prime Minister are, suggesting that the underlying culture of Question Period is adversarial, and the individualised/collective character does not affect levels of adversarialism in questions. 

Dr Ruxandra Serban is an LSE Fellow in Qualitative Methodology at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

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How Sunak can restore integrity, professionalism and accountability

Meg Russell, Alan Renwick, Sophie Andrews-McCarroll and Lisa James argue that for Rishi Sunak to keep his promise to put integrity, professionalism and accountability at the heart of his government, he must strengthen the standards system, enhance parliamentary scrutiny, defend the rule of law, abide by constitutional norms and defend checks and balances.

In his first speech as Prime Minister, Rishi Sunak promised to put integrity, professionalism and accountability in government at the heart of his premiership. This promise is to be warmly welcomed – commentators and experts have raised consistent alarms about slipping constitutional standards in recent years, and research shows that the public care deeply about honesty and integrity in their politicians.

But what might such a pledge look like in reality? Against the backdrop of Boris Johnson’s resignation this summer, precipitated by concerns about his approach to standards, integrity and accountability, an earlier post on this blog issued five questions for the then leadership candidates to address on rebuilding constitutional standards and restoring integrity. The subsequent premiership of Liz Truss aptly demonstrated these questions’ continuing relevance. This new post returns to the five core tasks, links them to Sunak’s stated goals, and suggests what his government might do to meet them. It demonstrates close agreement with proposals by respected experts from other bodies in response to Sunak’s pledge.

  1. Strengthening the standards system

The system for maintaining government and parliamentary standards was placed under great stress during the Johnson premiership. Successive Independent Advisers on Ministers’ Interests resigned, ministers unwisely attempted to derail a House of Commons Committee on Standards investigation, and a Privileges Committee inquiry into whether Johnson himself misled parliament is ongoing. Truss’s subsequent claim that her personal integrity was a sufficient bulwark against standards breaches fell far short of the serious commitment to institutional arrangements needed to safeguard integrity.

Rishi Sunak’s commitment to appointing a new Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests, expressed during the summer leadership contest, and repeated by the Minister for the Cabinet Office, Jeremy Quin, yesterday in the House of Commons (albeit following the somewhat problematic reappointment of Suella Braverman), is therefore welcome and important. Sunak should also move to strengthen the existing system. The independent Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) made recommendations last year to increase the effectiveness of the Independent Adviser, including by giving them the power to initiate investigations into alleged breaches of the Ministerial Code. This proposal, along with various others made by CSPL – such as placing more regulatory codes and roles on a statutory footing – is currently before parliament, via a private members’ bill introduced by Lord (David) Anderson of Ipswich. Providing government backing for the Anderson bill would be one clear and simple way for Sunak to demonstrate his commitment to integrity.

  • Rebuilding the scrutiny role of parliament

A further crucial mechanism for both professionalism and accountability lies in the scrutiny role played by parliamentarians. Recent years have seen increasing concerns raised about rushed legislation, the heavy use of delegated powers, evasion of select committee scrutiny, and the problems that these cause: both in terms of democratic principles and the increased risk of poorly thought-through policy. The Truss mini-budget was given only two hours for debate in the Commons, compared to the usual five or so days for a budget, despite the scale of its content.

Some of these problems can be addressed by setting clear expectations of ministers – for example, that they will prioritise select committee attendance. Others will require Sunak to address the mechanisms by which his predecessors limited parliamentary oversight of their policy-making. The Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Bill, which is currently in the early stages of its parliamentary passage, offers an early opportunity to do this. Various experts have criticised the scale of the delegated powers that the bill would give to ministers, allowing thousands of pieces of law to be amended or scrapped with only minimal parliamentary oversight. The extent of the ministerial powers in the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, currently before the House of Lords, has likewise caused alarm. It is probable that the House of Lords will seek to increase the parliamentary controls on the delegated powers contained in both bills; government openness to such amendments would be a further indication that the Sunak administration is serious about getting democratic accountability back on track.

  • Defending the rule of law

Integrity and accountability in government both demand a renewed commitment to the rule of law, and to respecting both domestic and international legal obligations.

Domestically, there have been attacks on the courts, as further outlined below. And ministers have too often resorted to using ‘ouster clauses’ to remove certain areas of decision-making from legal challenge.

Significant concerns have also been raised about the willingness of both the Johnson and Truss governments to risk breaching international law. The most high-profile instances of this have concerned their approach to the Northern Ireland Protocol. Sunak now inherits the Northern Ireland Protocol Bill, which began its life under Johnson and was championed by Truss. The bill, which is currently before the House of Lords, has been described as ‘not constitutional’ by the (Conservative) chair of the Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, and as a departure from the UK’s international obligations by the chair (again Conservative) of the Commons Justice Committee. The Lords is expected to amend the bill significantly, at a minimum to raise the bar which ministers must meet if they wish to breach international law. Sunak should think carefully before whipping his MPs to vote against such amendments when they return to the Commons, and should put significant efforts in the meantime into finding a negotiated solution to the Protocol controversy.

