Category: Blog

Blog

The real cost of MPs’ security to constituency representation

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date September 12, 2024

By Neil Matthews and Sean Haughey.

The abuse of MPs, both online and offline, is becoming a more prevalent feature of British political life. In the most egregious cases, abuse has escalated into violent and even fatal attacks on MPs. In response, MPs are adopting new security measures at the constituency level to protect themselves from harm. These measures range from the subtle (e.g. no longer advertising the details of surgeries) to the not-so-subtle (such as the wearing of stab vests). We know how these developments are impacting MPs personally, not least in terms of their mental health. We also know about the associated financial ramifications, with the costs of MPs’ security skyrocketing in recent years. But what about the implications for representation and democracy? Are MPs able to perform their representative role just as well amid stricter security protocols? Or are costs incurred to representative democracy when constituency service is securitised?

The security-accessibility trade-off

All security systems come with costs attached. When MPs tighten constituency service security the most obvious cost incurred pertains to accessibility. This security-accessibility trade-off manifests in one of two ways: either through a reduction in opportunities for constituents to meet with their MP, or through the adoption of security protocols which complicate access pathways. In terms of reduced opportunities for constituent-MP engagement, take for instance those MPs who have stopped holding surgeries in public venues (e.g. shopping malls) because of security concerns. Consider also the MP who, after repeated incidents of verbal abuse, admits that he no longer socialises in his own constituency. These examples of retreat from the public square are problematic, because it is through even the most innocuous and impromptu interactions – in the local pub or supermarket for instance – that MPs develop their constituency antennae, learning about the issues which matter to their constituents:

‘We try to be, as constituency MPs, recognisable, available, accessible to all. A successful constituency MP is the person who people feel they can go to in the pub or, as frustrating as that sometimes is, come up to you when you’re doing your shopping.‘

Access to MPs can be complicated by security in a number of ways. Some MPs, for example, have replaced “drop-in” surgeries with appointment-only meetings, a formality which likely results in some constituents being turned away. We also know that, on the advice of police, some MPs have discontinued in-person surgery appointments, instead offering online meetings only. Whilst this might expedite access to MPs for the digitally confident citizen, it will disincentivise engagement for those without the requisite skills. What is more, the value and quality of online meetings – relative to in-person meetings – is open to question. The social scientific evidence underlines the therapeutic value of in-person meetings between MPs and constituents. These in-person meetings are key to the development of “co-presence”, and help build a “human bridge” through which constituents feel listened to. These benefits could be much harder to attain when the interaction occurs through a screen. Similarly, with face-to-face meetings, that personal touch and sense of intimacy is likely compromised by the presence of security guards.

The symbolic costs

Public spaces articulate political and cultural messages. What messages, then, are conveyed to the public when MPs adopt airport-style (or even prison-style) security at their constituency offices? Think bulletproof glass, CCTV, reinforced doors, panic buttons and so on. Whilst these measures may reassure MPs and their staff, the effect on constituents could be quite the opposite, perhaps marking the space as somehow unsafe, where visitors need to be on their guard. Research into other sites that have been securitised suggests as much, whereby defensive urban architecture (designed to mitigate terrorist attacks) has had a chilling effect on public democratic culture, eliciting a range of subjective emotional responses from pedestrians: fearfulness, suspicion, paranoia, and exclusion. Some of the security measures at constituency offices could be eliciting a similar response from constituents. Take, for instance, the MP who tells his constituents they should “be prepared to be searched” when they arrive at his surgery:

‘We are following security guidance, as a result Security Operatives and/or the Police will be screening constituents attending face to face surgery appointments. Please bring along photo ID, leave bags and coats at home where possible, as they will not be permitted in the meeting toom and will need to remain outside the meeting space and be prepared to be searched.‘

(Guidance provided on Julian Smith MP’s website for constituents)

For the architect, Stephen Flusty, places and spaces bearing the features of security – searches of person or property, say – warrant being labelled as “jittery”. They are marked, in other words, by a tense and nervous atmosphere. We might ask then: how many of the constituency offices in the UK are showing signs of the jitters?

Security and trust: a Catch-22?

Security measures at the constituency level could, then, be counter-productive, in that MPs may be undermining the very representative connections they seek to protect. Up until now, the linkage between MPs and constituents at the local level has been held up as a positive exception to what has otherwise been a story of increasing political disengagement across western democracies. But what if new security measures at the local level are making engagement more difficult, placing distance (figuratively and literally) between MPs and constituents?

Amid a general crisis of representation, in which people in the UK typically feel unrepresented by Westminster, there is a risk that the mitigating power of constituency service will be diminished if MPs become (or are perceived to be) harder to reach – or are less present – at the local level. Moreover, if perceptions of disconnect between politicians and the public is a driver of political distrust, and that distrust in turn fuels abuse of politicians, the security steps MPs are taking to mitigate this threat could in fact be exacerbating it.

Importantly, the securitising trend affecting British political life appears set to deepen. The Speaker of the Commons, Lindsay Hoyle – a long-time advocate for greater protections for MPs – has called for a transformation in parliament’s “security culture”. To a similar end, the outgoing Conservative government signed-off on a £31m package to bolster the constituency-level security of MPs; while the recently published Walney review recommends even greater bolstering. Understanding how such enhanced security shapes the character and delivery of representative democracy in the UK – and the myriad costs it brings to bear on both politicians and the public – warrants greater attention.

This blog post was first posted by LSE blogs. It draws on research by the authors published in Parliamentary Affairs. All views expressed are the authors’ own.

About the authors

Neil Matthews is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the University of Bristol.

Sean Haughey is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the Institute of Irish Studies at the University of Liverpool.

Tags House of Commons, MPs, parliaments, representation, security, Westminster

Blog

Parliaments need to ensure democratic accountability for public debt

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date July 1, 2024

By Franklin De Vrieze.

On the occasion of the International Day of Parliamentarism (30 June), this article highlights the challenging task for many parliaments around the globe in ensuring accountability for the rapidly increasing public debt of their nation. It analyses questions of debt transparency, legislative and oversight practices on public debt and the challenge of executive dominance.

Today’s debt crisis

The world is facing a new debt crisis. Twenty-five of the poorest countries spend more on debt repayments than on education, health, and social policy combined. Sixty percent of low- and middle-income countries are highly debt vulnerable. In its latest International Debt Report, the World Bank revealed the sharpest rise in global borrowing costs in four decades.

The origins of this dire situation are both historical and more recent. They include global power dynamics, international and regional barriers to trade and infrastructure development, national political histories and governance decisions around economic development, and the policies of multi-lateral lending institutions and the role of credit agencies. More recently, public debt of many countries has exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the environmental and climate emergency – and their economic and financial impacts – as well as sometimes dubious national borrowing decisions.

Breaking out of the current debt crisis and avoiding future ones will require a fundamental shift in oversight and accountability for the way that governments borrow and manage debt. In this context, there is increasing recognition of the unique roles for parliament in the governance of public debt.

Why parliaments need to get involved

In its submission to the UK House of Common’s International Development Committee’s inquiry, Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) suggested that there are six incentives as to why parliaments can play a more active role with regards to public debt: 1) It serves as a catalyst for greater debt transparency. 2) It helps to establish and implement a stronger legal framework on public debt management. 3) It strengthens oversight over government policies and spending. 4) It protects the national interest in emergency contexts and highlights the gendered effects of public debt. 5) It unearths the risks of State-Owned Enterprises becoming a major cause of debt accumulation and debt crises. 6) It contributes to delivering the requirements of successful Nature-for-Debt swaps, hence contributing to action on climate change mitigation and adaptation, and to climate change finance accountability.

Parliaments, as representatives of people’s interests, as well as lawmakers and agents of accountability, are critical fiscal policy institutions responsible for approving the annual budget and overseeing the government’s execution of its approved programme. Meanwhile, debt managers are responsible for ensuring the government’s financing needs are met at the lowest cost over the medium-to-long term, consistent with an acceptable level of risk, and other objectives such as supporting domestic debt market development.

How parliaments can get involved

How can parliaments play a meaningful role in public debt oversight?

Firstly, setting a legal framework for public debt management ensures that parliament provides strategic direction to borrowing decisions and clearly specifies the roles and responsibilities for the institutions involved in debt management. While most countries in the world have a financial administration act, public debt can also be regulated by more specific legislation.

Secondly, the budget cycle provides the main structure for financial decision-making in parliament, and there are opportunities to scrutinize public debt and public debt management throughout the four stages of the budget cycle: formulation, approval, execution and audit/oversight.

