Month: February 2024

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PSA Parliaments at #PSA24

We are excited to present you four panels at the 74th Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association , which will be held at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow from 25-27 March 2024 (more information here).

Our first panel on Knowledge and Specialisation in Parliaments (chaired by Ruxandra Serban) is scheduled for the afternoon session on the first day, Monday 25th March.

On Tuesday, the 26th March, we are convening three more panels, so you can stay with us the entire day. Firstly, we will have presentations on the theme of Speech and Presence in Parliaments (chaired by Sean Haughey) in the morning.

We will also hold an Annual General Meeting at 11am to make a few announcements and gather input from our members. Please join us in the same room (Conference Room 1) as our panels.

After lunch, we continue with a panel on Exploring Participation and Public Engagement (chaired by Diana Stirbu).

Our final panel features work on Accountability and Scrutiny (chaired by Ruxandra Serban) from parliaments across the globe.

We would be very delighted if you could join us for these panels and engage in the discussions on the latest research in parliamentary studies.

Follow our Twitter/X account for the latest updates closer to the conference and on the days of the panels.

See you in Glasgow!

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Where MPs sit in social networks matters

By Grace Cooper.

Most office workers tend to do much of their day-to-day socialising with colleagues. They meet over coffee, talk in corridors on the way to meetings, or grab a drink together at the end of a long day. These shared activities can have a significant impact on people’s behaviour and preferences. MPs are no different – Parliament is their workplace, and other MPs make up most of their social network. Their social interactions shape their preferences and behaviour, just like it would any other workplace. But the details matter for understanding how influential MPs can be, given their roles within their social networks.

How Parliament’s institutions affect MPs behaviour

MPs spend the majority of their time in Westminster in meeting rooms for select committee hearings, in the chamber, in the division lobby or in All-Party Parliamentary Group meetings (APPGs). APPGs are less formal meetings where MPs and Lords meet to discuss certain topics, such as refugees, climate change or gender equality.  An MP’s primary social network is formed of other MPs they socialise with through being on a select committee or an APPG together.

My previous research has shown that these parliamentary institutions shape the degree to which MPs are engaged in different topics. For example, if an MP is a member of the Home Affairs Select Committee or Refugee APPG, they are more likely to raise questions about refugees in Parliament above and beyond their committee obligations.

Perhaps it’s no surprise that MPs who end up having several meetings on specific issues tend to then promote those very issues in Parliament.  What’s more interesting though is that what particular role an MP ends up playing within these networks goes on to impact their behaviour, such as the number of written questions they submit about a particular policy.

As part of my research, I looked at four types of MPs who had an important role in the network and tested to see how their relationships to other MPs affected their parliamentary behaviour.

The middleman

This is the broker, the go-between. They have a structural advantage in the network and as a result an increased engagement with representative activities, such as submitting written parliamentary questions. This MP has a structural social advantage as they are the easiest person to access information from the select committees and APPGs and therefore captures this knowledge. They bridge the gaps of disconnected or uninformed MPs in parliament and connect the social network with the knowledge that they have as a key player in the network. This type of MP was found to submit more questions than their respective colleges in the same select committees or APPGs, indicating higher engagement with the issue.

The popular one 

This very important MP sits at the heart of the network. They have closer social access to other MPs in the network, highlighting connectivity and being at the centre of the flow of information. This centrality gives them easier access to the flow of information and as a result this social network influences their behaviour by being linked to a higher rate of raising questions within parliament. Some MPs worth noting are Kate Green, Tim Farron and Olivia Blake who were identified as key actors and as ‘Popular’ MPs. These MPs had the shortest pathways to other MPs in the network and therefore had a higher rate of written question submission.

The busy one 

This MP is in a lot of social groups, they are in select committees and multiple APPGs meaning they know a lot of MPs. Their social network is larger than those of other MPs in their network. In the refugee policy network, Afzal Khan was the busiest MP. However, surprisingly, there was no evidence that this gave them structural advantage. The assumption that knowing more MPs and having a larger network would mean MPs knew more, had access to more information and contacts, and therefore would encourage them to be more engaged in a specific policy area turned out not to be true. Someone like Afzal Khan was no more likely than his colleagues to submit written questions about refugees. Simply knowing more MPs or being involved in more parliamentary groups doesn’t mean an MP ends up doing more.

The social climber 

This MP is well connected to other well-connected MPs, demonstrating that they are part of the ‘popular’ groups in the parliamentary system. Initially it was assumed that as this type of MP came into contact with other well-connected MPs, it would give them a structural social advantage, leading to more engagement in the policy world they were socialising in. In other words, the thought was that their more connected and involved network would lead to an increase in their engagement. This has not been proven to be the case, however, no matter what the size of an MP’s network. Simply being an MP of a party with a larger representation, like the Conservative party, and therefore having a larger network than the MPs of smaller parties, does not increase their activity.

Where you sit in the social network matters

While being a member of a social network matters, it is the MP’s specific social, or structural position within this network that has the greatest impact on how they perform in their role. Simply having a bigger social network and joining more groups doesn’t seem to have a great effect on an MP’s levels of engagement compared to their colleagues. However, occupying the right kind of structural position, such as being the middleman or popular MP can end up having a noticeable impact on how an MP conducts themselves within parliament and how they advocate for particular groups.

It’s not enough for an MP to be in a select committee or APPG if they want to have an impact – MPs have to position themselves carefully within these networks. Parliamentary researchers should continue to look into social network analysis if they want to better understand how the social world of MPs affects and shapes their influence.

This post was first published on the LSE British Politics and Policy blog.

About the author

Grace Cooper is a PhD candidate in parliamentary studies at the University of York. Her research interests include social network analysis and the representation of refugees in Parliament.