  • Abiding by long-established constitutional norms

Also essential to integrity, professionalism and accountability is adherence to the conventions and traditions which underpin the UK’s political constitution. One important step would be a pledge to abide by the recommendations of the House of Lords Appointments Commission, which vets peerage nominees for propriety – which Johnson didn’t do. Sunak should also take care over the number of members appointed to the Lords – Johnson’s appointments (87 while in officeplus another 26 handed on to Truss, and others possibly to follow) flouted the recommendations of the committee established by the Lord Speaker to manage down the size of the chamber. Excessive prime ministerial patronage is deeply unpopular with the public, and Sunak should return to the standards of restraint established by Theresa May.

The Johnson government was also notable for its willingness to risk drawing the monarchy into political controversy – whether through the unlawful prorogation, suggestions in 2019 that he might ‘dare the Queen to sack him’, or his reluctance earlier this year to rule out requesting a dissolution of parliament in order to circumvent his removal from office by his own MPs. This indicated a willingness to push constitutional arrangements to their limits, and undermine the non-political status of the monarch. The Sunak government should resolutely avoid taking such risks.

  • Defending political institutions and checks and balances

Finally, a critical aspect of restoring professionalism to public life is repairing the relationships between government and the various constitutional actors which provide institutional checks and balances in policy-making. In addition to parliament, these include the courts, regulators and the civil service. One simple way of demonstrating respect for these institutions would be to avoid the kind of rhetorical attacks on the judiciary, legal professionals, and civil servants which appeared to be sanctioned by both Johnson and Truss. Sunak should also refuse to tolerate the scapegoating of senior civil servants – seen most recently through the unorthodox sacking of Tom Scholar.

The Johnson and Truss governments sought in particular to sideline institutions which they saw as defenders of ‘orthodoxy’. While policy disagreements are legitimate, attempts to shut down or circumvent potential critics are incompatible with professionalism in government. Such efforts were most recently evident in the Truss government’s attempt to bypass the usual independent economic assessments for its mini-budget, and strained relationship with the Bank of England – with very damaging effect. Sunak has promised a different approach, and this welcome recognition of the value of checks and balances should extend to other areas.

Conclusion

For Rishi Sunak to emphasise integrity, professionalism and accountability as central to his leadership is not only constitutionally sound, but also politically astute. Recent Constitution Unit research has shown that members of the public care deeply about honesty and integrity in their politicians. They support an independent and professional civil service, a stronger role for regulators, an ongoing, powerful role for the courts in preventing abuses, and deeper parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. There will be ample opportunities for Rishi Sunak to demonstrate his commitment to these principles in the coming weeks and months.

About the authors

Meg Russell FBA is Professor of British and Comparative Politics at UCL and Director of the Constitution Unit.

Alan Renwick is Professor of Democratic Politics at UCL and Deputy Director of the Constitution Unit.

Sophie Andrews-McCarroll is Impact Research Fellow at the Constitution Unit.

Lisa James is a Research Fellow in the Constitution Unit.

This blog post was originally published on the Constitution Unit’s Blog. We are grateful to the Constitution Unit for allowing us to republish the post. You can see the original post here: https://constitution-unit.com/2022/10/27/how-sunak-can-restore-integrity-professionalism-and-accountability/

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A case of innovative parliamentary oversight? Faroese and Greenlandic MPs in the Danish Parliament 

By Mette Marie Staehr Harder and Hallbera West

Controlling the government is a key task of any democratic country’s parliament. One widely used legislative control tool is parliamentary questions which are typically used by members of the opposition. In the Faroe Islands and Greenland, as in most parliamentary settings, members of the national parliaments; the Løgting and Inatsisartut, may pose questions to their national government, thus controlling their government. However, more atypically, the two Faroese MPs as well as the two Greenlandic MPs who are elected to the Danish parliament, the Folketing have an alternative arena for control of their government at home. Hence, in theory, these four North Atlantic members of the Danish Folketing may also pose parliamentary questions to the Danish government concerning the actions or inactions of their home-rule government. If applied this way, the Folketing could act as an alternative arena for control of the national periphery government, and we would be witnessing an example of what we term cross-parliamentary control. 