Thirdly, parliaments can incorporate debt management into their regular law-making and budgeting responsibilities in various ways, such as: reviewing and endorsing the Debt Management Strategy and monitoring ongoing implementation; reviewing and ratifying external loan and guarantee agreements in a timely manner; drawing on debt management compliance/ performance audit reports prepared by the Supreme Audit Institution to check the effectiveness of regulatory and systems arrangements; maintaining one or more permanent parliamentary oversight committees with overall responsibility for budget and debt management scrutiny.

Worldwide, parliaments fulfil their debt management roles to varying extents, as MPs often struggle to understand the availability and completeness of debt statistics and other debt management documents. Hence, some parliaments decided to create a dedicated Committee on public debt, bringing together those MPs with strongest knowledge and interest in the topic, as is the case in Kenya and Nigeria. Many parliaments lack staff with the specializedknowledge and skills to support stronger oversight of public debt. Hence, some parliaments have established a Parliamentary Budget Office (for instance in Kenya and Sierra Leone), which provides members with specialized analysis on fiscal and budget issues, including issues of public debt.

Transparency as precondition for parliamentary debt oversight

Transparency is one of the major anchors of debt sustainability, ensuring that all stakeholders, including policymakers, creditors and investors, can take optimal decisions on a country’s debt obligations, based on fully disclosed, reliable and timely information. The issue of debt transparency became more prominent following the discovery of hidden debts in some debtor countries (for instance in Mozambique). It’s the main preconditions for parliamentary involvement in public debt oversight.

There are clear advantages to greater debt transparency as it gives credibility to government policies and helps ensure debt and fiscal sustainability. It supports democratic systems and reduces the opportunity for corruption. However, some national governments might not be ready to provide timely, comprehensive, accurate, accessible, and intelligible debt data, policies and operations to their national parliament or the public at large. Parliament often only gets partial access to the relevant data, thus limiting their ability to exercise oversight on public debt.

Executive dominance

In addition, oversight of public debt largely depends on oversight of the political choices underpinning the proposed investment projects which are funded by new loans. However, parliamentary oversight of these political choices often faces the challenge of executive dominance. In some countries, it means that, for instance, the President might request MPs to adopt proposals, vote for proposed investment projects, or increase the debt ceiling while the MPs know that this is not a sound policy. I learned that, in those circumstances, MPs may sometimes feel that they have no choice but to approve requests by the executive, as their position in parliament or within their party – and in extremely worrying cases their personal security and the safety of their family – can depend on it.

This means that debt transparency is not sufficient. Based on a political economy analysis, there is need for a corruption and patronage lens to fiscal and debt policy. When the national budget is inflated by imprudent projects requiring large loans, it is indebting the country for generations to come. In these circumstances, public debt can be called “budgeted corruption”.

Civil society

Therefore, in addition to more rigorous oversight by parliaments, civil society also needs a more robust role. CSOs and academics, with expertise in fiscal and debt policies, can play a complementary monitoring role, reinforcing parliamentary scrutiny. The role of the Institute for Public Finance in Kenya is a commendable example.

Unsustainable and opaque debt is a democratic deficit. It undermines the social contract which underpins a democratic system of governance. That is why Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) advocates for debt transparency, more rigorous debt accountability to parliaments and robust civil society monitoring.

About the author

Franklin De Vrieze is the Head of Practice Accountability at Westminster Foundation for Democracy.

Tags accountability, parliaments, public debt, transparency

Blog

Petitions and Petitioning in Europe and North America

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date June 20, 2024

By Henry Miller.

Over the last decade, parliaments across the world have adopted e-petition systems to promote citizen engagement with legislatures. While made possible by the internet and twenty-first century technology, the contemporary e-petition can also be understood as the latest version of an ancient political practice: the petition. As this blog will illustrate, petitions and petitioning have long been a popular way for people to engage with parliamentary institutions, both before and after the advent of modern democracy.

This blog summarises key findings from a major new edited book, Petitions and Petitioning in Europe and North America: From the Late Medieval Period to the Present published by Oxford University Press for the British Academy. Originating from an AHRC Network, the book brings together historians, political scientists, legal scholars, and sociologists to examine petitions and petitioning, that is the practices related to the drafting, signing, presentation and reception of petitions.

As the book shows, petitions have been ubiquitous across a many different geographical, chronological, and political contexts, including modern democracies and authoritarian regimes. The book is organised into three sections that: 1) define petitions with greater conceptual clarity than before; 2) examine changes and continuities in petitioning over long periods of time; and 3) offer case studies of why and when petitions have mattered in particular political contexts, ranging from late medieval England to the early Soviet Union. This blog will summarise findings in three areas that will be of particular interest to scholars of parliamentary studies.

First, a key theme of the book is the relationship between petitions and the evolution of parliamentary institutions. In his chapter, Gwilym Dodd shows that petitions were an important method for collectively asserting parliamentary authority against royal power in late medieval England. During the ‘age of revolutions’ (1789-1871) in Europe and North America, mass, collective petitioning on public issues, often based on newly codified rights to petition, was increasingly directed to legislatures. The value of petitions to parliaments was double-edged in an age of limited suffrage. Parliaments, including the UK House of Commons, used petitions to claim a degree of popular consent in the absence of democratic elections. Yet at the same time, petitioners invoking ideas of popular sovereignty frequently challenged parliamentary authority by claiming to represent a broader people than the limited electorate.

In the twentieth century, as Richard Huzzey and Henry Miller show, there was a shift away from petitioning legislatures to a broader range of authorities, including international bodies like the United Nations. Petitioning remained a ubiquitous form of political participation, but because petitions to non-parliamentary authorities (such as Number 10 Downing Street) were rarely recorded, its continued popularity remained largely invisible to scholars. This historical perspective allows us to see that one important implication of the growth of legislative e-petitions systems, documented by Cristina Leston-Bandeira in her chapter, is that it restores parliaments as the principal authorities for receiving petitions from citizens.

Second, petitions have been an important mechanism for representation across the centuries. As a series of studies have shown, petitions have enabled the ‘voice of the voteless’ to be heard in legislatures from groups lacking formal political rights, including Native Americans, women before universal suffrage, and colonised peoples in the British empire. In their study of the US Congress over two centuries, Maggie Blackhawk and Daniel Carpenter persuasively argue that petitioning has been an important form of representation that exists independently of electoral and party politics. Examining Dutch petitions over three centuries, Maartje Janse et al, demonstrate that petitioning has been a significant practice for making representative claims to authority by individual citizens and groups. In his survey of petitions in colonial Jamaica during the era of slavery, the late Aaron Graham shows that petitioning was one of the few tools available to groups including Free People of Colour and Jewish subjects to claim rights from a legislature dominated by slave-owners. Marta Gravela and Ismini Pells show that petitions were an important mechanism for claiming citizenship and welfare, respectively, from the state.

Third, the book reveals the essential duality of petitions and petitioning as both formal and informal political practices that is vital for understanding their ubiquity, longevity, and flexibility. While often studied in formal, institutional, official settings, notably parliaments, petitions have always taken informal, unofficial forms as well and have been directly to a range of authorities. As chapters by Mark Knights, Joris Oddens, and others show, there has been an enormous variety of petitions and related subscriptional (or name-signing) practices, including supplications, covenants, declarations, and gravamina to name but a few. In the nineteenth-century UK, petitions to the House of Commons were the most popular genre of petitioning, but these existed alongside addresses to the monarch, memorials to government, and requisitions and other petitions directed to every type of local authority.

Petitions have never been isolated from other forms of political participation. Indeed, in particular contexts they have underpinned and made possible other forms of collective action. While petitions today are often regarded by sociologists as a conventional form of collective action compared to more direct forms of protest, a historical perspective shows that petitioning has often been linked with revolts, rebellions, and revolutions. Petitioning has often been a fluid political practice that could mutate into other forms, including mass demonstrations or strikes, while the correlation between petitions and the formation of political organisation such as political parties or single-issue associations is well-established. Modern forms of participation and engagement have evolved from petitioning. The institutionalised forms of referendums and initiatives in Switzerland, Andreas Würgler shows, developed from a long tradition of petitioning. The practice of letter-writing to MPs and political leaders, which expanded dramatically in the twentieth-century, was an outgrowth of petitioning as Huzzey and Miller suggest.

The shape-shifting quality of petitions is one of the many reasons why they have been a widespread practice since the late medieval period, and a key means for interacting with parliamentary and representative institutions, even if now, they largely take digital form.

About the authors

Dr. Henry Miller is Vice Chancellor’s Fellow in the Department of Humanities, Northumbria University.