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Parliament’s Role in the Downfall of the Republic in Afghanistan (2001-2021)

By Narges Mohammadi.

1.      Introduction

The Afghan parliament, crucial for shaping core policies, played a pivotal role in the republic’s destiny. Emerging from the Taliban’s fall in 2001, the 2004 constitution established a powerful bicameral parliament with essential monitoring mechanisms. Despite its structural advancements, the parliament faced challenges leading to the republic’s failure and the inefficiency of the political system. Corruption, inefficiency, ethnic divisions, and outdated laws plagued Afghanistan’s legislative body. Corruption prioritised personal gain over national interests, and ethnic tensions escalated disharmony. Outdated laws failed to uphold civil rights and international standards. Analysing content and interviews with experts in the study of Afghanistan’s legislation deepened the understanding of problems, revealing a parliament that failed to oversee government decisions and adhere to republican principles. The culmination of a dysfunctional parliament, marked by corruption, inefficiency, ethnic divisions, and outdated laws, significantly contributed to political instability, a dysfunctional government system, and eventually to the downfall of the Afghan Republic and the assumption of power by the Taliban on August 15, 2021.

2.      Political System of Afghanistan

Afghanistan has undergone various political structures, transitioning from the Monarchy to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), the Taliban Emirate (I), and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s creation after the Bonn conference 2001. Presently, the country is under the de facto rule of the Taliban Emirate (II). The political system established after 2001 was presidential, encompassing executive, judiciary, and legislative branches with checks and balances. The president served as both head of state and commander-in-chief, supported by two vice presidents. The National Assembly (NA) or Parliament, comprising the House of Elders (Meshrano Jirga (MJ)) and the House of People (Wolesi Jirga (WJ)), served as the highest legislative body. While WJ members were directly elected, MJ included elected and appointed members. The independent judiciary consisted of the Supreme Court (SC), Primary Courts, and the Courts of Appeal (CA), with SC members appointed by the President with WJ approval.

2.1.  Duties and Powers of the Parliament

The 2004 Afghan constitution gave the parliament more power than previous constitutions. The Afghan parliament’s duties represented the nation, making and ratifying laws and reviewing, controlling and supervising the performance of the executive power. In particular, WJ and MJ had the power to approve, modify or abrogate laws and executive decrees. The power and duties of WJ included endorsing social, cultural, and economic development programs, approving state budgets, making, modifying, or abrogating administrative units, and ratifying international treaties and agreements. In addition, the constitution enabled both houses to interrogate and impeach ministers on specific issues and approve or reject high-level appointees.

3.     Factors Contributed to the Parliament’s Role in the Downfall of Democracy in Afghanistan

I was thrilled to present this research during the PSA Parliaments Annual Conference 2023. In this blogpost, in examining the parliament’s role in the collapse of Afghanistan’s democratic government, I explore how the Afghan parliament’s dysfunctionality contributed to the republic government’s downfall. The subsequent factors shed light on my investigation, which reveals ethnic divisions and governmental inefficiency rooted in corruption.

3.1. Corruption

Widespread corruption severely impacted the Afghan government, notably hindering the parliament’s ability to combat corruption effectively. The ministerial impeachment process, designed for accountability, became susceptible to personal biases and alliances within the parliament, undermining stability goals. This corruption permeated the monitoring institution, impeding its crucial role in ensuring good governance and emphasising the urgent need for systemic reforms in Afghanistan’s parliamentary system. Political analyst Hadi Joya highlighted corrupt practices in the Afghan Parliament, labelling it a “trading/commissioning” entity engaged in transactions and bribes, losing its genuine connection with the people and government. An Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) reported widespread corruption, legislative negligence, and budget misappropriation. Furthermore, media reports exposed the misuse of 45,900,000 Afghani funds in former Speaker Abdul Raouf Ebrahimi’s budget, prompting his commitment to return 5.3 million Afghanis to the WJ’s budget.

A police officer witness claimed that corruption among parliamentarians played a significant role in the republic’s downfall, stating, “Getting ministers’ votes of confidence from the Afghan parliament was a mistake, as ministers had to comply with MPs to secure confidence votes.” The officer criticised the Ministry of Interior (MI), pointing out the appointment of “uneducated, unprofessional, and corrupt security officials through MPs’ influence.” Instances were noted where MPs supported the Taliban in areas under their control to secure votes. Moreover, recently, the US imposed sanctions on Mir Rahman Rahmani, the former Speaker of the Afghan parliament, and his son Ajmal Rahmani, citing “massive financial corruption.” Mir Rahman allegedly bribed parliament members for the Speaker role, while Ajmal paid $1.6 million to Election Commission members for parliamentary entry. Despite corruption, a few dedicated MPs in the WJ were acknowledged for their hard work in ratifying and implementing laws prioritising people’s interests, as highlighted by former MP Nisar Ahmad Ghoryani. However, these efforts were insufficient and required additional improvement.

3.2 Ethnic Division

Ethnic divisions pervaded Afghanistan’s government, including Parliament, where democracy was rooted in ethnicity. The selection of the interim government head prioritised ethnicity over political considerations, resulting in Hamid Karzai’s appointment as a Dorani Pashtun. The ethnic basis extended to parliamentary decisions, with MPs’ votes for ministerial candidates reflecting considerations of ethnicity, language, and discrimination instead of meritocracy and experience.