Questions and Data

Thus far, this type of control in which representatives use the control tool of another country’s parliament to control their home government has not yet been an issue of much attention in the legislative literature. Yet, as the influence of national parliaments vs. governments is challenged due to processes of globalization, international collaboration, and specialization of the executive branch among others, the need to understand parliamentary control and thus the quality of democracy through unorthodox perspectives of multilevel governance grows increasingly important. Therefore, we set out to study the following research question: 

In addition, if such cross-parliamentary control exists we ask: 

To answer these questions, we study a newly collected dataset consisting of parliamentary questions posed by North Atlantic members of the Danish parliament to Danish ministers in a period of 15-years (2005-2020). As the literature quite concordantly states that mostly parliamentarians in opposition make use of tools for control, we exclusively study the questions posed by North Atlantic MPs who represent political parties that are in opposition at home(N=869). As such, our data is selected from the premise that it is within this data, we are most likely to find examples of cross-parliamentary control.  

Importance of cross-parliamentary control

In providing a theoretical possibility for conducting cross-parliamentary control, the case of the Danish Realm is a seldom case – yet it is not unique. Hence, other parliaments – e.g. the French parliament as well as Westminster—may provide similar opportunities for members elected in districts with different levels of national self-government. 

The perspectives on cross-parliamentary control offered by the Danish case have importance beyond the similar cases: Empirically, it is not a new observation that the power of parliaments vs. the executive power is challenged due to processes of globalization, international collaboration, and specialization of the executive branch. Also, research shows that parliaments are finding ways to take back power (Raunio 2014; Martin & Vanberg 2011; Bergman & Strøm 2011: 14-16; Saalfeld 2000; Judge 1995, 8; Norton 1990, 3–4). Yet, the appliance of cross-parliamentary institutions for control as a means which strengthens parliamentary control of the government has not been an object of much scholarly consideration. Rather, instead of cross-parliamentary foci, scholars have studied ways in which international collaboration among parliaments remedy national parliaments’ loss of power. For example, the occurrence of this within international inter-parliamentary institutions (IPIs) has spurred much recent scholarly interest (Cofelice, 2018; Costa, 2016; Costa et al., 2013; Flockhart, 2004). In turn, scholars have stressed the importance of not overlooking the role played by national parliaments in international politics, diplomacy and sub-state units para diplomacy though this is normally thought of as an area of the executives (e.g. Ackrén 2014, Malamud and Stavridis 2011; Pintz 2019; Sabic 2008). Our study contributes to the field of legislative oversight by studying this phenomena from a perspective of multi-level governance rather than the conventional national –or the more recent—inter-parliamentary contexts. 

Results

Corresponding to our expectations, our analyses show that most of the questions posed by the North Atlantic members of the Danish parliament, who are in opposition at home, concern the actions or inactions of the Danish government. Nevertheless, 7.8 pct. of these questions concern the actions or inactions of the members’ home government. Hence, they enact cross-parliamentary control: either as direct control in the short run or as a more indirect, long-run control which create a sense of being potentially controlled from abroad (for this “long-run” sense of being potentially controlled we find inspiration in Bentham’s Panopticon as described by Foucault).  

Moreover, in line with our initial expectations, which are based on the former findings of Harder and West (Harder 2021; West 2019), we find that Greenlandic MPs make use of this possibility to a much larger extent than the Faroese members do. However, contrary to our expectations, it is the members from the parties that are most critical towards the Danish Realm, which makes the most use of the opportunity to gain information on the actions of their home-governments from the Danish Authorities. Especially, this tendency is particularly strong for Faroese members. We believe this to be a sign that partisan motives at home are more important to North Atlantic politicians in the Danish parliament than we initially expected them to be. 

Finally, and in line with our expectations, most of the questions posed are questions that ask for information regarding the actions or inactions of the government at home. Though we assume that these questions primarily have the effect of creating an awareness of potential control at home as well as providing MPs with concrete information, if picked up by the media at home, some of these questions will quite surely also have partisan effects at home. 

In conclusion, the theoretical possibility of cross-national control turns out to be used by the MPs elected in the North Atlantic peripheries. This type of control has not yet been described in the legislative literature. Moreover, it is not described as a possibility within the few formal institutions that guide the North Atlantic behavior within the Danish parliament (The Danish Constitution most notably). Nor does it seem to have been anticipated among the institutional designers when the North Atlantic representation in the Danish parliament was last adjusted (in the early 1950s). Nevertheless, through their practical representative behavior, North Atlantic MPs have innovated this tool to control their home government – a tool which may even be extra powerful because a foreign government is involved. 

Authors

Mette Marie Staehr Harder, senior lecturer in Political Science, Karlstad University, Sweden and visiting fellow at the Department of Law, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. mm.harder@jur.ku.dk 

Hallbera West, assistant professor in Political Science, University of the Faroes Islands and  program leader of West Nordic Studies. hallberaw@setur.fo

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Reimagining impeachment: A new blueprint for our challenging times

By Chris Monaghan

Henry Dundas, the first Viscount Melville (1742-1811), holds an infamous place in British constitutional history: he was the last person to be impeached. His acquittal by the House of Lords in 1806 marked the beginning of what has become a long pause in the use of an impeachment procedure against politicians or public officials. The last time that events got anywhere near interrupting this long pause came in 2004 when a number of MPs, including our present Prime Minister Boris Johnson, sought to impeach Tony Blair over the invasion of Iraq. The impeachment motion was co-drafted by experienced MPs and placed on the House of Common’s order paper, though proceeded no further (for the motion and background see J Simson Caird, ‘Impeachment’ House of Commons Briefing Paper).