Tags House of Commons, parliaments, UK Parliament

Blog

Reimagining the UK Parliament

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date May 22, 2024

By David Judge and Cristina Leston-Bandeira.

Few institutions – whether economic, social, or political – have escaped calls in recent years for reimagining. In its literal sense reimagining is ‘the action or an act of imagining something again’(OED); or, stated more pithily, it means to ‘think seriously about starting over’. A reimagining of parliament, therefore, needs to explore and trouble (in the sense of challenging and disrupting) current imaginings of what parliament is and does. This is what we set out to do in our new book Reimagining Parliament.

Stages of Reimagining

A ‘stages approach’ was adopted to reimagining. The first stage was to identify what was to be reimagined. Obviously, in our case the specific focus is the UK parliament. It is not about the genus of ‘parliament’, or of the general concept of ‘parliament’. Instead, it is about the Westminster parliament firmly located within a ‘Westminster system’ of government. This is the present (what currently exists). This provides the starting point for reimagining (what does not yet exist).

The second stage of reimagining was to identify who is doing the reimagining. The selection criteria for ‘reimagineers’ was that they should collectively combine the practical, professional experience of those who have worked in Westminster and the academic, research experience of those who have analysed parliament from a range of disciplines; and that they should be willing to step outside their professional and academic comfort zones to be provoked into thinking afresh about how they might reimagine parliament. Our ‘reimagineers’ were: Didier Caluwaerts, Emma Crewe, Paul Evans, David Judge, Cristina Leston-Bandeira, Lucinda Maer, Alexandra Meakin, Dann Vermassen, Hannah White, and Ben Yong.

A third stage was the ‘how’ of reimagining. A ‘headshift’, in the sense of ‘a break with conventional thinking’, was required. To break with the orthodoxies of institutional perspectives, contributors were asked to identify foundational principles with which to drive the modelling ab initio of various dimensions of parliamentary activity; to explain why the identified principles are deemed to be foundational, and why they matter. Two broad categories of principles emerged from this identification process. In the first category are principles broadly reflective of basic political tenets currently underpinning notions of liberal democracy in the UK: these include openness; engagement/connectedness; accessibility; inclusion; equality; fairness; responsiveness; and accountability. Principles in the second category are associated more with institutional and organisational norms and practices: these include wellness; ethical propriety; sustainability; organisational flexibility; and effective institutional governance.

The outcomes of reimagining

Notions of space, connectivity and interaction help in defining the positioning and distinctiveness of parliament at the centre of UK politics. ‘Space’ focuses attention upon location, architectural space and purpose, and the symbols, performances and rituals of parliament. ‘Connectivity’ is concerned with the dynamics of representation, the identities of those to be brought together in parliament, and how citizens are included and engaged in parliamentary processes. ‘Interaction’ is multi-directional, both outward looking to inter-institutional connections and highly politicised processes of effecting government responsibility and accountability; and inward looking to intra-institutional modes of administration and regulation, demarcated by parliamentary procedures and processes of self-governance.

Within these encompassing frames – of parliamentary space, connectivity, and interaction – the impact of how first category foundational principles may impact reimagining can be seen below.

Openness, engagement/connectedness, and accessibility

Space: These principles are used to guide rethinking: first, in the architectural sense of designing more open-plan spaces within which parliamentarians and staff could meet and work; and of an opening-up of the dark recesses of the parliamentary estate to allow in more natural light and ventilation. Second, in the sense of parliament being open to the public and infusing the principle of public access into the architectural design and necessary security structures and working regimes at Westminster. A fundamental question behind such reimagining is: what would the building look like if the public’s access to democracy was the primary purpose for the design?

Connectivity: The principles of openness and accessibility also underpin a reimagining of the engagement networks, mechanisms and processes of parliament to inform its information, education, communication, consultation and participation activities. In part this prioritisation of openness reflects growing citizen expectations of more openness within parliamentary democracies across the world. Whilst the principles of openness and accessibility provide keystones for engagement activities, their interconnectedness with other principles – of relatability, relevance, continuity, and sustainability – is also vital to reimagining public engagement.

Interaction: When applied to parliamentary scrutiny the principles of openness; engagement/connectedness; and accessibility provide for: greater openness and accessibility in the sense of the ability to obtain information from government and citizens and the capacity to receive (and publish) information in a more open way – through reimagining the technologies, the language, and the choreography of scrutiny. A reimagining of connectedness would include greater deliberative innovation into the scrutiny process; alongside a rethinking of partnership working both within Westminster and between legislatures in the UK; as well as enhanced networking with other monitoring and regulatory bodies. In turn, the principle of engagement can be used to rethink the relationship between parliamentarians and scrutiny processes.

When applied to parliamentary procedure, a reimagining based on the above principles, would aim to encourage participation, deliberation, and make procedure more accessible to parliamentarians and citizens. To this end, it should be transparent both in the sense of being ‘open’ about the rules governing parliamentary behaviour and how they are applied, as well as being presented in language which is natural, plain and transparent. Enhanced openness, in conjunction with other identified ‘second category’ principles, envisages procedure to be more ‘relatable’ inasmuch as it must be recognisably human; ‘relevant’ insofar as it must focus attention on what is important; and provide ‘continuity’ to the extent that procedure must be predictable without being unchanging.

Inclusion, equality, fairness, and responsiveness

These principles provide tensile threads running through most aspects of reimagining parliament.

Space: the principles of inclusion and equality are of central importance in re-envisioning parliamentary architectural space and transforming parliamentary rhythms, rituals and symbols. Such reimagining would have at its heart securing greater equality and inclusion in relation to currently under-represented or un-represented groups in parliament. These principles would be inhered by symbolic recognition of the achievements of minority groups; provide challenges to prevailing ‘hierarchies of value’; and made manifest in redesigns of parliamentary space, parliamentary communication and messaging strategies, and the adoption of neutral (non-exclusionary) parliamentary language.

Connectivity: A rethinking of parliamentary engagement imbued with the principle of inclusion aims to produce a parliament that is more welcoming, more relatable, and more relevant both to current generations and to future generations of parliamentarians and citizens. The principle of inclusion also signifies a necessary representation of diverse bodies, abilities, voices, opinions, backgrounds, races, ethnicities, genders, and identities in parliamentary activities. Securing greater equality and inclusiveness in the representative process requires affirmative action, including compensatory measures, to challenge the structural and attitudinal barriers which perpetuate representational inequalities. The inclusion of more, and more diverse, voices in the deliberation of public policies through such institutional actions and measures, alongside the situating of parliament as a key nodal point in intricate networks of electoral and non-electoral representation, are essential elements of reimagining parliamentary representation. The principle of fairness also intersects with the discussion of representational equality, not least in the maxim that formal political equality is secured through free and fair elections. In turn, securing fairness opens up considerations of a more proportional electoral system and greater alignment of the activities of representatives to the preferences of the represented through the institutionalisation of an encompassing system of responsiveness.

Interaction: Inclusion – and the promotion of diversity – serves as a guiding principle for reimagining the patterns of social interactions, working routines, and ‘people policies’ at Westminster. A reimagined parliament would conceptualise itself as an exemplar of best workplace practice and culture, rather than an exception to the rules shaping other workplaces. Moreover, a reimagined parliament would uphold the principle of fairness, and the closely aligned principle of non-discrimination, to guarantee the general right of workers be treated fairly and not to be discriminated against. When reimagining parliamentary governance, a parliamentary administration which is both responsive and responsible is to be a touchstone of good governance. These principles, when operationalised, would provide greater transparency of governance arrangements; and ensure that those making key administrative decisions are clearly identifiable and known to be responsible and accountable for those decisions.

When it comes to reimagining parliamentary scrutiny, what makes it unique, and distinct from other forms of scrutiny of executive actions, is that it engages the notion of democratic accountability. The media, regulatory bodies, charities and academics may all play valuable scrutiny roles, but they lack this central democratic function. For parliamentary scrutiny to be effective, it needs to engage parliamentarians. Being engaging, efficient, connected, informed, and accessible can all be seen as part of good scrutiny, but good scrutiny should feed back into good government. Equally, if procedure is essential to conferring legitimacy upon the processes and outputs of parliament then the way decisions are reached must be seen to be fair (and, so far as possible, be enduring because they are fair).

Further serious thinking

Whilst the specific focus of Reimagining Parliament is ‘thinking seriously about starting over’ – in conceptualising parliamentary space, connectivity and interaction in Westminster – it also serves to prompt questions about the necessity of further serious thinking about reimagining the broader institutions and processes of parliamentary democracy and parliamentary government in the UK. Calls for broader reimagining are particularly salient at a time when: parliament is widely and roundly criticised (see, for example, Ian Dunt, Hannah White, and Alison Young); significant proportions of the UK population have little trust in Parliament; and many citizens believe that politicians at Westminster do not understand their lives.