The ethnic division in Afghanistan’s parliament was exacerbated by the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, which emphasised non-partisanship and discouraged the formation of trans-ethnic political parties. The absence of partisan politics in parliament allowed ethnic tendencies to dominate decision-making, leading to prolonged involvement in ethnic issues. For example, debates over the higher education law highlighted linguistic divisions, with disagreements on mentioning Pashto and Persian-Dari words. Additionally, conflicts over key positions in the parliament further underscored ethnocentrism, causing prolonged disputes and hindering effective governance. However, Ghulam Farooq Majrooh, former MP, noted exceptions to ethnic differences, citing instances where individuals from various ethnic groups, such as Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, were appointed to ministerial positions or the Supreme Court. This suggests that, amid challenges, there were efforts to address ethnic diversity and promote inclusivity in key roles, but these efforts fell short and required further enhancement. Therefore, ethnic divisions significantly weakened parliamentary performance as love and hatred were influenced by ethnic affiliations. Rather than representing national interests and promoting nation-building, ethnic divisions fueled tribal conflicts, undermining the parliament’s effectiveness in serving the Afghan people.

3.3. Inefficiency

The inefficiency of the parliament, despite its pivotal role in shaping the republican system and upholding supposed freedoms, became evident as the three powers within the system clashed, compromising democratic principles and neglecting citizens’ rights. Ineffective supervision allowed corruption and legislative weaknesses to persist, with meritocracy often sidelined, impeding parliamentary efficiency. The parliament struggled with lawlessness, lacking the capacity for supervision and prioritising ethnic-based entries over specialisation and commitment. Many MPs, entering through ethnic relations and indirect quotas, were unfamiliar with supervision, turning it into a tool for pursuing individual and group interests rather than upholding democratic values.

The parliament struggled to assert its political authority amid ongoing tension between the executive and legislative branches. As revealed in the MEC report, executive interference manifested in enforcing several laws through presidential decrees without parliamentary approval, indicating failure in ratifying laws, weaknesses, MPs absenteeism, and the influence of external elements. Despite constitutional provisions for legislative decrees during parliamentary recess, the government often avoided submitting decrees for fear of rejection. Parliamentary shutdowns became an opportunity for the executive to pass legislation likely to be rejected by parliament. These challenges and inefficiencies in law-making, where the parliament produced only five laws in 16 years, showcased obstacles within the legislative body and external branches hindering its effective performance.

3.4 Outdated Laws

The practical implementation of approved laws and the prevention of corruption and bribery could mitigate public distrust and prevent further decline in Afghanistan. However, despite the existence of parliament, specific laws needed to be updated in a timely manner. For instance, over the sixteen years of the WJ, crucial laws related to governing constitutional formations were outdated, and some civil matters remained unchanged, reflecting similarities with the 1964 constitution. This failure to adapt these laws to contemporary needs highlights missed opportunities for necessary amendments in response to evolving societal dynamics. Additionally, in a rigid gender context where males dominate, any legislative proposal, government oversight measure, and budget modifications or amendments required the endorsement of the majority of male MPs. Success was particularly contingent on gaining approval from influential and leading legislators.

4. Conclusion

This research explains how the weaknesses inherent in the democratically inclined republican system set up in 2001 led to its downfall in 2021. The republic’s failure in Afghanistan stemmed from various factors. The note focuses on the significant role played by the parliament in the re-emergence of the Taliban. Despite its pivotal function, the Afghan parliament faced challenges such as corruption, ethnic divisions, inefficiency, and outdated laws, leading to a decline in public trust in the system. The parliament’s inability to effectively supervise and ratify laws allowed unchecked governance by a select few, further destabilized democracy. The fraudulent electoral system and MPs’ lack of expertise in key areas rendered the parliament weak and hindered decision-making. This weakness contributed to the republic’s collapse. The writer acknowledges that other factors like legislative and judicial powers, political disagreements, foreign intervention, and public unfamiliarity with democratic processes also played a role.

In the future, if it becomes possible, reforms should include a stronger parliament established to revitalise Afghanistan and its institutions, accompanied by comprehensive political, social, and economic measures. Strengthening anti-corruption laws, fostering inter-ethnic relations, and prioritising citizens’ participation in decision-making are essential for Afghanistan’s progress. Additionally, cultivating political culture, education, public awareness, positive engagement with international communities, and upholding human rights are crucial elements for a positive transformation in Afghanistan’s future.

I hope such possibilities will arise in the future and hope that by establishing how things went wrong in the past, the research may eventually contribute to a better future for the people of Afghanistan.

About the author

Narges Mohammadi is a PhD Student in the School of International Relations and Diplomacy at Beijing Foreign Studies University.

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Changes in UK executive-legislative relations: A Congressionalising House of Commons, 1997-2015

By Kento Ohara.

Literature on the changing nature of the UK constitution in recent years abounds. Although there is a widespread perception that the UK constitution has been undergoing some significant change recently, there is little consensus to date on how to conceptualise this change. In addressing this challenge and placing the UK’s recent constitutional developments in a comparative context, my project focuses on executive-legislative relations in the UK as the underlying dimension in the country’s recent constitutional evolution. This focus flows from the fact that the sovereignty of crown-in-parliament has been widely identified as the core of the UK constitution. To repeat the well-rehearsed phrase of the late English constitutional thinker Walter Bagehot, it is the ‘close union, the nearly complete fusion of the executive and legislative powers’ that is the ‘efficient secret’ of the (English) constitution (2009, p. 11). Notable recent developments within the UK’s sovereign parliament (especially the House of Commons) and its relationship with the executive branch include: major shake-ups in the Commons’ select committee system (Fisher 2015; Russell 2011), increasing number of rebellions within parliamentary parties (Cowley & Stuart 2012; 2014) and new legislation on the prime minister’s dissolution power (Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011; Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Act 2022). The role perception of MPs and their career patterns, amid the rise of ‘career politicians’ in UK politics, have also been said to be going through some transformation, influencing attitudinal changes on part of these politicians to a certain extent (Fisher 2015; Heuwieser 2018).