But could it be that the turbulence of recent years when there have been many complaints about the government’s disrespect for accepted constitutional norms, now demands that we shake impeachment processes out of their sleepy historical stupor? It might be possible that reimagining impeachment at Westminster provides a way of ‘shifting the balance’ towards a healthier constitutional equilibrium. Such a shift might have positive effects beyond thinking solely in terms of the executive and the legislature. However, we would need to consider what a new blueprint for impeachment would actually look like. This is important for when we consider below the problem that needs to be addressed, which is an increasing trend for certain members of the executive to display behaviour that demonstrates a failure to show proper respect to the accepted constitutional norms. 

The problem

The starting point is to address whether the executive is sufficiently responsible to the House of Commons for how it conducts the affairs of state and ministerial decision making. 

The balance between the different branches of the state is key. This responsibility of ministers to Parliament is the lynchpin of the Westminster system of government and our unwritten constitution, developed over time through custom and practice, some of its principles are reiterated today in the Ministerial Code. In making a case for impeachment, I am concerned that the House of Commons, as it is empowered at present, is not fully capable of holding the executive to account in performing its basic function of ensuring ministerial decision-making and the conduct of affairs of state are undertaken in accordance with prevailing political morals, procedures and expectations.

In my view, there is now a tendency in executive conduct n either being not prepared to accept the traditional obligations imposed by the constitution and expressed in convention, or to be too willing to push constitutional boundaries. This undermines the political morality of the constitution and the centrality of ethics and obligations in our public life (see for example Andrew Blick and Lord Hennessy, ‘Good Chaps No More? Safeguarding the Constitution in Stressful Times’).

The accountability mechanisms that the Commons currently has as its disposal have inherent limitations. Ministerial question time and select committees, whilst used increasingly effectively in drawing attention to matters of constitutional controversy, can raise public awareness and so exert pressure, but are not directly capable of ensuring ministerial compliance with the accepted norms and principles of good governance. The last resort of a no confidence motion, which if successful will trigger a prime ministerial resignation or general election, is so self-destructive to backbench MPs of the governing party as to be arguably ineffective for the purpose of securing real accountability. This is because bringing down a Prime Minister could reek havoc within their own political party, risks electoral defeat if this is accompanied by a general election, will incur the wrath of constituency party members, and possibly see an MP lose their seat. It should be noted that a no confidence motion should be distinguished from the willingness of MPs to rebel against their own government, as is currently the case with the government and conservative MPs who do not support any further Covid-19 restrictions. This is because the intent is not to bring down the government, but rather to use the threat of undermining the government to influence policy. 

A core problem is the lack of formal checks and balances in the UK’s unwritten constitution, and the dominance of the government over the legislature that has sovereign legal authority in the state. Where the Cabinet enjoys a comfortable majority in the Commons, as at present, and its own MPs and ministers are willing to accept or to ignore its leadership’s assault on the constitution, there is a virtual vacuum of accountability, however strenuous the attempts of the Supreme Court to fill the void.

There have been several well-catalogued cases of unconstitutional conduct in the last few years. They include the willingness of the present Prime Minister to abuse the royal prerogative to prorogue Parliament during the final crucial stages of the Brexit negotiations, and to undermine the reports of independent inquiries into cases of ministerial and parliamentary misconduct (see for example the criticism of the Prime Minister’s advice to the monarch concerning the prorogation of Parliament and the general background to the Supreme Court’s decision in R (on the application of Miller) v The Prime Minister). 

This increased willingness to disregard constitutional norms for reasons of self-serving political expediency risks undermining respect for British political rules and customs generally. It poses potentially catastrophic consequences too if politicians come to believe that any course of conduct can now be justified and override constitutional niceties simply by reference to its electoral and parliamentary majority: this is pure populism, the antithesis of constitutionalism. 

The solution

In my forthcoming book, Accountability, the Constitution and Impeachment: The Case for a Modernised Process in the United Kingdom (Routledge 2022), I argue that impeachment could provide a remedy. I envisage that the House of Commons could more overtly serve as the guardian of the constitution, possessing a modernised power of impeachment that focusses on breaches of the accepted norms of good governance, both in terms of competence and morality. It would not be concerned with allegations of criminal conduct which can and should be left to the ordinary courts. 