About the authors

David Judge is Emeritus Professor of Politics in the Department of Government and Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.

Cristina Leston-Bandeira is Professor of Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds.

Tags House of Commons, parliaments, UK Parliament

Blog

Refinement Is All You Need: Shaping the Future of Parliaments with AI

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date April 16, 2024

By Alberto Mencarelli.

In the landmark paper “Attention Is All You Need” (Vaswani et al., 2017), the concept of transformers fundamentally changed the landscape of AI, particularly in how machines understand and generate human language through mechanisms like Generative Pre-trained Transformers (GPT) and Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG). These breakthroughs not only represent significant technological strides but also strikingly parallel the intricate processes in parliaments. Just as transformers learn and adapt by absorbing and synthesizing vast amounts of information, so do parliamentary systems refine legislative measures by assimilating diverse data and viewpoints, underscoring a shared theme of progressive enhancement and complex data integration in both realms.

The essence of this analogy lies in the conceptual similarity between the AI ‘attention’ mechanism and the parliamentary ‘refinement’ process, where both prioritize and contextualize information to produce nuanced outcomes. The refinement process in parliaments evolves through stages: from committee to plenary, and across chambers in bicameral systems – each procedural step meticulously crafted to enhance output. In parliamentary terms, refinement involves a multifaceted iterative process that ensures broad deliberative bases, adversarial but inclusive consideration of diverse views, and the scrutiny of legislative provisions based on data-driven assessments. The similarity between AI systems and parliamentary processes shows that both share a fundamental approach: just as AI uses attention and retrieval mechanisms to process information, parliaments use iterative, knowledge-based methods to develop legislation. Thus, the dynamics of generative AI not only mirror, but also offer new perspectives on traditional methodologies of parliamentary activity, suggesting a unique intersection between technology and governance.

In the digital age, turning data into meaningful action is the cornerstone of progress. Generative AI, with its sophisticated attention mechanism, offers a new lens through which to examine the complexities of parliamentary discussions, identifying connections, trends, and implications that may elude human analysis. This does not mean replacing the human process, but rather enriching it, providing political actors with advanced tools to address contemporary challenges with a deeper understanding.

Linguistic Foundations: Bridging Parliaments and Large Language Models

At the core of both parliamentary procedure and Large Language Models (LLMs) lies a deep appreciation for the nuance and power of language, serving as the foundation for creating, disseminating, and negotiating knowledge.

The parallels between the linguistic dynamics of parliaments and those of LLMs are striking and suggest a natural synergy. Both domains achieve their goals through the meticulous refinement of language, optimizing their outputs to meet pre-defined objectives. This common linguistic underpinning presents a compelling case for the integration of LLMs into parliamentary processes. Such a union promises to enhance the clarity, precision, and accessibility of communication – a cornerstone upon which effective governance is built.

Leveraging AI can streamline legislative workflows and inspire explorations at the intersection of technology and parliamentary practices. By integrating technology and linguistics, we unlock innovative opportunities that could dramatically transform how parliaments and legislatures operate.

Ensuring Diversity, Inclusivity and Depth in AI-Augmented Parliamentary Processes

In recent years, pioneering experiments in some parliamentary settings have laid the groundwork for a more integrated approach to the use of AI tools (see this Popvox Foundation report for an updated overview of current international experiences). Real-time captioning of parliamentary proceedings, automated classification and transcription of policy documents, and the early stages of conversational document search are at the forefront of this integration. The leading parliaments include the U.S. Congress, whose House Subcommittee on Modernization issues regular flash reports on AI strategy and implementation (most recently in December 2023), the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, which has developed the Ulysses artificial intelligence suite, and the Estonian Parliament. But other parliaments have launched or plan to launch pilots in the coming months, as in the case of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, which recently adopted a report.

Parliaments are on the cusp of a transformative journey, blending deep-rooted traditions with cutting-edge AI technology. While still early days, a promising path is unfolding. As AI rapidly evolves, it’s crucial for parliaments worldwide to share best practices and develop common approaches. This collaboration is key to tackling the challenges of this significant shift.

AI’s advanced language models can revolutionize how laws are made. These models are not only adept at producing well-crafted text but also at ensuring laws reflect a broader range of societal objectives and values. Such tools could make legislation more inclusive, weaving minority perspectives into the legislative narrative. By enhancing the drafting phase, AI could lead to laws that represent a more diverse range of opinions, softening the impact of decisions made by slim majorities.

The implications of generative AI in parliamentary contexts are profound, offering numerous possibilities for its application, such as:

Predictive Analysis: AI can forecast voting outcomes based on historical data, aiding in strategic negotiation planning.
Deliberative Refinement: Through quantitative analysis of debate intensities and MP motivations, AI can foster a more inclusive deliberative process. Projects like Inclusive.AI and the latest research highlights AI’s role in enriching democratic deliberation by capturing a broad range of opinions and value preferences. In an effective parliamentary AI system, the technology should not just simplify the aggregation of viewpoints but also ensure that the depth and variation of these viewpoints are preserved.
Moderation and Persuasion: AI moderation tools can enhance the quality and inclusiveness of debates, especially in committees or remote settings. According to empirical evidence, LLMs have the potential to enhance conversational persuasiveness and provide real-time, evidence-based recommendations that can improve participants’ perception of feeling understood in conversations. This, in turn, has the potential to improve the quality of conversations and reduce political divisiveness, without altering the content of the conversation (Argyle et al., 2023).
Data Analysis and Policy Simulation: Generative AI has the capability to analyze vast amounts of data from diverse sources and formats to identify pertinent variables, causal relationships, trends, and anomalies. This capability can be utilized to simulate alternative policy scenarios and predict the potential effects of public policies, while considering various factors and uncertainties.
Participatory Democracy: AI can gauge public opinion on legislative proposals, capturing not just the majority view but the intensity of support or opposition.
Hybrid Proceedings Facilitation: With the shift towards hybrid parliamentary models, AI offers tools for virtual participation, document sharing, real-time translation, and even emotional tone recognition, enhancing session efficiency and accessibility of hybrid sittings by addressing the challenges of virtual engagement.

Integrating AI into parliamentary processes could mark a major shift towards more efficient and inclusive governance.. By leveraging AI’s capabilities, parliaments can navigate the complexities of modern governance, ensuring that legislative processes are both reflective of and responsive to a broader range of societal needs and perspectives.

AI in Parliaments: Opportunities, Risks, and the Democratic Balance

As we contemplate the integration of AI into parliamentary processes, it becomes apparent that this endeavor is both promising and fraught with complexities. The ethical and the procedural implications of these tools for parliaments can shape entirely new functions and attributes. The potential of AI to enhance efficiency and decision-making is counterbalanced by significant ethical and operational challenges. Concerns regarding privacy, data protection, and the transparency of AI-driven decisions highlight the need for rigorous scrutiny. Furthermore, the importance of maintaining accountability in the face of AI’s potential errors or biases cannot be overstated. The task of customizing AI to complement political processes, while ensuring that its decisions remain accessible and understandable to the general public, underscores the critical balance between innovation and the foundational values of democracy. A notable challenge is the risk of AI being manipulated or misused, particularly in an age characterized by advanced cyber threats. In this regard, it seems crucial that parliaments strive to ensure that the introduction of AI tools in their processes is accompanied by maintaining full control over the AI technologies deployed in order to establish sufficient levels of technological sovereignty.

Parliaments are thus confronted with a pivotal challenge: to adopt AI through the development of stringent policies, the conduct of ethical testing, and the provision of comprehensive training. The stakes are significant, as failure to effectively integrate AI could result in falling behind in the ongoing technological revolution, potentially compromising the resilience and adaptability of parliamentary ecosystems.

Embracing AI in parliaments thoughtfully yet boldly requires striking a balance between innovation and democratic integrity, safeguarding the core values of these vital institutions.

About the author

Dr Alberto Mencarelli is a parliamentary official in the Italian Chamber of Deputies. He gained his PhD in constitutional law from Sapienza University of Rome.

Tags AI, artificial intelligence, knowledge, parliaments

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Evidence on Stage? Comparing committee hearings in the UK House of Commons and German Bundestag

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date April 15, 2024

By Marc Geddes.