How then can we conceptualise these changes in UK executive-legislative relations, and how can we measure such changes empirically? My project seeks to address these questions by turning to the classic works of Polsby (1975, ch. 4) and Wilson (1885) on Anglo-American comparison of legislatures. Drawing on these influential studies on comparative legislatures, my project proposes the concept of ‘Congressionalisation’ of the UK House of Commons. It is argued that both institutionally and behaviourally, UK executive-legislative relations are incrementally becoming more similar to those observed between the US executive and congress.

Traditionally, the UK’s executive-dominated parliamentary system has been contrasted with the US presidential system, where Congress dominates the legislative process. Whereas in the UK the parliamentary majority, controlled by the executive, is vested with extensive agenda control and legislative power in its fusion-of-power model of government, under the US’s division-of-power constitution, the executive and legislative branches retain a much more significant degree of power to constrain each other in the legislative process (not to mention the heftier role of the judicial branch) (Bagehot 2009; Lijphart 1992; Wilson 1885).[i] This arrangement has created what the US political scientist Richard E Neustadt called a system where ‘separated institutions shar[e] power’ (1960, p. 39). This Anglo-American difference has long been noted by American and British constitutional thinkers, perhaps most notably by the future American president Woodrow Wilson, who decried the American system as a ‘congressional government’ (1885).

It was Polsby who picked up on these earlier observations on the different levels of policy-making influence legislatures have in Western democracies, and conceptualised the Westminster parliament as the ideal-type of an ‘arena’ legislature, in contrast to the ‘transformative’ Congress in the US (1975, pp. 278ff). In short, an arena legislature exercises very limited policy-making powers, whereas a transformative legislature enjoys a vital role in shaping policies. Following Wilson’s and other earlier observations, Polsby attributed this difference in policy-making influence of the UK and US legislatures primarily to the strength of their committees. Whilst the UK featured ad hoc standing committees to scrutinise bills, congressional committees yielded significant and effective policy influence. Indeed, some ‘mega-seat’ committees, such as the House Rules Committee, have acted as gateways for bills thereby exercising considerable agenda control, a power that is usually reserved for government ministers in the UK.

Polsby also proposed some preliminary hypotheses as to why some legislatures enjoyed larger policy-making influence than others. According to Polsby, it was the ‘character of parliamentary parties’ (emphasis added) that was related to the extent to which a legislature was ‘arena’ or ‘transformative’: the more coalitional, decentralised and flexible the parties, the more transformative the legislature.[ii] Among these characteristics, the first dimension (the extent to which parties are coalitional) related to the electoral parties, and the third dimension (flexibility) to the legislative parties, whilst the second dimension (the extent to which parties are decentralised) concerned both electoral and legislative parties. Hence, with respect to the internal working of legislatures, Polsby’s argument on the difference between the UK parliament and the US congress can be summarised into the following three key aspects:

  1. Committee strength: the US congress features stronger committees in terms of policy influence than the UK parliament.
  2. Agenda control: the US congress features a more decentralised, coalitional agenda control over its business than the UK parliament.
  3. Legislative parties: the US congress features parties that are more decentralised in terms of the distribution of legislative posts and more flexible (less party-disciplined) in terms of intra-legislative voting than the UK parliament.

My project argues that the UK parliament is indeed incrementally growing similar to this classic understanding of the US congress on these three dimensions, and seeks to corroborate the Congressionalisation argument by empirically measuring recent changes in these three aspects.

Existing studies do point to some recent developments in Westminster with regard to these three aspects. For example, studies have shown that with reforms to both public bill committees (legislative committees, formerly known as standing committees) and select committees (executive oversight committees), parliament is in a better position to scrutinise the government effectively (Levy 2009; Benton & Russell 2013). Especially in the case of select committees, these institutional innovations seem to have strengthened Parliament’s policy-making influence (Russell & Benton 2011; Lynch & Whitaker 2019). Although the UK government still retains unrivalled agenda control (a pledge made by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition to establish a House Business Committee in the House of Commons went unfulfilled), there now exists the Backbench Business Committee, which determines the topics to be debated during backbench business, giving parliamentarians more control over their own time (Matthews 2015). Distribution of legislative posts, such as select committee chairs and membership, has also become more decentralised, taking patronage away from the party whips (Fisher 2015; Russell 2011).

It is also important to note the behavioural changes on part of both MPs and the executive as well. Party cohesion in the House of Commons has waned in recent years with rebellions and government defeats becoming increasingly more common (Cowley & Stuart 2012; 2014). The preventive, as opposed to reactive, influence of Parliament has also manifested in the government’s approach to the legislative process, with the government’s Guide to making legislation explicitly advising ministers to anticipate potential dissent in Parliament (Cabinet Office 2022, pp. 159-160; see also Russell & Cowley 2016; Russell et al 2016). This is more akin to what we are used to see in the US context, where the executive branch is required to anticipate and bargain with congressional actors to achieve policy goals (e.g. Mayhew 1974, p. 107).

My project seeks to further this comparison of the British and American legislatures, especially on the flexibility dimension of legislative parties. I am devising new measures on divisions, i.e. intra-legislative voting, and on parliamentary speeches, that will allow me to trace behavioural changes of parliamentarians over time, especially in relation to Anthony King’s ‘modes’ of executive-legislative relations (1976). This will make a novel contribution to the literature on UK parliamentary reform and cross-national comparison of legislatures, as well as documenting the logic of Westminster’s evolution over recent years.

[i] Takayasu’s recent contribution highlights the changing roles of the judiciary and the House of Lords in the UK constitution as well, which he denotes as ‘Madisonianisation’(2018, in Japanese). My project focuses on the UK’s narrower executive-legislative relations.