This would be a statutory mechanism, established by my proposed Impeachment Act. It would enable a quorum of MPs, which would be twelve, to initiate investigation of serious ministerial misconduct, provide a framework through which investigations would remove fruitless or politically motivated actions, and an independent means of adjudication and outcome, further elaborated on below. At this point it is worth noting that the quorum of twelve MPs was chosen as the number would ensure that there was always the possibility that an impeachment could be brought, but the relatively low number required would be balanced out against the checks and balances within the statutory framework.

Its principal value would be as a form of deterrent. My proposed modernised procedure would certainly make it easier to bring an impeachment action (removing uncertainty over the existence of impeachment, drawing MPs attention to its utility, and stipulating parliamentary time and resources beyond the gift of government), but in practice it would be rarely used. Its main purpose would be as an ultimate sanction if ministers choose to ignore constitutional conventions, or are simply inept. 

Its use as a deterrent would be further strengthened by including in the Impeachment Act a retrospective sanction, operating as a punitive sanction when the prime minister or minister is no longer protected by a government majority in the Commons. This would clearly distinguish it from a no confidence motion. It is clear that there could remain a valid reason for the House of Commons to proceed against former Prime Ministers, such as the continuing sustained criticism of Sir Tony Blair’s conduct over the invasion of Iraq (see for example the petition to rescind Blair’s knighthood).  In the case of serving ministers backed by the government majority, an impeachment process could allow a small number of MPs to commence a time limited examination into allegations of unconstitutionality or incompetence. The point of this would be a high-profile case being made for impeachment that would be accompanied by a report by leading experts, which in itself could serve as a deterrent in the first place, even if the minister was in the short-term protected by their party’s majority in the Commons. 

What would a modernised form of impeachment look like?

My proposals for a modernised impeachment process would be set out in an Impeachment Act. This reimagines impeachment, identifying its rationale and normative purpose, attempting to steer clear of the problems long associated with impeachment. For example, to address concerns over partisanship and MPs using impeachment to proceed against former ministers without merit for purely party-political purposes, I provide procedural safeguards. These include a central role played by the Speaker of the Commons, and a preliminary inquiry by an Independent Panel of Experts, followed by a report by an Impeachment Committee of the Commons. This committee would be specially created to carry out this purpose and would be independent of the Committee on Standards and Privileges.

Historically, once the Commons voted to impeach an individual, then that individual was tried before the House of Lords under the presidency of the Lord Chancellor. Clearly this process has become an anachronism and the involvement of neither the Lords nor Lord Chancellor are desirable today. 

If we are to draw up a modern impeachment process, it should draw on the experience of other comparative legislatures. A useful model is Denmark, where a minister who has been impeached by the legislature is then tried before a specially constituted Court of Impeachment. It was successfully utilised in 1995 in a gross case of illegal ministerial tampering with visa applications to prevent Tamil refugees entering the country. 

The House of Commons would fulfil its role as the guardian of the constitution by calling out unconstitutional conduct and impeaching those responsible. The impeachment is not the final determination of guilt, and it is important that there is a separate forum for reaching a verdict, which would be the Court of Impeachment. In my book I suggest the Court for UK purposes be composed of seven senior judicial office holders and seven suitably qualified lay (non-parliamentary) members serving ten years terms of office. After the lengthy pre-trial processes in Parliament, it would fall to the Court to determine whether a violation of the constitution as set out in the letters of impeachment had occurred. If the answer was yes then, then unlike the traditional operation of English impeachment in times past, there would be no custodial sentence or fine. I envisage that the remedies available to the Court be limited to a declaration of misconduct and/or disqualification from holding public office.

The proposals for reform in my book, Accountability, the Constitution and Impeachment: The Case for a Modernised Process in the United Kingdom, may appear radical, controversial and out of time. However, an impeachment process operating to support and strengthen the authority of the legislature and sanction ministers to comply with ideas and practices of good governance operates successfully elsewhere and should be seriously considered for the UK. As a concept it was pioneered in England in former times and subsequently emulated in other countries in modernised forms. 

A new impeachment process for the UK, working in the way set out at length and in detail in my book, is not designed to replace existing political accountability mechanisms, but rather to buttress and support those mechanisms, and draw attention to the great importance for ministers to respect the fundamental principles of good governance and our constitution. 

Chris Monaghan is a Principal Lecturer in Law at the University of Worcester. I am grateful to Professor Robert Blackburn, Professor Matthew Flinders, Professor Alison Young and Professor Mike Gordon for their extremely helpful feedback.

Accountability, the Constitution and Impeachment: The Case for a Modernised Process in the United Kingdom will be published by Routledge in June 2022. 

This post is cross-posted with permission from the United Kingdom Constitutional Law Association Blog and the original post is available here.

(Suggested citation: C. Monaghan, ‘Reimagining impeachment: A new blueprint for our challenging times’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (12th January 2022) (available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/)

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Does being watched make MPs behave better? 