Parliamentary and legislative committees perform a range of roles, such as the scrutiny of legislation or accountability of government. Increasingly, committees are holding public hearings, which can be really important for MPs to gather relevant knowledge and evidence to support their work and fulfil committee tasks. In recent research, I spent time in the UK House of Commons and German Bundestag and interviewed MPs and staff to get a better understanding of whether committee hearings are important information-gathering tools. Given that these are often official and formal routes for parliaments to listen to stakeholders, these are prestigious and important and can be seen as ‘evidence on stage’.

In the House of Commons, the parliament has two committee systems. For scrutinising legislation, temporary bill committees are made up of 30 or so members, appointed by parliamentary parties, to go through proposed laws via public meetings with an optional evidence-gathering stage. For scrutinising policy and holding government to account, permanent select committees exist to shadow government departments. Made up of small groups of MPs – usually around 11 members – and elected by the party colleagues, they are often independent-minded spaces. Select committees conduct policy scrutiny through inquiries that include open calls for written evidence and public hearings with a variety of witnesses (e.g. scientists, business or trade union leaders, interest groups, etc.). Committee members deliberate in private to identify key conclusions and recommendations, to which government must respond (but is not forced to accept). Analysis has shown that around 40 percent of recommendations are accepted.

In the German parliament, permanent committees mirror government departments (plus some cross-cutting ones, such as a Petitions Committee). Committees are tasked with both examining legislation and with scrutinising policy. Committee size varies depending on the topic, but they are in general much larger than UK committees. For example, the Committee on Work and Social Affairs has 49 members. Members are appointed by parliamentary parties and take on the role of rapporteur, i.e. they are allocated specific portfolios within the committee’s wider remit. For example, in the Committee on Work and Social Affairs, one MP from each party will have responsibility for migration issues, another for pensions, etc. In general, Bundestag committee meetings are private but, especially since the 1980s, they have increasingly made use of public hearings. These can be used to invite experts to give evidence as part of scrutiny of legislative or policy proposals.

At first glance, both parliaments seem reasonably similar. But this masks considerable differences. In the UK, committees are supported by a secretariat of procedural and policy specialists, who write briefing papers for all members, suggest witnesses and analyse written evidence. Witnesses are usually identified on the basis of suggestions from members and especially the committee’s chair, in consultation with the advice from parliamentary officials (including the secretariat but also the House of Commons Library and the Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology). Bundestag committees, meanwhile, are also served by a secretariat, but their role is to offer procedural advice only. Witnesses are instead nominated by parliamentary parties, often via group leaders and rapporteurs, who’s own staff will undertake research and identify experts. The number of witnesses depends on the size of the parliamentary party. Witness lists are published, inclusive of the party that nominated them, so it is fully transparent who invited whom.

The two approaches by the House of Commons and the Bundestag push evidence-gathering in different directions. In the former case, hearings are usually organised in a non-partisan way, especially for select committees. In the latter, given the inbuilt party political considerations, the process sharpens political divisions. These differences are reinforced through other practices. Briefing packs in the House of Commons are produced by the parliamentary administration and shared with all members; these often serve as agendas and give suggestions for issues to probe. Witnesses are often given oral briefing by the inquiry manager so that the witness can adequately prepare. In the Bundestag, briefings are handled by the rapporteur within each parliamentary party, often in close collaboration with the party leadership teams. Witnesses are usually briefed by the relevant party, too, in terms of the kinds of points and questions the party wants to get across.

These dynamics mean that committee hearings in both parliaments operate differently. Questioning in the House of Commons can be very political, but it is rarely directly partisan. Indeed, many hearings – especially with experts – tend to be thematic and open-ended, which may be directed a the panel in general or at specific witnesses, and without time limits (though the chair may play an active role in directing questioning). Committee hearings in this context can allow for robust questioning of political and policy positions, and allow MPs to gather information and expert opinion on a range of issues. In the Bundestag, meanwhile, questioning dynamics are very different. MPs usually focus their questions only on witnesses that they have invited, and usually have a set amount of time to both pose a question and receive an answer (in committees I’ve observed, this was often three to five minutes). Consequently, hearings do not develop thematically or where responses can build on one another; there is no dialogue. The end result is that hearings are often used by MPs to confirm existing knowledge, legitimise pre-existing political positions, or criticise the government.

Given the often assumed centrality of committees, and the growing prevalence of hearings, understanding how these function and work on a daily basis is critically important. What does this mean for committee hearings as evidence on stage? In both settings, it is clear that expertise is used, but used differently. Borrowing from the work of Christina Boswell, it seems that committee hearings in the UK case are used more ‘instrumentally’, i.e., for their problem-solving functions, while in the German case to ‘substantiate’ and ‘legitimise’ policy positions.

What I have found so far is notably different to what we might expect. Given the UK’s wider adversarial political culture, replicated in many dynamics in the House of Commons (not least prime minister’s questions), and Germany’s consensus-seeking political system characterised by coalition governments and bargaining, we would have perhaps expected committee work to echo such cultural differences. And yet, they operate in opposing ways. We can explain this at least in part due to their parliamentary structures, whereby the German Bundestag is organised with reference to its parliamentary party groups and the UK House of Commons gives primacy to the individually elected representative.

However, there are deeper underlying issues at play. First, with respect to the parliamentary administration, for example, MPs in the UK are a lot more positive about the service provided by officials who are seen as trusted and impartial. In my interviews, German MPs were a lot more sceptical of the idea of neutrality, with many questioning whether anybody can ever be neutral. Second, MPs view their roles in the institutions differently. In the House of Commons, MPs are either part of the frontbench or backbench; and if the latter, they see themselves as independent-minded and with the freedom to focus on anything they want. In the Bundestag, MPs are allocated policy portfolios on behalf of their parliamentary parties, and so see themselves as becoming specialists and advocate for their party in respective debates and committees. This suggests a more general point of difference between the two parliaments, which have developed within different parliamentary traditions and therefore have developed different structures and organisational methods to achieve those results.

About the author

Dr Marc Geddes is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the School of Social and Political Science, University of Edinburgh, and Visiting Fellow, Institute for Parliamentary Research (IParl). His past area of research expertise focuses on parliamentary committees in the UK House of Commons. Since 2024, he has begun a new research project to compare how parliaments across Europe gather, analyse and make use of different types of knowledge to fulfil their democratic functions.

Tags Bundestag, comparative, Germany, House of Commons, legislatures, MPs, parliaments, UK

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Where MPs sit in social networks matters

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date February 23, 2024

By Grace Cooper.

Most office workers tend to do much of their day-to-day socialising with colleagues. They meet over coffee, talk in corridors on the way to meetings, or grab a drink together at the end of a long day. These shared activities can have a significant impact on people’s behaviour and preferences. MPs are no different – Parliament is their workplace, and other MPs make up most of their social network. Their social interactions shape their preferences and behaviour, just like it would any other workplace. But the details matter for understanding how influential MPs can be, given their roles within their social networks.

How Parliament’s institutions affect MPs behaviour

MPs spend the majority of their time in Westminster in meeting rooms for select committee hearings, in the chamber, in the division lobby or in All-Party Parliamentary Group meetings (APPGs). APPGs are less formal meetings where MPs and Lords meet to discuss certain topics, such as refugees, climate change or gender equality. An MP’s primary social network is formed of other MPs they socialise with through being on a select committee or an APPG together.

My previous research has shown that these parliamentary institutions shape the degree to which MPs are engaged in different topics. For example, if an MP is a member of the Home Affairs Select Committee or Refugee APPG, they are more likely to raise questions about refugees in Parliament above and beyond their committee obligations.

Perhaps it’s no surprise that MPs who end up having several meetings on specific issues tend to then promote those very issues in Parliament. What’s more interesting though is that what particular role an MP ends up playing within these networks goes on to impact their behaviour, such as the number of written questions they submit about a particular policy.

As part of my research, I looked at four types of MPs who had an important role in the network and tested to see how their relationships to other MPs affected their parliamentary behaviour.

The middleman

This is the broker, the go-between. They have a structural advantage in the network and as a result an increased engagement with representative activities, such as submitting written parliamentary questions. This MP has a structural social advantage as they are the easiest person to access information from the select committees and APPGs and therefore captures this knowledge. They bridge the gaps of disconnected or uninformed MPs in parliament and connect the social network with the knowledge that they have as a key player in the network. This type of MP was found to submit more questions than their respective colleges in the same select committees or APPGs, indicating higher engagement with the issue.

The popular one

This very important MP sits at the heart of the network. They have closer social access to other MPs in the network, highlighting connectivity and being at the centre of the flow of information. This centrality gives them easier access to the flow of information and as a result this social network influences their behaviour by being linked to a higher rate of raising questions within parliament. Some MPs worth noting are Kate Green, Tim Farron and Olivia Blake who were identified as key actors and as ‘Popular’ MPs. These MPs had the shortest pathways to other MPs in the network and therefore had a higher rate of written question submission.