[ii] Later studies have also confirmed that in parliamentary systems, having a coalition government is correlated with stronger parliamentary power to scrutinise the executive (Martin & Vanberg 2011; André et al 2016).

About the author

Kento Ohara is an MPhil student reading Politics (Comparative Government) at the University of Oxford. He is primarily interested in legislatures in parliamentary democracies, mainly in the UK, Germany and Japan, and how their internal procedures change over time.

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Petition platforms must reach beyond the usual suspects

By Cristina Leston-Bandeira and Blagovesta Tacheva.

Petitions are a popular avenue for participating in politics, with a recent study finding that signing a petition is the dominant form of political engagement. Thanks to new parliamentary processes introduced in recent years, petitioning parliament has also become an effective way for the public to raise issues of concern to policymakers.

However, as illustrated in the figure below, current petitioners are overwhelmingly from already politically engaged groups, typically an older white public with high socio-economic status – the so-called “usual suspects”. Rather than expanding opportunities for democratic engagement, there is a risk that petitions to parliament are simply amplifying the voices of those who “already shout the loudest”.

Source: Research Retold

This problem is compounded by a lack of research on how people from disengaged groups perceive engagement and petitioning. In a new study, we addressed this issue by asking people from seldom-heard groups, such as those from a low socio-economic or ethnic minority background, for their perceptions about petitioning. Our aim was to identify the barriers and enablers to engagement faced by groups beyond the usual suspects.

To do so, we organised focus groups with petitioners and non-petitioners, including people from seldom-heard groups. This was supplemented by interviews with parliamentary officials and representatives from community organisations. This research allowed us to identify six core findings.

1. Deep mistrust

Unsurprisingly, our research unveiled deep mistrust of politics – as illustrated in the figure below, which shows participants’ views when asked what politics would be if it were an animal.

Source: Nifty Fox

There was a particularly acute disconnect from the political system among seldom-heard groups. Although everyone who took part in the research identified core issues they felt strongly about, they did not see these issues as being related to politics.

Participants held such negative perceptions that positive experiences with politicians did not alter these perceptions. This affected participants’ willingness to engage in politics and petitioning. As a result, they did not view politics as a route for addressing core issues affecting them. Participants felt politics was not for them, despite expressing interest in it.

Our research showed that engagement with politics or political processes, such as petitioning, needs to be communicated through issues (examples, case studies, stories) as much as possible. This is what enables a connection between politics and citizens. We also found evidence that the deep well of distrust keeps people away from opportunities such as petitions.

2. A lack of awareness

Seldom-heard groups had limited knowledge or awareness of petitioning in general, including through platforms such as change.org. Very few were aware that they can petition their parliament. Those participants aware of petitioning were usually those who reported higher levels of political engagement overall. However, even the politically engaged non-petitioners were mostly unaware of petitions to their parliament, only knowing of websites such as change.org.

3. Obstacles to engagement

Seldom-heard groups are often affected by intersecting inequalities. These inequalities can exacerbate each other, making it extremely difficult for people within these groups to engage in politics. As illustrated in the figure below, seldom-heard groups can be affected by illiteracy, language barriers, low IT literacy, a lack of IT equipment, disability, poverty and isolation. These barriers can preclude them from engaging in formal politics.

Our research also identified specific barriers to political engagement and petitioning, such as limited knowledge about politics. This was a recurring theme throughout our research, with participants lacking basic knowledge about politics and the UK political system, such as an understanding of what parliament does and how it differs from the government

.Source: Research Retold

This was combined with a lack of key campaigning skills, as well as a lack of confidence, which can make the process of petitioning feel intimidating. These findings show why parliaments need to be more proactive in the way they disseminate and explain their petition systems if they wish to reach beyond the usual suspects.

4. Community organisations as mediators

Our research also showed the importance of community organisations working with seldom-heard groups as mediators when it comes to facilitating access. Community organisations have often built long-term relationships with these communities, they have direct access to them, they have a good understanding of their circumstances and challenges, and they have gained their trust. They could therefore play a role in helping to raise awareness of petitioning among these groups and even help them to start a petition, just as they help people access other services.

However, these types of organisations would not necessarily think of facilitating engagement with petitions, as they may themselves be unaware or unconvinced of their value. This was apparent in our interviews. Facilitating further involvement from these groups would also be challenging for community organisations due to a lack of capacity and resources.

Still, interviewees suggested that a buddy system in which engagement “champions” are identified could make this role easier. Following the “train the trainer” principle, these champions could be based in community organisations and trained to have a better understanding of petitioning and their potential role in supporting service users.

5. Managing expectations and guiding participation

Managing expectations was a recurring theme in our research. This is closely linked to the way parliaments’ e-petitions systems are communicated to the public. The language used to communicate with petitioners and explain the petitions process was often seen as unclear, with many asking for more plain language to be used.

Although petitioners were happy overall with their experience, a few found the process disjointed and unclear. These concerns were well summarised by one petitioner, who highlighted that clarity around the process and the language used to describe it is key for managing petitioners’ expectations: “You’ve got to have that clarity, otherwise people’s expectations go up here and they’re just going to be massively deflated by the end of it.”

The language used across all communication channels is essential to making the process more accessible beyond the usual suspects. This should be accompanied by the development of resources aimed at wider audiences, such as infographics, audiovisual material and “Easy Read” guides.

6. Collaboration with citizen-centred services

Finally, our research showed that petitioning processes cannot be considered solely through the actions of the officials directly involved. Other citizen-centred services, such as education, communication, outreach and participation services, play a key role.