By Ben Worthy and Cat Morgan ( Birkbeck, University of London)

One of the central dilemmas of democracy stems from the information gap between voters and those they elect. After politicians are elected, a yawning knowledge gap opens up between the seemingly all-knowing elector and the only occasionally interested or rarely watchful constituents. Of all the information gaps across democracies, this is perhaps the most fundamental, the most fragile – and the most fraught with complications.  

This gap can be both profound and dangerous for democracy. The information asymmetry can mean that once elected, representatives could easily engage in hidden behaviour that runs contrary to what their voters want. As Strom argues, this includes voting against their constituents’ wishes, using their position to make money, or simply not doing their job very well. As we’ve seen from the Brexit votes and, more recently, the lobbying smash and burn U-turn around Owen Patterson, this is not some abstract possibility.  

So how can we stop legislators ‘deviating, rent seeking or shirking’? One way is to simply provide more information or data to voters. Transparency advocates argue that this can have two separate effects. There’s the concrete impact of exposing individual legislator’s behaviour when it’s out of line or out of order. Then there’s a broader effect through ‘anticipated reactions’, meaning that the mere possibility of being watched makes misbehaviour less likely.  

Yet, with these solutions come with a warning. The hoped-for effects hinge, crucially, on if politicians perceive themselves to be watched. It also assumes what watching will then do. Being watched should, in theory, make us behave better, but it can also just make us better at hiding, or even throw the spotlight into the wrong place.  

Watching Parliament in 2021 

Our Leverhulme Trust funded study has looked at who is watching Westminster. Over the last decade, there are certainly many new ways to do so. Since 2005, a host of new formal and informal ‘political observatories’ or  Parliamentary Monitoring Organisations which aim to put ‘politicians permanently on their toes’. A family of political theory label this ‘monitory’ or ‘counter democracy’ and hope it creates permanent accountability and even ‘humility’ among those under observation.  

In the UK, there is now an ecosystem of ever-expanding tools and sources. You can see data direct from Parliament itself detailing attendance, voting and activity. There’s also a growing number of third parties providing monitoring, most famously TheyWorkForYou, providing individuals MPs’ voting and activities, and Public Whip, collecting rebellion data. If the data isn’t there you can ask for it via an FOI, as someone did about Owen Paterson long ago.  

Beyond this, there’s a shifting landscape of searchable digital platforms of MPs’ expenses data, Register of Interests declarations and sites watching everything from Climate Change voting records, which MP earned the highest additional income 2017-2019 (clue-he’s Prime Minister) to the changes made to MPs’ Wikipedia pages. The data is certainly there, but is it having an effect? 

Who is watching? 

For data to have an effect, it needs to be used. Analysis of TheyWorkForYou.com found users to be a mixture of the engaged public, private companies, NGOs, and the media, with most users already engaged or interested in politics. Outside of these usual suspects academics are significant data users, creating detailed analyses of which MPs blocked Brexit.  

Another interesting group of users are MPs themselves and their staff. TWFY cite 2% of all users as coming within the Parliamentary estate. Their use of data seems to be a mixture of research on others, self-defence of their own records, and championing their reputation. Labour MP Madeline Moon used the data to defend her work: 

TheyWorkForYou says that I have above-average commitments in terms of debates, I ask above-average numbers of questions and I have an above-average response to my electorate when I have letters, although I admit that it also indicates that my voting record is lower than some (HC Deb, 26 September 2019, c958) 

Not only the users but the uses are varied, and data are deployed in a seemingly infinite variety of ways. They are deployed heuristically to understand MPs’ voting positions, or inferentially, around lobbying or donations. Aggregated data easily becomes a metric to measure, compare and create yardsticks for what constitutes a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ MP, giving the illusion of objectivity and measurability. 

Once gotten by these groups, data are then picked up or developed by the media, campaigners as well as across social media. After the controversial Owen Paterson ‘standards’ vote data was quickly found on how many of those supporting Paterson had an outside income or were themselves under investigation. The public may become caught up when data is used to drive a narrative, when it is part of a wider campaign or when they purposely or accidentally see a tweet or an article. What happens next can be unexpected. A lot of monitoring fizzles into an angry wave but not always. In 2013, The Sun used voting record data to create a list of the country’s ‘laziest MPs’ featuring Lucy Powell, who quickly pointed out she was on maternity leave. Not only was the article withdrawn, but the controversy helped the push for proxy voting in 2019.  

What impact is it having? 

MPs do feel they are ‘being watched’ and behave according, albeit to very different degrees. The exact impact is highly dependent on the individual, with MPs in safe or unsafe seats likely to behave very differently. It is also dependent on the data itself, as most voting behaviour can (perhaps) be justified in a way that expenses largesse cannot.  