The busy one

This MP is in a lot of social groups, they are in select committees and multiple APPGs meaning they know a lot of MPs. Their social network is larger than those of other MPs in their network. In the refugee policy network, Afzal Khan was the busiest MP. However, surprisingly, there was no evidence that this gave them structural advantage. The assumption that knowing more MPs and having a larger network would mean MPs knew more, had access to more information and contacts, and therefore would encourage them to be more engaged in a specific policy area turned out not to be true. Someone like Afzal Khan was no more likely than his colleagues to submit written questions about refugees. Simply knowing more MPs or being involved in more parliamentary groups doesn’t mean an MP ends up doing more.

The social climber

This MP is well connected to other well-connected MPs, demonstrating that they are part of the ‘popular’ groups in the parliamentary system. Initially it was assumed that as this type of MP came into contact with other well-connected MPs, it would give them a structural social advantage, leading to more engagement in the policy world they were socialising in. In other words, the thought was that their more connected and involved network would lead to an increase in their engagement. This has not been proven to be the case, however, no matter what the size of an MP’s network. Simply being an MP of a party with a larger representation, like the Conservative party, and therefore having a larger network than the MPs of smaller parties, does not increase their activity.

Where you sit in the social network matters

While being a member of a social network matters, it is the MP’s specific social, or structural position within this network that has the greatest impact on how they perform in their role. Simply having a bigger social network and joining more groups doesn’t seem to have a great effect on an MP’s levels of engagement compared to their colleagues. However, occupying the right kind of structural position, such as being the middleman or popular MP can end up having a noticeable impact on how an MP conducts themselves within parliament and how they advocate for particular groups.

It’s not enough for an MP to be in a select committee or APPG if they want to have an impact – MPs have to position themselves carefully within these networks. Parliamentary researchers should continue to look into social network analysis if they want to better understand how the social world of MPs affects and shapes their influence.

This post was first published on the LSE British Politics and Policy blog.

About the author

Grace Cooper is a PhD candidate in parliamentary studies at the University of York. Her research interests include social network analysis and the representation of refugees in Parliament.

Tags legislatures, MPs, parliaments

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Parliament’s Role in the Downfall of the Republic in Afghanistan (2001-2021)

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date February 23, 2024

By Narges Mohammadi.

1. Introduction

The Afghan parliament, crucial for shaping core policies, played a pivotal role in the republic’s destiny. Emerging from the Taliban’s fall in 2001, the 2004 constitution established a powerful bicameral parliament with essential monitoring mechanisms. Despite its structural advancements, the parliament faced challenges leading to the republic’s failure and the inefficiency of the political system. Corruption, inefficiency, ethnic divisions, and outdated laws plagued Afghanistan’s legislative body. Corruption prioritised personal gain over national interests, and ethnic tensions escalated disharmony. Outdated laws failed to uphold civil rights and international standards. Analysing content and interviews with experts in the study of Afghanistan’s legislation deepened the understanding of problems, revealing a parliament that failed to oversee government decisions and adhere to republican principles. The culmination of a dysfunctional parliament, marked by corruption, inefficiency, ethnic divisions, and outdated laws, significantly contributed to political instability, a dysfunctional government system, and eventually to the downfall of the Afghan Republic and the assumption of power by the Taliban on August 15, 2021.

2. Political System of Afghanistan

Afghanistan has undergone various political structures, transitioning from the Monarchy to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), the Taliban Emirate (I), and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s creation after the Bonn conference 2001. Presently, the country is under the de facto rule of the Taliban Emirate (II). The political system established after 2001 was presidential, encompassing executive, judiciary, and legislative branches with checks and balances. The president served as both head of state and commander-in-chief, supported by two vice presidents. The National Assembly (NA) or Parliament, comprising the House of Elders (Meshrano Jirga (MJ)) and the House of People (Wolesi Jirga (WJ)), served as the highest legislative body. While WJ members were directly elected, MJ included elected and appointed members. The independent judiciary consisted of the Supreme Court (SC), Primary Courts, and the Courts of Appeal (CA), with SC members appointed by the President with WJ approval.

2.1. Duties and Powers of the Parliament

The 2004 Afghan constitution gave the parliament more power than previous constitutions. The Afghan parliament’s duties represented the nation, making and ratifying laws and reviewing, controlling and supervising the performance of the executive power. In particular, WJ and MJ had the power to approve, modify or abrogate laws and executive decrees. The power and duties of WJ included endorsing social, cultural, and economic development programs, approving state budgets, making, modifying, or abrogating administrative units, and ratifying international treaties and agreements. In addition, the constitution enabled both houses to interrogate and impeach ministers on specific issues and approve or reject high-level appointees.

3. Factors Contributed to the Parliament’s Role in the Downfall of Democracy in Afghanistan

I was thrilled to present this research during the PSA Parliaments Annual Conference 2023. In this blogpost, in examining the parliament’s role in the collapse of Afghanistan’s democratic government, I explore how the Afghan parliament’s dysfunctionality contributed to the republic government’s downfall. The subsequent factors shed light on my investigation, which reveals ethnic divisions and governmental inefficiency rooted in corruption.

3.1. Corruption

Widespread corruption severely impacted the Afghan government, notably hindering the parliament’s ability to combat corruption effectively. The ministerial impeachment process, designed for accountability, became susceptible to personal biases and alliances within the parliament, undermining stability goals. This corruption permeated the monitoring institution, impeding its crucial role in ensuring good governance and emphasising the urgent need for systemic reforms in Afghanistan’s parliamentary system. Political analyst Hadi Joya highlighted corrupt practices in the Afghan Parliament, labelling it a “trading/commissioning” entity engaged in transactions and bribes, losing its genuine connection with the people and government. An Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) reported widespread corruption, legislative negligence, and budget misappropriation. Furthermore, media reports exposed the misuse of 45,900,000 Afghani funds in former Speaker Abdul Raouf Ebrahimi’s budget, prompting his commitment to return 5.3 million Afghanis to the WJ’s budget.

A police officer witness claimed that corruption among parliamentarians played a significant role in the republic’s downfall, stating, “Getting ministers’ votes of confidence from the Afghan parliament was a mistake, as ministers had to comply with MPs to secure confidence votes.” The officer criticised the Ministry of Interior (MI), pointing out the appointment of “uneducated, unprofessional, and corrupt security officials through MPs’ influence.” Instances were noted where MPs supported the Taliban in areas under their control to secure votes. Moreover, recently, the US imposed sanctions on Mir Rahman Rahmani, the former Speaker of the Afghan parliament, and his son Ajmal Rahmani, citing “massive financial corruption.” Mir Rahman allegedly bribed parliament members for the Speaker role, while Ajmal paid $1.6 million to Election Commission members for parliamentary entry. Despite corruption, a few dedicated MPs in the WJ were acknowledged for their hard work in ratifying and implementing laws prioritising people’s interests, as highlighted by former MP Nisar Ahmad Ghoryani. However, these efforts were insufficient and required additional improvement.

3.2 Ethnic Division

Ethnic divisions pervaded Afghanistan’s government, including Parliament, where democracy was rooted in ethnicity. The selection of the interim government head prioritised ethnicity over political considerations, resulting in Hamid Karzai’s appointment as a Dorani Pashtun. The ethnic basis extended to parliamentary decisions, with MPs’ votes for ministerial candidates reflecting considerations of ethnicity, language, and discrimination instead of meritocracy and experience.

The ethnic division in Afghanistan’s parliament was exacerbated by the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, which emphasised non-partisanship and discouraged the formation of trans-ethnic political parties. The absence of partisan politics in parliament allowed ethnic tendencies to dominate decision-making, leading to prolonged involvement in ethnic issues. For example, debates over the higher education law highlighted linguistic divisions, with disagreements on mentioning Pashto and Persian-Dari words. Additionally, conflicts over key positions in the parliament further underscored ethnocentrism, causing prolonged disputes and hindering effective governance. However, Ghulam Farooq Majrooh, former MP, noted exceptions to ethnic differences, citing instances where individuals from various ethnic groups, such as Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, were appointed to ministerial positions or the Supreme Court. This suggests that, amid challenges, there were efforts to address ethnic diversity and promote inclusivity in key roles, but these efforts fell short and required further enhancement. Therefore, ethnic divisions significantly weakened parliamentary performance as love and hatred were influenced by ethnic affiliations. Rather than representing national interests and promoting nation-building, ethnic divisions fueled tribal conflicts, undermining the parliament’s effectiveness in serving the Afghan people.