However, links between these services and the staff responsible for petitions are not always well established. Petitions to parliament are considered to be parliamentary business, but they are also led by citizens. Supporting the petitions process therefore requires closer collaboration between those services that focus on enhancing the public’s understanding of parliament.

The need to be proactive

Overall, we found people have considerable interest in political issues and petitions, including those within seldom-heard groups. However, there is also deep mistrust within these groups, often coupled with a lack of knowledge, skills and confidence to engage with participatory tools such as petitions.

To expand the reach of petitions beyond the usual suspects, parliaments need to be proactive in reaching out to a wider audience. The mere fact a participatory tool exists does not mean it will be used by everyone. Our research underlines the importance of education and clear communication for enhancing the value of participatory tools.

This post was first published on the LSE British Politics and Policy blog.

About the authors

Cristina Leston-Bandeira is a Professor of Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds.

Blagovesta Tacheva is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds.

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The (worst) laws of the land: The concept of legislative basket cases in Central-Eastern Europe

By Miklós Sebők and Rebeka Kiss.

Is it possible to conceptualise the quality of legislation in a multidimensional manner? If yes, how can we define the laws which are of the lowest quality? This blog examines these conceptual and methodological issues by introducing a theory of legislative basket cases and offering illustrative case studies from Central-Eastern Europe.

How can we conceptualise legislative quality in a multidimensional manner?

One way to start the conceptualisation of legislative quality is to look at some examples which are universally (regardless of party affiliation) considered to be “bad” laws. An example, which we described in more detail in Sebők, Kiss and Kovács, 2023, that highlights the potential failures of the legislative process is the famous case of the ‘Bridge to Nowhere’ in Alaska. The ‘Bridge to Nowhere’ narrative commenced in 1996 when municipal authorities in the city of Ketchikan endorsed a proposal to construct a bridge. This proposed infrastructure aimed to connect the sparsely populated Gravina Island to the Alaskan mainland. The justification for this bridge was vigorously debated, especially since a functional and inexpensive ferry service was already in place. Despite the availability of this service, the  bridge project secured initial federal backing under the ‘Transportation Equity Act of 1998’.

Eventually, the Gravina bridge became a notorious example of wasteful expenditure and dysfunctional legislation, particularly after a dramatic U-turn by Sarah Palin, who was campaigning for the governorship of Alaska at the time. Palin had initially displayed support for the project, only to pivot post-election as governor and ultimately dismissing the bridge in 2007 as an impractical solution. Extant scholarship often correlates such poor legislative practices with authoritarian and illiberal regimes. The case of the ‘Bridge to Nowhere’, however, demonstrates that ‘good’ and ‘bad’ laws are not a regime characteristic as the legislative process leading up to is passage unfolded in one of the longest-standing liberal democracies.

Conceptualising the quality of law-making and legislative basket cases

Although the problem of legislative quality has not generated a unified strand of research in political science and legal studies, various approaches to conceptualisation are available that we can build on:

Based on the literature cited, a ‘good’ law can be characterized by a clear, and publicly supported policy objective which was fleshed out in stakeholder consultations. It should be efficient, coherent, transparent, and relatively stable post-adoption. Essentially, a ‘good’ law meets high standards across four key dimensions of legislative quality: (1) public policy; (2)  formal–legal–constitutional; (3) procedural; and (4) stability.

Conversely, a legislative basket case signifies a major failure in law-making, marked by various deficiencies compromising its effectiveness and legitimacy. Such laws often miss their public policy goals, have unclear purposes, and may conflict with existing laws and constitutional principles. Their drafting often bypasses essential consultations and is rushed through the legislature without adequate justification, leading to a lack of consensus. Post-enactment, these laws are unstable, requiring frequent amendments. The absence of post-implementation evaluations and a failure to establish necessary enforcement conditions further diminish their effectiveness and enforceability. In essence, a law can be considered to be a legislative basket case if it is flawed across a wide-ranging of indicators of legislative quality.

Building on our previous research, which delves into the concept and measurement of legislative backsliding (Sebők, Kiss and Kovács, 2023), in the manuscript serving as the basis of this blog entry, we aim to identify legislative basket cases by employing a multidimensional framework for assessing legislative quality considering content, public process, legal formalities, and constitutional considerations. We examine the quality criteria listed in Table 1 for each law under consideration.

An empirical case study: The Polish Law on Forests

In our presentation at PSA Parliaments Conference 2023, we examined illustrative cases from the Czech, Hungarian, Polish, and Slovak legislation in detail. Here, we focus on the Polish Law on Forests (Act on Forests of 16 December 2016, known as “Ustawa o lasach”) and evaluate it from the perspective of our theory of legislative quality. This piece of legislation was at the centre of a significant legal controversy due to its provisions allowing land clearing and excessive cutting down of trees, which was claimed by its detractors to be in violation of European Union conservation laws. The initial goals of the law were to enhance the rights of property owners regarding tree and shrub growth, simplify regulations on felling trees, and delegate to local governments the ability to adjust greenery protection levels to their needs. The law aimed to introduce a stable solution under the oversight of the Minister for the Environment, who was expected to ensure environmental balance and prevent selective application of provisions (Radecka, 2018).

However, the law’s implementation led to a scandal involving the Minister of Climate and Environment, who approved a logging plan that sparked widespread criticism. The law’s enforceability was complicated by the fact that the area in question—Białowieża forest—is part of the Natura 2000 network and UNESCO World Heritage sites, which is subject to stringent protection standards. The European Commission consistently and formally called on Poland to avoid extensive logging in the primeval forest, which Poland’s government initially ignored and proceeded with the logging activities.