Monitoring and watching have most frequently led to accountability. MPs put out more explanations and justifications in Hansard, on Twitter or in the local press – some of which are anticipated (“how will your MP vote”). In 2020, Conservative MPs voting against the government’s Covid-19 lockdown measures and tier system took to Twitter to explain their decisions – both before and after key votes.  

In terms of any ‘anticipated effect’, there is evidence of some behaviour change when MPs are under scrutiny, with a reluctance to claim expenses (especially by women MPs) in the Commons.  

Beyond the individual data can be used to rank or compare and can become a benchmark, and a basis for a moral judgement. There is evidence that monitoring, as with monitoring data elsewhere, compels members to ‘raise their reputational game’ and to be ‘be seen doing it’ (Mau 2019, 163).  

While this can drive ‘better’ behaviour, can it also lead to gaming? Nick De Bois, an MP with a very slim majority, pointed out  in his memoirs that MPs can speak in debates 

Sometimes…so you can enlighten constituents on your position on any given issue. Either that, or because it’s not a good thing to have against your name ‘Below-average number of speeches in the House of Commons’ on that pesky ‘They Work for You’ website, which relentlessly measures how active you are in the chamber. 

But MPs do not feel they are being watched fairly. They seem to feel that monitoring is skewed or biased. 30 Conservative MPs published an open letter to the Guardian in 2019 complained about being misrepresented on their climate change records and a full 50 complained in a letter to the Head of mySociety in 2021 about the same thing.  

Nor are they being watched evenly. Certain MPs are watched more than others, and there are skews and biases. Moreover, the data only highlights some areas, such as voting or expenses, leaving constituency work or lobbying in darkness.  

Are politicians behaving better?  

More data does make for some better behaviour. Overall, it increases accountability, justification, and explanation – as well as representation. MPs are explaining more and even folding data into their representative performance. It has also created behavioural change and driven measurement rankings, which itself has an anticipatory effect – no MP wants to be on this sort of list.  

Monitoring has a self-perpetuating momentum, and data about MPs staff, familial employees or meetings has shifted the boundaries of what is known about legislators and for what they are accountable. It has opened new areas intentionally or by accident. An MP in 2021 must be aware of their voting record, their attendance and expenses in a way they would not have been in decades past.  

However, Parliament is a political place, so it’s no surprise that data equals political conflict. Data is used by groups against individuals, groups, and the institution for political and partisan reasons. This then provokes, in turn, explanation, resistance and further conflict. Data can sometimes close the gap between voters and legislator, but it can make for more conflict and controversy as it does so. 

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From anti-terrorism legislation to COVID emergency laws: Can sunset clauses live up to their promise?

Franklin De Vrieze, Senior Governance Adviser at Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD), and Sean Molloy, Lecturer in Law at Northumbria University consider the efficacy of sunset clauses as a means to ensure democratic accountability.

COVID-19 emergency legislation is often fast-tracked, approved without much parliamentary scrutiny, expanding executive powers while limiting individual rights. Can sunset clauses provide a counterbalance by guaranteeing the temporary nature of the COVID-19 emergency legislation? Experience from anti-terrorism legislation suggests that sunset clauses may reinject democratic accountability, but only if there is a high quality and evidence-based review practice.

Legislative responses to emergencies

The effects of the September 11 (2001) attacks were felt well beyond the United States. The ‘global war on terror’ led many countries to usher in emergency laws to combat the threat posed by terrorism. The Canadian Anti-terrorism Act, for instance, introduced a range of new offences and authorized new intrusive powers, such as preventive arrest. For its part, the UK government introduced the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (2001). Under the act, significant powers were transferred to the government with the effect that individual rights and liberties could be circumvented as a matter of course. For instance, the police can forcefully obtain fingerprints and other identifying features from an individual to ascertain their identity, and the government may regulate telephone companies and internet providers to retain data for the purpose of national security.

In both the UK and Canada, as with many other contexts, the response to terrorism involved limiting individual rights and liberties while at the same time expanding executive power.

The logic of sunset clauses

It is at the juncture between short-term responses and longer-term consequences that sunset clauses find pride of place in emergency legislation. Sunset clauses are provisions that determine the expiry of a law or regulation within a predetermined period. They provide that at a certain point in time, specific and often the most intrusive provisions on civil liberties cease to have effect. In this way sunset clauses seek to ensure the temporal nature measures that extend the reach of government powers or limit human rights,

Because sunset clauses provide for evaluation of the legislation passed, they can help to claw back a degree of democratic oversight and legislative scrutiny. For some, the requirement to respond in haste to an emergency provides the justification for fast-tracking law and sidelining normal processes of parliamentary scrutiny. The review processes attached to sunset clauses are thus a way of reinjecting a degree of scrutiny and oversight in ways not possible when emergency laws are expedited through fast-tracked processes. In the UK, for example, the 2001 Act required annual renewal of the provisions allowing indefinite detention. It required the Home Secretary to appoint someone to review the operation of that part of the act and report annually.