3.3. Inefficiency

The inefficiency of the parliament, despite its pivotal role in shaping the republican system and upholding supposed freedoms, became evident as the three powers within the system clashed, compromising democratic principles and neglecting citizens’ rights. Ineffective supervision allowed corruption and legislative weaknesses to persist, with meritocracy often sidelined, impeding parliamentary efficiency. The parliament struggled with lawlessness, lacking the capacity for supervision and prioritising ethnic-based entries over specialisation and commitment. Many MPs, entering through ethnic relations and indirect quotas, were unfamiliar with supervision, turning it into a tool for pursuing individual and group interests rather than upholding democratic values.

The parliament struggled to assert its political authority amid ongoing tension between the executive and legislative branches. As revealed in the MEC report, executive interference manifested in enforcing several laws through presidential decrees without parliamentary approval, indicating failure in ratifying laws, weaknesses, MPs absenteeism, and the influence of external elements. Despite constitutional provisions for legislative decrees during parliamentary recess, the government often avoided submitting decrees for fear of rejection. Parliamentary shutdowns became an opportunity for the executive to pass legislation likely to be rejected by parliament. These challenges and inefficiencies in law-making, where the parliament produced only five laws in 16 years, showcased obstacles within the legislative body and external branches hindering its effective performance.

3.4 Outdated Laws

The practical implementation of approved laws and the prevention of corruption and bribery could mitigate public distrust and prevent further decline in Afghanistan. However, despite the existence of parliament, specific laws needed to be updated in a timely manner. For instance, over the sixteen years of the WJ, crucial laws related to governing constitutional formations were outdated, and some civil matters remained unchanged, reflecting similarities with the 1964 constitution. This failure to adapt these laws to contemporary needs highlights missed opportunities for necessary amendments in response to evolving societal dynamics. Additionally, in a rigid gender context where males dominate, any legislative proposal, government oversight measure, and budget modifications or amendments required the endorsement of the majority of male MPs. Success was particularly contingent on gaining approval from influential and leading legislators.

4. Conclusion

This research explains how the weaknesses inherent in the democratically inclined republican system set up in 2001 led to its downfall in 2021. The republic’s failure in Afghanistan stemmed from various factors. The note focuses on the significant role played by the parliament in the re-emergence of the Taliban. Despite its pivotal function, the Afghan parliament faced challenges such as corruption, ethnic divisions, inefficiency, and outdated laws, leading to a decline in public trust in the system. The parliament’s inability to effectively supervise and ratify laws allowed unchecked governance by a select few, further destabilized democracy. The fraudulent electoral system and MPs’ lack of expertise in key areas rendered the parliament weak and hindered decision-making. This weakness contributed to the republic’s collapse. The writer acknowledges that other factors like legislative and judicial powers, political disagreements, foreign intervention, and public unfamiliarity with democratic processes also played a role.

In the future, if it becomes possible, reforms should include a stronger parliament established to revitalise Afghanistan and its institutions, accompanied by comprehensive political, social, and economic measures. Strengthening anti-corruption laws, fostering inter-ethnic relations, and prioritising citizens’ participation in decision-making are essential for Afghanistan’s progress. Additionally, cultivating political culture, education, public awareness, positive engagement with international communities, and upholding human rights are crucial elements for a positive transformation in Afghanistan’s future.

I hope such possibilities will arise in the future and hope that by establishing how things went wrong in the past, the research may eventually contribute to a better future for the people of Afghanistan.

About the author

Narges Mohammadi is a PhD Student in the School of International Relations and Diplomacy at Beijing Foreign Studies University.

Tags Afghanistan, Constitution, parliament

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Changes in UK executive-legislative relations: A Congressionalising House of Commons, 1997-2015

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date February 22, 2024

By Kento Ohara.

Literature on the changing nature of the UK constitution in recent years abounds. Although there is a widespread perception that the UK constitution has been undergoing some significant change recently, there is little consensus to date on how to conceptualise this change. In addressing this challenge and placing the UK’s recent constitutional developments in a comparative context, my project focuses on executive-legislative relations in the UK as the underlying dimension in the country’s recent constitutional evolution. This focus flows from the fact that the sovereignty of crown-in-parliament has been widely identified as the core of the UK constitution. To repeat the well-rehearsed phrase of the late English constitutional thinker Walter Bagehot, it is the ‘close union, the nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers’ that is the ‘efficient secret’ of the (English) constitution (2009, p. 11). Notable recent developments within the UK’s sovereign parliament (especially the House of Commons) and its relationship with the executive branch include: major shake-ups in the Commons’ select committee system (Fisher 2015; Russell 2011), increasing number of rebellions within parliamentary parties (Cowley & Stuart 2012; 2014) and new legislation on the prime minister’s dissolution power (Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011; Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022). The role perception of MPs and their career patterns, amid the rise of ‘career politicians’ in UK politics, have also been said to be going through some transformation, influencing attitudinal changes on part of these politicians to a certain extent (Fisher 2015; Heuwieser 2018).

How then can we conceptualise these changes in UK executive-legislative relations, and how can we measure such changes empirically? My project seeks to address these questions by turning to the classic works of Polsby (1975, ch. 4) and Wilson (1885) on Anglo-American comparison of legislatures. Drawing on these influential studies on comparative legislatures, my project proposes the concept of ‘Congressionalisation’ of the UK House of Commons. It is argued that both institutionally and behaviourally, UK executive-legislative relations are incrementally becoming more similar to those observed between the US executive and congress.

Traditionally, the UK’s executive-dominated parliamentary system has been contrasted with the US presidential system, where Congress dominates the legislative process. Whereas in the UK the parliamentary majority, controlled by the executive, is vested with extensive agenda control and legislative power in its fusion-of-power model of government, under the US’s division-of-power constitution, the executive and legislative branches retain a much more significant degree of power to constrain each other in the legislative process (not to mention the heftier role of the judicial branch) (Bagehot 2009; Lijphart 1992; Wilson 1885).[i] This arrangement has created what the US political scientist Richard E Neustadt called a system where ‘separated institutions shar[e] power’ (1960, p. 39). This Anglo-American difference has long been noted by American and British constitutional thinkers, perhaps most notably by the future American president Woodrow Wilson, who decried the American system as a ‘congressional government’ (1885).

It was Polsby who picked up on these earlier observations on the different levels of policy-making influence legislatures have in Western democracies, and conceptualised the Westminster parliament as the ideal-type of an ‘arena’ legislature, in contrast to the ‘transformative’ Congress in the US (1975, pp. 278ff). In short, an arena legislature exercises very limited policy-making powers, whereas a transformative legislature enjoys a vital role in shaping policies. Following Wilson’s and other earlier observations, Polsby attributed this difference in policy-making influence of the UK and US legislatures primarily to the strength of their committees. Whilst the UK featured ad hoc standing committees to scrutinise bills, congressional committees yielded significant and effective policy influence. Indeed, some ‘mega-seat’ committees, such as the House Rules Committee, have acted as gateways for bills thereby exercising considerable agenda control, a power that is usually reserved for government ministers in the UK.

Polsby also proposed some preliminary hypotheses as to why some legislatures enjoyed larger policy-making influence than others. According to Polsby, it was the ‘character of parliamentary parties’ (emphasis added) that was related to the extent to which a legislature was ‘arena’ or ‘transformative’: the more coalitional, decentralised and flexible the parties, the more transformative the legislature.[ii] Among these characteristics, the first dimension (the extent to which parties are coalitional) related to the electoral parties, and the third dimension (flexibility) to the legislative parties, whilst the second dimension (the extent to which parties are decentralised) concerned both electoral and legislative parties. Hence, with respect to the internal working of legislatures, Polsby’s argument on the difference between the UK parliament and the US congress can be summarised into the following three key aspects:

Committee strength: the US congress features stronger committees in terms of policy influence than the UK parliament.
Agenda control: the US congress features a more decentralised, coalitional agenda control over its business than the UK parliament.
Legislative parties: the US congress features parties that are more decentralised in terms of the distribution of legislative posts and more flexible (less party-disciplined) in terms of intra-legislative voting than the UK parliament.

My project argues that the UK parliament is indeed incrementally growing similar to this classic understanding of the US congress on these three dimensions, and seeks to corroborate the Congressionalisation argument by empirically measuring recent changes in these three aspects.