The law faced challenges regarding its constitutionality and compliance with EU law, whereby the Polish government defended its policies by asserting that national legislation mandated sustainable forest management, implying that its tree-cutting practices were environmentally friendly. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) sided with the European Commission, ruling that Poland’s policy contravened the EU’s nature conservation rules (C-432/21). Notably, this was not the first instance of Poland facing legal action over forest management. In 2018, CJEU had already ruled that Poland should halt tree-cutting in the protected Białowieża forest (C-441/17). Due to a ruling in 2023 (C-432/21), Poland was required to revise its national legislation to align its forest management plans with EU biodiversity conservation laws.

The procedural aspects of the law’s enactment were also criticised, as it was adopted hastily, without sufficient preparation, stakeholder consultation, and proper public deliberation. The parliamentary debate was conducted in a fast-track manner, raising concerns about the law’s rushed adoption and potential violation of EU directives— this was later confirmed by the judgments mentioned above. Overall, the Forest Law ticks most boxes related to poor legislative quality and, therefore, constitutes an example of a legislative basket case.

As we showed in our presentation at PSA Parliaments 2023 this case is not unique, and similar multidimensional deficiencies can be observed in relation to many other laws passed in the Central-Eastern European region. Notable such examples include the Czech taxation of church restitution (Act No. 125/2019 Coll.), the Hungarian Medical Chamber Law (Act I of 2023) or the Slovak Land Acquisition Law (Act No. 140/2014 Coll.). Avenues for future research include developing methods to measure and quantify individual quality criteria in a multilingual  research design and to assess the causes and consequences of passing legislative basket cases.

About the authors

Miklós Sebők is a Research Professor at HUN-REN Centre of Social Sciences and poltextLAB (poltextlab.com). He serves as the research director of the Hungarian Comparative Agendas Project, and as principal investigator of the V-SHIFT Momentum research project, funded by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. His research in legislative studies includes co-authored contributions such as “The Concept and Measurement of Legislative Backsliding” in Parliamentary Affairs, “Measuring legislative stability – A new approach with data from Hungary”, in European Political Science, and “Comparative European legislative research in the age of large-scale computational text analysis: A review article” in International Political Science Review.

Rebeka Kiss is a Junior Research Fellow at the HUN-REN Centre for Social Sciences and a PhD student at the Doctoral School of Public Administration Sciences of the University of Public Service, specialising in legislative studies. Her contributions to the field include co-authored works such as “The Concept and Measurement of Legislative Backsliding” in Parliamentary Affairs and “The Transparency of Constitutional Reasoning: A Text Mining Analysis of the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s Jurisprudence” published in Studia Iuridica Lublinensia. She has participated in various research projects including as the Hungarian Comparative Agendas Project, the V-SHIFT Momentum research project, and the OPTED – Observatory for Political Texts in European Democracies. 

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News

February 2024 Newsletter

Here are the latest February updates for you:

  1. Call for Papers
  2. #PSA24: Early Bird Registration Deadline Extended
  3. Spotlight on Our Members
  4. Invitation to an Exhibition on Parliaments
  5. Entries for the APSA-PSA International Partnerships Award
  6. Editorial Announcements from Parliamentary Affairs
  7. Recent Publications
  8. Recently on the Blog
  9. Overview of Parliaments Map

If you have any notices/messages you would like us to circulate to our group, please let us know.

Best wishes,

Seán, Caroline, Diana, Ruxandra, and Jack.

1. Call for Papers

Sixteenth Workshop of Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians, Wroxton College, 27-28 July 2024

Today is the last day to send a paper/panel proposal for the Sixteenth Workshop of Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians, which will be held on Saturday 27 July and Sunday 28 July 2024 at Wroxton College, Oxfordshire, UK. The Workshop serves to bring together scholars and parliamentarians – from legislatures around the globe – to discuss research findings likely to be of practical interest to members of parliaments.

Paper proposals (no more than 300 words), should be sent to Professor The Lord Norton of Louth, via e-mail and should arrive no later than Monday 5 February 2024. Decisions will normally be made within a month of receipt.

2. #PSA24: Early Bird Registration Deadline Extended

The early bird registration for the PSA Annual Conference (25–27 March 2024), taking place in Glasgow, has now been extended until 9 February. This is your chance to take advantage of discounted rates. If your paper has been accepted on one of our panels, please take this opportunity to secure your spot.

3. Spotlight on Our Members

4. Invitation to Exhibition on Parliaments

The Global Research Network on Parliaments and People would like to invite members of the SPG, PSA and IPEN to an exhibition on Parliaments on 15th February 6-8pm, hosted by Emma Crewe (SOAS) with Professor Cristina Leston-Bandeira (Leeds) reflecting on a joint research programme Ethnographies of Parliaments and People – in Brazil, Ethiopia, Fiji, India, the UK and the US).

On the evening between 6-8pm guests will be offered a tour of the exhibition of photography, film, timelines and installations, with refreshments and networking in the Brunei lower gallery, SOAS University of London. Please sign up on Eventbrite.

For those able to come a little earlier, there is also the option of a film screening 5:30-6:50pm: “Elections in Paradise”. Directed by Tumeli Tuqota and Laisiasa Dave, this film is one of four in the exhibition, showing on 15th February in the central room of the exhibition.  

5. Entries for the APSA-PSA International Partnerships Award

The APSA-PSA International Partnerships Award honours those Political Studies academics engaged in collaborative and productive cross-national partnerships that make a significant contribution to the discipline in the areas of teaching, research, or civic engagement. The deadline for applications is 14 February 2024.

The award will be judged by a joint APSA and PSA panel and the winning entry will this year be announced at the APSA’s annual meeting in Philadelphia in September 2024 and will be awarded a cash prize worth £2,000. For entry requirements and submission process, please click here.