Sunset clauses, at least in theory, are thus a way of enabling countries to respond to immediate threats while at the same time ensuring that expanded powers and limitations on rights do not become the new normal.

Sunset clauses and COVID-19

The use of sunset clauses in terrorism legislation is instructive when thinking about the inclusion of similar provisions in emergency legislation adopted in response to COVID-19.

The speed of response has been paramount to limiting the effects of COVID-19, justifying, in turn, the passing of fast-tracked legislation in ways that ‘differ’ from normal processes of parliamentary scrutiny. Invoking fear and uncertainty, it is the unknown and the unpredictability of the virus, as with the threat of terrorism, which has legitimized the widening of executive powers while at the same time limiting individual rights.

Yet, the risks associated with the fast-tracked nature of legislation, the broadening of state power and curtailment of civil rights and liberties in the context of terrorism, are equally present in the COVID-19 era. Like the threat to terrorism, COVID-19 shows little signs of desisting and retreating into distant memory. At what point, therefore, should the emergency response to COVID-19 desist to prevent the ‘new norm’ becoming one of government overreach and restricted rights?

As with the terrorism legislation, sunset clauses are seen as part of the answer. Indeed, in Scotland, Ireland, Germany, Singapore, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uzbekistan, Serbia, Albania and North Macedonia sunset clauses have featured in emergency legislation, as documented in the WFD Pandemic Democracy Tracker. This, in turn, reflects an inherent confidence in what sunset clauses can achieve and a faith in the theoretical potential of sunset clauses being realized in practice. But is this confidence justified?

Future response

The Canadian experience with anti-terrorism legislation helps us answer this question. The Canadian House of Commons voted against renewing the provisions prior to their expiry under the terms of the sunset clause. Central to this decision was a detailed hearing before parliamentary committees examining the operation of the legislation and practice. By contrast, in the UK, notwithstanding the sunset clause in the 2001 Act, the emergency legislation remained in place until replaced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. This is not in any way unique. The 2001 Patriot Act in the US remains in force even today.

A comparison between the UK and Canada shows that the practical impact of sunset clauses is often determined by the quality of debate that precedes the discussion about whether to repeal emergency legislation. Indeed, a Law Commission report pointed out that the UK civil society group JUSTICE was “sceptical about the quality of debate triggered by the sunset clauses in the UK Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, noting that the annual debates have been rushed affairs and seem to offer little of the substantive scrutiny that is required in respect of such sweeping measures (indefinite detention of foreign nationals and control orders respectively).”

We cannot simply commend those countries that have included sunset provisions in their COVID-19 legislation. We must think about how to ensure that they live up to their promise. This ought to involve drawing lessons from positive examples of Post-Legislative Scrutiny so as to help inform how the reviews of emergency legislation will play out. A few questions would be particularly relevant.:

  • Who is reviewing the legislation?
  • Who is being invited to participate in the review? Are human rights groups, civil society and academics permitted to contribute?
  • What is being examined? Is it, for example, technical aspects, or the impact of emergency measures?
  • If the latter, the impact on whom? For example, what role does age, class, or gender play in the analysis?
  • Is it merely primary legislation being examined, or also secondary legislation adopted under, for instance, enabling Acts?
  • To what extent are lessons from other contexts part of this analysis? Will there be a gender-sensitive approach to scrutiny?

Sunset clauses in practice

Notwithstanding the theoretical merits of sunset clauses, their effect in practice is often determined by the review processes. While they can reinject democratic accountability and evidence-based review, they can also serve merely to rubber-stamp existing powers. They can exist on paper but have little impact in practice. They can be renewed on an ongoing basis, often with little or insufficient scrutiny. Thus, adherence to sunset clauses must itself be scrutinized and lessons must be drawn from other contexts to inform the review processes that accompany them.

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Democratising Hansard: continuing to improve the accessibility of parliamentary records

The official, substantially verbatim report of what is said in both houses of Parliament is an essential tool for ensuring democratic accountability. This record, Hansard, contains a wealth of data, but it is not always fully accessible and easy to search. Lesley Jeffries and Fransina de Jager explain how a new project, Hansard at Huddersfield, aims to improve access to the Hansard records and contribute new ways of searching the data.

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Post-Legislative Scrutiny: how parliaments review the impact of legislation

Parliament has a responsibility to monitor that legislation is implemented as intended and has the expected impact. ‘Post-Legislative Scrutiny’ can help increase government accountability and fulfill parliament’s oversight role. But how exactly do parliaments review the impact of legislation?  In a blog based on his presentation at our 2017 Legislatures in Uncertain Times conference, Franklin De Vrieze (Westminster Foundation for Democracy) discusses the parliamentary experience across different democracies and identifies shared principles.

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