Existing studies do point to some recent developments in Westminster with regard to these three aspects. For example, studies have shown that with reforms to both public bill committees (legislative committees, formerly known as standing committees) and select committees (executive oversight committees), parliament is in a better position to scrutinise the government effectively (Levy 2009; Benton & Russell 2013). Especially in the case of select committees, these institutional innovations seem to have strengthened Parliament’s policy-making influence (Russell & Benton 2011; Lynch & Whitaker 2019). Although the UK government still retains unrivalled agenda control (a pledge made by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition to establish a House Business Committee in the House of Commons went unfulfilled), there now exists the Backbench Business Committee, which determines the topics to be debated during backbench business, giving parliamentarians more control over their own time (Matthews 2015). Distribution of legislative posts, such as select committee chairs and membership, has also become more decentralised, taking patronage away from the party whips (Fisher 2015; Russell 2011).

It is also important to note the behavioural changes on part of both MPs and the executive as well. Party cohesion in the House of Commons has waned in recent years with rebellions and government defeats becoming increasingly more common (Cowley & Stuart 2012; 2014). The preventive, as opposed to reactive, influence of Parliament has also manifested in the government’s approach to the legislative process, with the government’s Guide to making legislation explicitly advising ministers to anticipate potential dissent in Parliament (Cabinet Office 2022, pp. 159-160; see also Russell & Cowley 2016; Russell et al 2016). This is more akin to what we are used to see in the US context, where the executive branch is required to anticipate and bargain with congressional actors to achieve policy goals (e.g. Mayhew 1974, p. 107).

My project seeks to further this comparison of the British and American legislatures, especially on the flexibility dimension of legislative parties. I am devising new measures on divisions, i.e. intra-legislative voting, and on parliamentary speeches, that will allow me to trace behavioural changes of parliamentarians over time, especially in relation to Anthony King’s ‘modes’ of executive-legislative relations (1976). This will make a novel contribution to the literature on UK parliamentary reform and cross-national comparison of legislatures, as well as documenting the logic of Westminster’s evolution over recent years.

[i] Takayasu’s recent contribution highlights the changing roles of the judiciary and the House of Lords in the UK constitution as well, which he denotes as ‘Madisonianisation’(2018, in Japanese). My project focuses on the UK’s narrower executive-legislative relations.

[ii] Later studies have also confirmed that in parliamentary systems, having a coalition government is correlated with stronger parliamentary power to scrutinise the executive (Martin & Vanberg 2011; André et al 2016).

About the author

Kento Ohara is an MPhil student reading Politics (Comparative Government) at the University of Oxford. He is primarily interested in legislatures in parliamentary democracies, mainly in the UK, Germany and Japan, and how their internal procedures change over time.

Tags comparative, executive-legislative relations, House of Commons, US Congress

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Petition platforms must reach beyond the usual suspects

Post author By psaparliaments
Post date February 14, 2024

By Cristina Leston-Bandeira and Blagovesta Tacheva.

Petitions are a popular avenue for participating in politics, with a recent study finding that signing a petition is the dominant form of political engagement. Thanks to new parliamentary processes introduced in recent years, petitioning parliament has also become an effective way for the public to raise issues of concern to policymakers.

However, as illustrated in the figure below, current petitioners are overwhelmingly from already politically engaged groups, typically an older white public with high socio-economic status – the so-called “usual suspects”. Rather than expanding opportunities for democratic engagement, there is a risk that petitions to parliament are simply amplifying the voices of those who “already shout the loudest”.

Source: Research Retold

This problem is compounded by a lack of research on how people from disengaged groups perceive engagement and petitioning. In a new study, we addressed this issue by asking people from seldom-heard groups, such as those from a low socio-economic or ethnic minority background, for their perceptions about petitioning. Our aim was to identify the barriers and enablers to engagement faced by groups beyond the usual suspects.

To do so, we organised focus groups with petitioners and non-petitioners, including people from seldom-heard groups. This was supplemented by interviews with parliamentary officials and representatives from community organisations. This research allowed us to identify six core findings.

1. Deep mistrust

Unsurprisingly, our research unveiled deep mistrust of politics – as illustrated in the figure below, which shows participants’ views when asked what politics would be if it were an animal.

Source: Nifty Fox

There was a particularly acute disconnect from the political system among seldom-heard groups. Although everyone who took part in the research identified core issues they felt strongly about, they did not see these issues as being related to politics.

Participants held such negative perceptions that positive experiences with politicians did not alter these perceptions. This affected participants’ willingness to engage in politics and petitioning. As a result, they did not view politics as a route for addressing core issues affecting them. Participants felt politics was not for them, despite expressing interest in it.

Our research showed that engagement with politics or political processes, such as petitioning, needs to be communicated through issues (examples, case studies, stories) as much as possible. This is what enables a connection between politics and citizens. We also found evidence that the deep well of distrust keeps people away from opportunities such as petitions.

2. A lack of awareness

Seldom-heard groups had limited knowledge or awareness of petitioning in general, including through platforms such as change.org. Very few were aware that they can petition their parliament. Those participants aware of petitioning were usually those who reported higher levels of political engagement overall. However, even the politically engaged non-petitioners were mostly unaware of petitions to their parliament, only knowing of websites such as change.org.

3. Obstacles to engagement

Seldom-heard groups are often affected by intersecting inequalities. These inequalities can exacerbate each other, making it extremely difficult for people within these groups to engage in politics. As illustrated in the figure below, seldom-heard groups can be affected by illiteracy, language barriers, low IT literacy, a lack of IT equipment, disability, poverty and isolation. These barriers can preclude them from engaging in formal politics.

Our research also identified specific barriers to political engagement and petitioning, such as limited knowledge about politics. This was a recurring theme throughout our research, with participants lacking basic knowledge about politics and the UK political system, such as an understanding of what parliament does and how it differs from the government

.Source: Research Retold

This was combined with a lack of key campaigning skills, as well as a lack of confidence, which can make the process of petitioning feel intimidating. These findings show why parliaments need to be more proactive in the way they disseminate and explain their petition systems if they wish to reach beyond the usual suspects.

4. Community organisations as mediators

Our research also showed the importance of community organisations working with seldom-heard groups as mediators when it comes to facilitating access. Community organisations have often built long-term relationships with these communities, they have direct access to them, they have a good understanding of their circumstances and challenges, and they have gained their trust. They could therefore play a role in helping to raise awareness of petitioning among these groups and even help them to start a petition, just as they help people access other services.

However, these types of organisations would not necessarily think of facilitating engagement with petitions, as they may themselves be unaware or unconvinced of their value. This was apparent in our interviews. Facilitating further involvement from these groups would also be challenging for community organisations due to a lack of capacity and resources.

Still, interviewees suggested that a buddy system in which engagement “champions” are identified could make this role easier. Following the “train the trainer” principle, these champions could be based in community organisations and trained to have a better understanding of petitioning and their potential role in supporting service users.

5. Managing expectations and guiding participation

Managing expectations was a recurring theme in our research. This is closely linked to the way parliaments’ e-petitions systems are communicated to the public. The language used to communicate with petitioners and explain the petitions process was often seen as unclear, with many asking for more plain language to be used.

Although petitioners were happy overall with their experience, a few found the process disjointed and unclear. These concerns were well summarised by one petitioner, who highlighted that clarity around the process and the language used to describe it is key for managing petitioners’ expectations: “You’ve got to have that clarity, otherwise people’s expectations go up here and they’re just going to be massively deflated by the end of it.”

The language used across all communication channels is essential to making the process more accessible beyond the usual suspects. This should be accompanied by the development of resources aimed at wider audiences, such as infographics, audiovisual material and “Easy Read” guides.

6. Collaboration with citizen-centred services

Finally, our research showed that petitioning processes cannot be considered solely through the actions of the officials directly involved. Other citizen-centred services, such as education, communication, outreach and participation services, play a key role.

However, links between these services and the staff responsible for petitions are not always well established. Petitions to parliament are considered to be parliamentary business, but they are also led by citizens. Supporting the petitions process therefore requires closer collaboration between those services that focus on enhancing the public’s understanding of parliament.

The need to be proactive

Overall, we found people have considerable interest in political issues and petitions, including those within seldom-heard groups. However, there is also deep mistrust within these groups, often coupled with a lack of knowledge, skills and confidence to engage with participatory tools such as petitions.

To expand the reach of petitions beyond the usual suspects, parliaments need to be proactive in reaching out to a wider audience. The mere fact a participatory tool exists does not mean it will be used by everyone. Our research underlines the importance of education and clear communication for enhancing the value of participatory tools.

This post was first published on the LSE British Politics and Policy blog.

About the authors

Cristina Leston-Bandeira is a Professor of Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds.

Blagovesta Tacheva is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds.

Tags legislatures, parliaments, Participation, petitions