6. Editorial Announcements from Parliamentary Affairs

The editors of Parliamentary Affairs have issues a couple of announcements regarding a) aims and scope, hopefully clarifying the type of papers the journal is looking looking for, and b) authors’ guidelines have now been updated and submissions are now accepted in any format! 

7. Recent Publications

If you would like your published research to be featured in this section, please email Caroline with details.

8. Recently on the Blog

If you have an idea for a blog on some aspect of parliamentary study, please get in touch with our new communications officer, Jack. We will be posting more blogs from those who presented at our Annual Conference last November, so watch this space!

9. Overview of Parliaments Map

We have two new contributions to our Overview of Parliaments Map.

  • Lebanon by Meray Maddah – PhD candidate at University of Konstanz
  • Peru by Milagros Campos and Ana Neyra  – Professors at Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú and former head of parliamentary research at Peruvian Congress (Campos) and former Peruvian Minister of Justice (Neyra)

For anybody who wishes to cover any of the countries not yet covered in our map, contact our communications officer Jack.

Categories
News

January 2024 Newsletter

Happy New Year to you all! We hope you’re well. Here are the latest updates for you:

  1. Call for Papers
  2. #PSA24: Early Bird Registration
  3. PSA: Nominations for Academic Prizes
  4. University of London Exhibition on Parliaments
  5. Call for Applications: ECPR Summer School of the Standing Group on Parliaments
  6. RKE Opportunities and Academic Fellowships
  7. Recent Publications
  8. Recently on the Blog
  9. Overview of Parliaments Map

If you have any notices/messages you would like us to circulate to our group, please let us know. The next newsletter will be sent on 5th of February.

Best wishes,

Seán, Caroline, Diana, Ruxandra, and Jack.

1. Call for Papers

Workshop: Legal aspects of reform to the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland

Please consider the call for papers for this joint workshop on legal aspects of reform to the devolved institutions in NI from the Liverpool Public Law Unit and the International Law and Human Rights Unit at the University of Liverpool. The workshop will take place on 10 April 2024. The deadline for submission of abstracts is 28 January. Any queries should be directed to Dr Katie Johnston (katie.johnston@liverpool.ac.uk).

The Central European University 19th Annual Doctoral Conference

The CEU Annual Doctoral Conference (Re)Searching Power: Emerging Approaches across Disciplines is taking place between 17 and 19 April, 2024. The conference provides a professional, supportive, and international environment for PhD students and early career researchers in various fields of the humanities and social sciences to discuss their works in progress, establish formal or informal networks, and initiate future collaborative research. The submission deadline is 14 January 2024. For more details, click here or email adc2024@ceu.edu

2. #PSA24: Early bird registration still open

The early bird registration for the PSA Annual Conference (25–27 March 2024 in Glasgow) is still open until 2 February. This is your chance to take advantage of discounted rates. If your paper has been accepted on one of our panels, please take this opportunity to secure your spot.

Please note that there is a further discount for scholars from the Global South and Low-income Countries. The application deadline for the PSA Support Fund to assist with conference expenses is also 2 February. 

3. PSA: Nominations for academic prizes

17 January (5pm GMT) is the last day to submit a (self-)nomination for the PSA academic prizes, which will be presented during the PSA’s Annual Conference. The PSA particularly encourages you to make a nomination for the prestigious teaching prizes. More information is available here.

4. University of London Exhibition on Parliaments, 12 January – 16 March

The Global Research Network on Parliaments and People is holding an exhibition Living Democracy: Frayed Entanglements on the relationship between politicians and people in the Brunei Gallery, SOAS. The exhibition is open Tuesday to Saturday 10:30am-5pm, from the 12th January to 16th March 2024, featuring research findings from Brazil, Ethiopia, Fiji, India, the UK and the US.

Living Democracy – Frayed Entanglements offers films, photography, installations, podcasts and timelines about riffs, rhythms and rituals in parliaments. 

5. ECPR Summer School of the Standing Group on Parliaments: Call for applications

The ECPR Standing Group on Parliaments has just opened the call for applications for their summer school. The school is for PhD students and early career scholars. It takes place 18-29 August 2024 in Frankfurt, Germany. More information on what to expect and how to apply can be found here.

6. RKE opportunities and fellowships

The UK Parliament Knowledge Exchange Unit Call for Thematic Research Leads 2024 – 2026

The KE Unit is recruiting to eight positions  for thematic research leads from a broad range of scientific and research disciplines. These part-time roles, funded by UKRI and supported by all of UKRI’s research councils, will be appointed to work with UK Parliament from September 2024 to summer 2026.

More details can be found here. The deadline to apply is 23:55, Sunday 3 March 2024.

Parliamentary Academic Fellowship Scheme (UK Parliament)

The Parliamentary Academic Fellowship Scheme (UK Parliament) runs on a rolling basis, as Parliament identifies a need for academic expertise. Open for applications are the following:

The closing date for applications is 25th February 2024 at 23:55. More details and guidance can be found here. 

7. Recent publications

If you would like your published research to be featured in this section, please email Caroline with details.

8. Recently on the blog

If you have an idea for a blog on some aspect of parliamentary study, please get in touch with our new communications officer, Jack. We will be posting more blogs from those who presented at our Annual Conference last November, so watch this space!

9. Overview of parliaments map

We have two new contributions to our Overview of Parliaments Map.

  • Muhammad Asad Ayaz, a parliamentary researcher, has written a piece on the National Assembly of Pakistan.
  • Robert Hirst, a recent MA graduate from the University of Sheffield, has looked at the UK Parliament.

For anybody who wishes to cover any of the countries not yet covered in our map, contact our communications officer Jack.